what is a religious experience essay

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religious experience

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religious experience , specific experience such as wonder at the infinity of the cosmos, the sense of awe and mystery in the presence of the sacred or holy, feeling of dependence on a divine power or an unseen order, the sense of guilt and anxiety accompanying belief in a divine judgment, or the feeling of peace that follows faith in divine forgiveness. Some thinkers also point to a religious aspect to the purpose of life and the destiny of the individual.

In the first sense, religious experience means an encounter with the divine in a way analogous to encounters with other persons and things in the world. In the second case, reference is made not to an encounter with a divine being but rather to the apprehension of a quality of holiness or rightness in reality or to the fact that all experience can be viewed in relation to the ground from which it springs. In short, religious experience means both special experience of the divine or ultimate and the viewing of any experience as pointing to the divine or ultimate.

“Religious experience” was not widely used as a technical term prior to the publication of The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) by William James , an eminent American psychologist and philosopher, but the interpretation of religious concepts and doctrine s in terms of individual experience reaches back at least to 16th-century Spanish mystics and to the age of the Protestant reformers. A special emphasis on the importance of experience in religion is found in the works of such thinkers as Jonathan Edwards , Friedrich Schleiermacher , and Rudolf Otto . Basic to the experiential approach is the belief that it allows for a firsthand understanding of religion as an actual force in human life, in contrast with religion taken either as church membership or as belief in authoritative doctrines. The attempt to interpret such concepts as God, faith , conversion, sin , salvation , and worship through personal experience and its expressions opened up a wealth of material for the investigation of religion by psychologists, historians, anthropologists, and sociologists as well as by theologians and philosophers. A focus on religious experience is especially important for phenomenologists (thinkers who seek the basic structures of human consciousness ) and existentialist philosophers ( see phenomenology of religion ).

A number of controversial issues have emerged from these studies, involving not only different conceptions of the nature and structure of religious experience but also different views of the manner in which it is to be evaluated and the sort of evaluation possible from the standpoint of a given discipline . Four such issues are basic: (1) whether religious experience points to special experiences of the divine or whether any experience may be regarded as religious by virtue of becoming related to the divine; (2) the kinds of differentia that can serve to distinguish religion or the religious from both secular life and other forms of spirituality , such as morality and art; (3) whether religious experience can be understood and properly evaluated in terms of its origins and its psychological or sociological conditions or is sui generis , calling for interpretation in its own terms; and (4) whether religious experience has cognitive status, involving encounter with a being, beings, or a power transcending human consciousness , or is merely subjective and composed entirely of ideas and feelings that have no reference beyond themselves. The last issue, transposed in accordance with either a positivist outlook or some types of empiricism , which restrict assertible reality to the realm of sense experience, would be resolved at once by the claim that the problem cannot be meaningfully discussed, since key terms, such as “God” and “power,” are strictly meaningless.

Proponents of mysticism , such as Rudolf Otto, Rufus Jones , and W.T. Stace , maintained the validity of immediate experience of the divine, and theologians such as Emil Brunner stressed the self-authenticating character of the human being’s encounter with God. Naturalistically oriented psychologists, such as Sigmund Freud and J.H. Leuba , rejected such claims and explained religion in psychological and genetic terms as a projection of human wishes and desires. Philosophers such as William James, Josiah Royce , William E. Hocking, and Wilbur M. Urban represented an idealist tradition in interpreting religion, stressing the concepts of purpose, value, and meaning as essential for understanding the nature of God. Naturalist philosophers, of whom John Dewey was typical, have focused on the “religious” as a quality of experience and an attitude toward life that is more expressive of the human spirit than of any supernatural reality. The theologians Douglas Clyde Macintosh and Henry Nelson Wieman sought to build an “empirical theology” on the basis of religious experience understood as involving a direct perception of God. Unlike Macintosh, Wieman held that such a perception is sensory in character. Personalist philosophers, such as Edgar S. Brightman and Peter Bertocci, have regarded the person as the basic category for understanding all experience and have interpreted religious experience as the medium through which God is apprehended as the cosmic person. Existential thinkers , such as Søren Kierkegaard , Gabriel Marcel , and Paul Tillich , have seen God manifested in experience in the form of a power that overcomes estrangement and enables human beings to fulfill themselves as integrated personalities. Process philosophers , such as Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne , have held that the idea of God emerges in religious experience but that the nature and reality of God are problems calling for logical argument and metaphysical interpretation, in which emphasis falls on the relation between God and the world being realized in a temporal process. Logical empiricists (also called logical positivists ), of whom A.J. Ayer was typical, have held that religious and theological expressions are without literal significance, because there is no way in which they can be either justified or falsified (refuted). On this view, religious experience is entirely emotive , lacking all cognitive value. Analytic philosophers following the lead of Ludwig Wittgenstein , an Austrian British thinker, approach religious experience through the structure of religious language, attempting to discover exactly how this language functions within the community of believers who use it.

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Religious Experience

Religious experiences can be characterized generally as experiences that seem to the person having them to be of some objective reality and to have some religious import. That reality can be an individual, a state of affairs, a fact, or even an absence, depending on the religious tradition the experience is a part of. A wide variety of kinds of experience fall under the general rubric of religious experience. The concept is vague, and the multiplicity of kinds of experiences that fall under it makes it difficult to capture in any general account. Part of that vagueness comes from the term ‘religion,’ which is difficult to define in any way that does not either rule out institutions that clearly are religions, or include terms that can only be understood in the light of a prior understanding of what religions are. Nevertheless, we can make some progress in elucidating the concept by distinguishing it from distinct but related concepts.

First, religious experience is to be distinguished from religious feelings, in the same way that experience in general is to be distinguished from feelings in general. A feeling of elation, for example, even if it occurs in a religious context, does not count in itself as a religious experience, even if the subject later comes to think that the feeling was caused by some objective reality of religious significance. An analogy with sense experience is helpful here. If a subject feels a general feeling of happiness, not on account of anything in particular, and later comes to believe the feeling was caused by the presence of a particular person, that fact does not transform the feeling of happiness into a perception of the person. Just as a mental event, to be a perception of an object, must in some sense seem to be an experience of that object, a religiously oriented mental event, to be a religious experience, must in some way seem to be an experience of a religiously significant reality. So, although religious feelings may be involved in many, or even most, religious experiences, they are not the same thing. Discussions of religious experience in terms of feelings, like Schleiermacher’s (1998) “feeling of absolute dependence,” or Otto’s (1923) feeling of the numinous, were important early contributions to theorizing about religious experience, but some have since then argued (see Gellman 2001 and Alston 1991, for example) that religious affective states are not all there is to religious experience. To account for the experiences qua experiences, we must go beyond subjective feelings.

Religious experience is also to be distinguished from mystical experience. Although there is obviously a close connection between the two, and mystical experiences are religious experiences, not all religious experiences qualify as mystical. The word ‘mysticism’ has been understood in many different ways. James (1902) took mysticism to necessarily involve ineffability, which would rule out many cases commonly understood to be mystical. Alston (1991) adopted the term grudgingly as the best of a bad lot and gave it a semi-technical meaning. But in its common, non-technical sense, mysticism is a specific religious system or practice, deliberately undertaken in order to come to some realization or insight, to come to unity with the divine, or to experience the ultimate reality directly. At the very least, religious experiences form a broader category; many religious experiences, like those of Saint Paul, Arjuna, Moses, Muhammad, and many others come unsought, not as the result of some deliberate practice undertaken to produce an experience.

1. Types of Religious Experience

2. language and experience, 3. epistemological issues, 4. the diverse objects of religious experience, other internet resources, related entries.

Reports of religious experiences reveal a variety of different kinds. Perhaps most are visual or auditory presentations (visions and auditions), but not through the physical eyes or ears. Subjects report “seeing” or “hearing,” but quickly disavow any claim to seeing or hearing with bodily sense organs. Such experiences are easy to dismiss as hallucinations, but the subjects of the experience frequently claim that though it is entirely internal, like a hallucination or imagination, it is nevertheless a veridical experience, through some spiritual analog of the eye or ear (James 1902 and Alston 1991 cite many examples).

In other cases, the language of “seeing” is used in its extended sense of realization, as when a yogi is said to “see” his or her identity with Brahman; Buddhists speak of “seeing things as they are” as one of the hallmarks of true enlightenment, where this means grasping or realizing the emptiness of things, but not in a purely intellectual way.

A third type is the religious experience that comes through sensory experiences of ordinary objects, but seems to carry with it extra information about some supramundane reality. Examples include experiencing God in nature, in the starry sky, or a flower, or the like. Another person standing nearby would see exactly the same sky or flower, but would not necessarily have the further religious content to his or her experience. There are also cases in which the religious experience just is an ordinary perception, but the physical object is itself the object of religious significance. Moses’s experience of the burning bush, or the Buddha’s disciples watching him levitate, are examples of this type. A second person standing nearby would see exactly the same phenomenon. Witnesses to miracles are having that kind of religious experience, whether they understand it that way or not.

A fourth type of religious experience is harder to describe: it can’t be characterized accurately in sensory language, even analogically, yet the subject of the experience insists that the experience is a real, direct awareness of some religiously significant reality external to the subject. These kinds of experiences are usually described as “ineffable.” Depending on one’s purposes, other ways of dividing up religious experiences will suggest themselves. For example, William James (1902) divides experiences into “healthy-minded” and “sick-minded,” according to the personality of the subject, which colors the content of the experience itself. Keith Yandell (1993, 25–32) divided them into five categories, according to the content of the experiences: monotheistic, nirvanic (enlightenment experiences associated with Buddhism), kevalic (enlightenment experiences associated with Jainism), moksha (experiences of release from karma, associated with Hinduism), and nature experiences. Differences of object certainly make differences in content, and so make differences in what can be said about the experiences. See Section 4 for further discussion of this issue.

Many have thought that there is some special problem with religious language, that it can’t be meaningful in the same way that ordinary language is. The Logical Positivists claimed that language is meaningful only insofar as it is moored in our experiences of the physical world. Since we can’t account for religious language by linking it to experiences of the physical world, such language is meaningless. Even though religious claims look in every way like ordinary assertions about the world, their lack of empirical consequences makes them meaningless. Ayer (1952) calls such language “metaphysical,” and therefore meaningless. He says, “That a transcendent god exists 3s a metaphysical assertion, and therefore not literally significant.” The principle of verification went through many formulations as it faced criticism. But if it is understood as a claim about meaning in ordinary language, it seems to be self-undermining, since there is no empirical way to verify it. Eventually, that approach to language fell out of favor, but some still use a modified, weaker version to criticize religious language. For example, Antony Flew (Flew and MacIntyre, 1955) relies on a principle to the effect that if a claim is not falsifiable, it is somehow illegitimate. Martin (1990) and Nielsen (1985) invoke a principle that combines verifiability and falsifiability; to be meaningful, a claim must be one or the other. It is not clear that even these modified and weakened versions of the verification principle entirely escape self-undermining. Even if they do, they seem to take other kinds of language with them—like moral language, talk about the future or past, and talk about the contents of others’ minds — that we might be loath to lose. Moreover, to deny the meaningfulness of religious-experience claims on the grounds that it is not moored in experience begs the question, in that it assumes that religious experiences are not real experiences.

Another possibility is to allow that religious claims are meaningful, but they are not true or false, because they should not be understood as assertions. Braithwaite (1970), for example, understands religious claims to be expressions of commitments to sets of values. On such a view, what appears to be a claim about a religious experience is not in fact a claim at all. It might be that some set of mental events, with which the experience itself can be identified, would be the ground and prompting of the claim, but it would not properly be what the claim is about.

A second challenge to religious-experience claims comes from Wittgensteinian accounts of language. Wittgenstein (1978) muses at some length on the differences between how ordinary language is used, and how religious language is used. Others (see Phillips 1970, for example), following Wittgenstein, have tried to give an explanation of the strangeness of religious language by invoking the idea of a language-game. Each language-game has its own rules, including its own procedures for verification. As a result, it is a mistake to treat it like ordinary language, expecting evidence in the ordinary sense, in the same way that it would be a mistake to ask for the evidence for a joke. “I saw God” should not be treated in the same way as “I saw Elvis.” Some even go so far as to say the religious language-game is isolated from other practices, such that it would be a mistake to derive any claims about history, geography, or cosmology from them, never mind demand the same kind of evidence for them. On this view, religious experiences should not be treated as comparable to sense experiences, but that does not entail that they are not important, nor that they are not in some sense veridical, in that they could still be avenues for important insights about reality. Such a view can be attributed to D. Z. Phillips (1970).

While this may account for some of the unusual aspects of religious language, it certainly does not capture what many religious people think about the claims they make. As creationism illustrates, many religious folk think it is perfectly permissible to draw empirical conclusions from religious doctrine. Hindus and Buddhists for many centuries thought there was a literal Mount Meru in the middle of the (flat, disc-shaped) world. It would be very odd if “The Buddha attained enlightenment under the bo tree” had to be given a very different treatment from “The Buddha ate rice under the bo tree” because the first is a religious claim and the second is an ordinary empirical claim. There are certainly entailment relations between religious and non-religious claims, too: “Jesus died for my sins” straightforwardly entails “Jesus died.”

Since the subjects of religious experiences tend to take them to be real experiences of some external reality, we may ask what reason there is to think they are right. That is to say, do religious experiences amount to good reasons for religious belief? One answer to that question is what is often called the Argument from Religious Experience: Religious experiences are in all relevant respects like sensory experiences; sensory experiences are excellent grounds for beliefs about the physical world; so religious experiences are excellent grounds for religious beliefs. This argument, or one very like it, can be found in Swinburne (1979), Alston (1991), Plantinga (1981, 2000), Netland (2022) and others. Critics of this approach generally find ways in which religious experiences are different from sensory experiences, and argue that those differences are enough to undermine the evidential value of the experiences. Swinburne (1979) invokes what he calls the “Principle of Credulity,” according to which one is justified in believing that what seems to one to be present actually is present, unless some appropriate defeater is operative. He then discusses a variety of circumstances that would be defeaters in the ordinary sensory case, and argues that those defeaters do not obtain, or not always, in the case of religious experience. To reject his argument, one would have to show that religious experience is unlike sensory experience in that in the religious case, one or more of the defeaters always obtains. Anyone who accepts the principle has excellent reason to accept the deliverances of religious experience, unless he or she believes that defeaters always, or almost always, obtain.

Plantinga offers a different kind of argument. According to Cartesian-style foundationalism, in order to count as justified, a belief must either be grounded in other justified beliefs, or derive its justification from some special status, like infallibility, incorrigibility, or indubitability. There is a parallel view about knowledge. Plantinga (1981) argued that such a foundationalism is inconsistent with holding one’s own ordinary beliefs about the world to be justified (or knowledge), because our ordinary beliefs derived from sense-experience aren’t derived from anything infallible, indubitable, or incorrigible. In fact, we typically treat them as foundational, in need of no further justification. If we hold sensory beliefs to be properly basic, then we have to hold similarly formed religious beliefs, formed on experiences of God manifesting himself to a believer (Plantinga calls them ‘M-beliefs’), as properly basic. He proposed that human beings have a faculty—what John Calvin called the ‘ sensus divinitatis ’—that allows them to be aware of God’s actions or dispositions with respect to them. If beliefs formed by sense-experience can be properly basic, then beliefs formed by this faculty cannot, in any principled way, be denied that same status. His developed theory of warrant (2000) implies that, if the beliefs are true, then they are warranted. One cannot attack claims of religious experience without first addressing the question as to whether the religious claims are true. He admits that, since there are people in other religious traditions who have based beliefs about religious matters on similar purported manifestations, they may be able to make the same argument about their own religious experiences.

Alston develops a general theory of doxastic practices (constellations of belief-forming mechanisms, together with characteristic background assumptions and sets of defeaters), gives an account of what it is to rationally engage in such a practice, and then argues that at least the practice of forming beliefs on the basis of Christian religious experiences fulfills those requirements. If we think of the broad doxastic practices we currently employ, we see that some of them can be justified by the use of other practices. The practice of science, for example, reduces mostly to the practices of sense-perception, deductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning (memory and testimony also make contributions, of course). The justificatory status the practice gives to its product beliefs derives from those more basic practices. Most, however, cannot be so reduced. How are they justified, then? It seems that they cannot be justified non-circularly, that is, without the use of premises derived from the practices themselves. Our only justification for continuing to trust these practices is that they are firmly established, interwoven with other practices and projects of ours, and have “stood the test of time” by producing mostly consistent sets of beliefs. They produce a sufficiently consistent set of beliefs if they don’t produce massive, unavoidable contradictions on central matters, either internally, or with the outputs of other equally well-established practices. If that’s all there is to be said about our ordinary practices, then we ought to extend the same status to other practices that have the same features. He then argues that the Christian practice of belief-formation on the basis of religious experience does have those features. Like Plantinga, he admits that such an argument might be equally available to other religious practices; it all depends on whether the practice in question generates massive and unavoidable contradictions, on central matters, either internally, or with other equally well-established practices. To undermine this argument, one would have to show either that Alston’s criteria for rationality of a practice are too permissive, or that religious practices never escape massive contradictions.

Both Plantinga’s and Alston’s defense of the epistemic value of religious experiences turn crucially on some degree of similarity with sense-experience. But they are not simple arguments from analogy; not just any similarities will do to make the positive argument, and not just any dissimilarities will do to defeat the argument. The similarities or dissimilarities need to be epistemologically relevant. It is not enough, for example, to show that religious experiences do not typically allow for independent public verification, unless one wants to give up on other perfectly respectable practices, like rational intuition, that also lack that feature.

The two most important defeaters on the table for claims of the epistemic authority of religious experience are the fact of religious diversity, and the availability of naturalistic explanations for religious experiences. Religious diversity is a prima facie defeater for the veridicality of religious experiences in the same way that wildly conflicting eyewitness reports undermine each other. If the reports are at all similar, then it may be reasonable to conclude that there is some truth to the testimony, at least in broad outline. A version of this objection is the argument from divine hiddenness (cf. Lovering 2013). If God exists, and shows himself to some people in religious experiences, then the fact that he doesn’t do so for more people, more widely distributed, requires some explanation. Axtell provides another version of that objection. He argues that to insist that one’s own religious convictions are true in the face of the diversity of religions is to reason counter-inductively, and is therefore irrational. The reasoning is counter-inductive because your own convictions come from the same kinds of epistemic sources (investment in testimonial authority) as those you deem to be wrong, so if you are right, it is just a matter of luck. But if two eyewitness reports disagree on the most basic facts about what happened, then it seems that neither gives you good grounds for any beliefs about what happened. It certainly seems that the contents of religious-experience reports are radically different from one another. Some subjects of religious experiences report experience of nothingness as the ultimate reality, some a vast impersonal consciousness in which we all participate, some an infinitely perfect, personal creator. To maintain that one’s own religious experiences are veridical, one would have to a) find some common core to all these experiences, such that in spite of differences of detail, they could reasonably be construed as experiences of the same reality, or b) insist that one’s own experiences are veridical, and that therefore those of other traditions are not veridical. The first is difficult to manage, in the face of the manifest differences across religions. Nevertheless, John Hick (1989) develops a view of that kind, making use of a Kantian two-worlds epistemology. The idea is that the object of these experiences, in itself, is one and the same reality, but it is experienced phenomenally by different people differently. Thus, is possible to see how one and the same object can be experienced in ways that are completely incompatible with one another. This approach is only as plausible as the Kantian framework itself is. Jerome Gellman (2001) proposes a similar idea, without the Kantian baggage. Solutions like these leave the problem untouched: If the different practices produce experiences the contents of which are inconsistent with one another, one of the practices must be unreliable. Alston (1991) and Plantinga (2000) develop the second kind of answer. The general strategy is to argue that, from within a tradition, a person acquires epistemic resources not available to those outside the tradition, just as travelling to the heart of a jungle allows one to see things that those who have not made the journey can’t see. As a result, even if people in other traditions can make the same argument, it is still reasonable to say that some are right and the others are wrong. The things that justify my beliefs still justify them, even if you have comparable resources justifying a contrary view.

