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The Way We Live Now

The Perils of Soft Power

By Josef Joffe

• May 14, 2006

In recent years, a number of American thinkers, led by Joseph S. Nye Jr. of Harvard, have argued that the United States should rely more on what he calls its "soft power" — the contagious appeal of its ideas, its culture and its way of life — and so rely less on the "hard power" of its stealth bombers and aircraft carriers. There is one problem with this argument: soft power does not necessarily increase the world's love for America. It is still power, and it can still make enemies.

America's soft power isn't just pop and schlock; its cultural clout is both high and low. It is grunge and Google, Madonna and MoMA, Hollywood and Harvard. If two-thirds of the movie marquees carry an American title in Europe (even in France), dominance is even greater when it comes to translated books. The figure for Germany in 2003 was 419 versus 3,732; that is, for every German book translated into English, nine English-language books were translated into German. It used to be the other way around. A hundred years ago, Humboldt University in Berlin was the model for the rest of the world. Tokyo, Johns Hopkins, Stanford and the University of Chicago were founded in conscious imitation of the German university and its novel fusion of teaching and research. Today Europe's universities have lost their luster, and as they talk reform, they talk American. Indeed, America is one huge global "demonstration effect," as the sociologists call it. The Soviet Union's cultural presence in Prague, Budapest and Warsaw vanished into thin air the moment the last Russian soldier departed. American culture, however, needs no gun to travel.

There may be little or no relationship between America's ubiquity and its actual influence. Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accouterments of their daily lives with America. A Yankees cap is the epitome of things American, but it hardly signifies knowledge of, let alone affection for, the team from New York or America as such.

The same is true for American films, foods or songs. Of the 250 top-grossing movies around the world, only four are foreign-made: "The Full Monty" (U.K.), "Life Is Beautiful" (Italy) and "Spirited Away" and "Howl's Moving Castle" (Japan); the rest are American, including a number of co-productions. But these American products shape images, not sympathies, and there is little, if any, relationship between artifact and affection.

If the relationship is not neutral, it is one of repulsion rather than attraction — the dark side of the "soft power" coin. The European student movement of the late 1960's took its cue from the Berkeley free-speech movement of 1964, the inspiration for all post-1964 Western student revolts. But it quickly turned anti-American; America was reviled while it was copied.

Now shift forward to the Cannes Film Festival of 2004, where hundreds of protesters denounced America's intervention in Iraq until the police dispersed them. The makers of the movie "Shrek 2" had placed large bags of green Shrek ears along the Croisette, the main drag along the beach. As the demonstrators scattered, many of them put on free Shrek ears. "They were attracted," noted an observer in this magazine, "by the ears' goofiness and sheer recognizability." And so the enormous pull of American imagery went hand in hand with the country's, or at least its government's, condemnation.

Between Vietnam and Iraq, America's cultural presence has expanded into ubiquity, and so has the resentment of America's soft power. In some cases, like the French one, these feelings harden into governmental policy. And so the French have passed the Toubon law, which prohibits on pain of penalty the use of English words — make that D.J. into a disque-tourneur. In 1993, the French coaxed the European Union into adding a "cultural exception" clause to its commercial treaties exempting cultural products, high or low, from normal free-trade rules. Other European nations impose informal quotas on American TV fare.

N or is America's high culture more easily accepted than its pop — at least not by the cultural elites. A fine example is how the art critics of two distinguished German newspapers, Süddeutsche Zeitung (leftish) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (centrist), dealt with an exhibit of 200 pieces from the Museum of Modern Art in Berlin in 2004. More than a million visitors stood in line, many for up to nine hours, to view the objets from across the Atlantic. Yet the fervor of the hoi polloi mattered little to their betters, whose comments ran the gamut from contempt to conspiracy.

The opening shots were fired by the Süddeutsche Zeitung of Munich. Without having seen the collection, its critic aimed his volley straight against imperial America. Regurgitating a standard piece of European ressentiment, the author insinuated that what America has in the way of culture is not haute, and what is haute is not American. (Or as Adolf Hitler is said to have declared, "A single Beethoven symphony contains more culture than all that America has ever created.")

After World War II, the critic contended, America had wrested "artistic hegemony" from Europe in two sleazy ways. One culprit was "a new abstract school of painting" — Abstract Expressionism — "that had hyped itself into high heaven." The other was American mammon: "Everything still available in old Europe was bought up." And this "stolen idea of modern art will now be presented in Berlin." Thus were pilferage and grand theft added to the oldest of indictments: America's cultural inferiority.

The critic of Frankfurter Allgemeine went one worse. If his colleague claimed that America's art was either hyped or heisted, the man from Frankfurt thundered that MoMA's Berlin show was a mendacious ploy, indeed, an imperialist conspiracy. It was done by "concealment" and "censorship" in a game full of "marked cards," and its aim was not only to blank out Europe's greats but also to suppress their magnificent contribution to American art in the second half of the 20th century. This was an instance of the selective perception that suffuses anti-Americanism or any other "anti-ism," for the exhibit contained an impressive number of European works: Matisse, Picasso, Manet, Rousseau, Brancusi and Mondrian, plus assorted Expressionists and Surrealists.

That did not count. What about contemporary Germans like Beuys, Baselitz and Kiefer? the critic huffed. But even here, MoMA had done its duty, capping the progression with Gerhard Richter's "18 October 1977" cycle, which depicts dead members of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang. That MoMA would display these German works enraged the feuilletoniste from Frankfurt even more. That particular choice, he fumed, was the final proof of American perfidy. The terrorist motif was insidiously selected to finger Europe as a "creepy" place, as a messenger of "bad news."

There is a moral in this tale of two critics: the curse of soft power. In the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but resistance. Likewise, great soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage. And the target of Europe's cultural guardians is not just America, the Great Seductress. It is also all those "little people," a million in all, many of whom showed up in the wee hours to snag an admissions ticket to MoMA's Berlin exhibit. By yielding to America-the-beguiling, they committed cultural treason — and worse: they ignored the stern verdict of their own priesthood. So America's soft power is not only seductive but also subversive.

Hard power can by defanged by coalitions and alliances. But how do you balance against soft power? No confederation of European universities can dethrone Harvard and Stanford. Neither can all the subsidies fielded by European governments crack the hegemony of Hollywood. To breach the bastions of American soft power, the Europeans will first have to imitate, then improve on, the American model. Imitation and leapfrogging is the oldest game in the history of nations.

But competition has barely begun to drive the cultural contest. Europe, mourning the loss of its centuries-old supremacy, either resorts to insulation (by quotas and "cultural exception" clauses) or seeks solace in the disparagement of American culture as vulgar, inauthentic or stolen. If we could consult Dr. Freud, he would take a deep drag on his cigar and pontificate about inferiority feelings being compensated by hauteur and denigration.

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Making a Movement: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. on the Importance of Soft Power

In this section.

In his essay for the Carr Center's latest publication,  Making a Movement: The History and Future of Human Rights , Joseph S. Nye, Jr., discusses the importance of soft power in foreign policy and how it can be enhanced by reinforcing our human rights. 

