national case study center

National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science (NCCSTS)

The mission of the National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science (NCCSTS) at SUNY-Buffalo is to promote the development and dissemination of materials and practices for case teaching in the sciences. 

Click on the links below to learn more about-

• a bibliography of case studies,
• faculty perceptions on the benefit of teaching case studies, and
• research articles

Below is a sample work flow showing how to navigate the NCCSTS case collection. Enjoy!

1. Start at the NCCSTS homepage ( http://sciencecases.lib.buffalo.edu/cs/ ). Then click on Case Collection (red arrow, upper right).

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2. Clicking on Case Collection takes you to the Keyword Search page. As shown below use the dropdown arrows to narrow your search parameters. As an example I chose Organic Chemistry under Subject Heading.

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3. Below is a partial list (6/25) of case studies categorized under the Subject Heading choice, Organic Chemistry.

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4. Click on a case study. I chose The Case of the Missing Bees (not shown in the partial list above). Below is a partial screenshot of the case study description. To download the case study click on the DOWNLOAD CASE icon (red arrow, upper right).

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5. Below is the the top of the first page of the case study, The Case of the Missing Bees .

nccsts_case_front_page.png

6. And of course make sure to review and adhere to the Permitted and Standard Uses and Permissions ( http://sciencecases.lib.buffalo.edu/cs/collection/uses/ ).

nccsts_uses.png

National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science

Case study title: The Case of the Missing Bees: High Fructose Corn Syrup and Colony Collapse Disorder

Case study authors: Jeffri C. Bohlscheid and Frank J. Dinan

View videos, articles, presentations, research papers, and other resources of interest to STEM Teacher Leaders.  

National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science

• Case Studies

This website provides access to an award-winning collection of peer-reviewed case studies. The National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science also offers a five-day summer workshop and a two-day fall conference to train faculty in the case method of teaching science. In addition, they are actively engaged in educational research to assess the impact of the case method on student learning.

National Center for case study teaching in science

Method assessment.

WHAT DO WE KNOW about case study teaching? The use of problem-based learning (one form of case study teaching) in medical schools has received close scrutiny from researchers. As the use of case-based teaching more broadly increases in undergraduate college and K-12 classrooms, a significant body of literature is beginning to accumulate on the assessment of the method and other active learning pedagogies.

Research Articles

Faculty perceptions on the benefits of case teaching.

We surveyed over 100 science teachers we had trained over a year-and-a-half-long period. One of the things we asked them was what they thought the benefits of case-based teaching were for their students. Here’s what they had to say.

Cases and Critical Thinking

When we teach, we want our students to learn more than just a collection of facts – we also want them to become better critical thinkers. We believe that carefully constructed cases can provide pedagogical tools that teach not only content knowledge, but also critical thinking skills. We are currently engaged in an NSF-funded study that is looking at whether cases can be used to improve students' critical thinking skills.

© 1999-2024 National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science, University at Buffalo. All Rights Reserved.

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Review by Pamela Brittain , Common Sense Education | Updated May 2020

National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science

Science-based debates, discussions, role plays, and more for research, analysis, and critical thinking

Learning rating

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Digital Citizenship, Relationships & Communication, Science, Social & Emotional Learning, Social Studies

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Pros : Peer-reviewed content; a large collection of cases on a broad range of topics; free resources are extensive.

Cons : Teacher notes and answer keys require subscription; limited collection for middle school.

Bottom Line : Great resource to address many skills, apply science, and adapt to work in your classroom.

• How Can I Teach with This Tool?
• What Is It?
• Is It Good for Learning?

The National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science is a resource that could work to introduce concepts or reinforce them. Working through the case studies themselves also teaches important skills as a stand-alone activity. You can use the cases as they are, but you'll likely have to adapt the content to work in your classroom. Because many of the cases are text-heavy, you may need to adjust them to better fit your students' reading levels. 

The case studies could be really useful when studying concepts that may feel more abstract. So, for instance, if you're talking about climate change or the biology of nutrition, you can teach the foundational concepts and then find a case study that's related to your topic so that students can apply what they've learned. Or you can begin with a project-based learning or flipped case study to dig into the concepts that you're covering. Because there are case studies around topical issues, you can likely find one that feels relevant to students and will pique their interest.