Naturalistic explanations for religious experiences are thought to undermine their epistemic value because, if the naturalistic explanation is sufficient to explain the experience, we have no grounds for positing anything beyond that naturalistic cause. Freud (1927) and Marx (1876/1977) are frequently held up as offering such explanations. Freud claims that religious experiences can be adequately explained by psychological mechanisms having their root in early childhood experience and psychodynamic tensions. Marx similarly attributes religious belief in general to materialistic economic forces. Both claim that, since the hidden psychological or economic explanations are sufficient to explain the origins of religious belief, there is no need to suppose, in addition, that the beliefs are true. Freud’s theory of religion has few adherents, even among the psychoanalytically inclined, and Marx’s view likewise has all but been abandoned, but that is not to say that something in the neighborhood might not be true. More recently, neurological explanations of religious experience have been put forward as reasons to deny the veridicality of the experiences. Events in the brain that occur during meditative states and other religious experiences are very similar to events that happen during certain kinds of seizures, or with certain kinds of mental disorders, and can also be induced with drugs. Therefore, it is argued, there is nothing more to religious experiences than what happens in seizures, mental disorders, or drug experiences. Some who are studying the neurological basis of religious experience do not infer that they are not veridical (see, e.g., d’Aquili and Newberg 1999), but many do. Guthrie (1995), for example, argues that religion has its origin in our tendency to anthropomorphize phenomena in our vicinity, seeing agency where there is none.

There are general problems with all kinds of naturalistic explanations as defeaters. First of all, as Gellman (2001) points out, most such explanations (like the psychoanalytic and socio-political ones) are put forward as hypotheses, not as established facts. The proponent assumes that the experiences are not veridical, then casts around for an explanation. This is not true of the neurological explanations, but they face another kind of weakness noted by Ellwood (1999): every experience, whatever its source, is accompanied by a corresponding neurological state. To argue that the experience is illusory because there is a corresponding brain state is fallacious. The same reasoning would lead us to conclude that sensory experiences are illusory, since in each sensory experience, there is some corresponding neurological state that is just like the state that occurs in the corresponding hallucination. The proponent of the naturalistic explanation as a defeater owes us some reason to believe that his or her argument is not just another skeptical argument from the veil of perception.

One further epistemological worry accompanies religious experience. James claimed that, while mystical experiences proved authoritative grounds for belief in the person experiencing them, they cannot give grounds for a person to whom the experience is reported. In other words, my experience is evidence for me, but not for you. Bovens (2012) gives a modern expansion and explanation of this claim. The claim can be understood in a variety of ways, depending on the kind of normativity that attaches to the purported evidential relation. Some (see Oakes 1976, for example) have claimed that religious experiences epistemically can necessitate belief; that is, anyone who has the experience and doesn’t form the corresponding belief is making an epistemic mistake, much like a person who, in normal conditions, refuses to believe his or her eyes. More commonly, defenders of the epistemic value of religious experience claim that the experiences make it epistemically permissible to form the belief, but you may also be justified in not forming the belief. The testimony of other people about what they have experienced is much the same. In some cases, a person would be unjustified in rejecting the testimony of others, and in other cases, one would be justified in accepting it, but need not accept it. This leaves us with three possibilities, on the assumption that the subject of the experience is justified in forming a religious belief on the basis of his or her experience, and that he or she tells someone else about it: the testimony might provide compelling evidence for the hearer, such that he or she would be unjustified in rejecting the claim; the testimony might provide non-compelling justification for the hearer to accept the claim; or the testimony might fail to provide any kind of grounds for the hearer to accept the claim. When a subject makes a claim on the basis of an ordinary experience, it might fall into any one of these three categories, depending on the claim’s content and the epistemic situation of the hearer. The most natural thing to say about religious experience claims is that they work the same way (on the assumption that they give the subject of the experience, who is making the claim, any justification for his or her beliefs). James, and some others after him, claim that testimony about religious experiences cannot fall under either of the first two categories. If that’s true, it must be because of something special about the nature of the experiences. If we assume that the experiences cannot be shown a priori to be defective somehow, and that religious language is intelligible—and if we do not make these assumptions, then the question of religious testimony doesn’t even arise—then it must be because the evidential value of the experience is so small that it cannot survive transmission to another person; that is, it must be that in the ordinary act of reporting an experience to someone else, there is some defeater at work that is always stronger than whatever evidential force the experience itself has. While there are important differences between ordinary sense-experience and religious experience (clarity of the experience, amount of information it contains, presence of competing explanations, and the like), it is not clear whether the differences are great enough to disqualify religious testimony always and everywhere.

Just as there are a variety of religions, each with its own claims about the nature of reality, there are a variety of objects and states of affairs that the subjects of these experiences claim to be aware of. Much analytic philosophy of religion has been done in Europe and the nations descended from Europe, so much of the discussion has been in terms of God as conceived of in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. In those traditions, the object of religious experiences is typically God himself, understood as an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, free, and perfectly good spirit. God, for reasons of his own, reveals himself to people, some of them unbidden (like Moses, Muhammad, and Saint Paul), and some because they have undertaken a rigorous practice to draw closer to him (like the mystics). To say that an experience comes unbidden is not to say that nothing the subject has done has prepared her, or primed her, for the experience (see Luhrmann 2012); it is only to claim that the subject has not undertaken any practice aimed at producing a religious experience. In such experiences, God frequently delivers a message at the same time, but he need not. He is always identifiable as the same being who revealed himself to others in the same tradition. Other experiences can be of angels, demons, saints, heaven, hell, or other religiously significant objects.

In other traditions, it is not necessarily a personal being who is the object of the experience, or even a positive being at all. In the traditions that find their origin in the Indian subcontinent—chiefly Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism—the object of religious experiences is some basic fact or feature of reality, rather than some entity separate from the universe. In the orthodox Hindu traditions, one may certainly have an experience of a god or some other supernatural entity (like Arjuna’s encounter with Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita), but a great many important kinds of experiences are of Brahman, and its identity with the self. In Yoga, which is based in the Samkhya understanding of the nature of things, the mystical practice of yoga leads to a calming and stilling of the mind, which allows the yogi to apprehend directly that he or she is not identical to, or even causally connected with, the physical body, and this realization is what liberates him or her from suffering.

In Theravada Buddhism, the goal of meditation is to “see things as they are,” which is to see them as unsatisfactory, impermanent, and not-self (Gowans 2003, 191). The meditator, as he or she makes progress along the way, sheds various delusions and attachments. The last one to go is the delusion that he or she is a self. To see this is to see all of reality as made up of sequences of momentary events, each causally dependent on the ones that went before. There are no abiding substances, and no eternal souls. Seeing reality that way extinguishes the fires of craving, and liberates the meditator from the necessity of rebirth (Laumakis 2008, 158–161). Seeing things as they are involves removing from the mind all the delusions that stand in the way of such seeing, which is done by meditation practices that develop the meditator’s mastery of his or her own mind. The type of meditation that brings this mastery and allows the meditator to see the true nature of things is called Vipassana (insight) meditation. It typically involves some object of meditation, which can be some feature of the meditator him- or herself, some feature of the physical or mental world, or some abstraction, which then becomes the focus of the meditator’s concentration and examination. In the end, it is hoped, the meditator will see in the object the unsatisfactory and impermanent nature of things and that there is no self to be found in them. At the moment of that insight, nirvana is achieved. While the experience of nirvana is essentially the realization of a kind of insight, it is also accompanied by other experiential elements, especially of the cessation of negative mental states. Nirvana is described in the Buddhist canon as the extinction of the fires of desire. The Theravada tradition teaches other kinds of meditation that can help the meditator make progress, but the final goal can’t be achieved without vipassana meditation.

In the Mahayana Buddhist traditions, this idea of the constantly fluctuating nature of the universe is extended in various ways. For some, even those momentary events that make up the flow of the world are understood to be empty of inherent existence (the idea of inherent existence is understood differently in different traditions) to the point that what one sees in the enlightenment experience is the ultimate emptiness ( sunyata ) of all things. In the Yogacara school of Mahayana Buddhism, this is understood as emptiness of external existence; that is, to see things as they are is to see them as all mind-dependent. In the Zen school of Mahayana Buddhism, the enlightenment experience ( kensho ) reveals that reality contains no distinctions or dualities. Since concepts and language always involve distinctions, which always involve duality, the insight so gained cannot be achieved conceptually or expressed linguistically. In all Mahayana schools, what brings enlightenment is direct realization of sunyata as a basic fact about reality.

The situation is somewhat more complicated in the Chinese traditions. The idea of religious experience seems to be almost completely absent in the Confucian tradition; the social world looms large, and the idea of an ultimate reality that needs to be experienced becomes much less prominent. Before the arrival of Buddhism in China, Confucianism was primarily a political and ethical system, with no particular concern with the transcendent (though people who identified themselves as Confucians frequently engaged in Chinese folk religious practices). Nevertheless, meditation (and therefore something that could be called “religious experience”) did come to play a role in Confucian practice in the tenth century, as Confucian thought began to be influenced by Buddhist and Daoist thought. The resulting view is known as Neo-Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism retains the Mencian doctrine that human beings are by nature good, but in need of purification. Since goodness resides in every person, then examination of oneself should reveal the nature of goodness, through the experience of the vital force within ( qi ). The form of meditation that arises from this line of thought (“quiet sitting” or “sitting and forgetting”) are very like Buddhist vipassana meditation, but there is no value placed on any particular insight gained, though one can experience the principle of unity ( li ) behind the world. Success is measured in gradual moral improvement.

The Daoist ideal is to come to an understanding of the Dao, the fundamental nature of reality that explains all things in the world, and live according to it. Knowledge of the Dao is essential to the good life, but this knowledge cannot be learned from discourses, or transmitted by teaching. It is only known by experiential acquaintance. The Dao gives the universe a kind of grain, or flow, going against which causes human difficulty. The good human life is then one that respects the flow of Dao, and goes along with it. This is what is meant by “life in accordance with nature,” and is the insight behind the Daoist admonition of wu wei, sometimes glossed as “actionless action.” By paying attention to reality as it presents itself, a person can learn what the Dao is, and can experience unity with it. This picture of reality, along with the picture of how one can come to know it, heavily influenced the development of Ch’an Buddhism, which became Zen.

All of the same epistemological problems that arise for theism will also arise for these other traditions, though in different forms. That is, one can ask of experiences of Brahman, Sunyata, the Dao, and anything else that is the object of religious experience whether there is any reason to think the experience is veridical. One can also ask whether testimony about those experiences carries the same weight as ordinary experience. Naturalistic explanations can also be offered to these experiences. It is equally true that the responses that have been offered to these objections in a theistic context are also available to defenders of non-theistic religious experience.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Religious Experience Resources , by Wesley Wildman, Boston University.

empiricism: logical | hiddenness of God | James, William | mysticism | perception: epistemological problems of | religion: epistemology of | religious diversity | testimony: epistemological problems of

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Essay on Religious Experience

Students are often asked to write an essay on Religious Experience in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

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100 Words Essay on Religious Experience

Understanding religious experience.

Religious experience is a personal encounter with the divine or sacred. It is a feeling or perception that someone has when they come in contact with a higher power. This could be God, spirits, or other supernatural beings. These experiences are often very powerful and can change a person’s life.

Types of Religious Experiences

Impact of religious experiences.

Religious experiences can have a big impact on a person’s life. They can lead to a stronger faith, a change in behavior, or a new understanding of the world. Some people might even decide to dedicate their lives to their faith after having a religious experience.

Interpreting Religious Experiences

Interpreting religious experiences can be tricky. Some people might see them as proof of their faith, while others might see them as psychological events. It’s important to remember that religious experiences are personal and can mean different things to different people.

250 Words Essay on Religious Experience

What is a religious experience.

A religious experience is a special moment when a person feels a deep connection with a higher power. This higher power could be God, a spirit, or any divine being. These experiences are often very personal and can have a big impact on a person’s life. They can happen in different ways. Some people might have a religious experience during prayer, while others might have one while looking at nature.

There are many types of religious experiences. For instance, some people might have a ‘mystical experience’. This is when they feel a deep sense of unity with the universe. Some people might have a ‘conversion experience’. This is when they change their beliefs or their way of life because of a religious experience. Other people might have a ‘miracle experience’. This is when they believe that something impossible has happened because of the power of God.

Religious experiences can change a person’s life. They can make a person feel more peaceful, happy, and hopeful. They can also make a person feel more connected to other people and to the world around them. Some people might start to live in a different way after a religious experience. They might become kinder, more loving, or more understanding.

In conclusion, a religious experience is a powerful moment of connection with a higher power. It can happen in many different ways and can have a big impact on a person’s life. It is a deeply personal and often life-changing event.

500 Words Essay on Religious Experience

A religious experience is a special event or moment in a person’s life when they feel a strong connection to a higher power. This higher power could be God, a spirit, or a divine being. These experiences can vary greatly from person to person. Some people might see or hear things that others cannot. Others may have a deep feeling of peace and love. These experiences can happen anywhere, anytime – during prayer, in a dream, or even when simply looking at nature.

A third type is a “mystical” experience. This is a feeling of being one with the universe or God. It is often described as a deep sense of peace and love. Lastly, there’s a “conversion” experience. This is when a person decides to change their beliefs or way of life because of a religious experience.

Effects of Religious Experiences

Religious experiences can have a big impact on a person’s life. They can change how a person thinks and behaves. For example, a person who has a religious experience might decide to be kinder to others. They might also start to pray more often or read religious texts.

Understanding Religious Experiences

In conclusion, religious experiences are special moments when people feel a strong connection to a higher power. They can take many forms and have a big impact on a person’s life. Whether you believe in them or not, they are an important part of many people’s lives.

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Understanding Religious Experience

Religious experience: union with a greater power.

Religious experience can be understood in at least three different ways: as union with a greater power, a psychological effect (such as an illusion) and as the product of a physiological effect.

Union with a greater power

• The problem is that as the experience is merely subjective and private, how can the person who has it be certain of this?

The principle of credulity

• The principle states that we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be unless we have evidence that we are mistaken.
• This is an axiomatic (obviously true) principle of rationality which we apply all the time without even considering it in everyday life.

Quotation from Swinburne

• “If you say the contrary—never trust appearances until it is proved that they are reliable—you will never have any beliefs at all. For what would show that appearances are reliable, except more appearances? And, if you cannot trust appearances as such, you cannot trust these new ones either. Just as you must trust your five ordinary senses, so it is equally rational to trust your religious sense.”

Exception to axiomatic principle

• So Swinburne asks why we make an exception to an axiomatic principle of rationality when it comes to religion.

Common core to experiences

• William James used a psychological approach and gathered a large range of testimonies. He argued for a ‘common core’ to religious experience.

William James' conclusions

• The visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance.
• Union/harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end.
• Prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof - be that spirit “God” or “law” - is a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world.

William James - characteristics

• A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life and takes the form of either lyrical enchantment or of appeal to earnestness and heroism.
• An assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation to others, a preponderance of loving affections.

Mackie & Dawkins' criticisms

• Of James, Mackie says: even what he classes as genuinely religious experiences (ones which leave ‘good dispositions’ in the believer) do not intrinsically resist explanation in purely human terms.
• Others such as Dawkins have argued similarly: psychological or physiological explanations are far more likely given the prior improbability of a divine being who interacts with humans.

Religious Experience: Psychological & Physiological Effects

A psychological effect - Freud

• Often experiences can deceive us (like hallucinations). Some people may be mistaken and even self-deluding.
• Freud thought that we feel helpless, need a father figure and create one unconsciously with religious experience, which helps us satisfy the need for security.

A psychological effect - Jung

• Jung believed that archetypes in the collective unconscious can cause religious experience.
• Just because some people are mistaken or hallucinate, it doesn’t mean all religious experience is of this character.
• Just because God appears as a father in the way we need Him, it doesn’t prove that religious experience is not true – it may be that God appears that way because he has placed that deep need in us.

Physiological effects

• There are well-documented links between the body and the mind.
• There are ‘psychosomatic’ factors (which means caused by anxiety/worry instead of injury) in some illnesses, such as psoriasis (a skin disease) and high blood pressure. And the mind can affect things like heart rate, feelings of nausea and so on.
• As many religious experiences can be subtle and feeling-based, it is possible that physiological factors may be a major cause.

Ascetics & magnetic fields

• Ascetic practices (avoiding pleasures, such as fasting) can lead to hallucinations.
• The Persinger Helmet - a helmet Persinger invented to study creativity, religious experience and the impact of lobe stimulation - shows how manipulating magnetic fields in the brain can give rise to feelings of a ‘presence’.

Causes - limited understanding

• We still have a very limited understanding of how the brain works and interacts with physical processes in other parts of the body – it is possible that we will understand religious experiences in natural terms when our knowledge grows.

