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Why Is It So Hard to Be Rational?

I met the most rational person I know during my freshman year of college. Greg (not his real name) had a tech-support job in the same computer lab where I worked, and we became friends. I planned to be a creative-writing major; Greg told me that he was deciding between physics and economics. He’d choose physics if he was smart enough, and economics if he wasn’t—he thought he’d know within a few months, based on his grades. He chose economics.

We roomed together, and often had differences of opinion. For some reason, I took a class on health policy, and I was appalled by the idea that hospital administrators should take costs into account when providing care. (Shouldn’t doctors alone decide what’s best for their patients?) I got worked up, and developed many arguments to support my view; I felt that I was right both practically and morally. Greg shook his head. He pointed out that my dad was a doctor, and explained that I was engaging in “motivated reasoning.” My gut was telling me what to think, and my brain was figuring out how to think it. This felt like thinking, but wasn’t.

The next year, a bunch of us bought stereos. The choices were complicated: channels, tweeters, woofers, preamps. Greg performed a thorough analysis before assembling a capable stereo. I bought one that, in my opinion, looked cool and possessed some ineffable, tonal je ne sais quoi. Greg’s approach struck me as unimaginative, utilitarian. Later, when he upgraded to a new sound system, I bought his old equipment and found that it was much better than what I’d chosen.

In my senior year, I began considering graduate school. One of the grad students I knew warned me off—the job prospects for English professors were dismal. Still, I made the questionable decision to embark on a Ph.D. Greg went into finance. We stayed friends, often discussing the state of the world and the meta subject of how to best ascertain it. I felt overwhelmed by how much there was to know—there were too many magazines, too many books—and so, with Greg as my Virgil, I travelled deeper into the realm of rationality. There was, it turned out, a growing rationality movement, with its own ethos, thought style, and body of knowledge, drawn heavily from psychology and economics. Like Greg, I read a collection of rationality blogs—Marginal Revolution, Farnam Street, Interfluidity, Crooked Timber. I haunted the Web sites of the Social Science Research Network and the National Bureau of Economic Research, where I could encounter just-published findings; I internalized academic papers on the cognitive biases that slant our thinking, and learned a simple formula for estimating the “expected value” of my riskier decisions. When I was looking to buy a house, Greg walked me through the trade-offs of renting and owning (just rent); when I was contemplating switching careers, he stress-tested my scenarios (I switched). As an emotional and impulsive person by nature, I found myself working hard at rationality. Even Greg admitted that it was difficult work: he had to constantly inspect his thought processes for faults, like a science-fictional computer that had just become sentient.

Often, I asked myself, How would Greg think? I adopted his habit of tracking what I knew and how well I knew it, so that I could separate my well-founded opinions from my provisional views. Bad investors, Greg told me, often had flat, loosely drawn maps of their own knowledge, but good ones were careful cartographers, distinguishing between settled, surveyed, and unexplored territories. Through all this, our lives unfolded. Around the time I left my grad program to try out journalism, Greg swooned over his girlfriend’s rational mind, married her, and became a director at a hedge fund. His net worth is now several thousand times my own.

Meanwhile, half of Americans won’t get vaccinated; many believe in conspiracy theories or pseudoscience. It’s not that we don’t think—we are constantly reading, opining, debating—but that we seem to do it on the run, while squinting at trolls in our phones. This summer, on my phone, I read a blog post by the economist Arnold Kling, who noted that an unusually large number of books about rationality were being published this year, among them Steven Pinker’s “ Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters ” (Viking) and Julia Galef’s “ The Scout Mindset: Why Some People See Things Clearly and Others Don’t ” (Portfolio). It makes sense, Kling suggested, for rationality to be having a breakout moment: “The barbarians sack the city, and the carriers of the dying culture repair to their basements to write.” In a polemical era, rationality can be a kind of opinion hygiene—a way of washing off misjudged views. In a fractious time, it promises to bring the court to order. When the world changes quickly, we need strategies for understanding it. We hope, reasonably, that rational people will be more careful, honest, truthful, fair-minded, curious, and right than irrational ones.

And yet rationality has sharp edges that make it hard to put at the center of one’s life. It’s possible to be so rational that you are cut off from warmer ways of being—like the student Bazarov, in Ivan Turgenev’s “ Fathers and Sons ,” who declares, “I look up to heaven only when I want to sneeze.” (Greg, too, sometimes worries that he is rational to excess—that he is becoming a heartless boss, a cold fish, a robot.) You might be well-intentioned, rational, and mistaken, simply because so much in our thinking can go wrong. (“ RATIONAL , adj.: Devoid of all delusions save those of observation, experience and reflection,” Ambrose Bierce wrote, in his “Devil’s Dictionary.”) You might be rational and self-deceptive, because telling yourself that you are rational can itself become a source of bias. It’s possible that you are trying to appear rational only because you want to impress people; or that you are more rational about some things (your job) than others (your kids); or that your rationality gives way to rancor as soon as your ideas are challenged. Perhaps you irrationally insist on answering difficult questions yourself when you’d be better off trusting the expert consensus. Possibly, like Mr. Spock, of “ Star Trek ,” your rational calculations fail to account for the irrationality of other people. (Surveying Spock’s predictions, Galef finds that the outcomes Spock has determined to be impossible actually happen about eighty per cent of the time, often because he assumes that other people will be as “logical” as he is.)

Not just individuals but societies can fall prey to false or compromised rationality. In a 2014 book, “ The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium ,” Martin Gurri, a C.I.A. analyst turned libertarian social thinker, argued that the unmasking of allegedly pseudo-rational institutions had become the central drama of our age: people around the world, having concluded that the bigwigs in our colleges, newsrooms, and legislatures were better at appearing rational than at being so, had embraced a nihilist populism that sees all forms of public rationality as suspect. COVID deniers and climate activists are different kinds of people, but they’re united in their frustration with the systems built by experts on our behalf—both groups picture élites shuffling PowerPoint decks in Davos while the world burns. From this perspective, the root cause of mass irrationality is the failure of rationalists. People would believe in the system if it actually made sense.

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And yet modern life would be impossible without those rational systems; we must improve them, not reject them. We have no choice but to wrestle with rationality—an ideal that, the sociologist Max Weber wrote, “contains within itself a world of contradictions.” We want to live in a more rational society, but not in a falsely rationalized one. We want to be more rational as individuals, but not to overdo it. We need to know when to think and when to stop thinking, when to doubt and when to trust. Rationality is one of humanity’s superpowers. How do we keep from misusing it?

Writing about rationality in the early twentieth century, Weber saw himself as coming to grips with a titanic force—an ascendant outlook that was rewriting our values. He talked about rationality in many different ways. We can practice the instrumental rationality of means and ends (how do I get what I want?) and the value rationality of purposes and goals (do I have good reasons for wanting what I want?). We can pursue the rationality of affect (am I cool, calm, and collected?) or develop the rationality of habit (do I live an ordered, or “rationalized,” life?). Rationality was obviously useful, but Weber worried that it was turning each individual into a “cog in the machine,” and life into an “iron cage.” Today, rationality and the words around it are still shadowed with Weberian pessimism and cursed with double meanings. You’re rationalizing the org chart: are you bringing order to chaos, or justifying the illogical?

The Weberian definitions of rationality are by no means canonical. In “ The Rationality Quotient: Toward a Test of Rational Thinking ” (M.I.T.), from 2016, the psychologists Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West, and Maggie E. Toplak call rationality “a torturous and tortured term,” in part because philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, and economists have all defined it differently. For Aristotle, rationality was what separated human beings from animals. For the authors of “The Rationality Quotient,” it’s a mental faculty, parallel to but distinct from intelligence, which involves a person’s ability to juggle many scenarios in her head at once, without letting any one monopolize her attention or bias her against the rest. It’s because some people are better jugglers than others that the world is full of “smart people doing dumb things”: college kids getting drunk the night before a big exam, or travellers booking flights with impossibly short layovers.

Galef, who hosts a podcast called “ Rationally Speaking ” and co-founded the nonprofit Center for Applied Rationality, in Berkeley, barely uses the word “rationality” in her book on the subject. Instead, she describes a “scout mindset,” which can help you “to recognize when you are wrong, to seek out your blind spots, to test your assumptions and change course.” (The “soldier mindset,” by contrast, encourages you to defend your positions at any cost.) Galef tends to see rationality as a method for acquiring more accurate views. Pinker, a cognitive and evolutionary psychologist, sees it instrumentally, as “the ability to use knowledge to attain goals.” By this definition, to be a rational person you have to know things, you have to want things, and you have to use what you know to get what you want. Intentions matter: a person isn’t rational, Pinker argues, if he solves a problem by stumbling on a strategy “that happens to work.”

Introspection is key to rationality. A rational person must practice what the neuroscientist Stephen Fleming, in “ Know Thyself: The Science of Self-Awareness ” (Basic Books), calls “metacognition,” or “the ability to think about our own thinking”—“a fragile, beautiful, and frankly bizarre feature of the human mind.” Metacognition emerges early in life, when we are still struggling to make our movements match our plans. (“Why did I do that?” my toddler asked me recently, after accidentally knocking his cup off the breakfast table.) Later, it allows a golfer to notice small differences between her first swing and her second, and then to fine-tune her third. It can also help us track our mental actions. A successful student uses metacognition to know when he needs to study more and when he’s studied enough: essentially, parts of his brain are monitoring other parts.

In everyday life, the biggest obstacle to metacognition is what psychologists call the “illusion of fluency.” As we perform increasingly familiar tasks, we monitor our performance less rigorously; this happens when we drive, or fold laundry, and also when we think thoughts we’ve thought many times before. Studying for a test by reviewing your notes, Fleming writes, is a bad idea, because it’s the mental equivalent of driving a familiar route. “Experiments have repeatedly shown that testing ourselves—forcing ourselves to practice exam questions, or writing out what we know—is more effective,” he writes. The trick is to break the illusion of fluency, and to encourage an “awareness of ignorance.”

Fleming notes that metacognition is a skill. Some people are better at it than others. Galef believes that, by “calibrating” our metacognitive minds, we can improve our performance and so become more rational. In a section of her book called “Calibration Practice,” she offers readers a collection of true-or-false statements (“Mammals and dinosaurs coexisted”; “Scurvy is caused by a deficit of Vitamin C”); your job is to weigh in on the veracity of each statement while also indicating whether you are fifty-five, sixty-five, seventy-five, eighty-five, or ninety-five per cent confident in your determination. A perfectly calibrated individual, Galef suggests, will be right seventy-five per cent of the time about the answers in which she is seventy-five per cent confident. With practice, I got fairly close to “perfect calibration”: I still answered some questions wrong, but I was right about how wrong I would be.

There are many calibration methods. In the “equivalent bet” technique, which Galef attributes to the decision-making expert Douglas Hubbard, you imagine that you’ve been offered two ways of winning ten thousand dollars: you can either bet on the truth of some statement (for instance, that self-driving cars will be on the road within a year) or reach blindly into a box full of balls in the hope of retrieving a marked ball. Suppose the box contains four balls. Would you prefer to answer the question, or reach into the box? (I’d prefer the odds of the box.) Now suppose the box contains twenty-four balls—would your preference change? By imagining boxes with different numbers of balls, you can get a sense of how much you really believe in your assertions. For Galef, the box that’s “equivalent” to her belief in the imminence of self-driving cars contains nine balls, suggesting that she has eleven-per-cent confidence in that prediction. Such techniques may reveal that our knowledge is more fine-grained than we realize; we just need to look at it more closely. Of course, we could be making out detail that isn’t there.

Knowing about what you know is Rationality 101. The advanced coursework has to do with changes in your knowledge. Most of us stay informed straightforwardly—by taking in new information. Rationalists do the same, but self-consciously, with an eye to deliberately redrawing their mental maps. The challenge is that news about distant territories drifts in from many sources; fresh facts and opinions aren’t uniformly significant. In recent decades, rationalists confronting this problem have rallied behind the work of Thomas Bayes, an eighteenth-century mathematician and minister. So-called Bayesian reasoning—a particular thinking technique, with its own distinctive jargon—has become de rigueur.

There are many ways to explain Bayesian reasoning—doctors learn it one way and statisticians another—but the basic idea is simple. When new information comes in, you don’t want it to replace old information wholesale. Instead, you want it to modify what you already know to an appropriate degree. The degree of modification depends both on your confidence in your preëxisting knowledge and on the value of the new data. Bayesian reasoners begin with what they call the “prior” probability of something being true, and then find out if they need to adjust it.

Consider the example of a patient who has tested positive for breast cancer—a textbook case used by Pinker and many other rationalists. The stipulated facts are simple. The prevalence of breast cancer in the population of women—the “base rate”—is one per cent. When breast cancer is present, the test detects it ninety per cent of the time. The test also has a false-positive rate of nine per cent: that is, nine per cent of the time it delivers a positive result when it shouldn’t. Now, suppose that a woman tests positive. What are the chances that she has cancer?

When actual doctors answer this question, Pinker reports, many say that the woman has a ninety-per-cent chance of having it. In fact, she has about a nine-per-cent chance. The doctors have the answer wrong because they are putting too much weight on the new information (the test results) and not enough on what they knew before the results came in—the fact that breast cancer is a fairly infrequent occurrence. To see this intuitively, it helps to shuffle the order of your facts, so that the new information doesn’t have pride of place. Start by imagining that we’ve tested a group of a thousand women: ten will have breast cancer, and nine will receive positive test results. Of the nine hundred and ninety women who are cancer-free, eighty-nine will receive false positives. Now you can allow yourself to focus on the one woman who has tested positive. To calculate her chances of getting a true positive, we divide the number of positive tests that actually indicate cancer (nine) by the total number of positive tests (ninety-eight). That gives us about nine per cent.

Bayesian reasoning is an approach to statistics, but you can use it to interpret all sorts of new information. In the early hours of September 26, 1983, the Soviet Union’s early-warning system detected the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles from the United States. Stanislav Petrov, a forty-four-year-old duty officer, saw the warning. He was charged with reporting it to his superiors, who probably would have launched a nuclear counterattack. But Petrov, who in all likelihood had never heard of Bayes, nevertheless employed Bayesian reasoning. He didn’t let the new information determine his reaction all on its own. He reasoned that the probability of an attack on any given night was low—comparable, perhaps, to the probability of an equipment malfunction. Simultaneously, in judging the quality of the alert, he noticed that it was in some ways unconvincing. (Only five missiles had been detected—surely a first strike would be all-out?) He decided not to report the alert, and saved the world.