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean Emeritus, Harvard Kennedy School; Author, A Life in the American Century (Polity Press, January 2024)

"Realists sometimes complain that human rights interfere with American power in the harsh world of international relations. However, a sophisticated realist understands that, in addition to hard military and economic power, the soft power of attraction is also important. And human rights not only define us as a people, but they can also enhance our soft power.

"Survival and security are not the only important aspects of world politics. Polls show a majority of Americans also want the United States to pursue altruistic, humanitarian aims internationally. Many Americans have a general sense of a human community and support a foreign policy based, not just on international legal obligations, but upon moral considerations. While foreign aid in general is not popular, public support for international economic and public health assistance was strong enough for presidents to consistently maintain such policies. For example, George W. Bush’s initiatives related to AIDS and malaria in Africa stand out as moral policies which enjoyed such support. The extent of Good Samaritanism may be limited, but contrary to the skeptics’ views, helping others is one of the foreign policy objectives for which American presidents have found public support.

"Nothing dissolves soft power more effectively than charges of hypocrisy. The result is that human rights are an essential part of foreign policy, but their effective inclusion is never an easy task."

"There is more contention when verbal or economic support for human rights, or curtailment of military sales to a country such as Saudi Arabia, offends authoritarian leaders and obstructs other aspects of American foreign policy. Such disputes over values are normal and to be expected in a democracy. Americans have a degree of cosmopolitan concern about human rights in China or Myanmar, but human rights and democracy promotion cannot be the sole focus, as Jimmy Carter discovered. Foreign policy involves trade-offs among many objectives, including liberal values. Otherwise, we would have a human rights policy instead of a foreign policy.

"Trade-offs among priorities and objectives are at the heart of an effective foreign policy, and this creates problems not only for our human rights values but also for our soft power. Nothing dissolves soft power more effectively than charges of hypocrisy. The result is that human rights are an essential part of foreign policy, but their effective inclusion is never an easy task." ■

Read the full publication.

Related Publications

Discussing the israel and palestine conflict at the carr center, making a movement: maria kuznetsova on the state of human rights in russia, a first-hand account of the 2022 russian invasion of ukraine.

The Benefits of Soft Power

It is a central paradox of American power: The sheer might of the United States is unquestioned: U.S. troops are stationed in some 130 countries around the globe, and no opposing army would dare to challenge it on a level playing field. But as America's military superiority has increased, its ability to persuade is at low ebb in many parts of the world, even among its oldest allies. In the following remarks, drawn from an address given on March 11 at the Center for Public Leadership's conference on "Misuses of Power: Causes and Corrections," Joseph S. Nye Jr., Dean [until June 30, 2004] of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, distinguishes between hard power—the power to coerce—and soft—the power to attract.

The dictionary says that leadership means going ahead or showing the way. To lead is to help a group define and achieve a common purpose. There are various types and levels of leadership, but all have in common a relationship with followers. Thus leadership and power are inextricably intertwined. I will argue below that many leadership skills such as creating a vision, communicating it, attracting and choosing able people, delegating, and forming coalitions depend upon what I call soft power. But first we should ask, what is power?

What is power? At the most general level, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. There are several ways to affect the behavior of others.

• You can coerce them with threats.
• You can induce them with payments.
• Or you can attract or co-opt them.

Sometimes I can affect your behavior without commanding it. If you believe that my objectives are legitimate, I may be able to persuade you without using threats or inducements. For example, loyal Catholics may follow the Pope's teaching on capital punishment not because of a threat of excommunication, but out of respect for his moral authority. Or some radical Muslims may be attracted to support Osama bin Laden's actions not because of payments or threats, but because they believe in the legitimacy of his objectives.

Practical politicians and ordinary people often simply define power as the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence outcomes. Someone who has authority, wealth, or an attractive personality is called powerful. In international politics, by this second definition, we consider a country powerful if it has a relatively large population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability.

The virtue of this second definition is that it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable. Power in this sense is like holding the high cards in a card game. But when people define power as synonymous with the resources that produce it, they sometimes encounter the paradox that those most endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want. For example, in terms of resources, the United States was the world's only superpower in 2001, but it failed to prevent September 11. Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership. Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge—witness Hitler in 1941 or Saddam Hussein in 1990.

Measuring power in terms of resources is an imperfect but useful shorthand. It is equally important to understand which resources provide the best basis for power behavior in a particular context. Oil was not an impressive power resource before the industrial age, nor was uranium significant before the nuclear age. Power resources cannot be judged without knowing the context. In some situations those who hold high office, command force, or possess wealth are not the most powerful. That is what revolutions are about.

Soft power Everyone is familiar with hard power. We know that military and economic might often get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks"). But sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs. The indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been called "the second face of power." A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admire its values, emulate its example, aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them.

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. In the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives.

Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.

Soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power. Soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.

If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place—in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency—not force, not money—to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.

The interplay between hard and soft power Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power—the ability to change what others do—can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power—the ability to shape what others want—can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.

The types of behavior between command and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement to agenda-setting to pure attraction. Soft power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum of behavior, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behavior. Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other. A leader who courts popularity may be loath to exercise hard power when he should, but a leader who throws his weight around without regard to the effects on his soft power may find others placing obstacles in the way of his hard power.

The limits of soft power Some skeptics object to the idea of soft power because they think of power narrowly in terms of commands or active control. In their view, imitation or attraction do not add up to power. Some imitation or attraction does not produce much power over policy outcomes, and neither does imitation always produce desirable outcomes. For example, armies frequently imitate and therefore nullify the successful tactics of their opponents and make it more difficult for them to achieve the outcomes they want. But attraction often does allow you to get what you want. The skeptics who want to define power only as deliberate acts of command and control are ignoring the second or "structural" face of power—the ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change their behavior through threats or payments.

At the same time, it is important to specify the conditions under which attraction is more likely to lead to desired outcomes, and those when it will not. All power depends on context—who relates to whom under what circumstances—but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. Moreover, attraction often has a diffuse effect of creating general influence, rather than producing an easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of storing up political capital to be drawn upon in future circumstances.

Of course, such goodwill may not ultimately be honored, and diffuse reciprocity is less tangible than an immediate exchange. Nonetheless, the indirect effects of attraction and a diffuse influence can make a significant difference in obtaining favorable outcomes in bargaining situations. Otherwise leaders would insist only on immediate payoffs and specific reciprocity, and we know that is not always the way they behave.

Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people under his rule, but he can often ignore popularity when he calculates his interests. In settings where opinions matter, leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals. Thus it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003, because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity there. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan.

The information revolution The conditions for projecting soft power have transformed dramatically in recent years. The information revolution and globalization are transforming and shrinking the world. At the beginning of the 21st century, those two forces have enhanced American power. But with time, technology will spread to other countries and peoples, and America's relative preeminence will diminish.

Even more important, the information revolution is creating virtual communities and networks that cut across national borders. Transnational corporations and nongovernmental actors will play larger roles. Many of those organizations will have soft power of their own as they attract citizens into coalitions that cut across national boundaries. Political leadership becomes in part a competition for attractiveness, legitimacy, and credibility. The ability to share information—and to be believed—becomes an important source of attraction and power.