1 Philosophy of Religion

1.1 Ancient Philosophical Influences: Plato

1.1.1 Plato's Understanding of Reality

1.1.2 Plato's Theory of Forms

1.1.3 Plato's Analogy of the Cave

1.1.4 The Purpose of Plato's Analogy of the Cave

1.1.5 Evaluation of Plato's Theories

1.2 Ancient Philosophical Influences: Aristotle

1.2.1 Aristotle's Understanding of Reality

1.2.2 Aristotle's Four Causes

1.2.3 Aristotle's Prime Mover

1.3 Ancient Philosophical Influences: Soul, Mind, Body

1.3.1 Plato & Aristotle's Views of the Soul

1.3.2 Metaphysics of Consciousness

1.3.3 Materialism - Ryle’s Philosophical Behaviourism

1.3.4 Materialism - Identity Theory

1.4 The Existence of God - Arguments from Observation

1.4.1 The Teleological Argument - Aquinas' Fifth Way

1.4.2 The Teleological Argument - Paley & Evolution

1.4.3 The Cosmological Argument

1.4.4 Hume's Criticisms: Teleological & Cosmological

1.5 The Existence of God - Arguments from Reason

1.5.1 The Ontological Argument

1.5.2 Criticisms of the Ontological Argument

1.6 Religious Experience

1.6.1 Introduction to Religious Experience

1.6.2 Mystical Experience

1.6.3 Conversion Experience

1.6.4 Understanding Religious Experience

1.6.5 Issues Relating to Religious Experience - Validity

1.6.6 Issues Relating to Religious Experiences - People

1.7 The Problem of Evil

1.7.1 Presentations of the Problems of Evil

1.7.2 Discussion Points -

1.8 The Nature & Attributes of God

1.8.1 Omnipotence

1.8.2 Omniscience

1.8.3 Boethius - Divine Knowledge, Free Will & Eternity

1.8.4 (Omni)benevolence

1.8.5 Eternity & Free Will

1.9 Religious Language: Negative, Analogical, Symbolic

1.9.1 Apophatic & Cataphatic Way

1.9.2 Symbol

1.9.3 Discussion Points: Religious Language

1.10 Religious Language: 20th Century Perspective

1.10.1 Logical Positivism & Verification Principle

1.10.2 Wittgenstein

1.10.3 Falsification Symposium: Flew & Hare

1.10.4 Falsification Symposium: Mitchell

1.10.5 Discussion Points: Verification & Falsification

1.10.6 Discussion Points: Aquinas vs Wittgenstein

2 Religion & Ethics

2.1 Natural Law

2.1.1 St Thomas Aquinas - Telos & Four Tiers of Law

2.1.2 St Thomas Aquinas - Precepts

2.1.3 St Thomas Aquinas - Real & Apparent Goods

2.1.4 Discussion Points - Natural Law & Doing Good

2.1.5 Discussion Points - Telos & Double Effect Doctrine

2.2 Situation Ethics

2.2.1 Fletcher's Situation Ethics

2.2.2 Fletcher's Concept of Conscience

2.2.3 Discussion Points: Moral Decision-Making

2.2.4 Discussion Points - Agape

2.3 Kantian Ethics

2.3.1 Introduction to Kantian Ethics & Duty

2.3.2 Hypothetical & Categorical Imperative

2.3.3 Summum Bonum & Three Postulates

2.3.4 Discussion Points: Kantian Ethics

2.4 Utilitarianism

2.4.1 The Utility Principle

2.4.2 Act & Rule Utilitarianism

2.4.3 Discussion Points: Utilitarianism

2.5 Euthanasia

2.5.1 Key Concepts for Euthanasia Debates

2.5.2 Discussion Points: Natural Law & Situation Ethics

2.5.3 Discussion Points: Sanctity of Life

2.5.4 Discussion Points: Autonomy & Medical Intervention

2.6 Business Ethics

2.6.1 Corporate Social Responsibility & Whistle-Blowing

2.6.2 Good Ethics & Globalisation

2.6.3 Discussion Points: Utilitarianism & Kantian Ethics

2.6.4 Discussion Points: CSR, Globalisation & Capitalism

3 Developments in Christian Thought

3.1 Saint Augustine's Teachings

3.1.1 Human Nature

3.1.2 Original Sin & God's Grace

3.2 Death & the Afterlife

3.2.1 Heaven, Hell, & Purgatory

3.2.2 Different Interpretations of the Afterlife

3.2.3 Election

3.2.4 The Final Judgement

3.2.5 Discussion Points: Heaven, Hell & Purgatory

3.3 Knowledge of God's Existence

3.3.1 Natural Knowledge

3.3.2 Revealed Knowledge in Faith, Grace, & Jesus Christ

3.3.3 Revealed Knowledge in the Bible & Church

3.3.4 Discussion Points: Reason & Belief in God

3.3.5 Discussion Points: The Fall & Trust in God

3.4 The Person of Jesus Christ

3.4.1 Jesus Christ’s Authority as the Son of God

3.4.2 Jesus Christ’s Authority as a Teacher of Wisdom

3.4.3 Jesus Christ’s Authority as a Liberator

3.5 Christian Moral Principles

3.5.1 The Bible & Love

3.5.2 Bible, Church & Reason

3.5.3 Discussion Points: Christian Ethics

3.5.4 Discussion Points: Love & the Bible

3.6 Christian Moral Action

3.6.1 Dietrich Bonhoeffer & the Confessing Church

3.6.2 Bonhoeffer & Civil Disobedience

3.6.3 Bonhoeffer's Teaching on Ethics as Action

3.6.4 Discussion Points: Civil Disobedience & Bonhoeffer

3.7 Development - Pluralism & Theology

3.7.1 Pluralism & Theology: Exclusivism & Inclusivism

3.7.2 Pluralism & Theology: Pluralism

3.7.3 Discussion Points: Salvation

3.7.4 Discussion Points: Pluralism Undermining Beliefs

3.8 Development - Pluralism & Society

3.8.1 Development of Multi-Faith Societies

3.8.2 Responses to Inter-Faith Dialogue

3.8.3 The Scriptural Reasoning Movement

3.8.4 Discussion Points: Social Cohesion & Scripture

3.8.5 Discussion Points: Conversion

3.9 Gender & Society

3.9.1 Waves of Feminism

3.9.2 Traditional Christian Views on Gender Roles

3.9.3 Christian Views on Gender Roles & Family

3.9.4 Discussion Points: Secular Views of Gender

3.9.5 Discussion Points: Motherhood & Family

3.10 Gender & Theology

3.10.1 Rosemary Radford Ruether

3.10.2 Mary Daly

3.10.3 Discussion Points: Ruether & Daly

3.10.4 Discussion Points: Male Saviour & Female God

3.11 Challenges

3.11.1 Secularism - Sigmund Freud

3.11.2 Secularism - Richard Dawkins

3.11.3 Christianity & Public Life

3.11.4 Discussion Points: Spiritual Values

3.11.5 Discussion Points: Social Values & Opportunities

3.11.6 Karl Marx

3.11.7 Liberation Theology

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Conversion Experience

Issues Relating to Religious Experience - Validity

A Level Philosophy & Religious Studies

Religious Experience

AQA Philosophy

10 mark question content

Corporeal visions are sensory experiences; religious experiences that appear to be sensed through the senses such as vision and sound. They are experienced in the same way as you would experience any natural object like a tree or an animal. Seen with the eye of the body, or other sense organs.

St Bernadette experiences visions of a small young lady claiming to be the virgin Mary. The visions led to the discovery of a spring of water which became the site of miracles (Lourdes).

Imaginative visions are seen in the mind, such as in a dream or in the imagination. They are ‘seen’ with the eye of the mind.

Joseph’s dream. An Angel appeared to Joseph in a dream, warning him of King Herod’s attempt to find and kill Jesus and telling Joseph to run away with Jesus and Mary to Egypt. They do so until Herod dies.

Intellectual visions are seen with the ‘eye of reason’. There is no image; there is an intellectual grasping of knowledge or understanding.

St Theresa of Avila had a vision of Christ but not with the eye of the body or mind/soul. Theresa says she ‘felt’ Jesus at her right hand, being a witness to all her actions. She claimed to that such an experience ‘illuminates the understanding’ and that, in her case, Jesus made himself ‘present to the soul’.

Rudolf Otto on Numinous experiences

Otto defined mystical religious experiences as “numinous”, deriving from the latin word ‘numen’ meaning divine power. It involves feelings of awe and wonder in the presence of an all-powerful being. It is an experience of something ‘Wholly other’ – completely different to anything else.

Otto thought too much focus had been put on the idea that God could be known through logical argument. He insisted numinous experiences were non-rational. This does not mean irrational, it means a way of knowing that doesn’t involve reasoning.

Otto uses language to describe the experience but insists that the feelings involved are unique and unlike anything ordinary. To emphasise this, he deliberately describes uses Latin or Greek words:

• Mysterium – the utter inexplicable indescribable mystery of the experience
• Tremendum – the awe and fear of being in the presence of an overwhelmingly superior being
• Fascinans – despite that fear, being strangely drawn to the experience

Otto claims Numinous experiences are the core of any religion ‘worthy of the name’. For Otto, it is fundamental to true religion that individuals should have a sense of a personal encounter with the divine. This means that Numinous religious experiences are the true core of religion, whereas the teachings and holy books and so on are not the true core of a religion.

William James on mystical experiences

James was a philosopher and a psychologist who claimed that religious experiences occur in different religions and have similar features. People who engage in practices to have religious experiences are often called ‘Mystics’. Their experiences are called ‘Mystical experiences’, meaning intense and totally immersive. They don’t just involve distorted visual experience, seeing images and visions or hearing voices. They are unlike anything in normal experience. They often involve a sense of unity with some kind of higher power or even with the universe itself.

James’ four criteria which characterise all mystical religious experiences:

• Ineffable – the experience is beyond language and cannot be put into words to accurately described.
• Noetic – some sort of knowledge or insight is gained
• Transient – the experience is temporary
• Passive – the experience happens to a person; the person doesn’t make the experience happen.

James says that the most useful descriptor of a mystical experience is that it “defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words”. It is ineffable. It has to be directly experienced to be appreciated. It’s like music or love in that regard. If someone has never felt love or heard music, they might find a musician or lover weak-minded or absurd, but that’s just because they lack the required experience. James saying this is true of those who dismiss religious experience too.

James’ pluralist argument for religious experience

James’ argument is that there must be an explanation of why these four criteria are found in religious experiences in different cultures across the world. This is an interesting point that comes out of James’ observations. It clearly can’t be chance. So, what is the reason for religious experiences having these similar features?

James’ explanation is that religious experiences really are coming from a higher spiritual reality. Writers such as W. Stace developed this argument much more explicitly, claiming that the universality of certain features of religious experiences is good evidence that they are real.

James concludes that mystical experiences are the core of religion, whereas teachings and practices were ‘second hand’ religion, i.e not what religion is really about. This makes James a pluralist, the view that all religions are true.

Paul Knitter is a pluralist who makes a similar argument about religious experiences. He points to a classic metaphor. Each religion is a well. If you get to the bottom a well (through mystical experience) you get down to the underground water that you then realise is also sourcing all the other wells, i.e. all the other religions.

James’ pragmatism argument

James was not satisfied with the attempt to dismiss religious experiences as mere hallucinations. He pointed out that, unlike hallucinations, religious experiences can have positive and profound life-changing effects, which we can observe. This is a reason to think religious experiences are not just hallucinations.

James was most interested in the effects religious experiences had on people’s lives and argued that the validity of the experience depended upon those effects. This is because James was a Pragmatist – a philosophical view on epistemology which states that if something is good for us or works, then that is evidence of its truth.

James pointed to the case study of an Alcoholic who was unable to give up alcohol but then had a religious experience, after which he was able to give up the alcohol. After the experience, they had gained power which they lacked before. James would argue that this is evidence for the validity of the experience, that it really came from a higher spiritual reality.

Walter Stace on mystical experiences

We typically have a sense that we are a subject – an individual with consciousness looking out onto an external world of objects which are distinct from us. This is called the subject-object distinction. Mystical experiences alter or even cause us to lose this sense of the multiplicity of objective (extrovertive) or the sense of self (introvertive) that divides us from the external world.

Extrovertive mystical experience is non-sensuous. The world of material objects is still seen but seen with non-sensuous unity. The division of the world into separate objects is dissolved and everything appears to be unified.

Introvertive mystical experience involves the transcendence of all sensory experience and our sense of self is replaced by mystical consciousness. We lose the sense that we are a self that is separate from the world. The normal intellect is not functioning; it is a non-intellectual experience.

• Unity of all consciousnesses into pure consciousness.
• Outside of space and time.
• Experience of the true reality.
• Peace, tranquillity, equanimity.
• Sacredness and divinity.
• Beyond intellect and logic.

Challenges verifying religious experiences & religious responses

Challenge #1: religious experiences are private.

Religious experiences are private, meaning they occur within people’s minds. Evidence must be publicly accessible, however. This means there is no way for anyone to test whether they are true. Even the person having the religious experience has no way to test whether it is actually true. So, there is no way to verify a religious experience.

Religious response: James’ pragmatism argument

Challenge #2 : the multiple claims issue.

Religious experiences have evidence against them – the religious experiences of other religions. Since different religions cannot all be true, religious experiences about different religions conflict with each other. If all religions have religious experiences and yet most religions cannot be true, then they must be generally unreliable.

Whatever evidence might be attributed to a religious experience, at least the same amount of evidence must be granted to the religious experiences of other religions. However, different religions cannot all be true because they make incompatible claims about which supernatural being(s) exist.

So, evidence for one religion must be taken as evidence against all the others. Therefore, claiming that a religious experience is evidence for the supernatural beings of a particular religion must make it evidence against the beings of all other religions. Any principle that identifies a religious experience as evidence, inevitably also brings far greater evidence against it. Claiming that a religious experience is as evidence for a particular religious belief only creates more evidence against it.

Religious response: p luralism

Pluralism can respond to the multiple claims issue. Pluralism is the view that all religions are true. This view is held by William James, Hick and Knitter. James thinks that mystical religious experience occurring in all religions and being life-changing shows that they are all true (in a pragmatist sense). Hick argues that the different religions of the world are like blind men each touching a different part of an elephant. They each report they are feeling something different, yet that is because they are just too blind to see how they are really part of the same thing. For Hick, differences between religions are just part of the cultural ‘lens’ through which we see the world.

Knitter uses the analogy that each religion is like a well, and if you get to the bottom a well (through mystical religious experience) you get down to the underground water that you then realise is also sourcing all the other wells, i.e. all the other religions. Knitter thinks that this is an argument for taking a pluralist view of religion. The fact that mystical religions in different religions are so similar can’t be by chance. It shows that there is a core truth that all religions share.

Challenge #3: the challenge of the possibility of naturalistic explanations

A naturalistic explanation is one which attempts to provide a scientific account of why something happens. In the case of religious experiences, naturalistic explanations could be:

• Psychological: e.g., prayer, meditation, mental illness, mass hysteria, social compliance.
• Physiological: e.g., random brain hallucinations, drugs, alcohol, fasting, sleep deprivation.

Religious response: Swinburne

This challenge fails against Swinburne’s approach. If someone experiences something, that is evidence for that thing being true. If someone experiences the divine, then that is evidence for the divine. We could then check for the presence of physiological and psychological causes of their religious experience. If we can’t find any, then we have no reason not to believe the experience in that particular case. Although in such cases we cannot rule out naturalistic causes, Swinburne’s point is that we have no evidence for a naturalistic cause. The mere possibility of naturalistic explanations are not sufficient for rejecting such experiences. Only actual evidence of a naturalistic cause can count against the evidence of the experience itself. In cases where we have no evidence of a naturalistic cause, then we have no basis for rejecting such experiences as evidence for God.

Scientific challenges to religious experience & religious responses

Scientific challenge #1 freud.

Freud as a scientific psychological challenge to religious experience. Freud called religion an ‘obsessional neurosis’ and said it ultimately derived from two main psychological forces. The first is the fear of death. We have an instinctual animalistic fear of death which we can’t control but we can control our human thoughts and cognitions. While animals only have their fear of death triggered when in a dangerous situation, humans are the only animal that constantly are aware that they are going to die. We have the animalistic part of ourselves, but have since developed cognitive processes, which then unfortunately constantly trigger the fear of death on our animalistic side. So, the solution is to manipulate those to believe that death is not the end. Also, Freud argued that the reason Christians call God ‘father’ is because they have a desire to be a child forever. It’s a desire for eternal innocence in the face of the painful reality of the world. Freud thought these psychological forces were so strong that they resulted in delusions which could explain religious experience.

A person lost in a desert can be so desperate for water that they hallucinate it. This is called a mirage. Similarly, humans can be so desperately afraid of death and the difficulties of life that they can delude themselves that there is a God who will take care of them and an afterlife.

Religious response: Freud fails to explain mystical experience

Freud’s analysis fails to explain mystical religious experience because of its sense of unity with something infinite and unbounded. These seem to go far beyond the wish-fulfilling hallucinations of a neurotic. Freud’s theory might work well against mere visions, which we know can be created by the brain due to desperate wish-fulfilment such as in the mirage case. Mystical experiences are ecstatic, immersive, and totally unlike any ordinary sensory experience, however, making them harder to dismiss as hallucinations caused by delusory wishful thinking.

Scientific challenge #1: Persinger

Persinger poses a scientific challenge to religious experience through his discovery of a physiological explanation of them. Persinger is a neuroscientist who created a machine dubbed the ‘God helmet’ which physiologically manipulated people’s brain waves and sometimes caused them to have a religious experience where they felt the presence of unseen beings.

This seems to show that religious experiences originate from the brain, not anything supernatural like a God. Religious experiences are just an unusual state of the brain. Regular religious experiences could just be examples of that caused by some unknown brain process(es) that can happen without a machine.

Religious response: Persinger’s discovery does not disprove a supernatural cause

  However, maybe that brain manipulation is simply the mechanism by which God creates religious experience. Also, we know we can cause hallucinations by manipulating the brain with drugs like LSD. This shouldn’t necessarily count against the validity of religious experiences that occur without such manipulations.

Swinburne’s principles of credulity and testimony

Swinburne  argued that religious experiences are evidence for God. His argument involves the principles of testimony and credulity. The principle of credulity argues that you should believe what you experience unless you have a reason not to. The principle of testimony argues that you should believe what others tell you they have experienced, unless you have a reason not to. Swinburne is an empiricist who argues that an experience of God should count as evidence towards belief in God, although it doesn’t constitute complete proof.

Swinburne argued that whenever we gain some new evidence, we can’t dismiss it for no reason – that would be irrational. It is only if we have other better-established evidence which contradicts that new evidence that we may rationally dismiss it. This is the rationale behind the principles of testimony and credulity. If we see a tree, that is evidence that the tree exists. Unless we have some other evidence suggesting the tree doesn’t exist, we would be irrational for dismissing the evidence of our experience. So too is it with God. Experiencing God is evidence for God, unless we have some other evidence to justify dismissing that experience.

The influences of religious experiences and their value for religious faith

10 mark questions for religious experience, 15 mark question content, 15 mark questions for religious experience.

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Religious Experience - Edexel A2

Religious Experience Essay

“ Religious experience does not provide a secure basis for belief in God.” Analyse and discuss this claim.

Few topics in philosophy and theology cause as much disagreement as religious experience. With its different definitions and numerous types, anything from seeing the Virgin Mary to being relaxed at the sound of your favourite piece of classical music, religious experience has attracted the attention of many scholars, both pro and anti religious experience.

Although they can take many different forms, there are several things that link different types of religious experience, although they do not always appear in every experience. They are a personal experience, especially the ones that involve some sort of divine influence. They also have a direct and prominent effect on the person’s life. If a person had experienced a near-death experience, and found that they had experienced a pleasant afterlife, then they would be more likely to be relaxed about death. Indeed, there are certain scholars who believe that one can only say that a religious experience has taken place, if there is a change in life. For example, Saul, commonly called Paul, had a famous conversion on the Road to Damascus.