The National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science is an extensive collection of over 850 case studies focusing on various areas of science and society. Many cases, available for free on the site, come with resources for teaching the material (such as slideshows, PDFs, supporting materials, and videos), though some don't. Out of the 850-plus cases, only about 12 are specifically aimed at middle school, but over 400 are aimed at high school. Teachers can search by subject, educational level, instruction method, or special topic area (e.g., social justice, women in science, or science history). You can also search directly by keyword if you are interested in a specific thing. Aside from content, the cases come in different forms, like debates, clicker classes, flipped classrooms, role-playing, mock trials, and more. This gives teachers a lot of flexibility in both subject material and method of instruction.

A number of additional resources are available on the site to show teachers how to use case study materials in their classroom effectively, including the different methods of instruction for case studies. Some of these are free; however, there's a fee to access some of the materials (such as books, training, and conferences). With a subscription you also get access to teacher notes and answer keys. However, you must be a registered teacher to access these materials, and you have to prove your status as such before you are given access (they evaluate each registration individually). You can alter the studies, within reason, for "standard" usage, without additional permissions from the Center. This allows teachers to adapt the case studies to more accurately reflect their students and other lessons. However, "non-standard" alterations require permission from the Center. 

What makes The National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science especially useful is that it allows for a different way to approach the sciences and show the cross-curricular connections between both other sciences and the arts. This gives teachers a much broader range of tools for teaching science and a way to engage different types of students in their class. Cases are submitted by members of the scientific and education communities and are all peer-reviewed before being put on the site. This ensures that teachers can be confident that the materials they are teaching are accurate and have been fact-checked thoroughly.  

The wide variety of topics and approaches gives teachers a multitude of ways to engage students. The case studies can bring science to life, either through topical studies, history, or ethical debates. The biggest challenge is adapting the text-heavy studies to use in classes with students at different reading levels, as the vocabulary and syntax are generally advanced. However, the time and effort it takes to find and adapt the right study with an interesting approach will likely pay off with high engagement and practice in a wide variety of skills.

Learning Rating

Overall rating.

The case studies provide a selection of content that will meet the interests of a wide range of students, but engagement may depend on the type of case you present (PBL vs. Debate, etc.).

The case studies use multiple ways of presenting information and incorporate different instructional methods and content types. However, it's completely up to the teacher to provide scaffolding and adapt the cases to work in class.

The collection is limited to the case studies and their supporting materials; they're provided as stand-alone materials with instructor notes and answer keys available for a subscription. 

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Strategic Initiatives

Continuity in russian strategic culture: a case study of moscow’s syrian campaign.

Moscow’s modus operandi during the military campaign in Syria

Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky

Executive Summary

• The paper argues that Russian strategic-operational conduct in Syria demonstrates more continuity than change in the traditional Russian approach to military operations and strategy.
• The paper claims that this continuity presents itself in the following cultural traits: (1) a holistic approach to strategy and operations; (2) recklessness and disconnect between words and deeds; (3) a mix of messianic–pragmatic considerations; (4) an integral strategic management style; and (5) operational creativeness.
• The paper also suggests that change might be evolving on the tactical-operational level with the emergence of a mission command culture.

Introduction

In this paper, we explore the extent to which Moscow’s modus operandi during the military campaign in Syria demonstrates continuity in Russian strategic culture. Moscow’s intensive and years-long Syria campaign makes it possible to categorize Russian strategic behavior and to compare and contrast it with the conventional wisdom about Russian strategic culture and traits of operational behavior. Illustrating the cultural drivers behind Russian policy and operations in Syria, this paper adds an additional layer to the existing knowledge about Moscow’s conduct in the Middle East, and about ideational factors that shape Moscow’s strategic behavior elsewhere. This expands the toolbox for policy experts contemplating diagnosis and prognosis of Russian geostrategic assertiveness in the region and beyond.

The paper distills five main characteristics of Russian strategic-operational conduct in Syria. We claim that the Russian operation in Syrian demonstrated (1) a holistic approach to strategy and operations, (2) recklessness and disconnect between words and deeds, (3) a mix of messianic–pragmatic considerations, (4) an “integral” management style, and (5) operational creativeness. We argue that these traits demonstrate more continuity than change in the traditional Russian approach to military operations and strategy. However, we also suggest that change might be evolving on the tactical-operational level with the emergence of a mission command culture.