This political game in a global information age suggests that the relative role of soft power to hard power will likely increase. The most likely gainers in an information age will have:

• multiple channels of communication that help to frame issues,
• cultural customs and ideas that are close to prevailing global norms,
• and credibility that is enhanced by values and policies.

Soft power resources are difficult to control. Many of its crucial resources are outside the control of governments, and their effects depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences. Moreover, soft power resources often work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes take years to produce the desired outcomes.

Of course, these differences are matters of degree. Not all hard power actions promptly produce desired outcomes—witness the length and ultimate failure of the Vietnam War, or the fact that economic sanctions have historically failed to produce their intended outcomes in more than half the cases where they were tried. But generally, soft power resources are slower, more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield than hard power resources.

Information is power, and today a much larger part of the world's population has access to that power. Technological advances have led to dramatic reduction in the cost of processing and transmitting information. The result is an explosion of information, and that has produced a "paradox of plenty." When people are overwhelmed with the volume of information confronting them, it is hard to know what to focus on. Attention rather than information becomes the scarce resource, and those who can distinguish valuable information from background clutter gain power. Editors and cue-givers become more in demand.

Among editors and cue-givers, credibility is an important source of soft power. Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility. The world of traditional power politics is typically about whose military or economy wins. Politics in an information age may ultimately be about whose story wins.

Reputation has always mattered in political leadership, but the role of credibility becomes an even more important power resource because of the paradox of plenty. Information that appears to be propaganda may not only be scorned; it may also turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a reputation for credibility. Under the new conditions more than ever, the soft sell may prove more effective than a hard sell.

Finally, power in an information age will come not just from strong hard power, but from strong sharing. In an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so. As we share with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age.

Conclusion Soft power has always been a key element of leadership. The power to attract—to get others to want what you want, to frame the issues, to set the agenda—has its roots in thousands of years of human experience. Skillful leaders have always understood that attractiveness stems from credibility and legitimacy. Power has never flowed solely from the barrel of a gun; even the most brutal dictators have relied on attraction as well as fear.

Reproduced with permission from "Soft Power and Leadership," Compass: A Journal of Leadership , Spring 2004. Compass is published by the Center for Public Leadership, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

For more information on Compass, write to [email protected] .

See the latest issue of Compass

Joseph S. Nye Jr. is the Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. From December of 1995 through June of 2004 he was Dean of the Kennedy School.

Hard Power vs Soft Power (with Examples)

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Dr. Chris Drew is the founder of the Helpful Professor. He holds a PhD in education and has published over 20 articles in scholarly journals. He is the former editor of the Journal of Learning Development in Higher Education. [Image Descriptor: Photo of Chris]

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In international political theory, hard power and soft power are two different means by which nations can further their geopolitical goals.

Here is the basic difference:

• Hard power refers to the power a nation has to coerce other nations through military and economic means. It is a ‘carrot and stick’ approach (Nye, 2009).
• Soft power , on the other hand, refers to the power nations have to convince, attract, and influence other nations through means such as diplomacy and cultural exchange (Nye, 1991; Qin, 2018).

While soft power is considered the ideal means because it exacts less of an economic and human toll, hard power is ultimately most effective in influencing others, so long as a nation has the means to do so.

Hard Power vs Soft Power: Overview

The concepts of hard power and soft power were proposed by Joseph Nye (1991) to explain two ways in which nations attempt to exert their will in international affairs.

In Bound to Lead (1991), Nye argued that the United States of America’s power isn’t just a result of its hard power. America’s great strength is that it combined hard and soft power very effectively in the 20th Century.

We see American soft power in their cultural exports – Hollywood, Hip Hop, fashion, and so on. America’s ability to export is culture through media and technology has been highly beneficial to its international brand and ‘public diplomacy’ – ability to ingratiate itself with the world. Its push toward establishing international norms was, for decades, a powerful influence on the world.

But we also see American power in its hard power – its enormous economic strength and influence, ability to coerce nations into embracing a globalized economic posture, and of course, its awesome military power.

Hard Power Examples

Hard power, defined in terms of being able to apply ‘carrots and sticks’ through intervention, aggression, sanctions, and threats in the military and economic arenas.

Examples of hard power can include:

• Military Intervention: A classic form of hard power is military intervention. Examples include the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, or Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The use of force to achieve a particular outcome can be very effective, but it can also be costly and often leads to widespread condemnation (Volten, 2016).
• Sanctions: Economic sanctions are another form of hard power that countries use to assert their will and to punish those who do not comply with international norms or laws. For example, the United States and European Union have imposed heavy sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, causing huge economic difficulties for the country.
• Trade Tariffs: One of the strategies used by nations to protect their domestic industries and pressure other governments is the enforcement of trade tariffs. For instance, China and the U.S were involved in a trade war where both imposed heavy tariffs on imported goods, affecting the bilateral trade.
• Diplomatic Expulsion: Countries may also exert hard power by expelling foreign diplomats or cutting off diplomatic ties with another country as a way of expressing serious disapproval for its actions. This kind of political pressure can be seen, for example, in the case of several Western countries expelling Russian diplomats in response to the poisoning of a former Russian spy in the UK.
• Coercive Diplomacy: This is using threats or actual force as a diplomatic strategy to persuade adversaries to cease their politically adverse behaviors. A striking example of this was the United States’ threat of “fire and fury” against North Korea in 2017 if the latter didn’t stop its nuclear missile testing (Lemke, 2016).

Soft Power Examples

Soft power is defined by Joseph Nye as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2009, p. 2).

Nye (2011, 2021) emphasizes the importance of ‘attraction’ over ‘carrots and sticks’ in the soft power mode. Examples of soft power can include:

• Cultural Influence: Cultures that are influential or popular globally have a huge impact in soft power. American culture, from Hollywood movies to music, has a significant global influence, giving the US a significant amount of soft power. Similarly, South Korea has leveraged its cultural phenomena – K-Pop and K-Dramas – to increase its international influence.
• Diplomatic Relations and Negotiations: Engaging in diplomatic talks and maintaining good relations with multiple countries is also soft power. An example of this can be seen in Norway’s relationships in the international community, enabling them to mediate during international conflicts, for instance, between Israel and Palestine.
• Educational Exchanges: Countries like the United States and the United Kingdom attract international students from around the world, and these programs serve to spread their values and culture, influencing students who may go back to their home nations and spread these ideas further.
• Moral Authority: Countries that have a history of acting ethically in international dealings can have a form of soft power known as moral authority. For example, Sweden is often regarded as having considerable moral authority due to its commitment to humanitarian causes, conflict mediation, and adherence to international laws (Nye, 2009, 2011).
• Humanitarian Aid: Providing humanitarian aid in times of crises enhances a country’s positive image and trustworthiness in the global community, an example of soft power. Countries like Japan and Germany are known for their extensive humanitarian efforts globally.

Benefits and Limitations of Hard and Soft Power

A nation that has great hard power is formidable. It can get its own way through simply ‘pushing others around’.