Bayesian reasoning implies a few “best practices.” Start with the big picture, fixing it firmly in your mind. Be cautious as you integrate new information, and don’t jump to conclusions. Notice when new data points do and do not alter your baseline assumptions (most of the time, they won’t alter them), but keep track of how often those assumptions seem contradicted by what’s new. Beware the power of alarming news, and proceed by putting it in a broader, real-world context.

In a sense, the core principle is mise en place. Keep the cooked information over here and the raw information over there; remember that raw ingredients often reduce over heat. But the real power of the Bayesian approach isn’t procedural; it’s that it replaces the facts in our minds with probabilities. Where others might be completely convinced that G.M.O.s are bad, or that Jack is trustworthy, or that the enemy is Eurasia, a Bayesian assigns probabilities to these propositions. She doesn’t build an immovable world view; instead, by continually updating her probabilities, she inches closer to a more useful account of reality. The cooking is never done.

Applied to specific problems—Should you invest in Tesla? How bad is the Delta variant?—the techniques promoted by rationality writers are clarifying and powerful. But the rationality movement is also a social movement; rationalists today form what is sometimes called the “rationality community,” and, as evangelists, they hope to increase its size. The rationality community has its own lingua franca. If a rationalist wants to pay you a big compliment, she might tell you that you have caused her to “revise her priors”—that is, to alter some of her well-justified prior assumptions. (On her mental map, a mountain range of possibilities has gained or lost probabilistic altitude.) That same rationalist might talk about holding a view “on the margin”—a way of saying that an idea or fact will be taken into account, as a kind of tweak on a prior, the next time new information comes in. (Economists use the concept of “marginal utility” to describe how we value things in series: the first nacho is delightful, but the marginal utility of each additional nacho decreases relative to that of a buffalo wing.) She might speak about “updating” her opinions—a cheerful and forward-looking locution, borrowed from the statistical practice of “Bayesian updating,” which rationalists use to destigmatize the act of admitting a mistake. In use, this language can have a pleasingly deliberate vibe, evoking the feeling of an edifice being built. “Every so often a story comes along that causes me to update my priors,” the economist Tyler Cowen wrote, in 2019, in response to the Jeffrey Epstein case. “I am now, at the margin, more inclined to the view that what keeps many people on good behavior is simply inertia.”

In Silicon Valley, people wear T-shirts that say “Update Your Priors,” but talking like a rationalist doesn’t make you one. A person can drone on about base rates with which he’s only loosely familiar, or say that he’s revising his priors when, in fact, he has only ordinary, settled opinions. Google makes it easy to project faux omniscience. A rationalist can give others and himself the impression of having read and digested a whole academic subspecialty, as though he’d earned a Ph.D. in a week; still, he won’t know which researchers are trusted by their colleagues and which are ignored, or what was said after hours at last year’s conference. There’s a difference between reading about surgery and actually being a surgeon, and the surgeon’s priors are what we really care about. In a recent interview, Cowen—a superhuman reader whose blog, Marginal Revolution, is a daily destination for info-hungry rationalists—told Ezra Klein that the rationality movement has adopted an “extremely culturally specific way of viewing the world.” It’s the culture, more or less, of winning arguments in Web forums. Cowen suggested that to understand reality you must not just read about it but see it firsthand; he has grounded his priors in visits to about a hundred countries, once getting caught in a shoot-out between a Brazilian drug gang and the police.

Clearly, we want people in power to be rational. And yet the sense that rationalists are somehow unmoored from direct experience can make the idea of a rationalist with power unsettling. Would such a leader be adrift in a matrix of data, more concerned with tending his map of reality than with the people contained in that reality? In a sketch by the British comedy duo Mitchell and Webb, a government minister charged with ending a recession asks his analysts if they’ve considered “killing all the poor.” “I’m not saying do it—I’m just saying run it through the computer and see if it would work,” he tells them. (After they say it won’t, he proposes “blue-skying” an even more senseless alternative: “Raise V.A.T. and kill all the poor.”) This caricature echoes a widespread skepticism of rationality as a value system. When the Affordable Care Act was wending its way through Congress, conservatives worried that similar proposals would pop up on “death panels,” where committees of rational experts would suggest lowering health-care costs by killing the aged. This fear, of course, was sharpened by the fact that we really do spend too much money on health care in the last few years of life. It’s up to rationalists to do the uncomfortable work of pointing out uncomfortable truths; sometimes in doing this they seem a little too comfortable.

In our personal lives, the dynamics are different. Our friends don’t have power over us; the best they can do is nudge us in better directions. Elizabeth Bennet, the protagonist of “ Pride and Prejudice ,” is intelligent, imaginative, and thoughtful, but it’s Charlotte Lucas, her best friend, who is rational. Charlotte uses Bayesian reasoning. When their new acquaintance, Mr. Darcy, is haughty and dismissive at a party, she gently urges Lizzy to remember the big picture: Darcy is “so very fine a young man, with family, fortune, everything in his favour”; in meeting him, therefore, one’s prior should be that rich, good-looking people often preen at parties; such behavior is not, in itself, revelatory. When Charlotte marries Mr. Collins, an irritating clergyman with a secure income, Lizzy is appalled at the match—but Charlotte points out that the success of a marriage depends on many factors, including financial ones, and suggests that her own chances of happiness are “as fair as most people can boast on entering the marriage state.” (In modern times, the base rates would back her up: although almost fifty per cent of marriages end in divorce, the proportion is lower among higher-income people.) It’s partly because of Charlotte’s example that Lizzy looks more closely at Mr. Darcy, and discovers that he is flawed in predictable ways but good in unusual ones. Rom-com characters often have passionate friends who tell them to follow their hearts, but Jane Austen knew that really it’s rational friends we need.

In fact, as Charlotte shows, the manner of a kind rationalist can verge on courtliness, which hints at deeper qualities. Galef describes a typically well-mannered exchange on the now defunct Web site ChangeAView. A male blogger, having been told that one of his posts was sexist, strenuously defended himself at first. Then, in a follow-up post titled “Why It’s Plausible I’m Wrong,” he carefully summarized the best arguments made against him; eventually, he announced that he’d been convinced of the error of his ways, apologizing not just to those he’d offended but to those who had sided with him for reasons that he now believed to be mistaken. Impressed by his sincere and open-minded approach, Galef writes, she sent the blogger a private message. Reader, they got engaged.

The rationality community could make a fine setting for an Austen novel written in 2021. Still, we might ask, How much credit should rationality get for drawing Galef and her husband together? It played a role, but rationality isn’t the only way to understand the traits she perceived. I’ve long admired my friend Greg for his rationality, but I’ve since updated my views. I think it’s not rationality, as such, that makes him curious, truthful, honest, careful, perceptive, and fair, but the reverse.

In “Rationality,” “The Scout Mindset,” and other similar books, irrationality is often presented as a form of misbehavior, which might be rectified through education or socialization. This is surely right in some cases, but not in all. One spring, when I was in high school, a cardinal took to flying at our living-room window, and my mother—who was perceptive, funny, and intelligent, but not particularly rational—became convinced that it was a portent. She’d sometimes sit in an armchair, waiting for it, watchful and unnerved. Similar events—a torn dollar bill found on the ground, a flat tire on the left side of the car rather than the right—could cast shadows over her mood for days, sometimes weeks. As a voter, a parent, a worker, and a friend, she was driven by emotion. She had a stormy, poetic, and troubled personality. I don’t think she would have been helped much by a book about rationality. In a sense, such books are written for the already rational.

My father, by contrast, is a doctor and a scientist by profession and disposition. When I was a kid, he told me that Santa Claus wasn’t real long before I figured it out; we talked about physics, computers, biology, and “Star Trek,” agreeing that we were Spocks, not Kirks. My parents divorced decades ago. But recently, when my mother had to be discharged from a hospital into a rehab center, and I was nearly paralyzed with confusion about what I could or should do to shape where she’d end up, he patiently, methodically, and judiciously walked me through the scenarios on the phone, exploring each forking path, sorting the inevitabilities from the possibilities, holding it all in his head and communicating it dispassionately. All this was in keeping with his character.

I’ve spent decades trying to be rational. So why did I feel paralyzed while trying to direct my mother’s care? Greg tells me that, in his business, it’s not enough to have rational thoughts. Someone who’s used to pondering questions at leisure might struggle to learn and reason when the clock is ticking; someone who is good at reaching rational conclusions might not be willing to sign on the dotted line when the time comes. Greg’s hedge-fund colleagues describe as “commercial”—a compliment—someone who is not only rational but timely and decisive. An effective rationalist must be able to short the mortgage market today, or commit to a particular rehab center now, even though we live in a world of Bayesian probabilities. I know, rationally, that the coronavirus poses no significant risk to my small son, and yet I still hesitated before enrolling him in daycare for this fall, where he could make friends. You can know what’s right but still struggle to do it.

Following through on your own conclusions is one challenge. But a rationalist must also be “metarational,” willing to hand over the thinking keys when someone else is better informed or better trained. This, too, is harder than it sounds. Intellectually, we understand that our complex society requires the division of both practical and cognitive labor. We accept that our knowledge maps are limited not just by our smarts but by our time and interests. Still, like Gurri’s populists, rationalists may stage their own contrarian revolts, repeatedly finding that no one’s opinions but their own are defensible. In letting go, as in following through, one’s whole personality gets involved. I found it possible to be metarational with my dad not just because I respected his mind but because I knew that he was a good and cautious person who had my and my mother’s best interests at heart. I trusted that, unlike the minister in the Mitchell and Webb sketch, he would care enough to think deeply about my problem. Caring is not enough, of course. But, between the two of us, we had the right ingredients—mutual trust, mutual concern, and a shared commitment to reason and to act.

The realities of rationality are humbling. Know things; want things; use what you know to get what you want. It sounds like a simple formula. But, in truth, it maps out a series of escalating challenges. In search of facts, we must make do with probabilities. Unable to know it all for ourselves, we must rely on others who care enough to know. We must act while we are still uncertain, and we must act in time—sometimes individually, but often together. For all this to happen, rationality is necessary, but not sufficient. Thinking straight is just part of the work. ♦

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The myth of rational thinking

Why our pursuit of rationality leads to explosions of irrationality.

by Sean Illing

Are human beings uniquely irrational creatures? And if we are, what are the consequences of basing our society on the opposite assumption?

These are questions Justin E.H. Smith, a philosopher at the University of Paris, takes up in his new book, Irrationality: A History of the Dark Side of Reason . He pokes holes in the story humans in the Western world have been telling themselves for centuries: that we were once blinkered by myth and superstition, but then the ancient Greeks discovered reason and, later, the Enlightenment cemented rationality as the highest value in human life.

Smith argues that this is a flattering but false story. Humans, he says, are hardly rational, and in fact, irrationality has defined much of human life and history. And the point is not merely academic. “The desire to impose rationality, to make people or society more rational,” he writes, “mutates ... into spectacular outbursts of irrationality.”

If Smith is right, that leaves us in a precarious position. If we can’t impose order on society, what are we supposed to do? Should we not strive to incentivize rationality as much as possible? Should we rethink the role of reason in human life?

I put these and other questions to Smith in a recent interview. A lightly edited transcript of our conversation follows.

Sean Illing

It’s hard to sum up the thesis of a book like this. How would you characterize it?

Justin E.H. Smith

The thesis is that the 20th-century philosophers T.W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer were basically correct when they argued that the Enlightenment world has an innate tendency to degenerate into myth, reason into unreason. And that this tendency of reason toward unreason is exacerbated by overly ambitious efforts to suppress or eliminate unreason. I think this is true both at the level of individual reason, or “psychology,” as well as at the level of society as a whole.

Some examples of this will help clarify what you mean, but first let’s back up a little. We have this idea, which goes all the way back to Aristotle, that human beings are distinguished from other animals by their capacity for reason. Is this a misleading picture? Should we not think of humans as uniquely rational creatures?

This is the traditional view. There is a counter-tradition, however, which says that human beings are the uniquely irrational animal. On this view, animals are rational to the extent that they do not get mired in deliberation and hesitation, but always just cut right to the chase and execute those actions that are perfectly suited to the sort of creatures they are, while we human beings stand there paralyzed by doubt and worry.

I am sympathetic to this view, though it can be carried too far. Obviously, we have been able to choose the correct course of action enough of the time to survive long enough to reproduce. We are a successful species, but not exceptionally so, and as far as I can tell not in virtue of being exceptionally well-endowed with reason.

That’s certainly one way to think of rationality. By that standard, you might say that human beings are cursed with too much consciousness, that our obsession with thinking creates more problems than it solves.

You might say that. But it’s not as if we think just because we are obsessed with thinking. Presumably, we human beings, as well as our hominid and pre-hominid ancestors, thought for a very long time before we began thinking about how this is possible and how it can go wrong.

Well, let’s talk about how it can go wrong. You write: “The desire to impose rationality, to make people or society more rational, mutates ... into spectacular outbursts of irrationality.” Can you give me an example of what you mean here?

The clearest instance in the book, which I set up as a sort of foundational myth, is the Pythagorean cult in the fifth century BC, which becomes so devoted to the perfect rationality of mathematics that it has trouble dealing with the discovery of the existence of irrational numbers . And so when one of its own, Hippasus of Metapontum, starts telling people outside the group that the world can’t be explained by mathematics alone, legend has it that the leader of the group had him drowned in a fit of anger.

The 18th-century French playwright and activist Olympe de Gouges is another example. In the spirit of reason, she famously argued that whatever the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man — the civil rights document produced by the French Revolution in 1789 — said about men must also apply to women. And for that, the Jacobins cut her head off. So the response to her perfect rationality was extreme, murderous irrationality.

Something similar has followed countless revolutions since 1789, and many of these revolutions, notably the Marxist ones, have been at least nominally committed to the rational restructuring of society. I gather some Marxists are perfectly fine with seeing heads roll, and assume that it will only be the right heads that roll next time around and all present-day descendants of Olympe de Gouges will be spared. Or maybe they think it will never actually come to that.

I think it’s obvious enough why humans are irrational, but where does this mania for rationality come from? Why are we so desperate to impose order on the world and society in the first place?

I think we just got a bit carried away. In the modern period, anyway, rationality became a value first in science and technology, where it plainly had its place. Making the correct inferences and following the correct method meant more scientific breakthroughs, which meant faster and more powerful machines.