Following this introduction, the paper is divided into five sections. Each section describes a specific characteristic of Moscow’s Syria campaign and shows how it corresponds with or deviates from earlier Russian strategic tradition. The conclusion summarizes the findings and outlines the implications for policymakers.

Holistic Approach

Russian conduct in Syria exemplified the so-called holistic or systemic approach to strategy, dubbed in Russian as kompleksnyi or sistemnyi podhod. This applies to both the political-strategic and the operational-tactical aspects of the Syria campaign. A holistic or systemic approach stands for an all-embracing view that “grasps a big picture and describes every element of reality as being in constant interplay with others in frames of a meta-system. It views issues in different dimensions as interconnected within one generalized frame.” 1 A predilection for holism is prominent throughout Russian intellectual tradition and cognitive style in literature, religious philosophy, and the sciences. 2 It has also been projected on the culture of war, strategic style, and military thought. 3 

There are three examples that illustrate the continuity of this holistic trait in the Russian Syrian campaign. First, the goals of the intervention reflect the holistic nature of the Russian approach on the strategic-political level. The campaign has promoted, in parallel, several interconnected global, regional, domestic, and organizational logics ( sistemo-obrazuischiaia logika ), which have shaped the essence of Russian conduct. 4

Second, the campaign design on the military-operational level was equally holistic or systemic. The holistic-thinking tradition envisions war as a clash of two competing systems. Within such a paradigm, operational design does not aim at the annihilation of the enemy by methodical destruction of its forces, but seeks its dismantlement and disintegration through fragmentation strikes ( drobiaschii/raschleniaiuschii udar ), decomposition ( razlozhenie ), systemic paralysis, and neutralization. 5 The Russian campaign design and its operational execution demonstrated exactly that. Moscow sought to mount not just a large-scale operation, but a comprehensive one that would reverse strategic trends, deny the initiative to the anti-Syrian government forces, demonstrate the strength of the regime, fragment the opposition forces with their subsequent localization and neutralization, and facilitate conditions for a political process by convincing the main actors and their proxies of the futility of further fighting. The air campaign took the form of strikes on the systems that hold opposition forces together: the command and control (C2) systems, material supply chains, and economic centers of gravity. In conjunction with the air strikes, ground operations sought first to control the main transportation infrastructure; lift the blockade of encircled cities and garrisons of the Syrian army; and then localize, isolate, and dismantle pockets of resistance while, in parallel, systematically destroying hardware and fighters all over the country from the air. 6

Finally, contemporary Russian military-strategic thought, which informed the campaign’s design, illustrates holistic threat perception and a holistic conceptualization of the countermeasures. Combining hard and soft instruments of power across military and nonmilitary domains—which is so evident in the current Russian approach to strategy—is a manifestation of the same systemic tradition. Asymmetry, which has also been part of this paradigm, can also be seen as a manifestation of strategic holism. 7 In sum, the holistic approach demonstrates a clear continuity of the strategic tradition.

Recklessness and Disconnect Between Theory and Practice

Russian strategic tradition often manifests a disconnect between the words of theoreticians and the deeds of the practitioners implementing them. Military and nonmilitary theoreticians can be very advanced in their conceptualizations, but the system, as a whole, can be pathologically bad at implementing them. This trait, the other side of the holistic coin, has manifested itself throughout Russian history. 8   The gap between the theoretical and the feasible, however, has never stopped Russian decision-makers. Russian and Soviet military thinking has been future-oriented and could be described as wishful thinking that ignores current realities and neglects problems. The Soviets were traditionally good at theorizing innovative concepts, but often limited themselves to abstract considerations and remained prisoners of their futuristic visions; sophisticated doctrines were incompatible with the country’s operational capacity to implement them. 9  Frequently, an accompanying cultural trait has been an inclination to stage events for show ( pokazukha ) and efforts to appear rather than to be. Thus, despite leaders’ holistic approaches to strategic theory and operational planning, in reality we often observe systemic breakdowns ( sistemnii sboi ) on the operational level. This could be due to what various authors perceive as traditional Russian recklessness ( razgildiastvo ) and carelessness ( bezolarabenrnost’ ), resulting in an overall mess and chaos ( bardak ) in both planning and execution. 10