All religious experiences, however, are convincing for the individual; no matter what the mitigating evidence, or how illogical the experience, the individual normally truly believes what they have seen or felt.

One of the greatest theologians of the age, Richard Swinburne, argues in favour of religious experience, including a clumative argument for the existence of God from the experiences. When one looks at the arguments from design, from ontology and from cosmology, one is looking at a particular part of existence. Swinburne argues that it is religious experiences that provide the best argument for the existence of God. By personally experiencing God’s existence in one’s life, it can bring about a more convincing belief in God than an inferred argument. When all of the arguments are cululated, an argument is formed which makes for a reasonable possibility for God’s existence.

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Swinburne feels that religious experiences can be put in to two main groups, public and private ones. Public religious experiences are ones where God’s actions are seen in the world at large, or in large scale events. When people argue for the existence of God from a design argument, they will often refer to seeing God’s wonder at work in the universe. Whilst the atheist may see nothing more than a starry sky, a theist may look at this and see the wonder of creation; a creation so perfect that it could only have come from God. The other group, private experiences, are ones that are for a certain individual only. They may include experiences such as seeing the Virgin Mary, or the feeling of a ‘presence’ that you associate as being religious. Although not always describable, the experiences are nearly always a lot more convincing to those who experience them, than to someone hearing about them. A J Taylor argues that have the presence of God semi-permanently or permanently in one’s life also counts a religious experience; although not a singular event, God’s presence as a guide in one’s life can bring about a similar effect to a singular experience.

Caroline Franks Davis broadly agrees with Swinburne, taking the view, in The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, that with all the inferred arguments for God’s existence, the probability is roughly equal for God’s existence as not.

Religious experiences, however, may tip the balance in favor of God’s existence.

C F Davis is most recognized in the field of religious experience for her three challenges over religious experiences, aimed mainly at Swinburne’s principles of testimony and credulity.

The description related challenge challenges the experience on the basis of self-contradiction, or the inherent difficulty that surrounds the use of language as a communicating tool. Since one person may not necessarily use language the same way as another, the use of language as a communication tool is flawed. The subject related challenge challenges the experience on the basis of the individual experiencing them, and the condition that they were in when they had the experience. If the person was under the influence, then their report may not hold as much weight as someone who had a religious experience when they were in a normal condition. However, a common rebuttal is that, just because someone is somehow mentally impaired, it does not nessecarly mean that what they experienced was not real. The third challenge is that of object related challenges, which challenges the existence of an object that was in the experience.

If someone said that they had experienced the Loch Ness monster, the objection may be on the grounds of the object related challenge. These challenges can be linked to objections to corporate religious experiences, where it is argued that people cannot know what the other people are feeling, on the basis of objections to understanding language, and the difficulties of expressing emotions and feelings in words.

Anthony Flew is also well-known for his objection to religious experiences, the vicious circle. Whilst perhaps the most relevant objections for long-term corporate experiences, the vicious circle challenge is one which questions the nature of the experience itself. As Flew says, the nature of religious experiences “seems to depend on the interest, background and expectations of those that have them, rather than anything separate and autonomous.” Religious experiences, according to Flew, only seem to reinforce our previously held beliefs, and should not be used for the basis of an argument for the existence of God. Despite C F Davis rejecting this argument, by saying that it is not easy to distinguish between an experience and its interpretation, it remains an important criticism for religious experience.

In Verities of Religious Experience , William James says: “Religion, therefore, as I ask you to take it, shall mean for us the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitudes.” This quite vague description includes nearly every experience where a person experiences an overwhelming emotional response to an event; this could even include listening to a favourite piece of music, or looking at an important picture. According to James, there are four markers of a mystical experience: ineffability, the impossibility of putting an experience accurately into words; noetic quality, intuitive states of insight or knowledge that cannot be reached by argument or reason; transiency, though the experience does not last for a long time, it alters life; passivity, the feeling of a person’s will being surrendered.

Although his definition of an experience is vague, his approach to identifying religious experiences is epically based, and is similar to more modern approaches, like those employed at the Hardy Institute. James also refers to the fruits of the experience being more important than the experience itself, a feeling that holds true with modern theologians.

If the objections are combined, then it appears that any religious experience can be objected to in some way: a person’s state, the language that they use, the experience, or the person themselves can all be used as an objection; Freud and Jung believed that religious belief was a neurosis, caused by the repressed love of the mother, or from “penis envy.” Hume took a less scientific route when he said that theists could not be truly trusted, as they are prone to lying, and are devoid of a “good sense, education and learning” to make sure that they are not fooling themselves.

In conclusion, if by a secure basis for belief, we mean a feeling of certainty, then religious experience will only boost the faith of those who believe, and strengthen the criticisms of those who do not believe in God. In short, the religious experience debate falls foul of Flew’s vicious circle.

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• Word Count 1310
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• Level AS and A Level
• Subject Religious Studies & Philosophy

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When compared with the classical arguments for God’s existence – Cosmological, Teleological and Ontological – Religious Experience might seem like the best basis for believing in God, because the God revealed through well-known experiences is more obviously what Pascal called “the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob” than the abstract “God of the Philosophers”.  In this way, Religious Experience would better support Religion or Classical Theism than the other arguments, which seem to support deism at best.  Nevertheless, on closer analysis Religious Experience does little more to support belief in the God of Religion, a personal deity, than the other arguments.  Because of this, coupled with the unique difficulties which beset Religious Experience as an argument for God’s existence, Religious Experience is not the best – or even a good – basis for belief in God.

Firstly, as William James argued in his “Varieties of Religious Experience” (1902) genuine religious experiences are ineffable and resist description in what Ramsey called “ordinary language”.  When somebody reports having “seen” the Virgin Mary or having “heard” the voice of God, the experience is not really like other sense-experiences through the eyes or ears.  Further, the object that people experience is not really personal.  As Otto argued, genuine religious experiences are of “ the numinous” , “the Absolute” rather than any anthropomorphic being.  Stace concurred, arguing that genuine mystical experiences are of “ an ultimate nonsensuous unity in all things, a oneness or a One to which neither the senses nor the reason can penetrate.”  Happold agreed, arguing that genuine mysticism is characterized by a sense of love and union with all other beings which overcomes the anxiety we all feel at being separate and alone.  For James, Otto, Stace and Happold Religious Experiences point not towards the existence of “ the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob ” but to a “ higher powe r” which, as James pointed out, “ need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self…” ( Varieties of Religious Experience, Postscript)  In this way, Religious Experience does not really serve to support belief in the God of Religion or even Classical Theism any more than the classical arguments do and so it is not the best basis for belief in such a God.

Secondly, Religious Experience is a weaker basis for belief in a “higher power” God than the classical arguments are.  This is because:

• Religious Experience is difficult to define.  While James, Otto and Stace recognize only solitary experiences, Richard Swinburne and Caroline Franks-Davis allow for corporate experiences as well.  While James, Otto and Stace suggest that all genuine experiences are beyond literal description, Swinburne and Franks-Davis allow for experiences which can be described using everyday language.  Because scholars differ about which experiences are possibly “authentic” and which are not, Religious Experience as a phenomenon is a less convincing basis of observation on which to build an inductive argument for God’s existence.  When compared with the Cosmological Argument, nobody questions Craig’s first premise “ everything that begins to exist has a cause ” even if they go on to criticize other premises or the conclusion of his argument. It follows that because of the difficulty in defining Religious Experience, is a weaker basis for an inductive argument for God’s existence than the classical arguments are
• As Swinburne points out, the argument from Religious Experience depends on assuming the Principles of Credulity and Testimony.  While it is far to say that the other arguments from observation also depend on the Principle of Credulity, Hume’s critique of Miracles in “ An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding ” Section X (1758) fatally undermines the Principle of Testimony as it applies to reports of religious experiences.  It is always more likely that somebody has made a mistake than that their experience, which goes against the established laws of nature, is genuine.  While it is, as Hick pointed out, bad science to ignore such reports, it is, as James pointed out, impossible to exclude the possibility that the person reporting a religious experience is mistaken because credible physiological and/or psychological explanations exist to account for everything reported.  For examples, as James discusses in his chapter on Conversion Experiences, psychiatry might account for very many of these including those of St Paul (as a response to a moral crisis according to Leuba) and of St Augustine (as a delayed adolescent crisis according to Starbuck).  While St Paul or St Augustine might themselves be convinced that their experience was authentic and be justified in believing in their object, there is no necessity for other people to believe either in the authenticity of their experiences or in what they seem to refer to.  So, because testimony always lacks credibility, an inductive argument based on Religious Experience will be weaker than the classical arguments in establishing a basis for belief in God.
• Finally, as Swinburne points out, accepting accounts of Religious Experience as possibly genuine depends on prior probability.  If you are what James called a “ medical materialist “, reports of religious experience would be their very nature incredible.  In this way, reports of will only be entertained as the basis for belief in anything by those who are already open to the existence of that thing and the argument from Religious Experience is shown to be circular and so not as persuasive as the other classical arguments.

Clearly, Swinburne would disagree and would argue that Religious Experience is a better basis for believing in God than the other inductive arguments.  In his “ The Existence of God ” (1979) he set out a cumulative argument for God’s existence which employed Bayes’ Theorem to assess the relative probabilities of God and natural causes as explanations of causation, order and purpose, beauty and morality in the universe.  None of these arguments is conclusive in itself, argued Swinburne.  It takes Religious Experience to tip the balance in favour of God’s existence and provide a basis for believing in God.  Nevertheless, Swinburne’s cumulative argument has been widely criticized, not least by Anthony Flew, who compared it with “ ten leaky buckets ”.  A lot of bad arguments, each of which fails to justify belief in God in itself, are together not significantly better than one bad argument and so fail to justify religious belief.  Further, Swinburne’s contention that Religious Experience is the strongest argument, the argument which tips the balance of probability in favour of God’s existence, seems odd given that it depends on prior probability and so has no force without the other arguments having already established that God is slightly more probable than the natural alternative.  To what extent can an argument which is circular in itself be the deciding factor?  If the other arguments succeed in justifying an openness to the existence of God without depending on Prior Probability or the Principle of Testimony, then surely they are better bases for belief in God than Religious Experience.  For Swinburne, Religious Experience is a better basis for belief in God than the other arguments from observation even though it depends on Prior Probability and the Principle of Testimony because, as he sees it, Religious Experiences support belief in the personal God of Religion.  However, as has already been established here, this is not necessarily the case.  On close analysis, for those who have had no experience themselves, Religious Experiences can support openness to the existence of a “higher power” at most.  By contrast, the cosmological argument supports belief in a necessarily single, all-powerful creator God and the teleological argument supports belief in an omni-benevolent intelligent designer God, at least when “good” is understood in the purely Aristotelian sense.  In this way, Religious Experience is a worse basis for belief in God than either of the cosmological or teleological arguments, even when it comes to believing in “the God of the Philosophers” with the classical attributes.

In conclusion, Religious Experience is very far from being the best basis for belief in God. On close analysis, reports of such experiences fail to justify anything more than an openness to a “higher power” which would not have to have any of the classical attributes of God.  It is as impossible to exclude naturalistic explanations for Religious Experiences as it is to exclude the possibility that they have been caused by God, so the question of what they point towards must remain open.  Further, as an argument for God’s existence, Religious Experience is beset by problems of definition, credibility of testimony and circularity.  It is certainly not the decisive factor in demonstrating the existence of God that Swinburne claims, but is a bucket that is more leaky than most.

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Essays About Religion: Top 5 Examples and 7 Writing Prompts

Essays about religion include delicate issues and tricky subtopics. See our top essay examples and prompts to guide you in your essay writing.

With over 4,000 religions worldwide, it’s no wonder religion influences everything. It involves faith, lessons on humanity, spirituality, and moral values that span thousands of years. For some, it’s both a belief and a cultural system. As it often clashes with science, laws, and modern philosophies, it’s also a hot debate topic. Religion is a broad subject encompassing various elements of life, so you may find it a challenging topic to write an essay about it.

1. Wisdom and Longing in Islam’s Religion by Anonymous on Ivypanda.com

2. consequences of following religion blindly essay by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 3. religion: christians’ belief in god by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 4. mecca’s influence on today’s religion essay by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 5. religion: how buddhism views the world by anonymous on ivypanda.com , 1. the importance of religion, 2. pros and cons of having a religion, 3. religions across the world, 4. religion and its influence on laws, 5. religion: then and now, 6. religion vs. science, 7. my religion.

“Portraying Muslims as radical religious fanatics who deny other religions and violently fight dissent has nothing to do with true Islamic ideology. The knowledge that is presented in Islam and used by Muslims to build their worldview system is exploited in a misinterpreted form. This is transforming the perception of Islam around the world as a radical religious system that supports intolerance and conflicts.”

The author discusses their opinion on how Islam becomes involved with violence or terrorism in the Islamic states. Throughout the essay, the writer mentions the massive difference between Islam’s central teachings and the terrorist groups’ dogma. The piece also includes a list of groups, their disobediences, and punishments.

This essay looks at how these brutalities have nothing to do with Islam’s fundamental ideologies. However, the context of Islam’s creeds is distorted by rebel groups like The Afghan mujahideen, Jihadis, and Al-Qa’ida. Furthermore, their activities push dangerous narratives that others use to make generalized assumptions about the entire religion. These misleading generalizations lead to misunderstandings amongst other communities, particularly in the western world. However, the truth is that these terrorist groups are violating Islamic doctrine.

“Following religion blindly can hinder one’s self-actualization and interfere with self-development due to numerous constraints and restrictions… Blind adherence to religion is a factor that does not allow receiving flexible education and adapting knowledge to different areas.”

The author discusses the effects of blindly following a religion and mentions that it can lead to difficulties in self-development and the inability to live independently. These limitations affect a person’s opportunity to grow and discover oneself.  Movies like “ The Da Vinci Code ” show how fanatical devotion influences perception and creates constant doubt. 

“…there are many religions through which various cultures attain their spiritual and moral bearings to bring themselves closer to a higher power (deity). Different religions are differentiated in terms of beliefs, customs, and purpose and are similar in one way or the other.”

The author discusses how religion affects its followers’ spiritual and moral values and mentions how deities work in mysterious ways. The essay includes situations that show how these supreme beings test their followers’ faith through various life challenges. Overall, the writer believes that when people fully believe in God, they can be stronger and more capable of coping with the difficulties they may encounter.

“Mecca represents a holy ground that the majority of the Muslims visit; and is only supposed to be visited by Muslims. The popularity of Mecca has increased the scope of its effects, showing that it has an influence on tourism, the financial aspects of the region and lastly religion today.”

The essay delves into Mecca’s contributions to Saudi Arabia’s tourism and religion. It mentions tourism rates peaking during Hajj, a 5-day Muslim pilgrimage, and visitors’ sense of spiritual relief and peace after the voyage. Aside from its tremendous touristic benefits, it also brings people together to worship Allah. You can also check out these essays about values and articles about beliefs .

“Buddhism is seen as one of the most popular and widespread religions on the earth the reason of its pragmatic and attractive philosophies which are so appealing for people of the most diversified backgrounds and ways of thinking .”

To help readers understand the topic, the author explains Buddhism’s worldviews and how Siddhatta Gotama established the religion that’s now one of the most recognized on Earth. It includes teachings about the gift of life, novel thinking, and philosophies based on his observations. Conclusively, the author believes that Buddhism deals with the world as Gotama sees it.

Check out our guide packed full of transition words for essays .

7 Prompts on Essays About Religion

Religion’s importance is embedded in an individual or group’s interpretation of it. They hold on to their faith for various reasons, such as having an idea of the real meaning of life and offering them a purpose to exist. Use this prompt to identify and explain what makes religion a necessity. Make your essay interesting by adding real-life stories of how faith changed someone’s life.

Although religion offers benefits such as positivity and a sense of structure, there are also disadvantages that come with it. Discuss what’s considered healthy and destructive when people follow their religion’s gospels and why. You can also connect it to current issues. Include any personal experience you have.

Religion’s prevalence exhibits how it can significantly affect one’s daily living. Use this prompt to discuss how religions across the world differ from one another when it comes to beliefs and if traditions or customs influence them. It’s essential to use relevant statistical data or surveys in this prompt to support your claims and encourage your readers to trust your piece.

There are various ways religion affects countries’ laws as they adhere to moral and often humanitarian values. Identify each and discuss how faith takes part in a nation’s decision-making regarding pressing matters. You can focus on one religion in a specific location to let the readers concentrate on the case. A good example is the latest abortion issue in the US, the overturning of “Wade vs. Roe.” Include people’s mixed reactions to this subject and their justifications.

In this essay, talk about how the most widespread religions’ principles or rituals changed over time. Then, expound on what inspired these changes.  Add the religion’s history, its current situation in the country, and its old and new beliefs. Elaborate on how its members clash over these old and new principles. Conclude by sharing your opinion on whether the changes are beneficial or not.

There’s a never-ending debate between religion and science. List the most controversial arguments in your essay and add which side you support and why. Then, open discourse about how these groups can avoid quarreling. You can also discuss instances when religion and science agreed or worked together to achieve great results. 

Use this prompt if you’re a part of a particular religion. Even if you don’t believe in faith, you can still take this prompt and pick a church you’ll consider joining. Share your personal experiences about your religion. Add how you became a follower, the beliefs that helped you through tough times, and why you’re staying as an active member in it. You can also speak about miraculous events that strengthen your faith. Or you can include teachings that you disagree with and think needs to be changed or updated.

For help with your essay, check out our top essay writing tips !

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Article contents

Religion, culture, and communication.

• Stephen M. Croucher , Stephen M. Croucher School of Communication, Journalism, and Marketing, Massey Business School, Massey University
• Cheng Zeng , Cheng Zeng Department of Communication, University of Jyväskylä
• Diyako Rahmani Diyako Rahmani Department of Communication, University of Jyväskylä
•  and  Mélodine Sommier Mélodine Sommier School of History, Culture, and Communication, Eramus University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.013.166
• Published online: 25 January 2017

Religion is an essential element of the human condition. Hundreds of studies have examined how religious beliefs mold an individual’s sociology and psychology. In particular, research has explored how an individual’s religion (religious beliefs, religious denomination, strength of religious devotion, etc.) is linked to their cultural beliefs and background. While some researchers have asserted that religion is an essential part of an individual’s culture, other researchers have focused more on how religion is a culture in itself. The key difference is how researchers conceptualize and operationalize both of these terms. Moreover, the influence of communication in how individuals and communities understand, conceptualize, and pass on religious and cultural beliefs and practices is integral to understanding exactly what religion and culture are.

It is through exploring the relationships among religion, culture, and communication that we can best understand how they shape the world in which we live and have shaped the communication discipline itself. Furthermore, as we grapple with these relationships and terms, we can look to the future and realize that the study of religion, culture, and communication is vast and open to expansion. Researchers are beginning to explore the influence of mediation on religion and culture, how our globalized world affects the communication of religions and cultures, and how interreligious communication is misunderstood; and researchers are recognizing the need to extend studies into non-Christian religious cultures.