But then the idea caught on that society itself is a big machine, and that the human being is a small sub-machine within the big machine of society, and that these two kinds of machine can be perfected in the same way that we have managed to perfect the steam engine, the telegraph, and so on.

But this has always been a misguided approach to psychology and politics, based on a weak metaphor drawn from a narrow domain of human life — mechanical engineering — in which we actually do have a pretty good understanding of how things work and of how problems are fixed.

I wonder where all this leaves us. There are obviously limits to reason, and we can only do so much to curb our worst impulses. At the same time, we want a world that is more intelligent, more wise, more compassionate. But we also have to base our social and political systems on a realistic model of human nature.

I don’t really have any formulas to offer here. Caution, pragmatism, case-by-case consideration of questions of justice, all seem advisable to me. I am not a political theorist, let alone a policymaker, and I think I manage to get to the end of the book without pretending to be either of these.

In spite of everything I’ve said, I believe in some amount of redistributive justice, including taking away about 99.9 percent of the fortunes of Bezos, Zuckerberg, and others, and turning the big tech companies into public utilities. I just think this should be done with good laws and broad public support, in such a way as to make it inevitable and ultimately painless for everyone (after all, these men would still be multimillionaires after the great confiscation).

The big error of so many schemes to rationally improve the human condition has been to spread the belief that there must be some great event in order for the new order of things to take hold, that rationality must be stoked by irrationality in order to work. That’s Leninism in a nutshell. But if society is ever going to be organized rationally, getting there is going to be very boring.

I’m curious how you think about progress in a big-picture sense. Reading your book, I thought about the story people like Steven Pinker tell, which is essentially that human history is a bumpy but nonetheless steady march of reason and progress. What’s wrong with this narrative?

Some of the data are pretty compelling about overall improvements in human life. If you look at India just in the past few years, the number of people with access to plumbing has skyrocketed, and disease has correspondingly gone down significantly. This is part of the legacy of Narendra Modi, and it is likely that the new era of authoritarian capitalism, perfected by China with runners-up like Modi, Erdogan, Bolsonaro, and Trump trying to get in on the game, will likely involve some improvements in the standard of living, at least for members of favored groups.

But I’m not sure this counts as overall improvement. For one thing, it is proving to be, in the regimes I’ve cited, at the expense of someone else that the improvements are carried out. What’s more, it will all be for nothing if any of the apocalyptic scenarios of the near future, which all serious people take seriously, comes to pass.

I take Pinker’s point about how quality of life has improved, and yet I look at our civilization’s incapacity to curtail its own destruction. I look at the fact that we’ve built a civilization predicated on the destruction of our own environment, and we’re unable to change course because we’re too blinkered by short-term interests. That doesn’t feel like progress to me.

Pinker probably sincerely believes he’s got an answer to this question, but honestly, when I consider his argument about the steady improvement of things, I just want to say: Well, let’s check back in 50 years. Is the Amazon [River] still there? Have the nuclear weapons been used?

And as for the Enlightenment and the purported achievement of perpetual peace in Western Europe in the 20th century, is it not plain that these two great victories had to do, first of all, with the pillaging of the rest of the world, and, second of all, with the fact that since the end of World War II, Western Europe has been surrounded by two superpowers ready to blow up the world if anyone makes a false move? Of course Europeans have been behaving themselves!

Do you see the global resurgence of nativism and right-wing populism as a rejection of Enlightenment principles?

It’s an old dialectic. The populist right is articulating most of its opinions and aims in terms derived from the Enlightenment — distorted terms, but still the same terms. The clearest example of this is the invocation of “freedom of speech” as a bludgeon for pushing extreme-right ideology into the center of public discourse.

Is that to say that the rational and technocratic world built on Enlightenment principles will always produce these sorts of reactionary crises? And what exactly are these populist movements rejecting?

I think it’s a question of managing these tendencies so that they don’t rise to crisis level: managing them without heavy-handedly suppressing them, and at the same time without nurturing them. That’s a delicate balance, as we’ve been seeing in the past few years.

When I was a kid, I assumed it was good to allow Nazi parades in Skokie or wherever, in part because I believed this was an effective form of containment. I see now that I took for granted that these parades would never build to anything truly threatening, and I think it’s impossible to think that anymore. The parades have moved online, but with that minor difference accounted for, they are much, much larger than they were a few decades ago.

I’ll ask what might seem like a strange question: What’s the utility of irrationality in human life? How do our irrational instincts actually serve us?

I place a lot of good things under the heading “irrationality” — not just dreams but also drunkenness, stonedness, artistic creation, listening to stories by the campfire, enjoyment of music and dancing, all sorts of orgiastic revelry, mass events like concerts and sports matches, and so on. I think most people would agree that these things make life worth living. And I think it’s impossible to account for the value of these things in purely utilitarian terms.

I could make a utilitarian case for some of those things, but I know what you mean. Maybe the point here is that the choice isn’t between a rational or irrational society, but rather a question about how best to manage the tensions between these two forces.

That’s right. It’s all about managing it rather than suppressing it or, the opposite approach, letting it run loose. An analogy: Scientists who study addiction have noted the problems biochemically for some people with eating disorders are scarcely distinguishable from drug addictions. You can advise a person to quit heroin cold turkey, but what do you tell them if they’re addicted to food? Irrationality is more like food in this regard than like illicit drugs. You can’t eliminate it, but obviously if you’re bingeing, you’ve got a problem and should get some help.

If you’re right that we can’t contain our own stupidity, how should we think about the role of reason in human life?

I think the value of reason is exaggerated by some and downplayed by others. It’s also very often invoked disingenuously, as a bludgeon to assert one’s will. This is what Nietzsche understood so well about the history of rationalist philosophy, and it’s what we see vividly illustrated countless times each day by Twitter’s “reply guys,” who are always ready to jump in with a “Well, actually” to pretty much anything anyone says, and particularly if that person is a woman or someone they think they can easily upstage.

Now, what they are saying might be true and reasonable, but it’s just obvious that the reason they’re saying it has to do with self-glorification, venal ambition, and other base motives. From a certain point of view, the history of philosophy is a history of reply guys who just happen to be very good at masking the true nature of their project. I don’t necessarily think that, but that thought nevertheless comes to me whenever I hear someone exalting too fervently the importance and the power of reason.

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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• What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples

What Is Critical Thinking? | Definition & Examples

Published on May 30, 2022 by Eoghan Ryan . Revised on May 31, 2023.

Critical thinking is the ability to effectively analyze information and form a judgment .

To think critically, you must be aware of your own biases and assumptions when encountering information, and apply consistent standards when evaluating sources .

Critical thinking skills help you to:

• Identify credible sources
• Evaluate and respond to arguments
• Assess alternative viewpoints
• Test hypotheses against relevant criteria

Table of contents

Why is critical thinking important, critical thinking examples, how to think critically, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about critical thinking.

Critical thinking is important for making judgments about sources of information and forming your own arguments. It emphasizes a rational, objective, and self-aware approach that can help you to identify credible sources and strengthen your conclusions.

Critical thinking is important in all disciplines and throughout all stages of the research process . The types of evidence used in the sciences and in the humanities may differ, but critical thinking skills are relevant to both.

In academic writing , critical thinking can help you to determine whether a source:

• Is free from research bias
• Provides evidence to support its research findings
• Considers alternative viewpoints

Outside of academia, critical thinking goes hand in hand with information literacy to help you form opinions rationally and engage independently and critically with popular media.

Prevent plagiarism. Run a free check.

Critical thinking can help you to identify reliable sources of information that you can cite in your research paper . It can also guide your own research methods and inform your own arguments.

Outside of academia, critical thinking can help you to be aware of both your own and others’ biases and assumptions.

Academic examples

However, when you compare the findings of the study with other current research, you determine that the results seem improbable. You analyze the paper again, consulting the sources it cites.

You notice that the research was funded by the pharmaceutical company that created the treatment. Because of this, you view its results skeptically and determine that more independent research is necessary to confirm or refute them. Example: Poor critical thinking in an academic context You’re researching a paper on the impact wireless technology has had on developing countries that previously did not have large-scale communications infrastructure. You read an article that seems to confirm your hypothesis: the impact is mainly positive. Rather than evaluating the research methodology, you accept the findings uncritically.

Nonacademic examples

However, you decide to compare this review article with consumer reviews on a different site. You find that these reviews are not as positive. Some customers have had problems installing the alarm, and some have noted that it activates for no apparent reason.

You revisit the original review article. You notice that the words “sponsored content” appear in small print under the article title. Based on this, you conclude that the review is advertising and is therefore not an unbiased source. Example: Poor critical thinking in a nonacademic context You support a candidate in an upcoming election. You visit an online news site affiliated with their political party and read an article that criticizes their opponent. The article claims that the opponent is inexperienced in politics. You accept this without evidence, because it fits your preconceptions about the opponent.

There is no single way to think critically. How you engage with information will depend on the type of source you’re using and the information you need.

However, you can engage with sources in a systematic and critical way by asking certain questions when you encounter information. Like the CRAAP test , these questions focus on the currency , relevance , authority , accuracy , and purpose of a source of information.

When encountering information, ask:

• Who is the author? Are they an expert in their field?
• What do they say? Is their argument clear? Can you summarize it?
• When did they say this? Is the source current?
• Where is the information published? Is it an academic article? Is it peer-reviewed ?
• Why did the author publish it? What is their motivation?
• How do they make their argument? Is it backed up by evidence? Does it rely on opinion, speculation, or appeals to emotion ? Do they address alternative arguments?

Critical thinking also involves being aware of your own biases, not only those of others. When you make an argument or draw your own conclusions, you can ask similar questions about your own writing:

• Am I only considering evidence that supports my preconceptions?
• Is my argument expressed clearly and backed up with credible sources?
• Would I be convinced by this argument coming from someone else?

If you want to know more about ChatGPT, AI tools , citation , and plagiarism , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

• ChatGPT vs human editor
• ChatGPT citations
• Is ChatGPT trustworthy?
• Using ChatGPT for your studies
• What is ChatGPT?
• Chicago style
• Paraphrasing

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Critical thinking refers to the ability to evaluate information and to be aware of biases or assumptions, including your own.

Like information literacy , it involves evaluating arguments, identifying and solving problems in an objective and systematic way, and clearly communicating your ideas.

Critical thinking skills include the ability to:

You can assess information and arguments critically by asking certain questions about the source. You can use the CRAAP test , focusing on the currency , relevance , authority , accuracy , and purpose of a source of information.

Ask questions such as:

• Who is the author? Are they an expert?
• How do they make their argument? Is it backed up by evidence?

A credible source should pass the CRAAP test  and follow these guidelines:

• The information should be up to date and current.
• The author and publication should be a trusted authority on the subject you are researching.
• The sources the author cited should be easy to find, clear, and unbiased.
• For a web source, the URL and layout should signify that it is trustworthy.

Information literacy refers to a broad range of skills, including the ability to find, evaluate, and use sources of information effectively.

Being information literate means that you:

• Know how to find credible sources
• Use relevant sources to inform your research
• Understand what constitutes plagiarism
• Know how to cite your sources correctly

Confirmation bias is the tendency to search, interpret, and recall information in a way that aligns with our pre-existing values, opinions, or beliefs. It refers to the ability to recollect information best when it amplifies what we already believe. Relatedly, we tend to forget information that contradicts our opinions.

Although selective recall is a component of confirmation bias, it should not be confused with recall bias.

On the other hand, recall bias refers to the differences in the ability between study participants to recall past events when self-reporting is used. This difference in accuracy or completeness of recollection is not related to beliefs or opinions. Rather, recall bias relates to other factors, such as the length of the recall period, age, and the characteristics of the disease under investigation.

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Rational Thinking

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Analytical thinking ; Rational thinking style ; Reflective thinking

Rational thinking refers to differences across individuals in their tendency and need to process information in an effortful, analytical manner while using a rule-based system of logic.

Introduction

Rational thinking (or more formally, information processing) refers to differences across individuals in their tendency and need to process information in an effortful, analytical manner using a rule-based system of logic (Epstein et al. 1996 ; Scott and Bruce 1995 ; Stanovich and West 1998 ; Phillips et al. 2016 ). In other words, rational thinking is one’s preferred manner or style in which information from the environment is cognitively processed for sense-making. Although rational thinking deals with cognitive functioning, it is not a cognitive ability; it is a conative disposition – a natural tendency, impulse, or directed effort. Cognitive ability (a component of intelligence) refers to the capacity to...

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Blacksmith, N. (2020). Rational Thinking. In: Zeigler-Hill, V., Shackelford, T.K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24612-3_1897

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• Introduction

Types and expressions of rationalism

• Epistemological rationalism in ancient philosophies
• Epistemological rationalism in modern philosophies
• Ethical rationalism
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• Four waves of religious rationalism
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rationalism

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• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Rationalism vs. Empiricism
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• Table Of Contents

rationalism , in Western philosophy , the view that regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge . Holding that reality itself has an inherently logical structure, the rationalist asserts that a class of truths exists that the intellect can grasp directly. There are, according to the rationalists, certain rational principles—especially in logic and mathematics , and even in ethics and metaphysics —that are so fundamental that to deny them is to fall into contradiction. The rationalists’ confidence in reason and proof tends, therefore, to detract from their respect for other ways of knowing.

Rationalism has long been the rival of empiricism , the doctrine that all knowledge comes from, and must be tested by, sense experience. As against this doctrine, rationalism holds reason to be a faculty that can lay hold of truths beyond the reach of sense perception , both in certainty and generality. In stressing the existence of a “natural light,” rationalism has also been the rival of systems claiming esoteric knowledge, whether from mystical experience, revelation, or intuition , and has been opposed to various irrationalisms that tend to stress the biological, the emotional or volitional, the unconscious , or the existential at the expense of the rational.

Rationalism has somewhat different meanings in different fields, depending upon the kind of theory to which it is opposed.

In the psychology of perception , for example, rationalism is in a sense opposed to the genetic psychology of the Swiss scholar Jean Piaget (1896–1980), who, exploring the development of thought and behaviour in the infant, argued that the categories of the mind develop only through the infant’s experience in concourse with the world. Similarly, rationalism is opposed to transactionalism, a point of view in psychology according to which human perceptual skills are achievements, accomplished through actions performed in response to an active environment . On this view, the experimental claim is made that perception is conditioned by probability judgments formed on the basis of earlier actions performed in similar situations. As a corrective to these sweeping claims, the rationalist defends a nativism, which holds that certain perceptual and conceptual capacities are innate —as suggested in the case of depth perception by experiments with “the visual cliff ,” which, though platformed over with firm glass, the infant perceives as hazardous—though these native capacities may at times lie dormant until the appropriate conditions for their emergence arise.