Russian conduct in Syria could be attributed to these traits. Unquestionably, the limited order of battle sustained a very high rate of bombing sorties and combat missions with a historically low number of combat losses—both in personnel and in platforms—and of mechanical accidents, unparalleled in comparison with all previous Russian combat experiences. 11 However, the longer the campaign, the more accidents, combat and noncombat casualties, and systemic breakdowns occurred. Despite announcements of victory and the withdrawal of forces, the promotion of the victory narrative, and the conduct of victory parades, the political process has been moving more slowly than expected. Presumably, the episodes—at Dir-a-Zor in February 2018, when Russian mercenaries initiated an attack and were eventually destroyed by U.S. fire strikes; and in September 2018, when Syrian Air Defense forces shot down a Russian signals intelligence (ELINT) plane—illustrate the phenomenon of the abovementioned bardak . Apparently, the Syrian campaign exhibited less recklessness and bardak than was reported during the Soviet operations in Afghanistan, the Russian operations in Chechnya and in Georgia in 2008, and even less than in the 2014 war in Ukraine, but eventually, there were still more of these traits displayed in the aforementioned 2018 episodes than at the beginning of the operation. Thus, overall, despite relative improvements, this general cultural trait remained intact.

A Mix of Pragmatic and Messianic Considerations

Messianism has long been a tradition in Russian foreign policy. 12 It emanates from a religious-political-public conviction about the predestination of Russia in the world. Informed by the religious philosophy of the Holy Rus’ and Third Rome which defines Russia and its people as a God chosen country and nation, this concept places Russia at the spiritual center responsible for the salvation of Christian civilization and of the world. 13 The balance between pragmatism and messianism in the Tsarist and Soviet regional policies varied, but it was always a synthesis of both considerations. The tide of religious metaphysics as a driver of political considerations has ebbed and flowed over history, with varying impact on policy. 14 Messianic considerations and self-attribution of the civilizational mission were always traits in Russian strategic mentality and national narrative and have varied in intensity according to the centrality to the leadership. The Arab Spring coincided with an increase in the roles of religion and messianism in Russian ideology and politics. 15

The Syrian campaign has been the Russian diplomatic-military enterprise most significantly touched by religion in the post-Soviet era. During the operation, the ecclesiastical diplomacy (1) provided the Kremlin with a messianic raison d’être, enabling the leadership to justify the mission in their own eyes and operate from a position of moral-psychological comfort; (2) engaged foreign political leaders, international organizations, and the main Christian denominations worldwide to legitimize Moscow’s policy, mainly focusing on the EU and the United States; and (3) sustained domestic support for the operation and maintained combat effectiveness within the Russian military on the ground, which multiplied motivation, morale, and unit cohesion. Thus, the operation has been a clear extension of the messianic imprint on strategy, which expressed itself during the Tsarist and Soviet eras. 16

Integral Management Style

The Syrian operation demonstrated rapid decision-making and decision execution and a flexible approach to strategy, which owed a lot to the notion of “integral strategist” ( ingtegral’nii polkovodets ) and the C2 architecture supporting it that ensures uninterrupted political control over war . The Russian notion of integral strategist refers to the highest strategic authority, which ties together, at the national level all types of considerations (political, economic, ideological) and forms of power (military and civilian, private and public) into a single integrated effort. It can be translated as “grand strategist,” one who operates within the Stavka , or wartime supreme command. In different historical periods it has taken different shapes and forms, but the logic stays the same. Integration of military and nonmilitary sources of power is an old Russian managerial tradition, codified in both Soviet and post-Soviet times and supported by theoretical writings, mostly works by the Soviet military theoretician Svechin that have become somewhat popular within the Russian supreme command today. 17

One of the main desired outcomes of integral management style, at least in theory, is uninterrupted political control over the military operation from the grand strategic level to the tactical level. This leads to a calibrated use of force, ensuring the utility of violence. This “intervention” of the political authority in military affairs, and the familiarity of the military with grand strategic considerations, enable productive discourse within the strategic community, especially during uncertain and unstable situations that demand what Svechin called a “flexible plan of war” ( gibkii plan voiny ). 18  The notion is epitomized by the unique three-echelon C2 architecture that exists in Syria—from the National Defense Management Center (NDMC) in the General Staff (GS), the highest level of command, via the command post in Khmeimim; to the C2 centers giving the operational directions in the field, the lowest level of command. The NDMC—as part of the GS, but reporting directly to the Ministry of Defense (MoD)—tailored the processes from the strategic to the tactical level, and coordinated staff work on the combat, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities, synchronizing them with other armed segments of the coalition. 19