• communication
• intercultural communication

Intricate Relationships among Religion, Communication, and Culture

Compiling an entry on the relationships among religion, culture, and communication is not an easy task. There is not one accepted definition for any of these three terms, and research suggests that the connections among these concepts are complex, to say the least. Thus, this article attempts to synthesize the various approaches to these three terms and integrate them. In such an endeavor, it is impossible to discuss all philosophical and paradigmatic debates or include all disciplines.

It is difficult to define religion from one perspective and with one encompassing definition. “Religion” is often defined as the belief in or the worship of a god or gods. Geertz ( 1973 ) defined a religion as

(1) a system which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (p. 90)

It is essential to recognize that religion cannot be understood apart from the world in which it takes place (Marx & Engels, 1975 ). To better understand how religion relates to and affects culture and communication, we should first explore key definitions, philosophies, and perspectives that have informed how we currently look at religion. In particular, the influences of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel are discussed to further understand the complexity of religion.

Karl Marx ( 1818–1883 ) saw religion as descriptive and evaluative. First, from a descriptive point of view, Marx believed that social and economic situations shape how we form and regard religions and what is religious. For Marx, the fact that people tend to turn to religion more when they are facing economic hardships or that the same religious denomination is practiced differently in different communities would seem perfectly logical. Second, Marx saw religion as a form of alienation (Marx & Engels, 1975 ). For Marx, the notion that the Catholic Church, for example, had the ability or right to excommunicate an individual, and thus essentially exclude them from the spiritual community, was a classic example of exploitation and domination. Such alienation and exploitation was later echoed in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844–1900 ), who viewed organized religion as society and culture controlling man (Nietzsche, 1996 ).

Building on Marxist thinking, Weber ( 1864–1920 ) stressed the multicausality of religion. Weber ( 1963 ) emphasized three arguments regarding religion and society: (1) how a religion relates to a society is contingent (it varies); (2) the relationship between religion and society can only be examined in its cultural and historical context; and (3) the relationship between society and religion is slowly eroding. Weber’s arguments can be applied to Catholicism in Europe. Until the Protestant Reformation of the 15th and 16th centuries, Catholicism was the dominant religious ideology on the European continent. However, since the Reformation, Europe has increasingly become more Protestant and less Catholic. To fully grasp why many Europeans gravitate toward Protestantism and not Catholicism, we must consider the historical and cultural reasons: the Reformation, economics, immigration, politics, etc., that have all led to the majority of Europeans identifying as Protestant (Davie, 2008 ). Finally, even though the majority of Europeans identify as Protestant, secularism (separation of church and state) is becoming more prominent in Europe. In nations like France, laws are in place that officially separate the church and state, while in Northern Europe, church attendance is low, and many Europeans who identify as Protestant have very low religiosity (strength of religious devotion), focusing instead on being secularly religious individuals. From a Weberian point of view, the links among religion, history, and culture in Europe explain the decline of Catholicism, the rise of Protestantism, and now the rise of secularism.

Emile Durkheim ( 1858–1917 ) focused more on how religion performs a necessary function; it brings people and society together. Durkheim ( 1976 ) thus defined a religion as

a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things which are set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. (p. 47)

From this perspective, religion and culture are inseparable, as beliefs and practices are uniquely cultural. For example, religious rituals (one type of practice) unite believers in a religion and separate nonbelievers. The act of communion, or the sharing of the Eucharist by partaking in consecrated bread and wine, is practiced by most Christian denominations. However, the frequency of communion differs extensively, and the ritual is practiced differently based on historical and theological differences among denominations.

Georg Simmel ( 1858–1918 ) focused more on the fluidity and permanence of religion and religious life. Simmel ( 1950 ) believed that religious and cultural beliefs develop from one another. Moreover, he asserted that religiosity is an essential element to understand when examining religious institutions and religion. While individuals may claim to be part of a religious group, Simmel asserted that it was important to consider just how religious the individuals were. In much of Europe, religiosity is low: Germany 34%, Sweden 19%, Denmark 42%, the United Kingdom 30%, the Czech Republic 23%, and The Netherlands 26%, while religiosity is relatively higher in the United States (56%), which is now considered the most religious industrialized nation in the world ( Telegraph Online , 2015 ). The decline of religiosity in parts of Europe and its rise in the U.S. is linked to various cultural, historical, and communicative developments that will be further discussed.

Combining Simmel’s ( 1950 ) notion of religion with Geertz’s ( 1973 ) concept of religion and a more basic definition (belief in or the worship of a god or gods through rituals), it is clear that the relationship between religion and culture is integral and symbiotic. As Clark and Hoover ( 1997 ) noted, “culture and religion are inseparable” and “religion is an important consideration in theories of culture and society” (p. 17).

Outside of the Western/Christian perception of religion, Buddhist scholars such as Nagarajuna present a relativist framework to understand concepts like time and causality. This framework is distinct from the more Western way of thinking, in that notions of present, past, and future are perceived to be chronologically distorted, and the relationship between cause and effect is paradoxical (Wimal, 2007 ). Nagarajuna’s philosophy provides Buddhism with a relativist, non-solid dependent, and non-static understanding of reality (Kohl, 2007 ). Mulla Sadra’s philosophy explored the metaphysical relationship between the created universe and its singular creator. In his philosophy, existence takes precedence over essence, and any existing object reflects a part of the creator. Therefore, every devoted person is obliged to know themselves as the first step to knowing the creator, which is the ultimate reason for existence. This Eastern perception of religion is similar to that of Nagarajuna and Buddhism, as they both include the paradoxical elements that are not easily explained by the rationality of Western philosophy. For example, the god, as Mulla Sadra defines it, is beyond definition, description, and delamination, yet it is absolutely simple and unique (Burrell, 2013 ).

How researchers define and study culture varies extensively. For example, Hall ( 1989 ) defined culture as “a series of situational models for behavior and thought” (p. 13). Geertz ( 1973 ), building on the work of Kluckhohn ( 1949 ), defined culture in terms of 11 different aspects:

(1) the total way of life of a people; (2) the social legacy the individual acquires from his group; (3) a way of thinking, feeling, and believing; (4) an abstraction from behavior; (5) a theory on the part of the anthropologist about the way in which a group of people in fact behave; (6) a storehouse of pooled learning; (7) a set of standardized orientations to recurrent problems; (8) learned behavior; (9) a mechanism for the normative regulation of behavior; (10) a set of techniques for adjusting both to the external environment and to other men; (11) a precipitate of history. (Geertz, 1973 , p. 5)

Research on culture is divided between an essentialist camp and a constructivist camp. The essentialist view regards culture as a concrete and fixed system of symbols and meanings (Holiday, 1999 ). An essentialist approach is most prevalent in linguistic studies, in which national culture is closely linked to national language. Regarding culture as a fluid concept, constructionist views of culture focus on how it is performed and negotiated by individuals (Piller, 2011 ). In this sense, “culture” is a verb rather than a noun. In principle, a non-essentialist approach rejects predefined national cultures and uses culture as a tool to interpret social behavior in certain contexts.

Different approaches to culture influence significantly how it is incorporated into communication studies. Cultural communication views communication as a resource for individuals to produce and regulate culture (Philipsen, 2002 ). Constructivists tend to perceive culture as a part of the communication process (Applegate & Sypher, 1988 ). Cross-cultural communication typically uses culture as a national boundary. Hofstede ( 1991 ) is probably the most popular scholar in this line of research. Culture is thus treated as a theoretical construct to explain communication variations across cultures. This is also evident in intercultural communication studies, which focus on misunderstandings between individuals from different cultures.

Religion, Community, and Culture

There is an interplay among religion, community, and culture. Community is essentially formed by a group of people who share common activities or beliefs based on their mutual affect, loyalty, and personal concerns. Participation in religious institutions is one of the most dominant community engagements worldwide. Religious institutions are widely known for creating a sense of community by offering various material and social supports for individual followers. In addition, the role that religious organizations play in communal conflicts is also crucial. As religion deals with the ultimate matters of life, the differences among different religious beliefs are virtually impossible to settle. Although a direct causal relationship between religion and violence is not well supported, religion is, nevertheless, commonly accepted as a potential escalating factor in conflicts. Currently, religious conflicts are on the rise, and they are typically more violent, long-lasting, and difficult to resolve. In such cases, local religious organizations, places facilitating collective actions in the community, are extremely vital, as they can either preach peace or stir up hatred and violence. The peace impact of local religious institutions has been largely witnessed in India and Indonesia where conflicts are solved at the local level before developing into communal violence (De Juan, Pierskalla, & Vüllers, 2015 ).

While religion affects cultures (Beckford & Demerath, 2007 ), it itself is also affected by culture, as religion is an essential layer of culture. For example, the growth of individualism in the latter half of the 20th century has been coincident with the decline in the authority of Judeo-Christian institutions and the emergence of “parachurches” and more personal forms of prayer (Hoover & Lundby, 1997 ). However, this decline in the authority of the religious institutions in modernized society has not reduced the important role of religion and spirituality as one of the main sources of calm when facing painful experiences such as death, suffering, and loss.

When cultural specifications, such as individualism and collectivism, have been attributed to religion, the proposed definitions and functions of religion overlap with definitions of culture. For example, researchers often combine religious identification (Jewish, Christian, Muslim, etc.) with cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1991 ) like individualism/collectivism to understand and compare cultural differences. Such combinations for comparison and analytical purposes demonstrate how religion and religious identification in particular are often relegated to a micro-level variable, when in fact the true relationship between an individual’s religion and culture is inseparable.

Religion as Part of Culture in Communication Studies

Religion as a part of culture has been linked to numerous communication traits and behaviors. Specifically, religion has been linked with media use and preferences (e.g., Stout & Buddenbaum, 1996 ), health/medical decisions and communication about health-related issues (Croucher & Harris, 2012 ), interpersonal communication (e.g., Croucher, Faulkner, Oommen, & Long, 2012b ), organizational behaviors (e.g., Garner & Wargo, 2009 ), and intercultural communication traits and behaviors (e.g., Croucher, Braziunaite, & Oommen, 2012a ). In media and religion scholarship, researchers have shown how religion as a cultural variable has powerful effects on media use, preferences, and gratifications. The research linking media and religion is vast (Stout & Buddenbaum, 1996 ). This body of research has shown how “religious worldviews are created and sustained in ongoing social processes in which information is shared” (Stout & Buddenbaum, 1996 , pp. 7–8). For example, religious Christians are more likely to read newspapers, while religious individuals are less likely to have a favorable opinion of the internet (Croucher & Harris, 2012 ), and religious individuals (who typically attend religious services and are thus integrated into a religious community) are more likely to read media produced by the religious community (Davie, 2008 ).

Research into health/medical decisions and communication about health-related issues is also robust. Research shows how religion, specifically religiosity, promotes healthier living and better decision-making regarding health and wellbeing (Harris & Worley, 2012 ). For example, a religious (or spiritual) approach to cancer treatment can be more effective than a secular approach (Croucher & Harris, 2012 ), religious attendance promotes healthier living, and people with HIV/AIDS often turn to religion for comfort as well. These studies suggest the significance of religion in health communication and in our health.

Research specifically examining the links between religion and interpersonal communication is not as vast as the research into media, health, and religion. However, this slowly growing body of research has explored areas such as rituals, self-disclosure (Croucher et al., 2012b ), and family dynamics (Davie, 2008 ), to name a few.

The role of religion in organizations is well studied. Overall, researchers have shown how religious identification and religiosity influence an individual’s organizational behavior. For example, research has shown that an individual’s religious identification affects levels of organizational dissent (Croucher et al., 2012a ). Garner and Wargo ( 2009 ) further showed that organizational dissent functions differently in churches than in nonreligious organizations. Kennedy and Lawton ( 1998 ) explored the relationships between religious beliefs and perceptions about business/corporate ethics and found that individuals with stronger religious beliefs have stricter ethical beliefs.

Researchers are increasingly looking at the relationships between religion and intercultural communication. Researchers have explored how religion affects numerous communication traits and behaviors and have shown how religious communities perceive and enact religious beliefs. Antony ( 2010 ), for example, analyzed the bindi in India and how the interplay between religion and culture affects people’s acceptance of it. Karniel and Lavie-Dinur ( 2011 ) showed how religion and culture influence how Palestinian Arabs are represented on Israeli television. Collectively, the intercultural work examining religion demonstrates the increasing importance of the intersection between religion and culture in communication studies.

Collectively, communication studies discourse about religion has focused on how religion is an integral part of an individual’s culture. Croucher et al. ( 2016 ), in a content analysis of communication journal coverage of religion and spirituality from 2002 to 2012 , argued that the discourse largely focuses on religion as a cultural variable by identifying religious groups as variables for comparative analysis, exploring “religious” or “spiritual” as adjectives to describe entities (religious organizations), and analyzing the relationships between religious groups in different contexts. Croucher and Harris ( 2012 ) asserted that the discourse about religion, culture, and communication is still in its infancy, though it continues to grow at a steady pace.

Future Lines of Inquiry

Research into the links among religion, culture, and communication has shown the vast complexities of these terms. With this in mind, there are various directions for future research/exploration that researchers could take to expand and benefit our practical understanding of these concepts and how they relate to one another. Work should continue to define these terms with a particular emphasis on mediation, closely consider these terms in a global context, focus on how intergroup dynamics influence this relationship, and expand research into non-Christian religious cultures.

Additional definitional work still needs to be done to clarify exactly what is meant by “religion,” “culture,” and “communication.” Our understanding of these terms and relationships can be further enhanced by analyzing how forms of mass communication mediate each other. Martin-Barbero ( 1993 ) asserted that there should be a shift from media to mediations as multiple opposing forces meet in communication. He defined mediation as “the articulations between communication practices and social movements and the articulation of different tempos of development with the plurality of cultural matrices” (p. 187). Religions have relied on mediations through various media to communicate their messages (oral stories, print media, radio, television, internet, etc.). These media share religious messages, shape the messages and religious communities, and are constantly changing. What we find is that, as media sophistication develops, a culture’s understandings of mediated messages changes (Martin-Barbero, 1993 ). Thus, the very meanings of religion, culture, and communication are transitioning as societies morph into more digitally mediated societies. Research should continue to explore the effects of digital mediation on our conceptualizations of religion, culture, and communication.

Closely linked to mediation is the need to continue extending our focus on the influence of globalization on religion, culture, and communication. It is essential to study the relationships among culture, religion, and communication in the context of globalization. In addition to trading goods and services, people are increasingly sharing ideas, values, and beliefs in the modern world. Thus, globalization not only leads to technological and socioeconomic changes, but also shapes individuals’ ways of communicating and their perceptions and beliefs about religion and culture. While religion represents an old way of life, globalization challenges traditional meaning systems and is often perceived as a threat to religion. For instance, Marx and Weber both asserted that modernization was incompatible with tradition. But, in contrast, globalization could facilitate religious freedom by spreading the idea of freedom worldwide. Thus, future work needs to consider the influence of globalization to fully grasp the interrelationships among religion, culture, and communication in the world.

A review of the present definitions of religion in communication research reveals that communication scholars approach religion as a holistic, total, and unique institution or notion, studied from the viewpoint of different communication fields such as health, intercultural, interpersonal, organizational communication, and so on. However, this approach to communication undermines the function of a religion as a culture and also does not consider the possible differences between religious cultures. For example, religious cultures differ in their levels of individualism and collectivism. There are also differences in how religious cultures interact to compete for more followers and territory (Klock, Novoa, & Mogaddam, 2010 ). Thus, localization is one area of further research for religion communication studies. This line of study best fits in the domain of intergroup communication. Such an approach will provide researchers with the opportunity to think about the roles that interreligious communication can play in areas such as peacemaking processes (Klock et al., 2010 ).

Academic discourse about religion has focused largely on Christian denominations. In a content analysis of communication journal discourse on religion and spirituality, Croucher et al. ( 2016 ) found that the terms “Christian” or “Christianity” appeared in 9.56% of all articles, and combined with other Christian denominations (Catholicism, Evangelism, Baptist, Protestantism, and Mormonism, for example), appeared in 18.41% of all articles. Other religious cultures (denominations) made up a relatively small part of the overall academic discourse: Islam appeared in 6.8%, Judaism in 4.27%, and Hinduism in only 0.96%. Despite the presence of various faiths in the data, the dominance of Christianity and its various denominations is incontestable. Having religions unevenly represented in the academic discourse is problematic. This highly unbalanced representation presents a biased picture of religious practices. It also represents one faith as being the dominant faith and others as being minority religions in all contexts.

Ultimately, the present overview, with its focus on religion, culture, and communication points to the undeniable connections among these concepts. Religion and culture are essential elements of humanity, and it is through communication, that these elements of humanity are mediated. Whether exploring these terms in health, interpersonal, intercultural, intergroup, mass, or other communication contexts, it is evident that understanding the intersection(s) among religion, culture, and communication offers vast opportunities for researchers and practitioners.

Further Reading

The references to this article provide various examples of scholarship on religion, culture, and communication. The following list includes some critical pieces of literature that one should consider reading if interested in studying the relationships among religion, culture, and communication.