But at the same time, we ideally would live in a world of cooperation, where powerful nations didn’t coerce less powerful nations, which would in turn lead to exacerbated global inequalities (Lemke, 2016).

So, the following are key benefits and limitations of hard power:

A nation with great soft power that can get its way without war or economic conflict may end up better off in the end. Their positive relations with their neighbors can engender goodwill and peace (Lebedeva, 2017).

But soft power is often unrealistic. It doesn’t get you far when money or land is on the line. When a nation really wants power, it will roll over soft power nations with its hard power.

So, the following are key benefits and limitations of soft power:

A Middle Ground: Smart Power

Nye had already proposed proposed that great nations exert both smart and hard power. Following this proposition. Suzanne Nossel (2009) proposed the term ‘smart power’ to explain this combination of hard power and soft power strategies.

Smart power is the ability to strategically use diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the influence of business, political, and civil society actors in addition to economic coercion and military intervention (Volten, 2016; Wagner, 2014; Whiton, 2013).

This sort of nation appeals (soft power) when possible but includes compelling (hard power) when necessary (Volten, 2016; Whiton, 2013).

The idea of smart power acknowledges the fact that neither soft nor hard power alone is sufficient in maintaining a country’s national security or global influence – the optimal strategy often involves the right combination of both forms of power, hence ‘smarter’ power (Nossel. 2009).

Fan, Y. (2008). Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?.  Place branding and public diplomacy ,  4 (2), 147-158. ( Source )

Lebedeva, M. M. (2017). Soft power: the concept and approaches.  MGIMO Review of International Relations, 3  (54), 212-223.

Lemke, D. (2016). Dimensions of hard power: Regional leadership and material capabilities. In  Regional leadership in the global system  (pp. 31-50). Routledge.

Nossel, S. (2009). Smart Power.  Foreign Affairs . No. March/April 2004

Nye, J. S. (1991). Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power. Basic Books.

Nye, J. S. (2009).  Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics.  PublicAffairs.

Nye, J. S. (2011).  The Future of Power.  PublicAffairs.

Nye, J. S. (2021). Soft power: the evolution of a concept.  Journal of Political Power, 14 (1), 196-208. ( Source )

Qin, Y. (2018).  A Relational Theory of World Politics . Cambridge University Press.

Volten, P. (2016). Hard power versus Soft power or a balance between the two?.  All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace ,  5 (2), 91-94. ( Source )

Wagner, J. P. N. (2014). The effectiveness of soft & hard power in contemporary international relations.  E-International Relations , 1-2. ( Source )

Whiton, C. (2013).  Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War.  Potomac Books.

Yukaruc, U. (2017). A critical approach to soft power.  Bitlis Eren University Journal of Social Sciences ,  6 (2), 491-502.

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The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations

The first part of this essay explains the concepts of hard and soft power with referring to their combination, soft power. Then, the effectiveness of the two concepts is assessed by discussing different examples of their use in foreign policy making. This discussion also includes examples for the use of smart power. The essay states that soft power is the more effective and efficient concept in contemporary global politics because of its endurance and sustainability. Hard power, however, is less useful today as the global system changes in its disfavour. In addition to soft power, smart power strategies play an important role in the contemporary international system. The idea to distinguish between hard power and soft power was first introduced by Nye more than two decades ago (1990). In general, he defines power as the “ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants” (2009, p. 61) and command or hard power as coercive power wielded through inducements or threats (2009, p. 63). Hard power is based on military intervention, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions (Wilson, 2008, p. 114) and relies on tangible power resources such as armed forces or economic means (Gallarotti, 2011, p. 29). Thus, the German invasion into Poland in 1939 and the UN economic sanctions against Iraq in 1991 following the first Gulf War are examples for the use of hard power.

In contrast, co-optive or “soft power is the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants” (Wilson, 2008, p. 114). According to Nye, persuasive power is based on attraction and emulation and “associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions” (2009, p. 63). Cooper emphasises the importance of legitimacy for the concept of soft power (2004, p. 173). State activities need to be perceived as legitimate in order to enhance soft power. The dispersion of American culture within the Eastern bloc during the Cold War indicate the existence of American soft power and more recent processes of EU enlargement are indices for soft power possessed by the EU (cf. Nye, 2009, pp. 63-64). The concept of hard and soft power is a continuum with several instruments of different degrees of coercion or persuasion. These instruments are punishment, compulsion, inducement, agenda setting, persuasion and attraction (cf. Smith-Windsor, 2000, p. 52).

The effectiveness of hard and soft power approaches depends on the accessibility of power resources (see Heywood, 2011, Figure 9.1). Large states such as the USA or Russia with a higher national income are financially able to maintain large armed forces and to put other states economically under pressure. For smaller states, these traditional tools of hard power are more difficult to obtain. The accessibility of soft power resources though depends much less on the size of a state. As the example of Norway shows, small states have definitely the ability to build soft power (cf. Nye, 2004, pp. 111-112; and Leonard, 2002, p.53).

Heng, however, explains the importance of the nature of soft power resources in his comparison of Japanese and Chinese soft power strategies. He stresses for example that Japan’s war history forms the main limitation to its soft power (2010, p. 299), whereas China’s “competitive state-led model and its authoritarian political system” hinder the full utilisation of its soft power potential (ibid., p. 300). Hence, a state’s given soft power resources – such as its historical legacy and societal system – determine the strength and therefore the effectiveness of its soft power.

Another important aspect of the hard-soft-power continuum is time . It appears that generating hard power requires much less time as its resources are tangible. In contrast, soft power takes relatively long to build as its intangible resources develop over a long period of time. Similarly, the temporal dimension of the gain of hard power and soft power strategies differs: while military or economic coercion tends to result in an immediate but short-duration outcome, attraction and persuasion have the tendency to cause long-term change. This is due to an inherent aspect of the concept: as hard power forces one to act in a way different to one’s usual behaviour, one does so involuntarily. On the contrary, soft power changes one’s attitude to the end that one acts voluntarily in a way different to one’s usual behaviour. Gallarotti stresses that hard power evokes compelled action, whereas soft power induces voluntary action. Furthermore, he states that compulsion leads to conflict and voluntariness to consent (2011, p. 30) which explains why soft power solutions tend to last longer than hard power solutions. For example, the repressive measures put onto Germany after the Great War provoked another World War, whereas the soft power used to construct the European Union resulted in almost 70 years of Europe-wide peace.

Smith-Windsor argues that the borders between hard and soft power blur (2000). He stresses that armed forces can also be “called to participate in humanitarian and interposition peacekeeping operations” expressing the attractiveness of military means (2000, p. 53). The use of armed forces is, according to him, therefore not to be seen at the hard power pole of the hard-soft-power continuum.

Indeed, some foreign policy strategies may be perceived as effective combinations of the two poles of the power continuum. This idea was taken up and coined “smart power” by Nossel (cf. Nossel, 2004) and Nye (cf. Nye, 2004). Armitage and Nye state in 2007 that smart power draws from both hard and soft power resources (p. 7). They define the concept as “an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions” (ibid.). According to Wilson, smart power is “the capacity (…) to combine elements of hard and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing” (2008, p. 115).