Moreover, the NDMC configuration, even if it is only a ritualistic façade, illustrates the canonic role of the GS—the brain of the military and meta-operator of war—in direct continuity with the Russian strategic tradition, when the GS functions as the main staff organ supporting the decision-making process of the supreme command. The location and roles of the NDMC as part of the GS reflect the intentional organizational design based, among other, on the lessons learned from the Great Patriotic War (GPW) about strategic management architecture and its implementation. 20

About the Author

Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky is a professor at the School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the IDC Herzliya University, Israel. His research interests include international security; cultural approaches to international relations; and American, Russian, and Israeli national security policy. He has published on these topics in  Foreign Affairs ,  Security Studies ,  Journal of Strategic Studies ,  Problems of Post-Communism ,  Intelligence and National Security ,  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism , and  Cold War History . He is the author of Operation Kavkaz (2006), The Culture of Military Innovation  (Stanford University Press, 2010), and, with Kjell Inge Bjerga, Contemporary Military Innovation (Routledge, 2013). His latest book, Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy  (Stanford University Press, 2019), is about religion, politics, and strategy in Russia. This paper is based on Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “Russian Campaign in Syria — Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture,” Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 43, No. 2, 2020, pp.104–125.

Russia Strategic Initiative

Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI):  This program of research, led by the GCMC and funded by RSI ( U.S. Department of Defense effort to enhance understanding of the Russian way of war in order to inform strategy and planning), employs in-depth case studies to better understand Russian strategic behavior in order to mitigate miscalculation in relations.

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What to know about the Moscow concert attack and what's next in the case

Charles Maynes

People lay flowers at a makeshift memorial in front of the Crocus City Hall outside Moscow, on Monday. There were calls Monday for harsh punishment for those behind the attack on the Russian concert hall that killed more than 130 people, as authorities combed the burnt-out ruins of the shopping and entertainment complex in search of more bodies. Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP hide caption

People lay flowers at a makeshift memorial in front of the Crocus City Hall outside Moscow, on Monday. There were calls Monday for harsh punishment for those behind the attack on the Russian concert hall that killed more than 130 people, as authorities combed the burnt-out ruins of the shopping and entertainment complex in search of more bodies.

MOSCOW — Russia is still reeling from Friday's attack by gunmen who killed and stabbed scores of people before setting fire to the Crocus City concert hall outside Moscow — the worst terrorist attack in the country in over a decade.

The assault came less than a week after President Vladimir Putin claimed a landslide victory in a pro-forma election the Kremlin presented as an endorsement of Putin's war in Ukraine and promised defense of the Russian homeland from a hostile West.

At least 133 are dead and more injured after an attack on a Moscow concert hall

Throughout the weekend, authorities marked a grim rise in the death count— as recovery teams discovered additional bodies and other victims succumbed to injuries.

As of Monday, authorities said at least 137 people, including three children, had died, with more than 180 still in hospital.

Here are other key developments.

What is ISIS-K, the group that claims it carried out the Moscow concert attack?

Suspects have been charged and some show signs of torture.

Four suspects — all reportedly from Tajikistan, a former Soviet republic — were charged with committing acts of terror in a closed Moscow court hearing late Sunday night. A court statement said the men — identified as Dalerdzhon Mirzoyev, 32; Saidakrami Rachabalizoda, 30; Shamsidin Fariduni, 25; and Mukhammadsobir Faizov, 19 — all pled guilty to participating in the attack and shooting innocent civilians.

Dalerdzhon Mirzoyev, a suspect in the shooting attack at the Crocus City Hall concert venue, sits behind a glass wall of an enclosure for defendants at the Basmanny district court in Moscow, March 24. Shamil Zhumatov/REUTERS hide caption

Dalerdzhon Mirzoyev, a suspect in the shooting attack at the Crocus City Hall concert venue, sits behind a glass wall of an enclosure for defendants at the Basmanny district court in Moscow, March 24.

Yet in a brief appearance before the media, the suspects all showed outward signs of torture and duress.

One was brought into court with a bandage over his ear — the result, according to a video released by Russia's security services, of an interrogator severing it with a knife. Another was brought in a wheelchair, only partially conscious and with apparent trauma to his eye. A third had bruises on his face and a ripped plastic bag around his neck. A video leaked by security forces to social media appeared to show an agent electrocuting another suspect's genitalia.