• Allport, G. W. (1950). Individual and his religion: A psychological interpretation . New York: Macmillan.
• Campbell, H. A. (2010). When religion meets new media . New York: Routledge.
• Cheong, P. H. , Fischer-Nielson, P. , Gelfgren, S. , & Ess, C. (Eds.). (2012). Digital religion, social media and culture: Perspectives, practices and futures . New York: Peter Lang.
• Cohen, A. B. , & Hill, P. C. (2007). Religion as culture: Religious individualism and collectivism among American Catholics, Jews, and Protestants . Journal of Personality , 75 , 709–742.
• Coomaraswamy, A. K. (2015). Hinduism and buddhism . New Delhi: Munshiram Monoharlal Publishers.
• Coomaraswamy, A. K. (2015). A new approach to the Vedas: Essays in translation and exegesis . Philadelphia: Coronet Books.
• Harris, T. M. , Parrott, R. , & Dorgan, K. A. (2004). Talking about human genetics within religious frameworks . Health Communication , 16 , 105–116.
• Hitchens, C. (2007). God is not great . New York: Hachette.
• Hoover, S. M. (2006). Religion in the media age (media, religion and culture) . New York: Routledge.
• Lundby, K. , & Hoover, S. M. (1997). Summary remarks: Mediated religion. In S. M. Hoover & K. Lundby (Eds.), Rethinking media, religion, and culture (pp. 298–309). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
• Mahan, J. H. (2014). Media, religion and culture: An introduction . New York: Routledge.
• Parrott, R. (2004). “Collective amnesia”: The absence of religious faith and spirituality in health communication research and practice . Journal of Health Communication , 16 , 1–5.
• Russell, B. (1957). Why I am not a Christian . New York: Touchstone.
• Sarwar, G. (2001). Islam: Beliefs and teachings (5th ed.). Tigard, OR: Muslim Educational Trust.
• Stout, D. A. (2011). Media and religion: Foundations of an emerging field . New York: Routledge.
• Antony, M. G. (2010). On the spot: Seeking acceptance and expressing resistance through the Bindi . Journal of International and Intercultural Communication , 3 , 346–368.
• Beckford, J. A. , & Demerath, N. J. (Eds.). (2007). The SAGE handbook of the sociology of religion . Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
• Burrell, D. B. (2013). The triumph of mercy: Philosophy and scripture in Mulla Sadra—By Mohammed Rustom . Modern Theology , 29 , 413–416.
• Clark, A. S. , & Hoover, S. M. (1997). At the intersection of media, culture, and religion. In S. M. Hoover , & K. Lundby (Eds.), Rethinking media, religion, and culture (pp. 15–36). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
• Croucher, S. M. , Braziunaite, R. , & Oommen, D. (2012a). The effects of religiousness and religious identification on organizational dissent. In S. M. Croucher , & T. M. Harris (Eds.), Religion and communication: An anthology of extensions in theory, research, and method (pp. 69–79). New York: Peter Lang.
• Croucher, S. M. , Faulkner , Oommen, D. , & Long, B. (2012b). Demographic and religious differences in the dimensions of self-disclosure among Hindus and Muslims in India . Journal of Intercultural Communication Research , 39 , 29–48.
• Croucher, S. M. , & Harris, T. M. (Eds.). (2012). Religion and communication: An anthology of extensions in theory, research, & method . New York: Peter Lang.
• Croucher, S. M. , Sommier, M. , Kuchma, A. , & Melnychenko, V. (2016). A content analysis of the discourses of “religion” and “spirituality” in communication journals: 2002–2012. Journal of Communication and Religion , 38 , 42–79.
• Davie, G. (2008). The sociology of religion . Los Angeles: SAGE.
• De Juan, A. , Pierskalla, J. H. , & Vüllers, J. (2015). The pacifying effects of local religious institutions: An analysis of communal violence in Indonesia . Political Research Quarterly , 68 , 211–224.
• Durkheim, E. (1976). The elementary forms of religious life . London: Harper Collins.
• Garner, J. T. , & Wargo, M. (2009). Feedback from the pew: A dual-perspective exploration of organizational dissent in churches. Journal of Communication & Religion , 32 , 375–400.
• Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays by Clifford Geertz . New York: Basic Books.
• Hall, E. T. (1989). Beyond culture . New York: Anchor Books.
• Harris, T. M. , & Worley, T. R. (2012). Deconstructing lay epistemologies of religion within health communication research. In S. M. Croucher , & T. M. Harris (Eds.), Religion & communication: An anthology of extensions in theory, research, and method (pp. 119–136). New York: Peter Lang.
• Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind . London: McGraw-Hill.
• Holiday, A. (1999). Small culture . Applied Linguistics , 20 , 237–264.
• Hoover, S. M. , & Lundby, K. (1997). Introduction. In S. M. Hoover & K. Lundby (Eds.), Rethinking media, religion, and culture (pp. 3–14). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
• Karniel, Y. , & Lavie-Dinur, A. (2011). Entertainment and stereotype: Representation of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in reality shows on Israeli television . Journal of Intercultural Communication Research , 40 , 65–88.
• Kennedy, E. J. , & Lawton, L. (1998). Religiousness and business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics , 17 , 175–180.
• Klock, J. , Novoa, C. , & Mogaddam, F. M. (2010). Communication across religions. In H. Giles , S. Reid , & J. Harwood (Eds.), The dynamics of intergroup communication (pp. 77–88). New York: Peter Lang
• Kluckhohn, C. (1949). Mirror for man: The relation of anthropology to modern life . Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
• Kohl, C. T. (2007). Buddhism and quantum physics . Contemporary Buddhism , 8 , 69–82.
• Mapped: These are the world’s most religious countries . (April 13, 2015). Telegraph Online .
• Martin-Barbero, J. (1993). Communication, culture and hegemony: From the media to the mediations . London: SAGE.
• Marx, K. , & Engels, F. (1975). Collected works . London: Lawrence and Wishart.
• Nietzsche, F. (1996). Human, all too human: A book for free spirits . R. J. Hollingdale (Trans.). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
• Piller, I. (2011). Intercultural communication: A critical introduction . Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Philipsen, G. (2002). Cultural communication. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), Cross-cultural and intercultural communication (pp. 35–51). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
• Simmel, G. (1950). The sociology of Georg Simmel . K. Wolff (Trans.). Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
• Stout, D. A. , & Buddenbaum, J. M. (Eds.). (1996). Religion and mass media: Audiences and adaptations . Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
• Weber, M. (1963). The sociology of religion . London: Methuen.
• Wimal, D. (2007). Nagarjuna and modern communication theory. China Media Research , 3 , 34–41.
• Applegate, J. , & Sypher, H. (1988). A constructivist theory of communication and culture. In Y. Y. Kim & W. B. Gudykunst (Eds.), Theories of intercultural communication (pp. 41-65). Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.

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Psychological Analysis of Religious Experience: The Construction of the Intensity of Religious Experience Scale (IRES)

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• Published: 09 September 2020
• Volume 60 , pages 576–595, ( 2021 )

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• Stanisław Głaz 1  

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The aim of this article is to present the issues of religious experience, and the associated experience of God’s presence and God’s absence, and then its operationalization, as well as to construct the Intensity of Religious Experience Scale, IRES (Skala Intensywności Doświadczenia Religijnego, SIDR). The value of psychometric tool, the reliability and validity, were assessed. The study was conducted in three steps. Study 1 concerned the generalization of statements related to conception of Catholic religious experience; i.e., the subjective feeling whether one experiences God’s presence and God’s absence, and how such beliefs affect certain aspects of a person’s life. Study 2 was carried out on the sample of 217 people and was designed to perform Exploratory Factor Analysis and to assess three-week test–retest reliability of the IRES. Study 3 was based on the sample of 368 people and was aimed to perform Confirmatory Factor Analysis and concurrent validation of the IRES. The analysis of the religious experience showed that this kind of human experience has its own structure. The explication of the subject has confirmed the existence of two positive factors of religious experience; i.e., a subjective sense of experience of God’s presence and God’s absence that can influence on life of people living in the Catholic religion environment.

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Introduction

With regard to religion, the term “experience” means the process of directly obtaining information about religious reality and the entirety of religious experiences of man (Głaz 2003 ). It is connected with various Christian religions and in particular in Catholicism (Głaz 1998 ). James ( 1902 ) and Starbuck ( 1899 ) analyzing religious experience, they noticed that it is characterized by inexpressibility, impermanence and at the same time emphasizing its emotional element but it depends on the person, and other circumstances. For them the religious experience is the unique experience of “something more”, “divinity”. According to Otto ( 1968 ), religious experience is associated with a sense of sanctity and dependence. Religious experience has a responsive and dialogical character, and not only cognitive. It is a personal encounter with God, Absolut (Argyle 2000 ). Religious experience—according to Jung ( 1982 , 2010 )—cannot be identified with what is psychological. Psychological factors could be only carriers of religious content.

The analysis of religious experience, shows that there are different kinds of it (Maslow 1970 ; Allport 1972 ). It may occur in two varieties that is as ordinary, and as mystical. The mystical experience is already knowing God, while the ordinary experience is also an encounter with God directly in prayer, even though one does not hear His answer (Głaz 1998 ). Płużek ( 1986 ) mentions several varieties of religious experience. A frequent type is searching for and finding paths to God. Another variation of religious experience is searching for God, feeling His presence, also related to the return of man to God. A specific religious experience is the experience of the presence of God and the absence of God (Głaz 1998 ).

Many researchers, when analyzing the effects of religious experience, point to its creative character (Keating 2001 ; Jung 2010 ), not including those who perceive the experience in reductionist term, as suggested by Freud ( 1961 ) and others (Master and Houston 1966 ). A man who participated in the religious experience perceives the world as friendlier to him (Oman and Thoresen 2005 ), feels more integrated, more uniform, more efficiently organized (Rogers 2012 ), more creative, and characterized by the uniqueness of the self (Rogers 1975 ). Religious experience helps in searching for the meaning of life. It releases man from the old paths of life (Azari et al. 2005 ), which favors a positive influence on the further development of personality and religiousness (Rydz et al. 2017 ). A man who has had the experience of the Absolut, is more diligent, has greater satisfaction with a job (Fromm 1966 ). Researchers show that the religious experience also have therapeutic implications. It is able to change the views of a person to themselves, their own lives, the world and to other people. It liberate more creative power in man (Płużek 1986 ). Religious people discover in themselves the feelings of gratitude to God. It is expressed in prayer, adoration, thanksgiving, sacrifice, love for others and even in commitments (Shear 2005 ).

In the 1960s, in order to better understand and describe the structure of the religious experience of man, researchers used the method called open-ended responses, which is qualitative measure. For example, Klingberg ( 1959 ) conducted a study among adolescents, who were asked to answer the question “Once when I thought about God…?” Others proposed to answer such questions like “Have you ever as an adult had the feeling that you were somehow in the presence of God?” (Glock and Stark 1965 ). When the qualitative method used in the description of religious experience demonstrated to be insufficient and incomplete, quantitative research tools have been developed. Among the claims about religious content, the researchers also included statements regarding religious experience. These instruments were based on a review of scientific literature, both from a psychological and theological perspective. For example, Underwood and Teresi ( 2002 ) constructed a tool for measuring ordinary and everyday spiritual experiences “Daily Spiritual Experiences Scale”. Some statements include content about the experience of God’s presence: „I feel God’s presence”, “I desire to be closer to God or in union with Him”. Hall and Edwards ( 2002 ) developed a multi-dimensional tool to assess the level of religious maturity of the individual “The Spiritual Assessment Inventory”. It also contains statements regarding religious experience like “I am aware of God’s presence in times of need”, “My experience of God’s presence impacts me greatly”.

The Basics of the Intensity of Religious Experience Scale (IRES)

The basis of the scale of religious experience are the Catholic anthropology and the concept of God (Głaz 1998 ). The Catholic anthropology assumes that man is a person who fulfills his talents, predispositions, abilities in relationships with himself, with others and with God. Man, as an individual has a complex structure. It consists of the biological-physiological, psychological and spiritual dimensions (Frankl 1987 ). They work together. Each of them has an appropriate function. Bio-Physiological dimension includes the structural and functional integrity of the body. It includes impulsive dynamics and conditioning. The mental dimension is created by mental states such as experience, emotions and feelings. That is why man is open to the world, makes choices, and is creative. The spiritual dimension, which is the exclusive property of man, is an autonomous, dynamic factor. Thanks to its people get to know, reflect, analyze, evaluate, and make decisions. This dimension also directs man to God (Głaz 2013b ). Man has the ontical ability to establish a personal relationship with God. The Catholic concept of God presents Him as a personal God who revealed Himself in Christ, sending out the Holy Spirit, and entering into relationships with men (Jarosz 2011 ).

Literature shows that many pious people have experienced the presence of God and the absence of God (James 1902 ; Saint Jean de la Croix 1915 ). The both religious experiences can be noted in the lives of our contemporaries (Głaz 2011 , 2014 ). They are connected with the process of development of religious life (Głaz 1998 ). During the experience of God’s presence, man is aware of His presence in his life or His omnipresence in the world. This kind of experience is connected a feeling of joy, an elation, a feeling of surprise, and a feeling of inner calmness. It helps to deepen the relation with God and with other people. It also deepens the faith and love to God. Man who is convinced of God’s presence, can however experience His temporary absence. Sometimes it is accompanied by the inner emptiness and loneliness. It evokes feelings of dissatisfaction, doubt and sometimes even rejection by God (Głaz 1998 , 2014 ). During the experience of God’s absence, man experiences such features as lack of self-confidence, lack of patience, lack of understanding for oneself and others. In fact, it can be the greatest trial of faith because in spite of these appearing negative features, there are also such features as a desire to deepen faith, greater trust in God, greater involvement in religious life, awareness of own imperfections, appreciation of God’s presence (Głaz 1998 , 2013b ). Such internal and direct experiences can be perceived only by the experiencing man, and from the outside one can be people who experience it, and it can be observed from the outside by human behaviors. Awareness of these religious experiences may accompany a person for a longer or shorter time, in various stages of their life’s development (Eigen 2001 ; Głaz 2014 ). Every kind of religious experience, that is the presence of God and the absence of God, brings something good in the life of a given person, and it given him or her a new content. It leaves a certain trace in the person’s life. Its effects are visible in life in the personal and social sphere, as well as in religious and psychological behaviors. The religious experience of the presence of God and the absence of God is integrated into the totality of human experience (Jung 2010 ). The cognitive, emotional and value dimension of a human being participates in it. It has a personal character, although it can be socially and culturally conditioned taking into account religious differences (Głaz 1998 ; Huber 2003 ). On the basis of such an understanding of religious experience, an attempt was made to construct a scale of the religious experience: God’s presence as well as God’s absence.

Construction of the IRES

Many factors indicate the need to construct the scale relating to the concept of Catholic religious experience: the experience of God’s presence and the experience of God’s absence.

We want to know to what extent the proposed concept of Catholic religious experience of subjective feeling of God’s presence and God’s absence influencing some life aspects is scientific, true and verifiable.

The motivation to construct a tool for measuring the experience God’s presence and God’s absence is the increase in religious awareness and the usefulness of religion in the life of Poles. The Institute of Statistics of the Catholic Church in Poland (2015) stated that over 90% of Polish citizens declare membership of the Roman Catholic Church. After political changes, there is a great interest among believers and doubters about religious movements and communities, as well as religious press. Every tenth Pole considers his faith as deep. Many people declare that they have experienced the presence and absence of God in their lives (Głaz 2011 , 2014 ). There is an increase in the participation of believers in the Sunday liturgy and the Eucharist in the last decade. There is also a visible departure from institutional religiosity in favor of intrinsic religiosity (Mariański 2011 , 2014 ; Głaz 2013b ; Szyszka 2018 ).

Researchers developed standardized tools for studying religiosity, taking into account the dimension of Christian religious experience (Hill and Hood 1999 ). Foreign language adaptations of this type of tools to Polish conditions were also made (Zarzycka 2007 ; Zarzycka and Bartczuk 2011 ). However, there is still a lack of a standardized and satisfactory tool for measuring Catholic religious experience. It seems that the present tool for studying Catholic religious experience: God’s presence and God’s absence will to some extent fill the gap in this area.

The Scale of Religious Experiences (SRE) contains 37 items (Głaz 2011 ). Only Exploratory Factor Analysis was performed, but no Confirmatory Factor Analysis was carried out (validity of the scale). It has three subscales: Religious experience, Experience of God’s presence, and Experience of God’s absence (Głaz 2011 ). During the examination, participants often pointed out that there is too many items, which sometimes caused troubles. It was decided to construct a scale with two factors experience of God’s presence as well as God’s absence. While constructing the scale, it was decided to abandon the Religious experience subscale.

The existing tools seem insufficient and require further expansion. This mainly concerns taking into account the specificity of Catholic religious experience: God’s presence and God’s absence, as well as indicating the positive role of these two aspects in the life of modern man.

In the development of tools for the study of religious experience, the merits of the researchers are undisputed. However existing tools have limited applications. The development of a tool to study Catholic religious experience: God’s presence and God’s absence has a comprehensive approach. It seems that thank to the tool a new aspects of the Catholic experience in relation to the various elements of human life can be investigated.

Thus, the main purpose of this article is, on the basis of the concept of religious experience, to show construct the tool containing two subscales measuring the experience of God’s presence and the experience of God’s absence of people living in the Catholic religion environment that have an influence on the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral spheres of human life in the religious and mental dimensions.

The aim of the research procedure is threefold: 1. Confirmation of the specificity of the Catholic religious experience of God’s presence and God’s absence in relation to human life; 2. The construction of the Intensity of Religious Experience Scale (IRES); 3. Determining the psychometric value of the scale.

Validation of IRES

The validation of the IRES was done in the three study steps. Study 1 was to collect statements related to the concept of Catholic religious experience of God’s presence and God’s absence, evaluating them, and generating items for further analysis. Study 2 was carried out to perform the Exploratory Factor Analysis and to assess the three-week test–retest reliability of the IRES. Study 3 was conducted out to perform the Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

Study 1: Pilot Study

In order to test the generated primary IRES statements, i.e., to clarify them to the adapted concept of Catholic religious experience of God’s presence and God’s absence, and to verify whether the individual statements actually measure what is intended to be measured, and whether they are understandable and correctly understood, pilot study were conducted.

The Scale of Religious Experience (SRE) (Głaz 2011 ) was used as the starting point for the development of the IRES scale. The SRE contains 37 items. As mentioned earlier, this scale is related to the Catholic religious experience. In its construction, these items whose loadings were higher than .400 were considered. The grouped homogeneous items and the list of loadings in the columns of factor matrices allowed for the constitution of three factors. They concern: 1. Religious experience, 2. Experiencing God’s presence, and 3. Experiencing God’s absence. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for individual factors is .89 ≤  α  ≤ .91. No confirmatory factor analysis was performed. It contains an unequal number of items in the factors. Therefore, it was decided to rephrase some items in the construction of the new version of the scale, and to give up some of the items and introduce others. It was also decided to exclude all the items constituting the first factor regarding religious experience, due to its inadequacy with the intended subscales.

The collected material related to the concept of Catholic religious experience of God’s presence and God’s absence obtained through surveys, in pastoral work, during interviews and taken from the scientific literature, as well as from the previous scale (SRE), served to develop an initial pool of items for the IRES. First of all, the statements were evaluated by a group of people in scientific seminars. Those statements, the content of which was similar and incomprehensible, were dropped out. Some of them were corrected. We generated a list of face-valid 31 statements that were accepted for analysis. Then the accuracy of each statement was evaluated by a group of theologians and psychologists and on its basis the final selection of the statements was made. According to the method proposed by Lawshe’s ( 1975 ), 31 prepared statements were evaluated on a three-point scale (3 =  this statement is essential for a given scale , 2 =  this statement is useful, but it is not essential for a given scale , 1 =  this statement should not be in a given scale ). The statements (10 statements) which, according to experts, demonstrated to be useless, ambiguous, were excluded. 21 statements were accepted for further analysis. Each of them has 7 possible answers. 7 =  definitely yes ( I definitely agree ), 6 =  yes ( I agree ), 5 =  rather yes ( I rather agree ), 4 =  I cannot decide , 3 =  rather not ( I rather don’t agree ), 2 =  no ( I do not agree ), 1 =  definitely not ( I definitely disagree ). The generated items for the future tool were subject to a further test procedure aimed at verifying its psychometric properties.