In the comparative study of languages , a similar nativism was developed beginning in the 1950s by the linguistic theorist Noam Chomsky , who, acknowledging a debt to René Descartes (1596–1650), explicitly accepted the rationalistic doctrine of “ innate ideas .” Though the thousands of languages spoken in the world differ greatly in sounds and symbols, they sufficiently resemble each other in syntax to suggest that there is “a schema of universal grammar” determined by “innate presettings” in the human mind itself. These presettings, which have their basis in the brain, set the pattern for all experience, fix the rules for the formation of meaningful sentences, and explain why languages are readily translatable into one another. It should be added that what rationalists have held about innate ideas is not that some ideas are full-fledged at birth but only that the grasp of certain connections and self-evident principles, when it comes, is due to inborn powers of insight rather than to learning by experience.

Common to all forms of speculative rationalism is the belief that the world is a rationally ordered whole, the parts of which are linked by logical necessity and the structure of which is therefore intelligible. Thus, in metaphysics it is opposed to the view that reality is a disjointed aggregate of incoherent bits and is thus opaque to reason. In particular, it is opposed to the logical atomisms of such thinkers as David Hume (1711–76) and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), who held that facts are so disconnected that any fact might well have been different from what it is without entailing a change in any other fact. Rationalists have differed, however, with regard to the closeness and completeness with which the facts are bound together. At the lowest level, they have all believed that the law of contradiction “A and not-A cannot coexist” holds for the real world, which means that every truth is consistent with every other; at the highest level, they have held that all facts go beyond consistency to a positive coherence; i.e., they are so bound up with each other that none could be different without all being different.

In the field where its claims are clearest—in epistemology , or theory of knowledge—rationalism holds that at least some human knowledge is gained through a priori (prior to experience), or rational, insight as distinct from sense experience, which too often provides a confused and merely tentative approach. In the debate between empiricism and rationalism, empiricists hold the simpler and more sweeping position, the Humean claim that all knowledge of fact stems from perception. Rationalists, on the contrary, urge that some, though not all, knowledge arises through direct apprehension by the intellect. What the intellectual faculty apprehends is objects that transcend sense experience— universals and their relations. A universal is an abstraction , a characteristic that may reappear in various instances: the number three, for example, or the triangularity that all triangles have in common. Though these cannot be seen, heard, or felt, rationalists point out that humans can plainly think about them and about their relations. This kind of knowledge, which includes the whole of logic and mathematics as well as fragmentary insights in many other fields, is, in the rationalist view, the most important and certain knowledge that the mind can achieve. Such a priori knowledge is both necessary (i.e., it cannot be conceived as otherwise) and universal, in the sense that it admits of no exceptions. In the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), epistemological rationalism finds expression in the claim that the mind imposes its own inherent categories or forms upon incipient experience ( see below Epistemological rationalism in modern philosophies ).

In ethics , rationalism holds the position that reason, rather than feeling, custom, or authority, is the ultimate court of appeal in judging good and bad, right and wrong . Among major thinkers, the most notable representative of rational ethics is Kant, who held that the way to judge an act is to check its self-consistency as apprehended by the intellect: to note, first, what it is essentially, or in principle—a lie, for example, or a theft—and then to ask if one can consistently will that the principle be made universal. Is theft, then, right? The answer must be “No,” because, if theft were generally approved, people’s property would not be their own as opposed to anyone else’s, and theft would then become meaningless; the notion, if universalized, would thus destroy itself, as reason by itself is sufficient to show.

In religion , rationalism commonly means that all human knowledge comes through the use of natural faculties, without the aid of supernatural revelation . “Reason” is here used in a broader sense, referring to human cognitive powers generally, as opposed to supernatural grace or faith —though it is also in sharp contrast to so-called existential approaches to truth. Reason, for the rationalist, thus stands opposed to many of the religions of the world, including Christianity , which have held that the divine has revealed itself through inspired persons or writings and which have required, at times, that its claims be accepted as infallible, even when they do not accord with natural knowledge. Religious rationalists hold, on the other hand, that if the clear insights of human reason must be set aside in favour of alleged revelation, then human thought is everywhere rendered suspect—even in the reasonings of the theologians themselves. There cannot be two ultimately different ways of warranting truth, they assert; hence rationalism urges that reason, with its standard of consistency, must be the final court of appeal. Religious rationalism can reflect either a traditional piety, when endeavouring to display the alleged sweet reasonableness of religion, or an antiauthoritarian temper, when aiming to supplant religion with the “goddess of reason.”

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10 The Assessment of Rational Thought

• Published: December 2010
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The data presented in this book indicate that the rankings of individuals on assessments of rational thinking would be different from rankings on intelligence. At present, of course, there is no IQ-type test for rationality—that is, a test of one's RQ (rationality quotient). This chapter argues that it is time to start talking about such a thing. Assessing rationality more explicitly is what is needed to draw more attention toward rational thinking skills and to highlight the limitations of what intelligence tests assess. It defends the proposition that there is nothing conceptually or theoretically preventing us from developing such an assessment device. The chapter lays out a framework for the assessment of rational thought complete with examples.

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Developing as Rational Persons: Viewing Our Development in Stages

Stage Six We Reach the Sixth Stage When We Intuitively Think Critically at a  Habitually High Level Across all the Significant Domains of Our Lives

The sixth stage of development, the Master Thinker Stage, is best described in the third person, since it is not clear that any humans living in this age of irrationality qualify as "master" thinkers. It may be that the degree of deep social conditioning that all of us experience renders it unlikely that any of us living today are "master" thinkers. Nevertheless, the concept is a useful one, for it sets out what we are striving for and is, in principle, a stage that some humans might reach.

To some extent, the emergence of "master" thinkers may require the emergence of a "critical" society, a society that so values critical thinking that it systematically rewards those who develop it, a society in which parenting, schooling, social groups, and the mass media cultivate and honor it. When persons must develop their rationality in the face of large-scale irrationality in virtually every domain of their lives, it is much less plausible that any one will achieve the highest possible stage of development.

With these qualifications in the background, we will characterize the master thinker in three ways. The first in terms of "defining feature," "principal challenge," knowledge of thinking," "skill in thinking," and "intellectual traits." The second in terms of most significant "qualities" of mind. The third in terms of inner logic.

Defining Feature : Master thinkers not only have a successful plan for taking charge of their thinking, but are also continually monitoring, revising, and re-thinking strategies for effective thinking. The basic skills of critical thinking have been deeply internalized so that critical thinking is highly intuitive at this level. Through extensive experience and practice in engaging in self-assessment, master thinkers are not only actively analyzing their thinking in all the significant domains of their lives, but are also continually developing new insights into problems at deeper levels of thought. Master thinkers are deeply committed to fair-minded thinking, and have a high level of control over their egocentric nature.

Principal Challenge : To make the highest levels of critical thinking intuitive in every domain of one’s life. To model highly effective critical thinking in an interdisciplinary and practical way.

Knowledge of Thinking : Master thinkers are not only actively and successfully engaged in systematically monitoring the role in their thinking of concepts, assumptions, inferences, implications, points of view, etc., but are also regularly improving that practice. Master thinkers have not only a high degree of knowledge of thinking, but a high degree of practical insight as well. Master thinkers intuitively assess their thinking for clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, logicalness, etc. Master thinkers have deep insights into the systematic internalization of critical thinking into their habits. Master thinkers deeply understand the role that egocentric and sociocentric thinking plays in the lives of human beings, as well as the complex relationship between thoughts, emotions, drives and behavior.

Skill in Thinking : Master thinkers regularly, effectively, and insightfully critique their own plan for systematic practice, and improve it thereby. Master thinkers consistently monitor their own thoughts. They effectively and insightfully articulate the strengths and weaknesses inherent in their thinking. Their knowledge of the qualities of their thinking is outstanding. Although, as humans they know they will always be fallible (because they must always battle their egocentrism, to some extent), they consistently perform effectively in every domain of their lives.

Intellectual Traits : Naturally inherent in master thinkers are all the essential intellectual characteristics, deeply integrated. Master thinkers have a high degree of intellectual humility, intellectual integrity, intellectual perseverance, intellectual courage, intellectual empathy, intellectual autonomy, intellectual responsibility and fair-mindedness. Egocentric and sociocentric thought is quite uncommon in the master thinker, especially with respect to matters of importance. There is a high degree of integration of basic values, beliefs, desires, emotions, and actions.

The Qualities of Mind of a "Master" Thinker

The most significant qualities of mind of a master thinker are as follows. Master thinkers are 1) conscious of the "workings" of their minds, 2) highly integrated, 3) powerful, 4) logical, 5) far-sighted, 6) deep, 7) self-correcting, and 8) emancipated. Let us spell out each in more detail now:

• Master thinkers are conscious of the workings of their minds. -  aware of their own patterns of thought and action -  deliberate in the intellectual moves they make -  give explicit assent to their inner logic

• Master thinkers minds are highly integrated. -  transfer knowledge between different categories of experience -  use insight into foundational concepts and principles to organize large   bodies of information.

• Master thinkers minds are powerful. -  able to generalize knowledge -  in command of the logic of language -  function well with the logic of concepts and questions -  able to reason multi-logically -  using the mind so as to "multiply" comprehension and insight

• Master thinkers minds are logical. -  routinely analyze the logic of things -  committed to comprehensive principles of reason and evidence -  a keen sense of the need for deep consistency

• Master thinkers minds are far-sighted. -  take the long view -  plan their own development -  focus on ultimate values

• Master thinkers think deeply. -  have insight into their own foundational beliefs and values -  grasp the roots of their own thought & emotion -  make sure beliefs are rationally grounded -  consider the deep motives that guide thought, feeling, and action

• Master thinkers minds are self-correcting. -  apply intellectual criteria to their own thoughts, feelings, and behavior -  recognize and critique their own egocentrism & sociocentrism -  sensitive to their own contradictions

• Master thinkers minds are free. -  are energized by rational passions -  have a passion for clarity, accuracy, and other intellectual standards and   for getting at root causes -  are able to make fundamental changes in own life patterns, habits, and    behavior

The Inner Logic of a Master Thinker

Since master thinkers achieve a high level of success in bringing their thoughts, emotions, and actions in line with their espoused ideals, it follows that they would function with a high level of fulfillment and sense of well being. Having formed their identities in terms of reasonability, not in terms of any particular belief or belief system, they are able to shift beliefs without trauma or self-doubt. Seeing through the strategies used by those who would intimidate them by status and external authority, they are able to quietly dissent where others shy away in fear. Being keenly aware of the brevity of human life, they are able to prize and savor ordinary pleasures of daily life. Being committed to growth and deep honesty, they are able to form intimate relationships without mutual self-deception, hidden agendas, or bad faith discontent. Being aware of their place in a much larger world, they act with a realistic sense of what one person can and cannot achieve. They can plan without being possessed by their plans, believe without being trapped in those beliefs, and act without being blind to mistakes implicit in those acts.

The Ideal Thinker

Whether there are or shall ever be master thinkers, and however successful they may come to be, they can never be "ideal" thinkers, for it is not possible for the human mind to function in an "ideal" way. All actual human development is in the context of an innate tendency toward imperfection. However much we develop our potential for rationality, our native egocentricity and conditioned sociocentricity will sometimes become activated. However much we develop our integrity, some contradictions and inconsistencies will escape our notice. However much we develop our insights, there will be other insights we will not develop.

However many points of view we internalize, there will be others that we have no time to enter, master, or profit from. However rich our experience, there will be experiences we shall never have the benefit of. Our minds, however well developed, will always be the minds of finite, fallible, potentially egocentric, potentially sociocentric, potentially prejudiced, potentially irrational creatures. Master thinkers would, as such, be keenly aware of these limitations in themselves and therefore of how far they were from becoming the "ideal" thinker. They would therefore never cease to appreciate the need to grow and learn, never cease to make mistakes but never cease to learn from those mistakes, never cease to discover dimensions of their minds in need of critique and re-thinking and never cease to develop those critiques and perform that re-thinking.

{Elder, L. with Paul, R. (1996). At website  www.criticalthinking.org }

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How emotions affect logical reasoning: evidence from experiments with mood-manipulated participants, spider phobics, and people with exam anxiety

Recent experimental studies show that emotions can have a significant effect on the way we think, decide, and solve problems. This paper presents a series of four experiments on how emotions affect logical reasoning. In two experiments different groups of participants first had to pass a manipulated intelligence test. Their emotional state was altered by giving them feedback, that they performed excellent, poor or on average. Then they completed a set of logical inference problems (with if p, then q statements) either in a Wason selection task paradigm or problems from the logical propositional calculus. Problem content also had either a positive, negative or neutral emotional value. Results showed a clear effect of emotions on reasoning performance. Participants in negative mood performed worse than participants in positive mood, but both groups were outperformed by the neutral mood reasoners. Problem content also had an effect on reasoning performance. In a second set of experiments, participants with exam or spider phobia solved logical problems with contents that were related to their anxiety disorder (spiders or exams). Spider phobic participants' performance was lowered by the spider-content, while exam anxious participants were not affected by the exam-related problem content. Overall, unlike some previous studies, no evidence was found that performance is improved when emotion and content are congruent. These results have consequences for cognitive reasoning research and also for cognitively oriented psychotherapy and the treatment of disorders like depression and anxiety.

Introduction

In the field of experimental psychology, for a long time the predominant approach was a “divide and conquer” account in which cognition and emotion have been studied in strict isolation (e.g., Ekman and Davidson, 1994 ; Wilson and Keil, 2001 ; Holyoak and Morrison, 2005 ). Yet, in the last decade many researchers have realized that this is a quite artificial distinction and have regarded both systems as distinct but interacting (Dalgleish and Power, 1999 ; Martin and Clore, 2001 ). This new line of research resulted in many interesting findings and showed that emotions can have an influence on how we think and how successful we are at solving cognitive tasks (e.g., Schwarz and Clore, 1983 ; Bless et al., 1996 ; Schwarz and Skurnik, 2003 ). Such findings are not only relevant for basic cognitive research, such as reasoning (e.g., Blanchette, 2014 ), but may also have implications for cognitively oriented psychotherapy and the treatment of disorders like depression and anxiety.