On Monday, Russian authorities announced three additional arrests in the case.

Russia designated Sunday as a day of national mourning

Sunday marked a day of national mourning — with tributes to the victims held in cities across the country. A national billboard campaign ran ads that showed a candle with the words "We Mourn." Long lines were seen at blood donation centers in Moscow and other major cities.

People stand next to an advertising screen displaying an image of a lit candle and the slogan "(We) Mourn 22.03.2024" in Novosibirsk on March 23, a day after a gun attack on the Crocus City Hall. Vladimir Nikolayev/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

People stand next to an advertising screen displaying an image of a lit candle and the slogan "(We) Mourn 22.03.2024" in Novosibirsk on March 23, a day after a gun attack on the Crocus City Hall.

Russian Orthodox priests, including Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, a key Kremlin ally, held vigils and prayers for the victims. At the site of the massacre, an impromptu memorial had mushroomed into a mountain of flowers, candles, and other tributes by Sunday evening. An audiovisual presentation beamed images of flying cranes on the walls of the concert hall accompanied by stirring music — a tribute to the victims that was broadcast on state media and shared online.

Putin has yet to visit the site of the attack and the Kremlin indicated on Monday he had no plans to. Instead, the government released a video over the weekend that showed Putin lighting a candle to honor victims at a private Orthodox church at his residence outside Moscow.

Security failures occurred despite U.S. warnings, which Putin dismissed as fearmongering

The brazen attack appears to have if not damaged, then at least punctured, Putin's reputation as a leader known for maintaining order and security.

Moreover, he had warnings.

Two weeks ago, the U.S. Embassy shared reports — both through private government channels to Russia and to the public on its website — that it had intelligence suggesting an attack on a public space in Moscow was imminent.

In this grab taken from video released by the Investigative Committee of Russia on Saturday, March 23, investigators from the Investigative Committee of Russia examine the burned concert hall after an attack on the Crocus City Hall outside Moscow, Russia. Investigative Committee of Russia via AP hide caption

In this grab taken from video released by the Investigative Committee of Russia on Saturday, March 23, investigators from the Investigative Committee of Russia examine the burned concert hall after an attack on the Crocus City Hall outside Moscow, Russia.

Yet three days before the assault on Crocus City Hall, Putin dismissed the American claims as fearmongering. Speaking to the chiefs of Russia's Federal Security Service, the Russian leader said the warnings were "provocative" and "resemble outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilize our society."

Russian critics of the government argue the security failure signaled the Kremlin's obsession with cracking down on what it perceives as domestic challengers — such as Russians opposed to the invasion of Ukraine, followers of the late opposition leader Alexey Navalny and Russia's LGBT community — rather than legitimate threats.

Accounts of heroism have emerged from the attack

While social media accounts quickly captured the full horror of the carnage, accounts of heroism have also emerged. In particular, Russian media have zeroed in on the actions of Islam Khalilov, 15, a high school student originally from Kyrgyzstan who worked as a coat check attendant during the concert.

Video from the night of the attack shows Khalilov leading a large group of people — said to number around 100 — through the winding hallways of the concert venue and out to safety.

"I understood if I don't react [and help], then I'll lose my life and those of many people," said Khalilov, in an interview with Russian media. "But honestly, it was terrifying."

A Russian rapper has since offered to send Khalikov a 1 million ruble reward — $10,000 — for his heroism.

Putin is blaming Ukraine, despite ISIS-K claims of responsibility

The Islamic State Khorasan Province or ISIS-K — an ISIS-linked group that emerged in 2014 and 2015 in Afghanistan and Pakistan — has claimed responsibility for the attack. ISIS-linked social media channels have since published graphic footage of the assault filmed by the attackers. The U.S. says its own assessments confirm the ISIS claim.

Yet Russian officials, and state media, have largely ignored any Islamic State link — focusing almost exclusively on a possible Ukrainian connection. Speaking to the nation in a video address Saturday, Putin said, without evidence, that the attackers were detained while fleeing to the Ukrainian border — where "preliminary information" showed someone on "the Ukrainian side" was preparing to ferry them to safety.

People lay flowers and light candles next to the Crocus City Hall, on the western edge of Moscow, Saturday, March 23. Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP hide caption

People lay flowers and light candles next to the Crocus City Hall, on the western edge of Moscow, Saturday, March 23.