Study 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis and Three-Week Test–Retest Reliability of the IRES

After 21 statements related to the concept of Catholic religious experience of God’s presence and God’s absence was generated, the next step of work on the tool was to use exploratory factor analysis and three-week test–retest reliability of the IRES to determine an empirical verification of the scale validity. Based on the adapted conception of Catholic religious experience, a two-factorial research tool is expected, and subscales would have Cronbacha’s alpha coefficients sufficiently high.

Participants and Procedure

The group consisted of students at the Higher School of Insurance in Krakow, as well as Poles working in England in the town of Lincoln. People were asked about their place of birth, belonging to a religious group, as well as religious commitment. All respondents were born in Poland and grew up in a Catholic family. They consider themselves believers and practitioners. They take part in the Sunday Eucharist, they pray and take sacraments. They had in their lives the experiences of God’s presence and God’s absence. In order to obtain material for the further construction of the scale, people were asked to respond to each statement. The subject’s task was to express an opinion on a 7-point Likert-type scale, about the extent in which he or she agrees with or does not agree with the content of the statement. The analysis excluded those of people who did not respond to all test items. There were 10 of them. For further analysis, the results obtained on the basis of 217 correctly completed sets of questionnaires of people were used. The age of the respondents ranged from 23 to 47 ( M  = 39.2; SD  = 9.18). 22.3% of the surveyed population were men and 77.7% women.

Exploratory Factor Analysis of the IRES

In order to check whether the previously collected set of items related to the concept of Catholic religious experience of God’s presence and God’s absence has diagnostic power, it was evaluated by the method of competent judges, and then developed. The obtained data carried out in the sample were subjected to exploratory factor analysis. The separated factors were subjected to oblique rotation. According to the theory and adapted hypothesis, it was decided to use a two-factor solution. To determine the factual validity, the results were analyzed using the rotation method—Varimax. Matrix of factor loadings is included in Table  1 .

The variables (statements) whose loadings were higher than .450 were taken into account. 18 statements met these criteria (Table  1 ). Three statements were excluded because they had factor loadings lower than .450. One statement concerned the experience of God’s presence “During the experience of God’s presence, God reveals his intentions to man” (.411), and two statements concerned the experience of God’s absence. “I think the experience of God’s absence leaves in me the feeling of anxiety and uncertainty” (.401) and “Although in my life I experience the absence of God, I see God as the one who cares for me” (.364). The grouped statements of similar content, homogeneous and the combination of loadings in the columns of factor matrices, formed the basis for determining the name for particular factors, namely the first factor concerns the experience of God’s presence (PG), in which there were 10 statements, and the second factor concerns the experience of God’s absence (AG), which consists of 8 statements (see Table  1 ). Factor I, explains 33.1% of the variance of the experience of God’s presence, and the factor II accounts for 22.3% of the variance of the experience of God’s absence. The factors loadings of the items are strong. The obtained factors are correlated with each other. The obtained correlation coefficient between the separated factors is: r  = .39, p  < .01. This suggests that the accepted statements of the scale related to Catholic religious experience of God’s presence and God’s absence, and the isolated factors confirm the structure of religious experience and form the basis for further analyzes.

Reliability Analysis of the IRES

The reliability of the tool informs the researcher how far the statements included in the scale are similar to each other, whether they measure the same construct, in this case the experience of God’s presence and God’s absence. Verification of the reliability of the subscales were estimated using the internal coherence and absolute stability methods. In order to determine the internal coherence of the scale, Cronbach’s α coefficient and Guttman’s λ 6 for two subscales were calculated. Table  2 presents descriptive statistics and reliability indicators for both subscales.

The reliability indexes of the experience of God’s presence (PG) and the experience of God’s absence (AG) are high (Table  2 ). Cronbach’s values for both subscales are satisfactory, which shows a high reliability of the measure as well as Guttman’s do. The factor PG reveals a greater saturation of the contents related to the experience of God’s presence than the factor AG concerning the experience of God’s absence.

The stability of the subscales was estimated by a test–retest method with an interval of three weeks. The results are shown in Table  3 . The average results obtained from the test and retest are very similar. The obtained measures of correlation between the results from the first and second studies confirmed the stability of the scale. Both factors have a high stability indicator. For the subscale of the experience of the presence of God (PG), the correlation coefficient is r  = .83, p  < .001, and for the subscale of the experience of absence of God (AG), it is r  = .80, p  < .001.

Study 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Concurrent Validation of the IRES

After exploratory factor analysis and reliability of the IRES, to check the adequacy of the hypothetical model, whether the factor structure of the scale from Study 2 would replicate in another sample, validity of the scale was done through the use of confirmatory factor analysis and criterion validity of the scale by applying the correlation method. It was assumed that a confirmatory factor analysis model with two-correlated factors would show adequate fit and that subscales would correlate moderately with factors of similar content.

The analysis was carried out on the results obtained among the group of students consisted of full-time and part-time of Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow. People were asked about their place of birth, religious commitment, as well as belonging to a religious group. All respondents were born in Poland and grew up in a Catholic family. They consider themselves practitioners and believers. They take part in the Sunday Eucharist, take sacraments and they pray. They declared that they had in their lives the experience of God’s presence and God’s absence. The analysis excluded those of people who did not respond to all test items. There were 27 of them. For further analysis, the results obtained on the basis of 368 correctly completed sets of questionnaires of people were used. The age of the participants ranged between 19 and 23 ( M  = 20.16; SD  = 3.19). 14.1% of the surveyed population were men and 85.9% women.

Participants completed the final IRES version, 18-item scale as developed and described in previous Study 2. The persons under study expressed their opinions on a 7-point Likert-type scale, how they agreed or disagreed with the content of the statements. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the current study were .93 for God’s presence subscale and .87 for God’s absence subscale. The factor associated with the experience of God’s presence reveals greater satiation of the contents related to the experience of God’s presence ( M  = 5.3; SD  = 1.08) than the factor concerning the experience of God’s absence ( M  = 4.0; SD  = 1.12). In addition, participants completed the following measures:

The Personality Inventory (NEO-FFI) by McCrae and Costa ( 1997 ) used to determine the relatively constant personality traits. In McCrae and Costa’s view ( 1997 ) the distinguished traits really exist. They are significant for the individual’s adaptation to the environment. They are universal and stable, meaning independent of one’s race, cultural background, or gender, and biologically determined. The answer to the 60 items of the NEO-FFI questionnaire allows to obtain information on five basic personality dimensions such as: Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness. The subject’s task is to express an opinion according to a 5-point Likert scale. 5 =  definitely yes , 4 =  rather yes , 3 =  I cannot decide , 2 =  rather not , 1 =  definitely not . Adaptations to Polish conditions were made by Zawadzki et al. ( 1998 ). The scale has satisfactory reliability (.68 ≤  α  ≤ .82) and theoretical validity.

The Purpose in Life Test (PIL) by Crumbaugh and Maholick ( 1964 ) was used to assess the meaning of life. Crumbaugh and Maholick used Frankl’s existential ideas from logotherapy to assist in the development of their test. Frankl defined meaning in life as the ontological significance of life from the point of view of the experiencing individual (Frankl 1987 ). The test contains 20 statements. The subject’s task is to express an opinion according to a 7-point Likert-type scale, concerning the extent that one agrees with or does not agree with the content of the claim. 7 =  definitely yes , 6 =  yes , 5 =  rather yes , 4 = I cannot decide , 3 =  rather not , 2 =  no , 1 =  definitely not . Popielski ( 1987 ) made an adaptation of the scale to Polish conditions. The scale has satisfactory reliability (α = .90) and theoretical validity. The high overall score of the scale indicates a high level of sense of life, a low score—a low level of sense of life.

The Scale of Personal Religiosity (SPR) by Jaworski ( 1989 ) used to measure Catholic religiosity. It contains 30 statements. The subject’s task is to express an opinion according to a 5-point Likert-type scale, concerning the extent that one agrees with or does not agree with the content of the item. 5 =  definitely yes , 4 =  rather yes , 3 =  I cannot decide , 2 =  rather not , 1 =  definitely not . The scale has four factors: I—religious faith (WR), II—morality (MR), III—religious practices (PR), IV—religious self (SR). The correlation coefficient between the factors is positive and ranges from .51 to .62. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is: .78 ≤  α  ≤ .89.

The Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS) by Huber was used to measure Christian religiosity (Huber and Huber 2012 ). The scale contains 15 questions. The subject’s task is to answer each question by choosing: 1 =  not at all , 2 =  slightly , 3 =  on average , 4 =  rather , 5 =  very . The scale defines five dimensions of Christian religiosity: interest in religious issues—the intellectual dimension (ZPR), religious beliefs—dimension of ideology (PR), prayer—dimension of private practice (M), religious experience—the dimension of religious experience (DR) and worship—dimension of public practice (K). Adaptation to Polish conditions was made by Zarzycka ( 2007 ). The reliability of the scale is estimated using Cronbach’s alpha and is: .82 ≤  α  ≤ .90. The obtained measures of correlation between the results obtained in the first and second studies confirmed the stability of the scale ( r  = .62– r  = .85).

The Scale of Personal Relationship to God (SPRdB) by Jarosz ( 2011 ) was used to measure the relationship to God. It contains 20 statements. The subject’s task is to express an opinion according to a 5-point Likert-type scale, concerning the extent that one agrees with or does not agree with the content of the item. 5 =  definitely yes , 4 =  rather yes , 3 =  I cannot decide , 2 =  rather not , 1 =  definitely not . This scale defines three types of relationships to God. Updated relationship (RZ), mutual relationship (RW), dialogue relationship (RD). The obtained measures of correlation between the results from the first and second tests confirmed the stability of the scale ( r  = .66– r  = .84). The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) for individual factors is: .79 ≤  α  ≤ .92.

Validity of the IRES

The hypothesis was assumed that the confirmatory factor analysis model with two-correlated factors would show adequate fit. The values of the scale parameters were estimated and verified by the Maximum Likelihood (MLR) method by means of confirmatory factor analysis performed using the SPSS Amos package. The properties of the confirmatory factor analysis model are presented in Table  4 , and the size of the loadings of individual statements is shown in Fig.  1 .

The factor confirmation analysis model for the IRES. Above the arrows, the size of the factor loadings of the scale items has been placed ( N  = 368)

Absolute indices of goodness of fit were used to evaluate the model. Criteria indicated in Table  4 were assumed. Examining all the indices of goodness of fit considered in this study the values of the adapted model fit indicators for the tested model have proved satisfactory including RMSEA = .06 (Marsh and Hocevar 1985 ). Based on the obtained results, it can be assumed that the factor validity of the subscales has been confirmed. The obtained correlation coefficient between the separated factors is: r  = .31, p  < .01. This suggests that the structure of the scale is well-defined and plausible. It also indicates that the scale meets the required psychometric parameters.

Criterion Validity of the IRES

The criterion validity of the scale was checked and established by the method of correlation of values obtained in the scale by means of other research tools. It was expected according to the literature of the subject, as well as earlier studies (Głaz 2013a , 2014 ; Krok 2015 ), that the experience of God’s presence and the experience of God’s absence have a significant statistical and positive relationship with such personality traits as conscientiousness, openness, agreeableness, the meaning of life, and religiosity. Hence it was decided to show the strength and type of relationship between results obtained in the IRES and the Personality Inventory (NEO-FFI), the Purpose in Life Test (PIL), the Scale of Personal Religiosity (SPR), the Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS) and the Scale of Personal Relationship to God (SPRdB). In order to determine the strength of the relationship and its character between the variables taken in this work, Pearson’s correlation coefficient r was calculated. The results obtained in the scales shows Tables  5 and 6 .

The analysis of the results obtained in the IRES, in the NEO-FFI and in the PLT shows (Table  5 ) that a statistically significant relationship and positive occur between the experience of God’s presence (PG) and extraversion (E) ( r  = .12, p  < .05), openness (O) ( r  = .28, p  < .01), agreeableness (A) ( r  = .20, p  < .01), conscientiousness (C) ( r  = .12, p  < .05), and also between the experience of God’s absence (AG) and openness (O) ( r  = .13, p  < .05) and conscientiousness (C) ( r  = .13, p  < .05). Moreover, a significant statistical relationship is recorded between the experience of God’s presence (PG) ( r  = .32, p  < .01) and the experience of God’s absence (AG) ( r  = .18, p  < .01) and the sense of meaning in life (PIL).

Explanation of the results obtained in the scales: IRES, SPR, CRS, and SPRdB shows (Table  6 ) that the statistically significant relationship and positive is observed between the experience of God’s presence (PG) and religious faith (WR) ( r  = .73, p  < .001), morality (MR) ( r  = .72, p  < .001), religious practices (PR) ( r  = .74, p  < .001), religious self (SR) ( r  = .71, p  < .001), and self-forgiveness (PS) ( r  = .31, p  < .01). In addition, between the experience of God’s absence (AG) and religious faith (WR) ( r  = .22, p  < .01), morality (MR) ( r  = .23, p  < .01), religious practices (PR) ( r  = . 23, p  < .01), religious self (SR) ( r  = .22, p  < .01), and self-forgiveness (PS) ( r  = .13, p  < .05). Also, a statistically significant and positive relationship occurs between the experience of God’s presence (PG) and interest in religious issues (ZPR), ( r  = .57, p  < .01), religious beliefs (PR) ( r  = .61, p  < .01), prayer (M) ( r  = .55, p  < .01), religious experience (DR) ( r  = .64, p  < .01), worship (K) ( r  = .59, p  < .01), as well as an updated relationship (RZ) ( r  = .37, p  < .01), mutual relationship (RW) ( r  = .20, p  < .01) and dialogical relationship (RD)) (r = .16, p < .05). In addition, between the experience of God’s absence (AG) and interest in religious issues (ZPR) ( r  = .31, p  < .01), religious beliefs (PR) ( r  = .22, p  < .01), prayer (M) ( r  = .17, p  < .01), religious experience (DR) ( r  = .28, p  < .01), worship (K) ( r  = .21, p  < .01), as well as an updated relationship (RZ) ( r  = .15, p  < .05), mutual relationship (RW) ( r  = .12, p  < .05) and dialogical relationship (RD) ( r  = .11, p  < .05).

The aim objective of the article was to present the construction a simple and psychometrically sound scale to study the intensity of religious experience: experience of God’s presence and God’s absence people living in the Catholic religion environment, that is a subjective feeling which is not examined in itself, but as the impact of that feeling on life. The article also presents the basis of the tool and rationale of its construction. The Intensity of Religious Experience Scale (IRES) has 18 items. There are two subscales. The first one consists of ten items (1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18) and describes the intensity of the experience of the impact of the subjective conviction of feeling God’s presence on certain aspects of life (PG). The second subscale consists of eight statements (4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 15, 17) and describes the impact of the subjective conviction of feeling God’s absence on certain aspects of life (AG).

Verification of the validity of the IRES scale and the extent to which the scale measures the adapted Catholic concept: the experience of God’s presence and God’s absence, was evaluated in three ways. The first step consisted in developing and generating statements related to the Catholic concept of religious experience of God’s presence and absence taken on. The second step concerned the use of the exploratory factor analysis, which was done and presented earlier (see results Table  1 ). Third method concerns the estimation of the validity of the scale through the use of confirmatory factor analysis (see results Fig.  1 and Table  4 ) and criterion validity of the scale by applying the correlation method (see results Tables  5 and 6 ). The validation process confirmed the IRES 18-item instrument, as valuable sound psychometric tool.

The IRES confirms that many of contemporary persons experiences God’s presence and God’s absence. According to the theory of Catholic religion (Głaz 1998 ) and the analysis of the structure of Catholic religious experience, it should be stated that within this experience there are two factors of it: God’s presence and God’s absence as subjective feelings.

The exploratory factor analysis method shows that the experience of God’s presence has a greater saturation with content related to this kind of experience than the experience of God’s absence. In the subscale of the experience of God’s presence, items have stronger factor loadings than items in the subscale of the experience of God’s absence. The mean value for the subscale of experience of God’s presence is higher than the average experience of God’s absence, as well as reliability measures, Cronbach’s and Guttman’s values. This indicates that in the Catholic religious experience being analyzed the experience of the presence of God is more important than the experience of God’s absence, and it plays a greater positive role in the life of the individual, which was also confirmed by previous studies (Głaz 2013a , b ).

The validity of the scale was done through the use of confirmatory factor analysis and criterion validity of the scale by applying the correlation method.

The confirmatory factor analysis shows that the factors loadings of the items are strong. Examining all the indices of goodness of fit considered in this study, including RMSEA, it should be stated that the proposed two-factor model of religious experience is satisfactory. In addition, the magnitude of loadings of confirmatory factor analysis for particular statements (.44–.81; Fig.  1 ) is similar to loadings obtained by the exploratory factor analysis (.461–.868; Table  1 ), what shows that the scale has satisfactory structure.

Criterion validity of the IRES was determined by the correlations with other adequate tools as The Personality Inventory (NEO-FFI), the Purpose in Life Test (PIL), The Scale of Personal Religiosity (SPR), The Centrality of Religiosity Scale (SCR) and The Scale of Personal Relationship to God (SPRdB).

Analysis of correlation indicated that there is a positive correlation between the experience of God’s presence and the experience of God’s absence, and certain personality traits measured with the NEO-FFI and the PIL. As expected according to previous research (Głaz 2013b ), it was confirmed that the sense of the influence of God’s presence or absence on one’s life has a statistically significant and positive relationship with conscientiousness and openness, moreover, the experience of God’s presence is related to extraversion and agreeableness. The correlation coefficient is: r  = .12– r  = .28. There is no such relationship between the experience of God’s presence and His absence with neuroticism. Both dimensions of religious experience have a significant positive relationship with the meaning of life ( r  = .18– r  = .32). Directions of the obtained correlations are in line with expectations, positive, but the obtained values of correlation coefficients are low.

The IRES correlates statistically significantly and positively with all dimensions of the SPR. The correlation coefficients of these dimensions of religiosity for the experience of God’s presence range from .71 to .74, while for the experience of God’s absence from .22 to .23. Similar values as to the correlation coefficients are recorded between the IRES and the SCR. The magnitude of correlation coefficients for the experience of God’s presence ranges from .55 to .64, and for the experience of God’s absence from .17 to .31.

The smallest correlation coefficients are observed between the IRES and the SPRdB. Correlation coefficients for the experience of God’s presence range from .16 to .37, and slightly lower for the experience of God’s absence. The small values obtained for correlation coefficients between the dimensions of the IRES and some parameters of religiosity of the SPRdB may result from the content difference of the measured dimensions of religiosity. The IRES measures a sense of influence of God’s presence or absence on one’s life. The SPRdB includes religious dimensions such as worship, religious commitment, faith, religious self, etc., with the exception of religious experience included in the SCR, and defines religious content slightly different from those included in the IRES. Stronger positive relationships were expected between the results of the IRES and the results obtained in the SPRdB. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that there are statistically significant and positive correlations between the experience of God’s presence and the experience of God’s absence, which is an important component of religiosity, and the presented parameters of human religiousness, which confirms the value of the scale.

The undertaken analysis rises some comments.