In the present paper we explore the effect of emotion on a cognitive task that is often considered to be a test of rational thinking par excellence: logical reasoning. We start with a brief description of the logical problems that were used in our study. Then we summarize what is currently known about the connection between logical reasoning and emotional states. In the main part of the paper, we describe our hypotheses concerning the connection between logical reasoning and emotional states and then report a series of four experiments, two with a mood induction and two with participants who have a fear of either exams or spiders. In the final section we discuss the connection between logical reasoning and emotions and draw some general conclusions.

Logical reasoning problems

Logical reasoning goes back to the antique Greek philosopher Aristotle and is today considered to be essential for the success of people in school and daily life and all kinds of scientific discoveries (Johnson-Laird, 2006 ). In the psychological lab it is often investigated by means of conditional reasoning tasks. Such tasks are composed of a first premise, a second premise and a conclusion. The first premise consists of an “if p, then q” statement that posits q to be true if p is true. The second premise refers to the truth of the antecedent (“if” part) or the consequent (“then” part). The participants‘ task is to decide whether the conclusion follows logically from the two given premises. In this regard, two inferences are valid and two are invalid (given they are interpreted as implications and not as biconditionals, i.e., as “if and only if”). The two valid inferences are modus ponens (MP; “if p, then q, and p is true, then q is true”) and modus tollens (MT; “if p, then q, and q is false, then p is false”), whereas the two invalid inferences are affirmation of consequent (AC; “if p, then q, and q is true, then p is true”) and denial of antecedent (DA; “if p, then q, and p is false, then q is false”). This type of reasoning task was used for Experiments 2–4 while a Wason selection task (Wason, 1966 ) was used for Experiment 1. The classical Wason selection task (WST) consists of a conditional rule (e.g., “If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side.”) accompanied by four cards marked with a letter or number, visible only from one side (e.g., A, D, 2, 3). Thus, one side of the card presents the truth or falsity of the antecedent (e.g., A, D) and the other side the truth or falsity of the consequence (e.g., 2, 3). This task requires turning over only those cards which are needed in order to check the validity of the rule. The logically correct response is to turn over the A-card (to check whether the other side is marked with an even number, MP) and the 3-card (because this is not an even number and therefore no vowel should be on the other side, MT). For reasons of brevity, the reader is referred to Johnson-Laird ( 2006 ) and Knauff ( 2007 ) for a detailed overview of the different types of reasoning problems used in the present paper. We used these tasks in the present work since sentential conditional tasks and the Wason selection task are the best understood problems of logical reasoning research (overview in Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002 ).

Previous studies and main hypotheses

Several studies on logical reasoning found that participants' performance is modulated by their emotional state. In several experiments, participants underwent a mood induction or were recruited based on their pre-existing emotional state. In both conditions, the emotional state often resulted in a deterioration of reasoning performance (Oaksford et al., 1996 ). In another study participants were recruited because they reported being depressed (Channon and Baker, 1994 ). They were presented with categorical syllogisms and their performance was worse than that of non-depressed participants. One possible explanation is that emotionally congruent information (e.g., sad content in case of being depressed) put additional load on working memory (e.g., Baddeley, 2003 ). Other explanations are that different emotional states affect people's motivation to solve rather complex cognitive tasks (Melton, 1995 ) or that the emotional state affects how attention is allocated (e.g., Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2012 ) even with positive material (e.g., Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2013 ).

The content of the reasoning task can also have an effect on performance. For instance, the content can result in a stereotypical reaction which negatively affects performance on a conditional reasoning task (Lefford, 1946 ; see also De Jong et al., 1998 ). Other studies have shown that negative as well as positive content has a detrimental effect on conditional reasoning performance as opposed to neutral content which may be due to reduced working memory resources (Blanchette and Richards, 2004 ; Blanchette, 2006 ). The problem content can also be freed from any semantic value by using non-words that have been conditioned via classical conditioning to assume an emotional value. Therefore, the effect of non-semantic emotional material on reasoning performance can be investigated. Classical conditioning has been used to condition non-words and neutral words with a negative or positive emotional value and resulted in participants providing fewer logically valid answers in a conditional reasoning task (Blanchette and Richards, 2004 ; Blanchette, 2006 ). The hypothesis that emotions affect how conditional reasoning tasks are interpreted could not be confirmed (Blanchette, 2006 ).

The literature review shows that mood and emotional problem content negatively affect logical reasoning performance. However, the effects on reasoning performance are still ambiguous, in particular when mood is combined with a problem content that is relevant to the mood, e.g., a participant in a sad mood is presented with a sad reasoning problem about bereavement (mood and content are congruent). Some studies have shown that such a combination results in worse performance. Health-anxiety patients, when reasoning about health-threats in a Wason selection task, have a threat-confirming strategy (Smeets et al., 2000 ), for example, they very likely interpret a tremor as a sign of Parkinson's disease or chest pain as an indicator for cardiac infarction, etc., even though other—less dangerous—causes are much more likely. Thus, threat-confirming participants select the card that confirms (rather than falsifies) their fears about the anticipated illness. Controls that do not have health-anxiety do not show such a bias when reasoning about health-threats. These findings are similar to another study that also used a Wason selection task where spider-phobic participants confirmed danger rules and falsified safety rules more often for phobia-relevant information than controls (De Jong et al., 1997a ). Furthermore, socially anxious participants performed worse in relational inference tasks when the content was relevant to social anxiety as opposed to neutral content (Vroling and de Jong, 2009 ). However, spider phobic patients compared to non-phobic controls performed worse when the reasoning problem's content was specifically related to their phobia as well as when it contained general threat material (De Jong et al., 1997b ).

Other studies found no difference between control participants in a neutral mood, participants with health-anxiety (De Jong et al., 1998 ) or participants who were not recruited from a clinical population but nevertheless reported anxiety symptoms (Vroling and de Jong, 2010 ). Participants in a neutral mood as well as anxious participants performed worse in the threat condition. Lastly, some studies even found a beneficial effect of emotions on logical reasoning performance. After the bombing in London in 2005 a study was carried out to investigate if the increased amount of fear which was related to the bombing, has an impact on the performance of participants when solving conditional reasoning tasks that were related in content to the bombing (Blanchette et al., 2007 ). It resulted that fearful participants provided more correct responses on a reasoning task with fear-related content than participants that did not report a high level of fear. In another study participants that had been primed to be angry or who remembered an incident when they have been cheated on, performed better when the reasoning task involved detecting cheaters (Chang and Wilson, 2004 ). This mood congruent effect was not found when participants who remembered an altruistic incident had to detect altruists. An evolutionary psychology explanation is offered for these findings as the authors suggest that the ability to detect cheaters provides an evolutionary advantage (Chang and Wilson, 2004 ).

The ambiguous results in the literature motivated us to bring together the effect of the reasoners' emotional state and the effect of the reasoning problems' emotionally-laden content. Based on this combination we formulated and tested the following hypotheses:

• Positive and negative emotion 1 will result in a reduction of reasoning performance.
• Positive and negative problem content will result in a reduction of reasoning performance.
• There will be an interaction between the person's emotional state and the emotional content of the problem.

To test these hypotheses, four experiments have been carried out to investigate the effect of emotion, problem content and the combination of the two on reasoning performance. The experiments are:

• Experiment 1: Positive, negative or neutral emotion (induced) paired with a Wason selection task that had positive, negative or neutral problem content.
• Experiment 2: Positive, negative or neutral emotion (induced) paired with conditional reasoning tasks that had positive, negative or neutral problem content.
• Experiment 3: Anxious or neutral emotion (spider-phobic or non-phobic participants) paired with conditional reasoning tasks that had neutral, negative or anxious (phobia-relevant) content.
• Experiment 4: Anxious or neutral emotion (exam anxiety or confidence) paired with conditional reasoning tasks that had neutral, negative or anxious (exam anxiety-relevant) content.

Experiment 1: emotions in the wason selection task

This experiment was designed in order to test the hypotheses that emotion and emotional content have a disrupting effect on reasoning performance. The participants' emotion was either neutral or induced to be positive or negative and then they had to solve Wason selection tasks. The content of the reasoning tasks which all participants had to solve was positive, negative or neutral as well.

Participants

Thirty students from the University of Giessen participated in this study (mean age: 22.93 years; range: 19–30 years; 18 female, 12 male). They did not participate in any previous investigations on conditional reasoning and they received a monetary compensation of eight Euro. The participants came from a range of disciplines and none of them were psychology students. They were all native German speakers and provided informed written consent.

Design and materials

First, the emotional state of the participants was measured with the German version of the positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988 ; Krohne et al., 1996 ) with which a score for negative and one for positive affect can be computed. Then the participants' emotional state was altered by a manipulated IQ-test. The procedure is described below. However, participants were not told that their emotional state was to be altered with a success-failure-method and they were randomly assigned to the “success group,” “neutral group,” and “failure group.” This method has high reliability and ecological validity (Nummenmaa and Niemi, 2004 ).

During the logical reasoning task participants had to solve 24 Wason selection tasks based on the three types of content (positive, negative, and neutral). While Wason selection tasks with positive emotional value described success situations, the negative ones described failure situations. This was done to create a link between emotion and the content of the reasoning material. Table ​ Table1 1 shows examples of the positive, negative, and neutral logical reasoning problems. The sentences were presented in German language. Each problem was presented by means of four different virtual cards on a computer screen as can be seen in Figure ​ Figure1. 1 . The participants were told that each card contained one part of the rule on one side and the other part of the rule on the other side. On one set of cards, for example, one side of the card contained the information about whether somebody succeeds or not and on the other side whether somebody is glad or not (the correct answer in our example is card 1 and card 4 which means to verify and to falsify the rule; card 1 and card 3 which is the empirically most frequent answer means that participants in both cases try to verify the rule). The order of cards on the screen was pseudo-randomized and the order of Wason selection problems was completely randomized across participants.

Examples for negative (mirroring failure situations), positive (mirroring success situations) and neutral rules (words and sentences were presented in German language in all experiments) .

Example of a WST problem with the four corresponding cards .

Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room at the Department of Psychology of the University of Giessen. Prior to the experiment they were informed about the procedure. The emotional state of the participants was measured with the German version of the positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988 ; Krohne et al., 1996 ) with which a score for negative and for positive affect can be computed. This scale is based on 10 positive and 10 negative adjectives. Participants are required to state the emotional intensity of each word on a five point scale: 1 = “not at all,” 2 = “a little,” 3 = “moderately,” 4 = “quite a bit,” and 5 = “very much.” Thus, for the positive as well as for the negative affect a score ranging between 10 and 50 points could be computed. Examples of the test adjectives are: afraid, guilty, inspired, proud, etc. This emotion measurement schedule has been validated in several studies (e.g., Krohne et al., 1996 ; Crawford and Henry, 2004 ).

After that the participants carried out a subset of items from the IST2000R (Amthauer et al., 2001 ), which is a popular IQ-test in psychological research and practice. This subtest consisted of 13 items from three different categories: sentence completion, calculation and matrix tasks. These items were selected from all items by using the norming data from the intelligence test. For one group we selected the 13 problems that are most difficult, for the second group we selected items with moderate difficulty according to the norms and for the third group we used the easiest items from the IST2000R. Here is one example for the calculation tasks: (24/144) × 96 = ? (difficult), (3/6) + (20/8) = ? (moderate), and 8 × 123 = ? (easy). The items were presented on a sheet of paper and had to be solved by the participants in a limited time. In order to boost the effect of the emotion manipulation we also told them that the test was especially developed to predict academic success and that an average student solves approximately 50% of the items correctly. The time limit was 15 min. After finishing the test the participants received a manipulated verbal feedback on their performance to influence their emotional state. The feedback for the negative emotion group with the difficult problems was: “We are sorry to say that the analysis of your data showed that your performance was below the average student performance.” The feedback for the neutral emotion group with moderate item difficulty was: “The analysis of your data showed that your performance was on average student performance.” The participants from the positive emotion group with the easy items were told that their performance was above the average of student performance. Please note that this feedback did not reflect their real performance, because even if participants managed to solve the difficult problems they got the negative feedback. Accordingly, the participants in the positive emotional group got positive feedback even if they failed to solve the problems.

After this the emotional state was assessed again to see whether the mood induction was successful. Finally they were given the Wason selection tasks. In order to hide the real purpose of our study, we told the participants they had to do the PANAS since current emotions could influence their performance on intelligence tests and that we wanted to control for this. All our experiments were approved by the ethics committee of the German Psychological Association (DGPs).

The experiment then started with the emotion induction sequence [PANAS (t1), intelligence test items, feedback and PANAS(t2)], followed by the 24 Wason selection tasks. A computer administered the Wason selection problems using the SuperLab 4.0 software (Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA) and recorded participants‘ answers (in all experiments). A self-paced design was used for data collection. When the problem with the four cards was presented on the screen participants had to decide which of the cards they would like to turn over in order to check the validity of the given rule. They were asked to pick one or more cards by pressing the corresponding keys on the labeled keyboard. For instance, to turn over card 1 they had to press the “1” key, which was clearly labeled “card 1.” The problems were separated by the instruction to press the <spacebar> whenever ready for the next problem. At the beginning one practice problem was presented to familiarize participants with the task but no feedback was given. At the end of the experiment all participants were informed about the true nature, the intention and the manipulations of the experiment. In all experiments data was analyzed with SPSS19 (IBM © ) using analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and t -tests (details are given in each of the Results sections).

The emotion manipulation was successful, as can be seen in Figure ​ Figure2. 2 . The success group revealed a significant increase of positive affect from t1 to t2 [ t (9) = −4.906, p = 0.001], while the negative affect decreased. The failure group scores showed a significant decrease in positive affect [ t (9) = 5.471, p < 0.001] and a significant increase in negative affect [ t (9) = −4.226, p > 0.01]. For the neutral group no differences were found, neither for the positive nor the negative affect. A One-Way ANOVA including the factor “positive difference scores” and a between-subject factor (neutral, success, or failure group) revealed significant group differences [ F (2, 27) = 23.964, Mean Squared Error ( MSE ) = 6.511, p < 0.001]. A second One-Way ANOVA with the factor “negative difference scores” also showed group differences [ F (2, 27) = 7.975, MSE = 6.407, p < 0.01]. Planned t -tests for independent samples revealed significant differences in positive difference scores for the success and neutral group [ t (18) = 4.618, p < 0.001] and for the success and failure group [ t (18) = 7.069, p < 0.001]. Significant differences in the negative scores were observed for the comparison between success group and failure group [ t (18) = −3.192, p < 0.01], as well as for the comparison between failure group and neutral group [ t (18) = 4.024, p = 0.001].