Other Russian officials — such as the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova — have suggested that any U.S. statements were intended to steer attention away from Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials have vehemently denied involvement — calling the accusations a Kremlin attempt to marshal Russian public support for an increasingly unpopular war.

With the suspects now charged, a trial could get underway as soon as late May. If convicted, the men face possible life in prison. Russia currently has a moratorium on the death penalty — although the carnage at Crocus City has raised calls by leading political figures to change course.

Meanwhile, attention will now shift back to the Kremlin's messaging on the attack itself. Putin has vowed to retaliate against any and all involved. The concern — both at home and abroad — is that opens a new expansion of the war in Ukraine, whatever the truth.

• Moscow attack

Moscow's Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies

As the United States withdraws its military forces from parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, Russia is expanding its influence in these and other areas. But instead of deploying conventional Russian soldiers, Moscow has turned to special operations forces, intelligence units, and private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group to do its bidding. Russia’s strategy is straightforward: to undermine U.S. power and increase Moscow’s influence using low-profile, deniable forces like PMCs that can do everything from providing foreign leaders with security to training, advising, and assisting partner security forces.

Moscow’s use of PMCs has exploded in recent years, reflecting lessons learned from earlier deployments, a growing expansionist mindset, and a desire for economic, geopolitical, and military gains. Ukraine served as one of the first proving grounds for PMCs, beginning in 2014. The Russians then refined the model as these private mercenaries worked with local forces in countries such as Syria and Libya. Over time, Moscow expanded the use of PMCs to sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and other regions—including countries such as Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Venezuela. PMCs now fill various roles to undermine U.S. influence and support Russia’s expanding geopolitical, military, and economic interests.

With operations suspected or proven in as many as 30 countries across 4 continents and an increasingly refined and adaptable operational model, PMCs are likely to play a significant role in Russian strategic competition for the foreseeable future.

Spread of Russian PMC Activity since 2014

Dates represent the earliest credibly documented PMC presence in each country. Not all PMC deployments are ongoing.

Roles & Missions

Russian Special Forces soldiers from the army's intelligence unit take part in a military drill at a training ground near the village of Mol'kino, Krasnodar region, on July 10, 2015. Photo by SERGEI VENYAVSKY/AFP via Getty Images.

Russian Objectives

PMCs play key roles executing Moscow’s policy objectives and advancing Russian national security interests across the globe. Even though PMCs are technically illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, some of President Vladimir Putin’s closest allies—such as Yevgeny Prigozhin—head Russian PMCs. A core component of Russia’s "hybrid warfare" strategy, PMCs provide the Kremlin a quasi-deniable means through which to pursue Russian objectives, complementing or substituting for more traditional, overt forms of statecraft.

PMCs conduct training before deploying abroad, including at bases inside Russia and likely with the support of Russian military and intelligence agencies. Russia’s largest and most capable PMC, Wagner Group, conducts training at two camps attached to the location of 10th Special Mission Brigade of GRU Spetsnaz in Mol’kino, Krasnodar region, Russia.

The main base features a headquarters, an airborne training and obstacle course, weapons and munitions storage, and other military facilities.

North of the main military base, Wagner has a separate facility. The Wagner base was likely built between 2015 and 2016, encompasses approximately six acres, and consists of approximately nine permanent structures of varying sizes. Images show numerous and varying numbers of cargo trucks, small trucks, and civilian vehicles.

Features south of the main base include a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) unit—shown here—as well as an unidentified internal base and other training areas.

Date of Arrival: 2014

PMCs first began operating in Ukraine during Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 before taking on a central role in Moscow's ongoing covert war in Eastern Ukraine's Donbas region. Operating independently or augmenting regular Russian forces, PMC personnel in Ukraine including from Wagner Group reached between 2,500-5,000 during peak of fighting in 2015.

PMCs provided Moscow an ideal tool through which to pursue its geopolitical, military, and ideological objectives in Ukraine: destabilizing then consolidating control over Crimea and Donbas, undermining and pressuring Kyiv and its Western backers for diplomatic concessions, and doing it all while denying any official Russian involvement. However, while PMCs enabled Moscow and its Donbas proxies to seize and secure control over new "independent" republics in Donetsk and Luhansk, their battlefield achievements largely stalled since 2015, rendering the frontlines of Eastern Ukraine another Russian-backed frozen conflict. Moreover, Russian attempts to maintain "plausible deniability" for their actions fooled few Western governments, resulting in sanctions on Kremlin and PMC officials and organizations.