Moving on from the definitional part of this paper. The characteristics of the contemporary world order weaken the effectiveness of hard power strategies. Based on Nye (1990), Hackbarth defines the following characteristics (2008, pp. 2-3): globalisation-driven economic interdependence; the rise of transnational actors; the resurgence of nationalism in weak states; the spread of military technology; and the changed nature of international political problems. In 2008, Nye added the wide-spread access to information to this list (p. 99) and Gallarotti stresses that also the growth of democracy hinders the effectiveness of hard power (2011, p. 40).

An example for the ineffectiveness of basing foreign policy making solely on hard power strategies is the U.S. invasion into Iraq in 2003. According to Steinberg, “the strategy [of the invasion of Iraq] failed to understand what elements of power were needed most to defeat the emerging threat” from terrorist groups (2008, p. 159). This misunderstanding resulted in ignoring two key elements of soft power: the Bush administration firstly forgot about the USA’s dependence on their allies’ intelligence and policy forces and on global public support; and secondly, the question of the legitimacy of the invasion was not attributed any importance (ibid., p. 160). In the short term, these mistakes led to the failure of the action. In the long term, they have caused the degradation of American soft power as “the strategy undermined the U.S. global position” (ibid., p. 160) and “global public confidence in U.S. leadership” (ibid., p. 157). The USA felt the endurance of this damage for instance when facing problems of their development aid programs in Africa (cf. Hackbarth, 2008; and see below).

Due to the above mentioned factors limiting the effectiveness of hard power, it is hard to find successful foreign policies solely based on hard power resources. Many states now enact soft power rather than hard in its external relations. India’s foreign policy for instance is presently within the process of this transition. Wagner lists two main reasons for this transition: On the one hand, “India’s hard power approach of the 1970s and 1980s was not very successful” (Wagner, 2005, p. 2); and on the other hand, the economic advancement after 1991 facilitated the use of economic tools in foreign policy (ibid.). This explanation mirrors some of the above mentioned factors triggering the decline in the use of hard power.

On the other hand, also the concept of soft power has its weak points. Cooper lists three points of weakness. He firstly questions the strength of culture as a soft power resource as cultural influence does not equal political power (2004, p. 170). Secondly, the desirability of the outcomes of soft power strategies depends on particular circumstances which cannot necessarily be influenced by states (ibid., p. 171). Finally, he challenges the actual benefit of agenda setting as the positive results of those practices seem to occur long after their originators’ demises (ibid., p.171).

The U.S. Africa Command can be seen as an unsuccessful soft power strategy. According to Morrison and Hicks, it was initially set up for three reasons: oil, terrorism and ungoverned spaces in Africa, and China’s increased influence in Africa (2007, p. 1). Despite these hard power reasons, AFRICOM was sold as a soft power strategy which resulted in the perception of imperialist intentions the USA might pursue in Africa (Hackbarth, 2008, pp. 9-10). Together with the isochronal Iraq invasion, this perception damaged the American soft power.

Nevertheless, ineffective soft power strategies are usually the exception. The following examples show how soft power can be used effectively. The first example is the European Union and its ability to attract new members. The EU is a leading intergovernmental organisation and its success generates among non-members states the desire to participate in the project of European integration. Based on this promising foundation, the EU’s “soft power derives from its readiness to offer a seat at the decision making table” (Cooper, 2004, pp. 179-180). This attractiveness assures peace and safety among European states and the process of EU enlargement further strengthens its position at the global level. Thus, the EU’s soft power is beneficial for its member states as well as for the EU itself.

Volunteering and intercultural exchanges appear to be another kind of soft power that is increasingly used in today’s global politics. Rieffel and Zalud describe the positive effect of volunteering from an American perspective as follows:

Overseas volunteer work is a form of soft power that contributes measurably to the security and well-being of Americans. Volunteers (…) contribute to institutional capacity building, social capital, democratic governance, and a respect for human rights, all of which help to make the world a safer place for Americans both at home and abroad. (2006, p. 1)

Thus, volunteering is beneficial for both the host and the home countries as it promotes intercultural understanding and therefore conflict prevention.

An example for employed smart power is the US-American effort to strengthen its influence in Africa. According to Hackbarth (2008, pp. 6-10), this strategy embodies three instruments:

(i) the African Growth and Opportunity Act is a program of bilateral trade agreements bound to certain political, economic and social reforms (ibid., pp. 6-7).

(ii) the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is “the largest commitment ever by a single nation towards an international health initiative” (The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, 2009, p. 1). The program provides financial means to realise national policies combatting AIDS/HIV (Hackbarth, 2008, pp. 6-7).

(iii) the Millennium Challenge Corporation is a financial aid program “based on the principle that aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people” (The MCC 2008 cited in Hackbarth, 2008, p. 8).

These three programs have in common that they combine the attractiveness of money with the demand for political, social and economic development. The underlying principle is simple: in order to be eligible for partaking in the programs, a state has to meet the conditions set by the USA. Because the attractiveness of money is such a strong persuasive tool this type of development aid is a good example for an effective smart power strategy. As Mead states, “the generosity of U.S. humanitarian assistance abroad enhances U.S. soft power” (2004, p. 51).

Hard power is coercive power executed through military threats and economic inducements and based on tangible resources such as the army or economic strength. In contrast, soft power is persuasive power deriving from attraction and emulation and grounded on intangible resources such as culture. Although they are oppositional approaches to power, their combination, smart power, has its place in academic debate and policy making. Overall, it appears that soft power strategies are more effective in the contemporary international system than hard power strategies. The demise of hard power is caused by changes in the world order, whereas the strength of soft power is based on its endurance and sustainability. As soft power has weaknesses, too, it is worth considering the strength of smart power strategies.

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Gallarotti, G., 2011. Soft Power: what it is, it’s importance, and the conditions for its effective use. Journal of Political Power , 4(1), pp. 25-47.

Hackbarth, J. R., 2008. Soft Power and Smart Power in Africa. Strategic Insights , pp. 1-19.

Heng, Y.-K., 2010. Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the softest of the m all? Evaluating Japanese and Chinese strategies in the ‘soft’ power competitions era. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific , Volume 10, pp. 275-304.

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Smith-Windsor, B. A., 2000. Hard Power, Soft Power reconsidered. Canadian Military Journal , 1(3), pp. 51-56.

Steinberg, J. B., 2008. Real Leaders do Soft Power: Learning Lessons of Iraq. The Washington Quaterly , 31(2), pp. 155-164.

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Written by: Jan-Philipp N E Wagner Written at: University of Dundee Written for: Edzia Carvalho Date Written: March 2014

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• Published: 21 February 2017

Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept

• Joseph Nye 1  

Palgrave Communications volume  3 , Article number:  17008 ( 2017 ) Cite this article

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Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one prefers, and that can be accomplished by coercion, payment, or attraction and persuasion. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by attraction rather than coercion or payment. This anecdotal comment recounts the origins of the concept as an analytical tool, and its gradual development as an instrumental concept used in political discourse in Europe, China and the United States. This article is published as part of a collection on soft power.