Difference scores (t 2 - t 1 ) for the emotion induction of Experiment 1 for each group . ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.

On average, participants only solved 5% of the problems correctly (turning card 1 and card 4; every other decision was incorrect which occurred in 95% of the cases). We are aware that this performance is very low. Therefore, we initially thought that it might be useful to statistically test whether this performance significantly differs from chance level. We then decided, however, not to follow this idea, because our results agree with the entire literature on the Wason selection task (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972 ; overview in Manktelow, 2004 ). Moreover, the usual way of dealing with these low performance rates is to use the “falsification index” and the “confirmation index,” which have been introduced by Oaksford et al. ( 1996 ). These indices give a better performance measurement than just comparing correct answers in the Wason selection tasks. The indices can range from +2 to −2 and provide a measure of whether an individual tried to verify or to falsify a given rule by turning over certain cards or card combinations (Oaksford et al., 1996 ; Chang and Wilson, 2004 ). The falsification index (FI) is computed with the formula FI = (p + not q) − (not p + q) and stands for the participants' tendency to choose the p and not q cards in order to falsify the rule. Note, that a score of +2 is equivalent to full logicality. The confirmation index (CI) is the “complement” of the falsification index; it stands for the degree to which participants choose the p and q cards in order to confirm the rule. It is calculated with the formula CI = (p + q) − (not p + not q) (Oaksford et al., 1996 ). Note that a score of +2 is equivalent to a confirming strategy without falsifying the given rule. The mean falsification index is shown in Figure ​ Figure3 3 .

Falsification index (ranging from −2 to 2) for the WSTs for each group . It represents the choices of p and not-q in order to falsify the rule (modus tollens). ** p ≤ 0.01.

Falsification indices were then used in an ANOVA including the within-subject factor content (positive, negative, neutral) and the between-subject factor group (success, failure, neutral). This analysis showed that emotion of participants resulted in a significant difference, F (2, 27) = 6.033, MSE = 0.574, p < 0.01, but not the content of the reasoning problem. Post-hoc t -tests showed that the falsification index of the failure group differed significantly from those of the neutral group [ t (3.737) = −3.435, p < 0.01] and the success group [ t (10.353) = 3.14, p = 0.01]. Overall, the neutral group [ Mean Falisification Index (MFI) = 0.636, Standard Error (SE) = 0.19] performed better than the success group ( MFI = 0.426, SE = 0.14) and the success group in turn was better than the failure group ( MFI = − 0.029, SE = 0.038). A more detailed descriptive analysis showed that this effect is due to a specific type of error. In fact, participants in the failure group have chosen the p and q card most frequently (Figure ​ (Figure4 4 ).

Choices of the p and q cards of the WSTs in relative frequencies (%) for each group . With p and q (modus ponens) participants tried to confirm the rule.

The results indicate that the emotions of an individual have an effect on reasoning performance independent from task content. In particular, a negative emotion resulted in a lower falsification index meaning that participants in a negative emotional state were more likely to deviate from logical norms. The participants in a positive state were also not as good as the neutral group, but this difference was less pronounced. Overall, participants in a neutral emotional state performed best. However, no interaction has been found between participants' emotion and the emotional task content, neither for the falsification index, nor for the confirmation index. Thus, it was not easier for individuals in positive (negative) emotion to solve Wason selection tasks with positive (negative) content. The reason for this might be that the Wason selection task overall is too difficult to solve and that there is no generally accepted theory about what makes the tasks so complex. A recent overview of such approaches can be found in Klauer et al. ( 2007 ). For our studies the reasons for the difficulty of the Wason selection task are not particularly essential. However, a detrimental result might be that participants' low performance could result in a “floor effect” and thus existing effects of the emotional content might not be visible in the data. In order to control for this possible deficit, a paradigm for the subsequent experiment has been chosen which is known to result in better performance.

Experiment 2: emotions and conditional reasoning tasks

The intention of this experiment was to use a reasoning task which participants find easier to solve than a Wason selection task. We therefore used a conditional reasoning paradigm. If such a task is easier, any difference between groups' performance should be much clearer and such differences can be more readily attributed to the experimental manipulation. Again, the conditional reasoning tasks had a positive, negative or neutral content and like in the previous experiment, participants' emotions were either induced (positive or negative) or neutral.

Thirty students from the University of Giessen participated in this study (mean age: 22.6 years; range: 20–27 years; 22 female, 8 male). They did not participate in any of the other investigations. They received an eight Euro compensation for participation. All participants were naïve with respect to the aim of the study, none were psychology students. All were native German speakers and provided informed written consent.

The same success-failure-method which was used in the previous experiment was used for the emotion induction. Reasoning problems consisted of pairs of premises that were followed by a to-be-validated conclusion. Four premise-pairs had a positive, four a neutral and four a negative content. These 12 problems were combined with the four possible inferences: modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), denial of antecedent (DA) and affirmation of consequence (AC), resulting in 48 conditional inferences per participant. All problems were randomized for each participant. Half of the presented conclusions were valid; the other half were invalid. Here are two examples of inferences with a valid conclusion:

• Modus ponens/positive emotional content
• Premise 1: When a person succeeds, then the person is glad.
• Premise 2: A person succeeds.
• Conclusion: This person is glad.
• Modus tollens/negative emotional content
• Premise 1: When a person performs poorly, then this person is angry.
• Premise 2: A person is not angry.
• Conclusion: This person did not perform poorly.

The participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room at the Department of Psychology of the University of Giessen. Prior to the experiment, the participants were again instructed about the procedure of the experiment. Subsequently, the emotion induction started and resulted in a “success group,” a “failure group,” and a “neutral group.” Then the inferences were presented on a computer screen. A self-paced design was used. After reading the first premise on the screen, participants had to press the space bar to reach the next premise, then again the space bar to reach the conclusion. While both premises were presented in black letters the conclusion was presented in red. The task required an evaluation whether the conclusion followed necessarily from the premises (no evaluations as biconditionals). Participants responded by pressing either a “Yes” key or a “No” key on the keyboard. There were two practice trials at the beginning of the experiment but no feedback was given. At the end of the experiment there was a debriefing and a detailed explanation of the true purpose of the experiment.

The emotion induction was again successful. In the success group the positive affect was elevated and the negative affect reduced (similar to the previous experiments' mood induction). In the failure group the positive affect decreased and the negative affect increased (although the latter was not significant, due to a large standard error). No alteration for positive and negative affect was found in the neutral group. The ANOVA revealed significant group differences [ F (2, 27) = 15.964, MSE = 13.607, p < 0.001] and the t -tests for independent samples showed that the success and neutral group were dissimilar in the difference scores of positive affect [ t (18) = 2.146, p < 0.05], as well as the success and failure group [ t (18) = 5.666, p < 0.001] and the failure and neutral group [ t (18) = −3.854, p < 0.01].

Performance for the sentential conditional inference problems was better than for the Wason selection tasks as 61.46% of the problems were correctly solved. Error rates were compared using an ANOVA for the emotionality of the participants (success, failure, and neutral group) and the emotional content (positive, negative, neutral). Significant differences were found for both factors.

With respect to the emotional state the performance of the participants in the three groups was reliably different [ F (2, 27) = 3.68, MSE = 2.492, p < 0.05] and paired sample t -tests show that error rates for the failure group were significantly higher compared to the neutral group [ t (18) = 2.622, p < 0.05]. The neutral group showed best performance [ Mean (M) = 0.310, SE = 0.046] followed by the success group ( M = 0.402, SE = 0.035) and the failure group which committed most errors ( M = 0.446, SE = 0.024). These results are represented in Figure ​ Figure5 5 .

Error rates in relative frequencies (%) for the conditional reasoning task for each group . * p ≤ 0.05.

The difference between positive and negative content of the reasoning problems was also significant. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect [ F (2, 54) = 3.159, MSE = 0.555, p = 0.05] and the post-hoc paired sample t -tests revealed a significant difference in error rates between positive and negative content [ t (29) = 2.491, p < 0.05]. The fewest errors were made with negative content ( M = 0.356, SE = 0.029), followed by neutral content ( M = 0.385, SE = 0.022), and positive content ( M = 0.417, SE = 0.028). This is visualized in Figure ​ Figure6. 6 . However, no interaction was found between emotional state and task content.

Error rates in relative frequencies (%) for the conditional reasoning task for each type of content . * p ≤ 0.05.

The reported findings show that several factors can influence reasoning performance. Performance can be affected either by the emotion of the individual or the content of the problem or the type of inference.

The effect of emotion might be due to the fact that emotion results in representations in working memory that occupy the same subsystems that are also needed for reasoning (Oaksford et al., 1996 ). The content effect is also interesting since it challenges previous findings. While we found fewer errors in inferences with negative content, Blanchette and Richards ( 2004 ) found that emotions impair reasoning performance no matter whether they are positive or negative.

Experiment 3: spider-phobic participants and conditional reasoning

In contrast to the previous experiments the sample for this experiment was selected from a population with spider phobia. Therefore, it was not necessary to induce emotions as participants were selected for their anxiety with high ecological validity. This was done to expand the findings of the previous experiments in order to see if a difference in performance can be found for participants that already have pre-existing moods in certain situations without any mood induction. Additionally, we were interested in whether content relevant to the illness of such participants has any effect on their reasoning abilities.

Nine spider phobic students (mean age: 22.33 years; range: 20–26 years; 7 female, 2 male) and seven non-phobic control students (mean age: 22.86 years; range: 20–26 years; 7 female) from the University of Giessen participated in the experiment. Participants were selected from a larger sample by means of scores on the Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Klorman et al., 1974 ). SPQ scores of spider fearful students ( M = 20.22; SE = 0.878) were significantly higher than those of the non-fearful control students ( M = 2.00; SE = 0.873) [ t (14) = −14.459; p < 0.001]. Each participant received five Euro or a course credit for participation. Moreover, we controlled for participants being no psychology students (thus, no pre-experience with logical reasoning tasks) and all were native German speakers. All participants provided informed written consent.

Design and procedure were similar to that of Experiment 2. Forty-eight reasoning problems consisted of pairs of premises that were followed by a to-be-validated conclusion. However, the content differed because four statements had a spider phobia relevant content, four were generally negative and four neutral. The presentation of the 48 three-term problems was randomized across participants. Examples of the statements are presented in Table ​ Table2 2 .

Examples of statements with different content .

All participants were tested individually in a quiet room at the Department of Psychology of the University of Giessen. At the beginning participants filled out the SPQ. Afterwards the logical reasoning tasks had to be solved. Presentation of problems and recording of responses was identical to Experiment 2.

Error rates of the conditional reasoning task were compared using an ANOVA with the between-subject factor group and the two within-subject factors content and type of reasoning.

For the content of reasoning problems a significant main effect was obtained [ F (2, 28) = 4.645; p < 0.05]. Further paired t -tests showed that error rates for spider phobia relevant problems ( M = 36.72%; SE = 4.30%) resulted in significantly more errors than neutral ones ( M = 30.47%; SE = 4.41%) [ t (15) =2.928; p = 0.01]. This was due to spider phobics performing worse on phobia relevant contents. This interaction between problem content and emotion was significantly different [ F (2, 28) = 6.807; p < 0.01]. A post-hoc paired t -test revealed that spider phobics performed significantly worse for inference problems with spider phobia relevant content ( M = 43.06%; SE = 4.47%) compared to negative ones ( M = 34.72%; SE = 5.01%) [ t (8) = 2.667; p < 0.05]. Furthermore, phobia relevant problems resulted in more errors than neutral ones ( M = 36.81%; SE = 4.71%) but marginally failed to reach significance [ t (8) = 2.268; p = 0.053]. However, non-phobics made significantly more errors for inferences with negative content ( M = 33.93%; SE = 6.38%) compared to spider phobia relevant ( M = 28.57%; SE = 7.20%) [ t (6) = −2.521; p < 0.05] and neutral problems ( M = 22.32%; SE = 7.33%) [ t (6) = −3.653; p < 0.05]. This interaction pattern between the groups and the task content of the conditional reasoning task is visualized in Figure ​ Figure7 7 .

Error rates in relative frequencies (%) for the spider phobic and non-phobic participants . * p ≤ 0.05.

Our results show that Spider phobics' performance was worst on problems related to spider phobia. We are aware of the fact that our sample size is rather small. One reason was that it is difficult to find spider phobics, because they usually avoid situations where they are confronted with spiders. However, our control group was also small. The reason for that is that we initially also tested nine participants in the control group (same number as in the experimental group) but then we had to eliminate two participants (due to response strategy, incomplete data recording) and could not replace them by two new participants for technical reasons. However, we do not think that this is a serious problem, because even with this small sample size our differences reached the level of statistical significance. Given these thoughts we think that our results reliably show that illness related tasks impair reasoning for anxiety patients.

There are a couple of possible explanations of how (positive and negative) emotions impeded on reasoning performance. One explanation is that all kinds of emotions have negative effects on the motivation or effort of the participants (e.g., Lefford, 1946 ). Other explanations are based on dual process models (System or Type 1: automatic, fast, intuitive, based on prior knowledge; System or Type 2: effortful, slow, explicit, rule-based, e.g., Stanovich, 2010 ). A good overview on the different theories is provided in Blanchette ( 2014 ). However, we believe that the most reasonable explanation for the current findings is provided by the suppression theory (Oaksford et al., 1996 ): processing phobia relevant material comprised the confrontation with the phobic object which causes fear. This yields a strong emotional response resulting in a pre-load of working memory resources. Moreover, there is evidence that spider phobia could change reasoning patterns. De Jong et al. ( 1997a ) showed that spider phobics tend to rely on a danger-confirming reasoning strategy while solving phobia relevant Wason selection tasks. While spider phobics performed worst on phobia relevant problems in our study, non-phobics revealed worst performance on problems with negative content. These results are in line with Blanchette and Richards ( 2004 ) and Blanchette ( 2006 ). Overall affirmation of consequence and denial of antecedent with spider phobia relevant and negative content resulted in more errors which is similar to findings of Blanchette and Richards ( 2004 ).