In the validation process of the tool exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis techniques were used, that produced an 18-item instrument, which exhibits sound psychometric properties. Meanwhile, each of the factors may still be strengthened through revision, by adding new items that are not included in the present study.

The samples in the present investigation are representative for the Catholic population of student age. Thus, cautions should be taken when generalizing the findings despite the strong evidence of reliability and validity of the instrument.

Many tools have been developed to study religiousness, including religious experience, and their positive impact on human life has been analyzed (Hill and Hood 1999 ; Hall and Edwards 2002 ; Huber and Huber 2012 ). Empirical verification of the Catholic concept of religious experience: God’s presence and God’s absence confirmed that contemporary man manifests tendencies to realize himself on a spiritual and psychological level.

The tool in question does not examine experience, but a sense of the influence of the presence of God and absence of God on one’s own life taking into account their positive aspect. According to Catholic theology, also feeling of the experience of God’s absence can play a positive role in the life of a believer, which has been confirmed (Jaworski 1989 ; Głaz 1998 , 2013b ).

There are many measures that show that Christian religiosity has a great influence on psychological well-being in the life of the believers (Jarosz 2011 ; Huber and Huber 2012 ; Krok 2015 ), none of these indices investigated the possible relationship between Catholic subjective belief about the feeling of influence of God’s presence and God’s absence on certain aspects of one’s life and psychological outcomes for example, the meaning of life, and satisfaction in life.

The IRES can be used among young people in the student age and maybe to older people as well, living in the Catholic religion environment. It can be used to diagnose how persons perceive their religious sense of God’s presence and God’s absence as affecting their life. It seems that the scale may be the most useful in studying individuals and religious groups that lead an intense religious life. The statements contained in it relate to certain aspects of deepened and mature religious life of an individual with its consequences regarding his personal and social life.

The test may have various applications, e.g., it can be a form of self-esteem in groups of young people to help guide their religious development. In high school or student groups, such a religious orientation can be helpful to young people, and for pastoralists leading such groups. Pastoral psychology presupposes the interpenetration of spiritual and mental development. Due to its nature and purpose, it can serve as a direct aid in pastoral practice of youth.

The both IRES subscales have a positive meaning and can be interpreted as measures of the sense of God’s presence and God’s absence as encouraging some aspects of human life. Thus, the high scores in the subscales of the experience of God’s presence and God’s absence can be interpreted positively as follows.

The high score in the subscale of the experience of God’s presence (PG) suggests that such person has confidence in God, and seeks to have a relationship with Him. He or she knows himself or herself, and is open to the needs of others, sees his or her life as meaningful and valuable, accompanied by joy and peace. Whereas, the low score on the scale indicates that a person’s life lacks a deep relationship with God. A person treats himself and others objectively, and a lack of commitment to others is visible. The life of oneself and others is seen as worthless and meaningless.

The high score in the subscale of the experience of God’s absence (AG) suggests that the person is striving for greater trust in God, perceiving Him as the one who triggers creative anxiety, and is conducive to discovering the meaning of life. He seeks to get to know himself better and to be more open to others, as well as to gain more knowledge about others. Moreover, the low score in the scale of the experience of God’s absence indicates that man treats God as a preferential value. He does not care about getting to know himself and others better. He is accompanied by a lack of openness to new challenges and a lack of commitment to others.

In addition, the literature points to the multifaceted nature of the Christian religious experience. This scale concerning the experience of God’s presence and God’s absence can be useful to develop a tool for the study of Catholic religious experience taking into account other aspects of it not analyzed so far.

An important advantage of the method is that it concerns the experience of the presence of God and the experience of absence of God within the Catholic religion. The scale is a tool with satisfactory psychometric parameters, taking into account the discriminating power of its item, as well as its reliability and validity.

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Głaz, S. Psychological Analysis of Religious Experience: The Construction of the Intensity of Religious Experience Scale (IRES). J Relig Health 60 , 576–595 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-020-01084-7

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Table of Contents

• Chapter 2: Religious Practices and Experiences
• Chapter 3: Views of Religious Institutions
• Chapter 4: Social and Political Attitudes
• Appendix A: Methodology
• Appendix B: Putting Findings From the Religious Landscape Study Into Context

While religion remains important in the lives of most Americans, the 2014 Religious Landscape Study finds that Americans as a whole have become somewhat less religious in recent years by certain traditional measures of religious commitment. For instance, fewer U.S. adults now say religion is very important in their lives than did so seven years ago, when Pew Research Center conducted a similarly extensive religion survey. Fewer adults also express absolutely certain belief in God, say they believe in heaven or say their religion’s sacred text is the word of God.

The change in Americans’ religious beliefs coincides with the rising share of the U.S. public that is not affiliated with any religion. The unaffiliated not only make up a growing portion of the population, they also are growing increasingly secular, at least on some key measures of religious belief. For instance, fewer religious “nones” say religion is very important to them than was the case in 2007, and fewer say they believe in God or believe in heaven or hell.

Among people who do identify with a religion, however, there has been little, if any, change on many measures of religious belief. People who are affiliated with a religious tradition are as likely now as in the recent past to say religion is very important in their lives and to believe in heaven. They also are as likely to believe in God, although the share of religiously affiliated adults who believe in God with absolute certainty has declined somewhat.

When seeking guidance on questions of right and wrong, a plurality of Americans say they rely primarily on their common sense and personal experiences. But there has been a noticeable increase in the share of religiously affiliated adults who say they turn to their religious teachings for guidance.

This chapter takes a detailed look at the religious beliefs of U.S. adults – including members of a variety of religious groups – and compares the results of the current study with the 2007 Religious Landscape Study. The chapter also examines Americans’ views on religion and salvation, religion and modernity, and religion and morality.

Importance of Religion

Three-quarters of U.S. adults say religion is at least “somewhat” important in their lives, with more than half (53%) saying it is “very” important. Approximately one-in-five say religion is “not too” (11%) or “not at all” important in their lives (11%).

Although religion remains important to many Americans, its importance has slipped modestly in the last seven years. In 2007, Americans were more likely to say religion was very important (56%) or somewhat important (26%) to them than they are today. Only 16% of respondents in 2007 said religion was not too or not at all important to them.

The decline in the share of Americans who say religion is very important in their lives is closely tied to the growth of the religiously unaffiliated, whose share of the population has risen from 16% to 23% over the past seven years. Compared with those who are religiously affiliated, religious “nones” are far less likely to describe religion as a key part of their lives; just 13% say religion is very important to them. Furthermore, the share of the “nones” who say religion is not an important part of their lives has grown considerably in recent years. Today, two-thirds of the unaffiliated (65%) say religion is not too or not at all important to them, up from 57% in 2007.

For Americans who are religiously affiliated, the importance people attach to religion varies somewhat by religious tradition. Roughly eight-in-ten or more Jehovah’s Witnesses (90%), members of historically black Protestant churches (85%), Mormons (84%) and evangelical Protestants (79%) say religion is very important in their lives. These figures have stayed about the same in recent years.

Smaller majorities of most other religious groups say religion plays a very important role in their lives. This includes 64% of Muslims, 58% of Catholics and 53% of mainline Protestants. Roughly half of Orthodox Christians (52%) also say this. Fewer Jews, Buddhists and Hindus say religion is very important to them, but most members of those groups indicate that religion is at least somewhat important in their lives.

The survey also finds that older adults are more likely than younger adults to say religion is very important in their lives, and women are more likely than men to express this view. Additionally, those with a college degree typically are less likely than those with lower levels of education to say religion is very important in their lives. And blacks are much more likely than whites or Hispanics to say religion is very important in their lives. These patterns are seen in the population as a whole and within many – though not all – religious groups.

Belief in God

Nearly nine-in-ten Americans (89%) say they believe in “God or a universal spirit,” and most of them (63% of all adults) are absolutely certain in this belief. There has been a modest decline in the share of Americans who believe in God since the Religious Landscape Study was first conducted in 2007 (from 92% to 89%), and a bigger drop in the share of Americans who say they believe in God with absolute certainty (from 71% to 63%).

Majorities of adherents of most Christian traditions say they believe in God with absolute certainty. But this conviction has declined noticeably in recent years among several Christian groups. The largest drops have been among mainline Protestants (down from 73% in 2007 to 66% today), Catholics (from 72% to 64%) and Orthodox Christians (from 71% to 61%).

Among non-Christians, the pattern is mixed. Most Muslims (84%) are absolutely certain that God exists, but far fewer Hindus (41%), Jews (37%) or Buddhists (29%) are certain there is a God or universal spirit.

As was the case in 2007, most religiously unaffiliated people continue to express some level of belief in God or a universal spirit. However, the share of religious “nones” who believe in God has dropped substantially in recent years (from 70% in 2007 to 61% today). And religious “nones” who believe in God are far less certain about this belief compared with those who identify with a religion. In fact, most religiously unaffiliated believers say they are less than absolutely certain about God’s existence.

Nearly one-in-ten U.S. adults overall (9%) now say they do not believe in God, up from 5% in 2007.

Women are much more likely than men to say they are absolutely certain about God’s existence (69% vs. 57%), and older Americans are much more likely than younger adults to say they are absolutely convinced that God exists. Two-thirds of those with less than a college degree express certainty about God’s existence, compared with 55% of college graduates. Additionally, 83% of blacks say they are absolutely certain about God’s existence, while roughly six-in-ten whites (61%) and Hispanics (59%) hold this view.

There is considerable variation in the way members of different religious groups conceive of God. For example, seven-in-ten Christians think of God as a person with whom people can have a relationship. Only about a quarter of those who belong to non-Christian faiths (26%) share this view. Among non-Christian faiths, it is more common to see God as an impersonal force.

Among the religiously unaffiliated, roughly three-in-ten (31%) say God is an impersonal force, a quarter say God is best viewed as a person and a third say God does not exist. However, among the subset of religious “nones” who describe their religion as “nothing in particular” and who also say religion is very or somewhat important in their lives, a slim majority (53%) say they believe in a personal God.

Although the share of adults who believe in God has declined modestly in recent years, among those who do believe in God, views about the nature of God are little changed since 2007. In both 2007 and 2014, roughly two-thirds of people who believe in God said they think of God as a person, while just under three-in-ten see God as an impersonal force.

Beliefs About the Afterlife

Roughly seven-in-ten Americans (72%) believe in “a heaven, where people who have led good lives are eternally rewarded.”

Belief in heaven is nearly universal among Mormons (95%) and members of the historically black Protestant tradition (93%). Belief in heaven also is widely held by evangelical Protestants (88%), Catholics (85%), Orthodox Christians (81%) and mainline Protestants (80%).

The vast majority of Muslims (89%) also believe in heaven. About half of Hindus in the survey (48%) say they believe in heaven, as do 47% of Buddhists surveyed.

The only groups where significantly fewer than half say they believe in heaven are Jews (40%) and the unaffiliated (37%). While relatively few atheists or agnostics believe in heaven, a large share of those whose religion is “nothing in particular” and who also say religion is at least somewhat important in their lives do believe in heaven (72%).

The survey also finds that, overall, women are more likely than men to say they believe in heaven, and those with less than a college degree are more likely than those with a college degree to express this view. Slightly bigger shares of blacks and Hispanics than whites say they believe in heaven, and older Americans are slightly more likely than younger adults to hold this belief. In many cases, however, these demographic differences in belief in heaven are smaller within religious traditions than among the public as a whole. Among evangelical Protestants, for example, men are just as likely as women to believe in heaven, and young people are just as likely as older evangelicals to hold this belief.

Belief in “hell, where people who have lived bad lives and die without being sorry are eternally punished,” is less widespread than belief in heaven. About six-in-ten Americans (58%) believe in hell, little changed from 2007.

Belief in hell is most common among members of historically black Protestant churches (82%) and evangelical Protestant churches (82%). Somewhat fewer Catholics (63%), Mormons (62%), mainline Protestants (60%) and Orthodox Christians (59%) say they believe in hell.

Three-quarters of U.S. Muslims (76%) believe in hell, but belief in hell is less common among other non-Christian groups, including Buddhists (32%), Hindus (28%), Jews (22%) and the religiously unaffiliated (27%).

U.S. adults with less than a college degree are more likely than college graduates to say they believe in hell, and blacks are more likely than Hispanics and whites to believe in hell. However, there are minimal differences between men and women and between younger and older adults on this question.

Beliefs About Holy Scripture

Six-in-ten Americans (60%) view their religion’s sacred text as the word of God. This represents a slight decline from 2007, when 63% of the public held this view. Within most religious groups, there has been little movement on this question, but among the unaffiliated, there has been a modest decline in the share who view the Bible as the word of God (from 25% to 21%).

Three-quarters of Christians believe the Bible is the word of God, including about nine-in-ten evangelicals (88%), Mormons (91%) and Jehovah’s Witnesses (94%). Among members of other Christian traditions, smaller majorities say the Bible is the word of God.

Although there is widespread agreement across Christian groups on this question, there is disagreement about whether the Bible can be taken “literally, word for word.” Most evangelical Protestants (55%) and members of historically black Protestant churches (59%) believe the Bible should be taken literally, but fewer Christians from other traditions espouse a literalist view of the Bible. There has been little change in recent years in the share of Christians who believe the Bible should be interpreted literally, word for word.

Most Muslims (83%) accept the Quran (also spelled Koran) as the word of God. Far fewer Jews (37%), Hindus (29%) and Buddhists (15%) say their scripture is the word of God.

The share of the unaffiliated who believe the Bible was written by men and is not the word of God has risen by 8 percentage points in recent years, from 64% in 2007 to 72% in 2014. But while most religious “nones” say the Bible was written by men, about half of those who say they have no particular religion and who also say religion is at least somewhat important in their lives believe the Bible is the word of God (51%).

As on some other traditional measures of religious belief, older adults are more likely than younger adults to say their religion’s holy text is the word of God. And those with less than a college degree also are much more likely than college graduates to say their religion’s scripture is the word of God. Additionally, more women than men and more blacks than Hispanics and whites say their religion’s holy text is the word of God. For the most part, however, differences in beliefs about the Bible are larger across religious traditions (e.g., between evangelicals and Catholics and religious “nones”) than differences between demographic groups within the same religious tradition.

Beliefs About Religion and Modernity

Respondents in the survey who are affiliated with a religion were asked to choose one of three statements that best reflects their view of how their religion should engage with modernity. A plurality of religiously affiliated Americans (46%) believe their religion should “preserve traditional beliefs and practices.” A third (34%) say their congregation or denomination should “adjust traditional beliefs and practices in light of new circumstances.” Only 14% of people who are affiliated with a religious tradition say their religion should “adopt modern beliefs and practices.”

These findings are little changed from 2007, when 44% of affiliated respondents said their religion should preserve its traditional beliefs and practices, 35% said their religion should adjust its traditional beliefs and 12% said their religion should adopt modern beliefs and practices.

The belief that their religion should preserve traditional practices is held by most Mormons (70%), Jehovah’s Witnesses (60%), evangelical Protestants (61%) and members of historically black Protestant churches (53%), as well as half of Orthodox Christians (50%).

Muslims are closely divided on whether their religion should preserve traditional beliefs and practices or adjust traditional beliefs and practices in light of new circumstances. Among other religious groups, including Jews, mainline Protestants and Catholics, the most common view is that religions should adjust traditional practices.

Paths to Eternal Life

Two-thirds of those who identify with a religious group say many religions (not just their own) can lead to eternal life, down slightly from 2007, when 70% of all religiously affiliated adults said this.

This view is held by the vast majority of mainline Protestants (80%) and Catholics (79%), as well as smaller majorities of Orthodox Christians (68%) and members of historically black Protestant churches (57%) and about half of evangelicals (52%). Fewer than half of Mormons (40%) and only about one-in-ten Jehovah’s Witnesses (8%) believe that many religions can lead to eternal life.

Among the non-Christian religious traditions that are large enough to be analyzed, most say many religions can lead to eternal life.

Most Christians who say many religions can lead to eternal life also say non-Christian religions can lead to heaven. In fact, half of all Christians say some non-Christian faiths can lead to eternal life, while about four-in-ten say either that theirs is the one true faith leading to eternal life or that only Christianity can result in everlasting life. About one-in-ten Christians express no opinion or provide other views on these matters.

Two-thirds of Catholics (68%) and mainline Protestants (65%) say some non-Christian religions can lead to eternal life, as do 59% of Orthodox Christians. This view is less common among other Christian groups. Roughly four-in-ten members of historically black Protestant denominations (38%) say some non-Christian religions can lead to eternal life, as do three-in-ten evangelical Protestants and Mormons (31% each). Very few Jehovah’s Witnesses (5%) believe this.

Religion and Morality

When looking for answers to questions about right and wrong, more Americans say they turn to practical experience and common sense (45%) than to any other source of guidance. The next most common source of guidance is religious beliefs and teachings (33%), while far fewer turn to philosophy and reason (11%) or scientific information (9%).

Since the 2007 Religious Landscape Study, however, the share of U.S. adults who say they turn to practical experience has decreased by 7 percentage points (from 52% to 45%) while the share who say they look to religious teachings has increased by 4 points (from 29% to 33%). This turn to religious teachings as a source of moral guidance has occurred across many religious traditions, with the largest increases among evangelical Protestants and Catholics.

Six-in-ten or more evangelical Protestants, Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses say they turn to religious teachings and beliefs for moral guidance. Members of historically black Protestant churches are more divided: 47% say they rely on religious teachings while 41% rely on practical experience. Fewer Catholics (30%), mainline Protestants (29%) and Orthodox Christians (27%) turn primarily to religion for guidance on questions of right and wrong.

Fewer religious “nones” now say they use common sense and practical experience as their main source of guidance in this area (57%) than said this in 2007 (66%). But instead of finding guidance through religious teachings, more of the “nones” are turning to scientific information; the share who say they rely on scientific information has increased from 10% to 17% in recent years. The reliance on science is most common among self-identified atheists; one-third of this group (32%) relies primarily on scientific information for guidance on questions of right and wrong.

Nearly two-thirds of U.S. adults (64%) say that whether something is right or wrong depends on the situation, while a third say there are clear and absolute standards for what is right or wrong. In 2007, a different question about moral absolutes found that 39% of Americans completely agreed with the statement “there are clear and absolute standards for what is right and wrong.”

While Christians overall are more likely than members of other religious groups to say there are absolute standards for right and wrong, there are large differences within Christianity. Nearly six-in-ten Mormons (57%) and Jehovah’s Witnesses (57%) say there are clear standards for right and wrong. Evangelical Protestants are divided in their opinions, with 50% saying there are absolute standards and 48% saying it depends on the situation. Fewer Orthodox Christians (33%), mainline Protestants (32%), Catholics (30%) and members of the historically black Protestant tradition (29%) say there are clear and absolute standards of right and wrong.

Among members of non-Christian faiths, about three-quarters assert that determining right from wrong is often situational. Similarly, more than eight-in-ten atheists and agnostics express this view, as do three-quarters of those whose religion is “nothing in particular.”

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