I coined the term “soft power” in my 1990 book Bound to Lead that challenged the then conventional view of the decline of American power ( Nye, 1990 ). After looking at American military and economic power resources, I felt that something was still missing—the ability to affect others by attraction and persuasion rather than just coercion and payment. At that time, there was a prevalent belief that the United States was in decline, and Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers was a New York Times best seller ( Kennedy, 1987 ). Kennedy argued that the US was suffering from “imperial overstretch”, and would soon go the way of 17th century Spain or Edwardian Britain. Many others echoed these thoughts, and believed that the Soviet Union was passing us in military might and Japan was overtaking us in economic strength. I doubted this conventional wisdom and went to many seminars and conferences where I was a lonely dissenter.

Both academics and practitioners in international relations tended to treat power as tangible resources you could drop on your foot or drop on a city. This was less true of classical realists like Carr (1939) , but particularly true of neorealist theorists such as Kenneth Waltz and his followers who became fashionable in the 1970s ( Waltz, 1979 ). Everything was coercion and payments, but sometimes people influence others by ideas and attraction that sets the agenda for others or gets them to want what you want. Then carrots and sticks are less necessary, or can be used more frugally because others see them as legitimate. With its universalistic values, open culture and vast popular cultural resources ranging from Hollywood to foundations and universities, the United States seemed uniquely placed to affect how others viewed the world and us. Of course, it did not make us attractive to everyone. Quite the contrary, as the Mullahs in Iran proved. But where we were attractive, it was a huge advantage. As one Norwegian scholar put it, if the Americans had created an empire in Europe, it was an “empire by invitation” (Lundestad, 1998). I tried a variety of terms to try to summarize these thoughts, and eventually settled on the term “soft power”. I hoped its slightly oxymoronic resonance in the traditional discourse of my field might make people think again about their assumptions when they spoke of power.

I thought of soft power as an analytic concept to fill a deficiency in the way analysts thought about power, but it gradually took on political resonance. In some ways the underlying thought is not new and similar concepts can be traced back to ancient philosophers. Moreover, though I developed the term soft power in the context of my work on American power, it is not restricted to international behaviour or to the United States. As I became interested in leadership studies, I applied the concept to individuals and organizations in my 2008 book The Powers to Lead . ( Nye, 2008 ) Nonetheless, it has taken particular root in international relations, and as the European Union developed, more European leaders began to refer to its soft power. The term was less used, however, by American political leaders.

In 2002, I was one of two keynote speakers at a conference organized by the Army in Washington. I spoke to the assembled generals about soft power and, by their questions, they seemed to get it. Later, one of the generals asked the other keynote speaker, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, what he thought of soft power. He replied that he did not understand what soft power meant, and that was evident in his policies. This hubris was evident well before the security drama that followed the terrorist attacks on 9/11, but in that climate of fear, it was difficult to speak about soft power, even though attracting moderates away from appeals by radicals is a key component of any effective counterterrorism strategy.

In that climate, and with the invasion of Iraq proving disastrous, I felt I needed to spell out the meaning of soft power in greater detail. Even colleagues were incorrectly describing soft power as “non-traditional forces such as cultural and commercial goods” and dismissing it on the grounds that “it’s, well, soft” ( Ferguson, 2009 ). And a Congresswoman friend told me privately that she agreed 100 per cent with my concept, but that it was impossible to use it to address a political audience who wanted to hear tough talk. In 2004, I went into more detail conceptually in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. I also said that soft power was only one component of power, and rarely sufficient by itself. The ability to combine hard and soft power into successful strategies where they reinforce each other could be considered “smart power” (a term later used by Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State). I developed the concepts further in my 2011 book on The Future of Power Including in the realm of cyber power ( Nye, 2011 ). I made clear that soft power is not a normative concept, and it is not necessarily better to twist minds than to twist arms. “Bad” people (like Osama bin Laden) can exercise soft power. While I explored various dimensions of the concept most fully in this work, the central definition (the ability to affect others and obtain preferred outcomes by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment) remained constant over time.

In 2007, as the situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate, John Hamre, Richard Armitage and I co-chaired a “Smart Power Commission” for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. With former senators and Supreme Court justices participating, we hoped to use soft and smart power for the political purpose of centring American foreign policy. Subsequently in the Bush Administration, in 2007 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for the United States to invest more in soft power. It was a long way from the modest ambitions for the analytic concept scribbled out on my kitchen table 17 years earlier. The term “smart power” (the successful combination of hard and soft power resources into effective strategy) was clearly prescriptive rather than just analytical.

Even more impressive in terms of distance from that kitchen table was the fate of the concept in China. As China dramatically developed its hard power resources, leaders realized that it would be more acceptable if it were accompanied by soft power. This is a smart strategy because as China’s hard military and economic power grows, it may frighten its neighbours into balancing coalitions. If it can accompany its rise with an increase in its soft power, China can weaken the incentives for these coalitions. In 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao told the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that they needed to invest more in their soft power, and this has been continued by the current President Xi Jinping. Once the top leader had spoken and the word was out, billions of dollars were invested to promote soft power, and thousands of articles were published on the subject. China has had mixed success with its soft power strategy. Its impressive record of economic growth that has raised hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and its traditional culture have been important sources of attraction, but polls show it lags behind the United States in overall attractiveness in most parts of the world, including Asia. Portland—a consultancy in London that constructs an annual index of soft power—ranks the United States first and China as number 28 of the top 30 countries (Portland Communications and Facebook, 2016).

Top level endorsement in China affected me directly. Hardly a week went by in the year after Hu Jintao’s use of the concept without an e-mail asking me to write an article or participate in some soft power seminar or conference. Chinese officials contacted me for private conversations about how to increase China’s soft power. My advice was always the same. I say that China should realize that most of a country’s soft power comes from its civil society rather than from its government. Propaganda is not credible and thus does not attract. China needs to give more leeway to the talents of its civil society, even though this is difficult to reconcile with tight party control. Chinese soft power is also held back by its territorial disputes with its neighbours. Creating a Confucius Institute to teach Chinese culture in Manila will not generate attraction if Chinese naval vessels are chasing Philippine fishing boats out of Scarborough Shoal that lies within 200 miles of its coastline. When I said this on a televised panel at Davos in 2013, Wang Jianglin, the richest man in China interrupted the panel to criticize me for “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people”.

One of the most intriguing occasions was an invitation to address the School of Marxism at Peking University in Beijing. I was treated royally. When it came time for my lecture to some 1500 students, I was seated alone at a table on a podium covered with gorgeous flowers with a large screen on the wall behind me with an enlarged video of my performance. In the course of my speech, I addressed the question of how China could increase its soft power and I mentioned the harassment of the great Chinese artist Ai WeiWei as an example of too tight control over civil society. There was a slight titter in the crowd, but at the end of my lecture, the dean of the School of Marxism took the stage and gave a long flowery thanks that author of the concept of soft power had come to address the school. As he went on, however, I noted that my translator was skipping much of what he said. I later asked a Mandarin-speaking Canadian friend who was present in the front row what the dean had said. In summary: “we are flattered to have Professor Nye here, but you students must realize that his use of the concept is overly political and we prefer to restrict it to cultural issues.”