Experiment 4: exam-anxious participants and conditional reasoning tasks

This experiment was designed to investigate if the effect found in Experiment 3 extends to other anxiety related conditions such as exam-anxiety. Therefore, participants were also selected based on their anxious state and some of the problems had an emotional content which was relevant to exam-anxiety while others were neutral or generally negative.

The sample consisted of 17 students with exam anxiety and 17 students without exam-anxiety. They have been selected from a larger sample ( N = 47) based on their scores of a measure for exam-anxiety (Hodapp, 1991 ). They were all female because exam-anxiety is more prevalent amongst women (Zeidner and Safir, 1989 ; Chapell et al., 2005 ; Wacker et al., 2008 ). The age range was 20–29 years (mean age for participants with exam-anxiety: 24.24 years, without exam-anxiety: 23.12 years). For remuneration they could choose to receive five Euro or a course credit. Psychology students and people who have already taken part in experiments about this topic were excluded. All participants were native German speakers and provided informed written consent.

Participants were assessed with the TAI-G (Hodapp, 1991 ), a measure for exam-anxiety, in order to differentiate between exam-anxious and non-anxious participants. The TAI-G consists of 30 statements which describe emotions and thoughts in exam situations. Participants are asked how well those statements describe them when they have to take exams. Statements were ranked on a scale from “never” (1), “sometimes” (2), “often” (3) to “almost always” (4).

Examples of such statements are:

“I have a strange sensation in my stomach.”

“Thoughts suddenly start racing through my head that block me.”

“I worry that something could go wrong.”

Scores of the TAI-G range from 30 to 120. In order to be classified as exam-anxious a minimum score of 84 is necessary while a score below 54 is classified as non-exam-anxious. Those limits were obtained in a study with 730 students (Wacker et al., 2008 ) in which one standard deviation ( SD = 14.8) was subtracted from the mean score ( m = 69.1) to obtain the lower limit and added to obtain the upper limit.

Once participants finished the TAI-G, they were given the conditional inference problems. The 48 conditional inference problems consisted of “if, then”-statements of which one third were exam-anxiety-related, one third generally negative and one third emotionally neutral. Examples are given in Table ​ Table3. 3 . Presentation of the problems and recording of answers was identical to Experiments 2 and 3.

The selection of exam-phobic and non-exam phobic groups of participants was successful. The group of the exam-anxious participants had a TAI-G score that ranged from 84 to 107 and a mean of 97 ( SE = 1.586). The group of non-exam-anxious participants had a score between 39 to 54 and a mean of 48 ( SE = 1.047). A t -test for independent samples showed a significant difference between groups [ t (32) = 25.788, p < 0.001].

Moreover, as expected, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect with respect to content [ F (2, 64) = 8.058; p = 0.001]. Post-hoc t -tests showed that conditional inference problems with fear-related content ( M = 44.67%; SE = 2.52%) resulted in more errors than other negative ( M = 36.58%; SE = 2.53%) [ t (33) = 3.703; p = 0.001] and neutral problems ( M = 37.87%; SE = 2.80%) [ t (33) = 2.626; p < 0.05]. A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out based on error rates for type of inference (MP, MT, AC, and DA), content (fear-related, negative, and neutral) and exam-anxiety. However, no significant interaction was found for content and group. This means that both exam-anxious and non-exam-anxious participants performed similar across fear-relevant, negative, and neutral problems.

Our results show that exam-anxious and non-exam-anxious participants performed similar across fear-relevant, negative and neutral problems. Inferences about exam-anxiety resulted in reduced performance in both groups. This may be because all participants were currently enrolled at university and so can relate to exam-anxiety. Moreover, physiological changes have been observed in people who are high-exam-anxious as well as low-exam-anxious (Holroyd et al., 1978 ). Therefore, associations to exam-situations can get triggered which reduce working memory resources and subsequently performance on reasoning problems (Oaksford et al., 1996 ; Blanchette and Richards, 2004 ). In contrast to previous findings (Lefford, 1946 ; De Jong et al., 1998 ; Blanchette and Richards, 2004 ; Blanchette, 2006 ) negative problems did not result in a reduction of performance. Even though these problems were emotional and negative (e.g., “if a person has a miscarriage, then this person will get depressed”) participants may not have been able to relate to the content as it was not as personally relevant to students as the exam-related content.

General discussion

We conducted two experiments with participants who underwent a mood induction and two with participants that were either anxious about spiders or exams. Experiment 1 showed that the emotions of an individual have an effect on reasoning performance independent from task content. In Experiment 2, we found that reasoning performance can be affected either by the emotion of the individual or the content of the problem or the type of inference. In Experiment 3, spider-phobic participants showed lower reasoning performance in spider-related inferences, but in Experiment 4, exam-anxious participants did not perform worse on inferences with an exam-related content.

The results agree with some of our hypotheses but not with all of our initial assumptions. Our first hypothesis was that positive and negative emotion will result in a reduction of logical reasoning performance. This was confirmed as in the first and second experiment participants in a neutral emotional state outperformed those in negative or positive emotion independent of the task (WST and conditionals). These findings are consistent with previous research (Channon and Baker, 1994 ; Melton, 1995 ; Oaksford et al., 1996 ). When a negative or positive emotional state has been induced in participants this results in a deterioration of performance on a Wason selection task compared to participants in a neutral emotional state (Oaksford et al., 1996 ). In another study participants were recruited because they reported being depressed (Channon and Baker, 1994 ). They were presented with categorical syllogisms and their performance was worse than that of non-depressed participants. An explanation that has been offered is that as emotionally congruent information gets retrieved and processed this takes away resources from working memory (e.g., Baddeley, 2003 ) that should have been used to process the reasoning task. In addition, positive emotional states also result in poorer performance (Melton, 1995 ), as it is assumed that people in a positive mood pursuit more global reasoning strategies, paying less attention, and are therefore more prone to errors than people in a negative, analytic mood.

Our results concerning the second hypothesis (predicting a detrimental effect on performance of positive and negative problem content) are mixed. It was confirmed by the third experiment in which non-phobic participants performed best when the content was neutral. On the other hand, the content had no effect on performance in the first experiment, and in the second experiment, best performance was measured with negative content, whereas most errors were committed with positive content. In the fourth experiment there was no difference between negative and neutral content and performance was worst with exam-anxiety related content. These findings partially agree with previous research showing that performance is affected when the content is related to general threats because then participants tend to select threat-confirming and safety-falsification strategies in a Wason selection task (De Jong et al., 1998 ). Other studies have shown that negative as well as positive content has a detrimental effect on conditional reasoning performance as opposed to neutral content which may be due to reduced working memory resources (Blanchette and Richards, 2004 ; Blanchette, 2006 ). Furthermore, if the content is controversial, it can stir up emotions that result in a stereotypical reaction that negatively affects performance of a conditional reasoning task (Lefford, 1946 ). In this study participants made more errors when the content was controversial (e.g., stereotypical responses such as “homeless person are lazy”) as opposed to neutral.

The third hypothesis stating there may be an effect on performance when positive and negative mood is combined with positive and negative problem content was only supported by Experiment 3, which found the expected interaction. Nonetheless, the absence of the suggested interaction in three of four experiments is in line with some previous findings (e.g., De Jong et al., 1998 , health-anxiety; Vroling and de Jong, 2010 , anxiety symptoms in a non-clinical population).

Only in the third experiment participants who are afraid of spiders performed worse on problems with a spider phobia relevant content compared to a negative content which strengthens other findings (De Jong et al., 1997a , b ; Smeets et al., 2000 ; Vroling and de Jong, 2009 ). A similar trend was observed for the performance on spider phobia relevant problems compared to neutral ones. Yet this difference was insignificant, maybe a bigger sample would have yielded clearer results. A previous study showed that, when reasoning about health-threats in a Wason selection task, health-anxiety patients have a threat-confirming strategy (Smeets et al., 2000 ). Controls that do not have health-anxiety do not show such a bias when reasoning about health-threats. These findings are similar to another study that also used a Wason selection task where spider-phobic participants confirmed danger rules and falsified safety rules more often for phobia-relevant information than controls (De Jong et al., 1997a ). Furthermore, socially anxious participants performed worse in relational inference tasks when the content was relevant to social anxiety as opposed to neutral content (Vroling and de Jong, 2009 ). However, spider phobic patients compared to non-phobic controls performed worse when the content of the reasoning problem was specifically related to their phobia as well as when it contained general threat material (De Jong et al., 1997b ).

Why did we find no evidence showing that performance is improved when emotion and content are congruent? In Blanchette et al. ( 2007 ) fearful participants provided more correct responses on a reasoning task with fear-related content than participants that did not report a high level of fear. In another study participants who had been primed to be angry or who remembered an incident when they had been cheated on performed better when the reasoning task involved detecting cheaters (Chang and Wilson, 2004 ).

We think that the ambiguity in previous findings (Channon and Baker, 1994 ; Melton, 1995 ; Oaksford et al., 1996 ; Chang and Wilson, 2004 ; Blanchette et al., 2007 ) and our own experiments may be due to the differences between samples. The first two experiments induced emotions in participants who were primarily sad and frustrated whereas the last two experiments' participants were anxious. Hence one is not comparing like with like. The latter two experiments can be further differentiated as the third experiment selected people for the control group who are not afraid of spiders. However, most students experience some form of exam-anxiety and the sample of the fourth experiment was entirely made up of students. This may explain why participants who reported exam anxiety as well as those who reported none both performed poorly when the content was exam anxiety related.

According to the suppression theory (Oaksford et al., 1996 ), emotion has a detrimental effect on performance because resources are otherwise allocated and not available to solve the task at hand. This means that emotional participants should perform worse than those in a neutral state. This has been confirmed in Experiments 1 and 2. Content may give rise to emotion and so similar results due to reduced working memory resources should also be found in experiments with emotional content. In Experiment 3 best performance was with neutral content, possibly because spider-related content triggered a response that used resources of working memory that would otherwise have been used to solve the task (e.g., avoidance strategy). Anxious content in Experiment 4 resulted in worst performance possibly for the same reason.

Thus far we focused on working memory resources, but it is also possible that attentional processes are of major relevance in this context. For example, correct decisions and decision times may be compromised during emotional (especially negative) processing, since emotional processing (in addition to reasoning) requires attentional resources (see for instance the work of Harmon-Jones et al.). However, we cannot fully dissolve this problem of working memory vs. attention at this stage with these experiments.

The findings of Experiment 3 are in contrast to those of Experiments 1 and 2, where no content and interaction effect were found. People with a phobia may perform worse on problems that have a content which is related to their phobia because they try to avoid stimuli that are anxiety-provoking (American Psychiatric Association, 2000 ). This avoidance is not necessarily found in depressed participants as they tend to ruminate on depressive material (American Psychiatric Association, 2000 ). While participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were not clinically depressed, the emotion that was induced had a depressive quality and therefore may explain why no interaction was found in these experiments. In addition maybe only anxiogenic stimuli have a depleting effect on working memory and previous research was largely based on anxiety (De Jong et al., 1998 ; Blanchette and Richards, 2004 ; Blanchette, 2006 ). In contrast, Lefford's ( 1946 ) material was not anxiogenic but he found an effect. He argued that this was due to a stereotypical response. However, if people do not relate to the content, then this will not result in a stereotypical response.

The reason for why no effect was found in Experiments 1 and 2 might be that the material was not as personally relevant and therefore did not trigger sufficient emotions for an effect to show. This does not explain why in Experiments 2 and 4 best performance was with negative content. One could argue that since this content is negative, participants are more deliberate in order to avoid negative consequences (if personally relevant for them). Furthermore, a more analytic processing style has been proposed for depression (Edwards and Weary, 1993 ) so that this content may have triggered such a processing style compared to a more global processing strategy with a positive emotion. Considering this one would have expected superior performance for negative emotion in Experiments 1 and 2 which was not the case.

Therefore, more clarity might be achieved if experiments compare personally relevant emotional content and emotional content that is not personally relevant. Content should also be differentiated according to it being anxious or depressive. Furthermore, anxious participants should be compared to depressed participants. A distinction has to be made between avoidance caused by anxiety and rumination caused by depression. If a detrimental effect on performance is found in both groups it has to be investigated whether this has the same cause, namely depleted working memory resources (or attentional resources).

From a psychotherapeutic point of view our studies are interesting as they show that spider phobic patients do not only show inadequate emotional responses to spiders. They, in fact, also show a decrement in performing cognitive tasks, such as logical reasoning if they have to do with spiders. The study shows an apparent connection between reported fear on the SPQ (Klorman et al., 1974 ) and behavior during experiments (error rates). Experiments 1 and 2 show that it is neither misery nor happiness but “common unhappiness” (Freud, 1895 , p. 322) that is desirable, because participants in a negative or positive mood did not perform well. This has been the case for decades in some therapeutic approaches which have recognized that being freed from misery better equips one to deal with life's adversities (Freud, 1895 ). People appear to find it easiest to process neutral (non-emotional) information (Experiments 1 and 2) but ideally sessions work with hot cognitions and elicit key emotions and cognitions (Safran and Greenberg, 1982 ; Beck, 1995 ). If neutral information becomes the focus of sessions, then sessions would elicit less key emotions and cognitions and turn into a nice chat which will be remembered pleasantly by the patient. Thereby the patient does not get overwhelmed with emotional material which will have a detrimental effect on reasoning. Instead the emotional material can be introduced bit by bit (e.g., as is the case in systematic desensitization in cognitive behavioral therapy).

It is worthwhile for patients to remember what has been discussed in sessions because new behaviors and alternative viewpoints which have been collaboratively developed in sessions may be easily forgotten, especially when the patient is suffering from a depression which often results in decreased concentration. Some therapists recommend that their patients take notes during sessions (Beck, 1995 ) but if only things that are easily remembered are discussed, this problem is circumvented. Therefore, if the patient wishes to get stabilized, non-emotional material may be best. If they want to work through distressing material however, it will not be possible to avoid emotional content. Hence emotions and cognitions are related and influence each other and one has to combine them according to what the goal is.

Thus far the key finding is that emotional state and content may interact to modulate logical reasoning. This is however only the case if (mood) state and (task) content are related (Experiment 3; spider-related content among spider phobics). But, this does so far not generalize to other contexts, since it could for example not be found in a sample with exam anxiety (Experiment 4; exam anxiety in combination with exam content). These ambiguities, the role of working memory and attentional processes need to be addressed in future studies in order to explain the influence of emotional content and emotion on human reasoning performance.