With time, I have come to realize that concepts such as soft power are like children. As an academic or a public intellectual, you can love and discipline them when they are young, but as they grow they wander off and make new company, both good and bad. There is not much you can do about it, even if you were present at the creation. As the Princeton political scientist Baldwin (2016) has recently written, “Nye’s discussion of soft power stimulated and clarified the thoughts of policy makers and scholars alike—even those who misunderstood or disagree with his views”. Perhaps that is all one can hope for.

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How to cite this article : Nye J (2017) Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept. Palgrave Communications . 3:17008 doi: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.8.

Baldwin DA (2016) Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach . Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.

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A critique of the concept Soft Power

This essay aims to develop a critique on the concept of soft power. Joseph S. Nye’s term soft power was primarily developed for and relates to foreign policy. In the following, this essay will argue that the concept therefore misses out on the domestically generated origins of soft power and so inherits conceptual shortcomings.

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Soft power in its current, widely understood form has become a straitjacket for those trying to understand power and communication in international affairs. Analyses of soft power overwhelmingly focus on soft power 'assets' or capabilities and how to wield them, not how influence does or does not take place. It has become a catch-all term that has lost explanatory power, just as hard power once did. The authors argue that the concept of strategic narrative gives us intellectual purchase on the complexities of international politics today, especially in regard to how influence works in a new media environment. They believe that the study of media and war would benefit from more attention being paid to strategic narratives.

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Cambridge Review of International Affairs

Stephanie C Winkler

The purpose of this article is to analyse how the seemingly natural fit between Japan and the soft power concept has been possible despite the notorious vagueness of the concept and what the consequences of soft power’s reification are. By building on recent scholarship on concepts, expert knowledge and narratives, the article suggests that reification processes are best conceptualized as driven by concept coalitions. The article finds that soft power was narrated and nurtured into Japan’s cultural diplomacy, Japan’s relationship with the United States (US) and its security policy. The article, moreover, shows that the more soft power was understood, framed and accepted as benign and necessary, the more persuasive arguments about what Japan should do or be in order to wield soft power became. This has legitimized narratives that suggest that Japan’s 'proactive contribution to peace’ as a responsible ally of the US constitutes an inevitable source of soft power.

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Ammon Cheskin

Russian soft power in Ukraine: a structural perspective In this article, I adopt a structural approach to Russian soft power, switching focus from the supposed agent of power (Russia), towards the subjects of power (Ukrainians). I outline the applicability of this approach to empirical studies into soft power, demonstrating how soft power can be examined from bottom-up, discursively-focused perspectives. The empirical analysis then traces how Ukrainians (do not) link their self-identities to discursive understanding of " Russia ". Reviewing recent insights into the relationship between soft power and affect, I argue that Ukrainians' cultural, historical and linguistic ties with Russia often lack necessary emotional force to generate meaningful soft power.

Review of International Studies

Linus Hagström , Chengxin Pan

Soft power and hard power are conceptualised in International Relations as empirically and normatively dichotomous, and practically opposite-one intangible, attractive, and legitimate, the other tangible, coer-cive, and less legitimate. This article critiques this binary conceptualisation, arguing that it is discursively constructed with and for the construction of Self and Other. It further demonstrates that practices commonly labelled and understood as soft power and hard power are closely interconnected. Best understood as 'representational force' and 'physical force' respectively, soft and hard power intertwine through the operation of productive and disciplinary forms of power. We illustrate this argument by analysing the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Both governments exercise representational force in constructing their respective versions of events and Self/Other. The soft/hard power binary itself plays a performative role as the Self is typically associated with soft power and the Other with hard power. The operation of productive power, moreover, privileges the attractiveness of the former and the repellence of the latter, and disciplinary power physically enforces these distinctions on subjects in both states. Finally, reinforced Self/Other distinctions legitimise preparations for violence against the Other on both sides, thus exposing how fundamentally entangled soft and hard power are in practice.

This dissertation is a case study of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s approach to soft power with a focus on Iran’s use of soft power in Afghanistan. This dissertation is unique as it a delves into the diverse conceptual prescriptions on soft power, especially from a non-Western perspective. Studies of soft power in the current International Relations discipline ignore the implicit widespread liberal democratic bias in the current understanding of the concept. This dissertation argues that there are certain ontological assumptions lying deep within the soft power model first proposed by Joseph Nye (1990) that make it difficult to use as a model for studying non-Western states. This stems from Nye’s consideration that sources of attraction, essential in wielding soft power, as universal and equivalent to Western liberal values. Nye does not consider how the sources of attraction that he identifies are biased towards a Western notion of values, culture, policies and institutions. This has led to a disregard of the use of soft power by non-Western states. Thus, the aim of this study is to address the western-centric limitation of Nye’s concept by offering a reconceptualization that can be applied in studying the soft power of states that do not necessarily adhere to the same universal norms. By applying Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis framework, this dissertation examines Iran’s soft power strategy in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2017, in order to enhance its influence. Iran’s soft power application relies on what that the author calls ‘affinity’, whereby audience-oriented and localized resources of attraction are identified in the target population and are subsequently discursively cultivated. Attraction build through the ‘affinity’ process is different than Western states’ use of attraction and application of soft power. This dissertation highlights how Iran has created an affinity node centered on a ‘sense of brotherhood’ with its Afghanistan audience. It also shows that the strength of this narrative is in Iran’s ability to create an emotional connection that is embedded in commonalities between the two countries’ in terms of culture, historical legacy, and common language. The analysis presented shows the affinity node of brotherhood appears in over 20 speeches and statements targeted at the Afghan population by the Iranian supreme leader and successive Iranian presidents in recent decades. The notion of brotherhood provides Iran the emotional linkage, the affinity node, to connect with its Afghan audience. The affinity that Iran establishes with Afghanistan allows Iran to articulate its foreign policy objectives by showing how Iranian influence benefits the Afghan population and appeals to existing Afghan values. In addition, this dissertation finds that Iran devotes considerable resources to the development of these discourses in Afghanistan through the various institutions that in charge of Iran’s public diplomacy activities. The focus of these activities is mainly in the realm of culture, education, and language, leveraging the common ties between Iran and their Afghan audience. Lastly, the findings of this study indicate that Iran’s approach to soft power is strategically calculated. Iran makes explicit use of soft power that is different from the original notion of soft power as it was formulated by Nye. Iran’s actions show that sources of attraction do not have to be universal, attraction is contextual in its appeal, based on each target audience and can be constructed through discourses. Thus, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) would say, Iran’s articulation of an antagonistic discourse challenges the hegemonic discourses that are associated with the Western evaluation of soft power.

Giulia Conci

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Americans differ from people in other societies over some aspects of U.S. ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power

Americans don’t always see eye to eye with people in other societies over various dimensions of U.S. “hard” and “soft” power, according to a February Pew Research Center survey of the United States and 16 other advanced economies. While Americans see some aspects of U.S. power more positively than people elsewhere, they offer more negative views in other areas.