Author contributions

Nadine Jung did the statistical analysis and wrote the paper. Christina Wranke designed and conducted the experiments, and did the statistical analysis. Kai Hamburger designed the experiments and wrote the paper. Markus Knauff designed the experiments and wrote the paper.

Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by DFG-Graduate Program ”Neuronal Representation and Action Control—NeuroAct” (DFG 885/2) to Christina Wranke and by DFG Grant KN465/9-1 to Markus Knauff. We thank Luzie Jung and Nadja Hehr for carrying out some of the experiments. We further thank Sarah Jane Abbott and Carolina Anna Bosch for proofreading the manuscript. Finally, we thank the reviewers for their valuable comments.

1 For reasons of simplicity the term “emotion” is also used to represent “mood” (emotional state). The distinction between emotion and mood will only be pointed out were necessary.

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How to Write a Critical Thinking Essay: Examples & Outline

Critical thinking is the process of evaluating and analyzing information. People who use it in everyday life are open to different opinions. They rely on reason and logic when making conclusions about certain issues.

A critical thinking essay shows how your thoughts change as you research your topic. This type of assignment encourages you to learn rather than prove what you already know. In this article, our custom writing team will:

• explain how to write an excellent critical essay;
• introduce 30 great essay topics;
• provide a critical thinking essay example in MLA format.
• 🤔 Critical Thinking Essay Definition
• 💡 Topics & Questions
• ✅ Step-by-Step Guide
• 📑 Essay Example & Formatting Tips
• ✍️ Bonus Tips

🔍 References

🤔 what is a critical thinking essay.

A critical thinking essay is a paper that analyses an issue and reflects on it in order to develop an action plan. Unlike other essay types, it starts with a question instead of a thesis. It helps you develop a broader perspective on a specific issue. Critical writing aims at improving your analytical skills and encourages asking questions.

Critical Thinking in Writing: Importance

When we talk about critical thinking and writing, the word “critical” doesn’t have any negative connotation. It simply implies thorough investigation, evaluation, and analysis of information. Critical thinking allows students to make objective conclusions and present their ideas logically. It also helps them avoid errors in reasoning.

The Basics: 8 Steps of Critical Thinking Psychology

Did you know that the critical thinking process consists of 8 steps? We’ve listed them below. You can try to implement them in your everyday life:

It’s possible that fallacies will occur during the process of critical thinking. Fallacies are errors in reasoning that fail to provide a reasonable conclusion. Here are some common types of fallacies:

• Generalization . It happens when you apply generally factual statements to a specific case.
• Ambiguity . It occurs when the arguments are not clear and are not supported by evidence.
• Appeal to authority . This mistake happens when you claim the statement is valid only because a respected person made it.
• Appeal to emotion . It occurs when you use highly emotive language to convince the audience. Try to stay sensible and rely on the evidence.
• Bifurcation . This mistake occurs when you choose only between two alternatives when more than two exist.
• False analogy . It happens when the examples are poorly connected.

If you want to avoid these mistakes, do the following:

• try not to draw conclusions too quickly,
• be attentive,
• carefully read through all the sources,
• avoid generalizations.

How to Demonstrate Your Critical Thinking in Writing

Critical thinking encourages you to go beyond what you know and study new perspectives. When it comes to demonstrating your critical thinking skills in writing, you can try these strategies:

• Read . Before you start writing an essay, read everything you can find on the subject you are about to cover. Focus on the critical points of your assignment.
• Research . Look up several scholarly sources and study the information in-depth.
• Evaluate . Analyze the sources and the information you’ve gathered. See whether you can disagree with the authors.
• Prove . Explain why you agree or disagree with the authors’ conclusions. Back it up with evidence.

According to Purdue University, logical essay writing is essential when you deal with academic essays. It helps you demonstrate and prove the arguments. Make sure that your paper reaches a logical conclusion.

There are several main concepts related to logic:

If you want your essay to be logical, it’s better to avoid syllogistic fallacies, which happen with certain invalid deductions. If syllogisms are used carelessly, they can lead to false statements and ruin the credibility of your paper.

💡 Critical Thinking Topics & Questions

An excellent critical thinking essay starts with a question. But how do you formulate it properly? Keep reading to find out.

How to Write Critical Thinking Questions: Examples with Answers

Asking the right questions is at the core of critical thinking. They challenge our beliefs and encourage our interest to learn more.

Here are some examples of model questions that prompt critical thinking:

• What does… mean?
• What would happen if…?
• What are the principles of…?
• Why is… important?
• How does… affect…?
• What do you think causes…?
• How are… and… similar/different?
• How do you explain….?
• What are the implications of…?
• What do we already know about…?

Now, let’s look at some critical thinking questions with the answers. You can use these as a model for your own questions:

Question: What would happen if people with higher income paid more taxes?

• Answer: It would help society to prosper and function better. It would also help people out of poverty. This way, everyone can contribute to the economy.

Question: How does eating healthy benefit you?

• Answer: Healthy eating affects people’s lives in many positive ways. It reduces cancer risk, improves your mood and memory, helps with weight loss and diabetes management, and improves your night sleep.

Critical Thinking Essay Topics

Have you already decided what your essay will be about? If not, feel free to use these essay topic examples as titles for your paper or as inspiration. Make sure to choose a theme that interests you personally:

• What are the reasons for racism in healthcare?
• Why is accepting your appearance important?
• Concepts of critical thinking and logical reasoning .
• Nature and spirit in Ralf Waldo Emerson’s poetry.
• How does technological development affect communication in the modern world?
• Social media effect on adolescents.
• Is the representation of children in popular fiction accurate?
• Domestic violence and its consequences.
• Why is mutual aid important in society?
• How do stereotypes affect the way people think?
• The concept of happiness in different cultures.
• The purpose of environmental art.
• Why do people have the need to be praised?
• How did antibiotics change medicine and its development?
• Is there a way to combat inequality in sports?
• Is gun control an effective way of crime prevention?
• How our understanding of love changes through time.
• The use of social media by the older generation.
• Graffiti as a form of modern art.
• Negative health effects of high sugar consumption.
• Why are reality TV shows so popular?
• Why should we eat healthily?
• How effective and fair is the US judicial system?
• Reasons of Cirque du Soleil phenomenon.
• How can police brutality be stopped?
• Freedom of speech: does it exist?
• The effects of vaccination misconceptions.
• How to eliminate New Brunswick’s demographic deficit: action plan.
• What makes a good movie?
• Critical analysis of your favorite book.
• The connection between fashion and identity.
• Taboo topics and how they are discussed in gothic literature.
• Critical thinking essay on the problem of overpopulation.  
• Does our lifestyle affect our mental health?
• The role of self-esteem in preventing eating disorders in children. 
• Drug abuse among teenagers.
• Rhetoric on assisted suicide. 
• Effects of violent video games on children’s mental health.
• Analyze the effect stress has on the productivity of a team member.
• Discuss the importance of the environmental studies.
• Critical thinking and ethics of happy life.  
• The effects of human dignity on the promotion of justice.
• Examine the ethics of advertising the tobacco industry.
• Reasons and possible solutions of research misconduct. 
• Implication of parental deployment for children.
• Cultural impact of superheroes on the US culture.
• Examine the positive and negative impact of technology on modern society.
• Critical thinking in literature: examples. 
• Analyze the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on economic transformation.
• Benefits and drawbacks of mandatory vaccination.

Haven’t found a suitable essay idea? Try using our topic generator !

✅ How to Write a Critical Thinking Essay Step by Step

Now, let’s focus on planning and writing your critical thinking essay. In this section, you will find an essay outline, examples of thesis statements, and a brief overview of each essay part.

Critical Thinking Essay Outline

In a critical thinking essay, there are two main things to consider: a premise and a conclusion :

• A premise is a statement in the argument that explains the reason or supports a conclusion.
• A conclusion indicates what the argument is trying to prove. Each argument can have only one conclusion.

When it comes to structuring, a critical thinking essay is very similar to any other type of essay. Before you start writing it, make sure you know what to include in it. An outline is very helpful when it comes to structuring a paper.

How to Start a Critical Essay Introduction

An introduction gives readers a general idea of an essay’s contents. When you work on the introduction, imagine that you are drawing a map for the reader. It not only marks the final destination but also explains the route.

An introduction usually has 4 functions:

• It catches the reader’s attention;
• It states the essay’s main argument;
• It provides some general information about the topic;
• It shows the importance of the issue in question.

Here are some strategies that can make the introduction writing easier:

• Give an overview of the essay’s topic.
• Express the main idea.
• Define the main terms.
• Outline the issues that you are going to explore or argue about.
• Explain the methodology and why you used it.
• Write a hook to attract the reader’s attention.

Critical Analysis Thesis Statement & Examples

A thesis statement is an integral part of every essay. It keeps the paper organized and guides both the reader and the writer. A good thesis:

• expresses the conclusion or position on a topic;
• justifies your position or opinion with reasoning;
• conveys one idea;
• serves as the essay’s map.

To have a clearer understanding of what a good thesis is, let’s have a look at these examples.

The statement on the left is too general and doesn’t provide any reasoning. The one on the right narrows down the group of people to office workers and specifies the benefits of exercising.

Critical Thinking Essay Body Paragraphs: How to Write

Body paragraphs are the part of the essay where you discuss all the ideas and arguments. In a critical thinking essay, arguments are especially important. When you develop them, make sure that they:

• reflect the key theme;
• are supported by the sources/citations/examples.

Using counter-arguments is also effective. It shows that you acknowledge different points of view and are not easily persuaded.

In addition to your arguments, it’s essential to present the evidence . Demonstrate your critical thinking skills by analyzing each source and stating whether the author’s position is valid.

To make your essay logically flow, you may use transitions such as:

• Accordingly,
• For instance,
• On the contrary,
• In conclusion,
• Not only… but also,
• Undoubtedly.

How to Write a Critical Thinking Conclusion

In a critical thinking essay, the notion of “conclusion” is tightly connected to the one used in logic. A logical conclusion is a statement that specifies the author’s point of view or what the essay argues about. Each argument can have only one logical conclusion.

Sometimes they can be confused with premises. Remember that premises serve as a support for the conclusion. Unlike the conclusion, there can be several premises in a single argument. You can learn more about these concepts from the article on a logical consequence by Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Keeping this in mind, have a look at these tips for finishing your essay:

• Briefly sum up the main points.
• Provide a final thought on the issue.
• Suggest some results or consequences.
• Finish up with a call for action.

📑 Critical Thinking Essays Examples & Formatting Tips

Formatting is another crucial aspect of every formal paper. MLA and APA are two popular formats when it comes to academic writing. They share some similarities but overall are still two different styles. Here are critical essay format guidelines that you can use as a reference:

Finally, you’re welcome to check out a full critical essay sample in MLA format. Download the PDF file below:

Currently, the importance of critical thinking has grown rapidly because technological progress has led to expanded access to various content-making platforms: websites, online news agencies, and podcasts with, often, low-quality information. Fake news is used to achieve political and financial aims, targeting people with low news literacy. However, individuals can stop spreading fallacies by detecting false agendas with the help of a skeptical attitude.

✍️ Bonus Tips: Critical Thinking and Writing Exercises

Critical thinking is a process different from our regular thinking. When we think in everyday life, we do it automatically. However, when we’re thinking critically, we do it deliberately.

So how do we get better at this type of thinking and make it a habit? These useful tips will help you do it:

• Ask basic questions. Sometimes, while we are doing research, the explanation becomes too complicated. To avoid it, always go back to your topic.
• Question basic assumptions. When thinking through a problem, ask yourself whether your beliefs can be wrong. Keep an open mind while researching your question.
• Think for yourself. Avoid getting carried away in the research and buying into other people’s opinions.
• Reverse things. Sometimes it seems obvious that one thing causes another, but what if it’s the other way around?
• Evaluate existing evidence. If you work with sources, it’s crucial to evaluate and question them.

Another way to improve your reasoning skills is to do critical thinking exercises. Here are some of them:

Thanks for reading through our article! We hope that you found it helpful and learned some new information. If you liked it, feel free to share it with your friends.

Further reading:

• Critical Writing: Examples & Brilliant Tips [2024]
• How to Write a Rhetorical Analysis Essay: Outline, Steps, & Examples
• How to Write an Analysis Essay: Examples + Writing Guide
• How to Write a Critique Paper: Tips + Critique Essay Examples
• How to Write a Literary Analysis Essay Step by Step
• Critical Thinking and Writing: University of Kent
• Steps to Critical Thinking: Rasmussen University
• 3 Simple Habits to Improve Your Critical Thinking: Harvard Business Review
• In-Class Writing Exercises: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
• Demonstrating Critical Thinking in Writing: University of South Australia
• 15 Questions that Teachers and Parents Can Ask Kids to Encourage Critical Thinking: The Hun School
• Questions to Provoke Critical Thinking: Brown University
• How to Write a College Critical Thinking Essay: Seattle PI
• Introductions: What They Do: Royal Literary Fund
• Thesis Statements: Arizona State University
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Critical Thinking Essay Examples

The main aspects of critical thinking.

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Critical Thinking: Definition, the Importance and Problem Solving

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How Develop the Ability of Critical Thinking

Critical thinking not only involves practice and mental discipline, it allows a reader to form a judgment from analyzing facts. But this does not mean that only a few can learn the ability to think critically. In critical thinking reflection essay we will understand how...

Importance of Critical Thinking: a Reflection on Its Impact

Encouraging people to improve their mindset and think deeper will help them better themselves as people and individuals. Developing a good mindset may be hard to achieve but will be worth it in the end, according to philosopher Minke Tromp. Changing mindsets can affect people...

Impacts of Critical Thinking on Growth Mindset

In the articles “Learning to Think” and “Growth Mindset”, the authors describe how critical thinking can impact lives immensely. Both articles present the idea that if people think positive then their results will become more positive. While developing a more positive mindset may be tough...

Fake News and Critical Thinking in Information Evaluation

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The Importance of Critical Thinking Skills for My Education

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Critical Thinking Thesis: Learning Disabilities, Specifically Dyslexia

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Philosophical Problems and Critical Thinking

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The Role of Mental Imagery for an Athlete

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About Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is the analysis of available facts, evidence, observations, and arguments to form a judgment.

The list of core critical thinking skills includes observation, interpretation, analysis, inference, evaluation, explanation, and metacognition. In addition to possessing strong critical-thinking skills, one must be disposed to engage in problems and decisions using those skills. Critical thinking employs not only logic but broad intellectual criteria such as clarity, credibility, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, significance, and fairness.

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