When it comes to the U.S. military, for example, 44% of U.S. adults say it’s the best in the world and another 34% describe it as above average. These self-evaluations are slightly rosier than those offered by publics in the other advanced economies surveyed, where, outside of South Korea (42%) and Taiwan (37%), no more than around three-in-ten adults see the U.S. military as the best in the world. Still, large majorities in the U.S. and every other place surveyed describe the American military as at least above average.

This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on comparing attitudes in the United States about American “soft” (e.g. cultural products, technology) and “hard” power (e.g. military) with views in other advanced economies. For non-U.S. data, this post draws on nationally representative surveys of 16,254 adults from March 12 to May 26, 2021, in 16 advanced economies. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.

In the U.S., we surveyed 2,596 adults from Feb. 1 to 7, 2021. Everyone who took part in the U.S. survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories.

This study was conducted in places where nationally representative telephone surveys are feasible. Due to the coronavirus outbreak, face-to-face interviewing is not currently possible in many parts of the world.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses. Visit our methodology database for more information about the survey methods outside the U.S. For respondents in the U.S., read more about the ATP’s methodology .

Around three-in-ten Americans (29%) describe their country’s entertainment products – including movies, music and television – as the best in the world, while another 39% call them above average. Large majorities in every other place surveyed agree that U.S. cultural exports are at least better than average, but only in Greece, Japan, Singapore and Italy are people as likely as Americans to declare the U.S. the global leader.

Americans are notably less positive when it comes to their nation’s technological achievements. Only 16% think U.S. achievements in this area are the best in the world. On this question, people in other countries are slightly more likely to see the U.S. positively. A median of 20% of adults across the 16 other advanced economies say U.S. technology is the best in the world, including 45% in Greece, 38% in South Korea and 31% in Taiwan. While relatively few Americans see their own country’s technological achievements as the world’s best, 64% of U.S. adults see them as at least better than average – a view that is broadly shared across the other surveyed publics (median of 72%).

Americans do not offer especially glowing evaluations of their universities, either. Only 14% call them the best in the world, though another 33% describe them as better than average. Across the other publics surveyed, a median of 59% describe U.S. universities as at least better than average. And in Greece (40%), South Korea (31%), Japan (24%) and Singapore (23%), around a quarter or more describe them as the best in the world.

When it comes to the U.S. standard of living, around half of Americans (51%) describe it as above average or better, including 12% who call it the best in the world. Yet outside of Taiwan (53%), South Korea (52%), Spain (51%) and Greece (47%), people in other advanced economies offer less positive assessments. Across the other 16 places surveyed, a median of only 33% describe the U.S. standard of living as above average or better. In fact, in most places, a plurality describes the American standard of living as solidly “average” – including half who give it this rating in Germany. Around half of the Dutch (47%) and Swedes (53%) call the American standard of living below average or worse.

Few people in any of the advanced economies surveyed – the U.S. included – describe the American health care system as the best in the world. Americans themselves are relatively divided over whether it is better than average (31%), average (30%) or worse than average (39%). Elsewhere, majorities say the American health care system is below average or worse, including one-in-five or more in Australia (24%), Spain (20%) and Belgium (20%) who say the American health care system is the worst in the world.

Views differ by age, income, party affiliation

Younger people tend to evaluate America more positively than older people in some of the advanced economies surveyed. In the U.S., however, the opposite is often true: Older Americans, for example, are more likely than younger adults to describe their nation’s standard of living, health care system, military, technological achievements and universities as above average. Younger Americans, however, are more likely than older adults to see their country’s entertainment products positively.

Across many advanced economies surveyed, people with higher incomes are more likely than those with lower incomes to describe the U.S. as above average across nearly all dimensions asked about – with the notable exceptions of the health care system and the overall standard of living. In the U.S., however, higher-income people are more likely than lower-income people to compliment America’s standard of living.

In the U.S., there are also stark partisan and ideological differences in views about American power. Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party are more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to describe America’s health care system, standard of living and military as above average or better. The opposite is true when it comes to universities and entertainment.

Note: Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses. Visit our methodology database for more information about the survey methods outside the U.S. For respondents in the U.S., read more about the ATP’s methodology .

• Global Balance of Power
• Health Care
• Higher Education
• Military & Veterans
• National Conditions
• U.S. Global Image

Laura Silver is an associate director focusing on global attitudes at Pew Research Center .

Growing Partisan Divisions Over NATO and Ukraine

Americans remain critical of china, how americans view the conflicts between russia and ukraine, israel and hamas, and china and taiwan, comparing views of the u.s. and china in 24 countries, views of india lean positive across 23 countries, most popular.

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ABOUT PEW RESEARCH CENTER  Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of  The Pew Charitable Trusts .

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Argument: What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power

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This article was published more than 11 years ago

What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power

Beijing and moscow are trying their hands at attraction, and failing -- miserably..

When Foreign Policy first published my essay " Soft Power " in 1990, who would have expected that someday the term would be used by the likes of Hu Jintao or Vladimir Putin? Yet Hu told the Chinese Communist Party in 2007 that China needed to increase its soft power, and Putin recently urged Russian diplomats to apply soft power more extensively. Neither leader, however, seems to have understood how to accomplish his goals.

When Foreign Policy first published my essay “ Soft Power ” in 1990, who would have expected that someday the term would be used by the likes of Hu Jintao or Vladimir Putin? Yet Hu told the Chinese Communist Party in 2007 that China needed to increase its soft power, and Putin recently urged Russian diplomats to apply soft power more extensively. Neither leader, however, seems to have understood how to accomplish his goals.

Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, and that can be accomplished in three main ways — by coercion, payment, or attraction. If you can add the soft power of attraction to your toolkit, you can economize on carrots and sticks. For a rising power like China whose growing economic and military might frightens its neighbors into counter-balancing coalitions, a smart strategy includes soft power to make China look less frightening and the balancing coalitions less effective. For a declining power like Russia (or Britain before it), a residual soft power helps to cushion the fall.

The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). But combining these resources is not always easy.

Establishing, say, a Confucius Institute in Manila to teach Chinese culture might help produce soft power, but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied the Philippines over possession of Scarborough Reef. Similarly, Putin has told his diplomats that “the priority has been shifting to the literate use of soft power, strengthening positions of the Russian language,” but as Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the dispute with Georgia, Russia has to use “hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world … and because it has little soft power — that is, social, cultural, political and economic attractiveness.”

Much of America’s soft power is produced by civil society — everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture — not from the government. Sometimes the United States is able to preserve a degree of soft power because of its critical and uncensored civil society even when government actions — like the invasion of Iraq — are otherwise undermining it. But in a smart power strategy, hard and soft reinforce each other.

In his new book, China Goes Global , George Washington University’s David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that opinions of China’s influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.

Even China’s soft-power triumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long after the last international athletes had departed, China’s domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message.

China and Russia make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today’s world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the Economist noted about China, “the party has not bought into Mr. Nye’s view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal.” But soft power doesn’t work that way. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights “a poverty of thought” among Chinese leaders.

The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for China and Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is a professor at Harvard University and former chair of the National Intelligence Council and the author, most recently, of Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy From FDR to Trump . Twitter:  @Joe_Nye

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