Nonetheless, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine was one of the first battlefield applications of its new "hybrid warfare" doctrine, and Moscow integrated PMCs into its military operations. Russia applied several lessons, such as exploiting the military-like capabilities of PMCs and their official " deniability ," to its next major foreign operation: Syria.

PMC combat support to Donbas separatists, particularly from Wagner Group, was decisive in pivotal early battles of the war in Eastern Ukraine from 2014 to 2015.

Click on the map for more information about an event.

• Annexation of Crimea March 2014
• Battle of Luhansk Airport Spring 2014
• Shootdown of Ukrainian Il-76 June 2014
• Battle of Debaltseve Early 2015

Date of Arrival: 2015

Building off its experience in Ukraine, Russia again turned to PMCs in Syria to help achieve important goals —including stabilizing the Assad regime and countering efforts by the United States and its partners. In addition, PMCs played a crucial role capturing oil fields , refineries, gas plants, and other energy infrastructure from rebels. Russian PMCs played an increasingly direct role in pro-regime combat operations over the course of the Syrian civil war and were often synchronized with Russian economic priorities, including securing key energy infrastructure. PMC personnel in Syria reached up to 1,000-3,000 personnel, including contingents from Wagner Group, Vegacy, E.N.O.T., Vostok Battalion, and other PMCs.

Syria was an important testing ground for the application of a hybrid-PMC deployment model, which is now being exported to other battlegrounds. PMCs acted as a ground force with skill sets similar to Russian Spetsnaz through which Moscow could limit regular Russian military casualties and provide deniability for high-risk Russian actions. PMCs synchronized military advances with economic priorities: capitalizing on ground advances in oil- and gas-rich areas, securing key pipelines, oil fields, refineries, and gas plants to stage future ground advances and draw profits. The Wagner Group’s advance on the Conoco Plant in Dayr az Zawr in February 2018 demonstrates how Moscow used PMCs to take risks in a deniable manner. In this case, Wagner attempted to seize the U.S.- and partner-controlled Conoco gas plant both to secure an economically valuable site and test U.S. resolve.

T-4 airbase in central Syria served as a key airbase for Russia in January 2017 as part of its strategy and planning to retake eastern Syria. Battlefield needs in 2017 precipitated a steady increase in specialized ground forces, including Russian PMCs, which led the ground component of this stage of the war. By 2019, Russia had expanded its presence at T-4 to become an all-purpose, air, ground, and intelligence base for its missions in Syria. The following imagery of T-4 identifies possible PMC positions at the airbase in 2017 and 2019.

Full airbase shot of T-4, January 23, 2017.

Left: An infantry battalion position observed at T-4 was likely Russian since the Syrian Arab Army no longer displayed this type of formation six years into the war.

Right: A likely Russian logistics facility at T-4.

A tank company and support element position at T-4. Russia expanded its presence at the airbase since battlefield needs required increased ground forces.

Russian ground attack aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles in May 2019 indicate Russia’s expanded presence at T-4.

This multi-mission role of PMCs—military, political, economic—and integration into host-nation proxy forces would next be employed in Libya.

With lessons learned from supporting the Assad regime in Syria, Russia deployed PMCs to Libya's civil war to bolster General Khalifa Haftar, his Libyan National Army (LNA), and the eastern-based government in Tobruk. Since 2017, PMCs such as Wagner Group have been at the vanguard of Russian efforts, advising and enabling Haftar's LNA offensive into western Syria and assault on the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli in 2019. Moscow deployed up to 800-1,200 PMC personnel, primarily from Wagner Group, to multiple training sites, forward bases, and key energy and infrastructure facilities as of early 2020, conducting a variety of missions vital to Haftar's offensive and to Russian interests.

1,600 Russian "Wagner" PMC militants left the west of Libya after the defeat and flight of the Russian-Haftar troops. View original tweet.

One of Russia’s primary deployment sites has been Al Jufra Air Base in central Libya, which has served as the launching pad for Wagner Group forces and Russian air support to the Tripoli campaign. A close examination of Russia’s deployment at Al Jufra Airbase reveals an expansion of Russian air and ground forces. In particular, satellite imagery shows a growth in the presence of the Russian PMC Wagner Group, a core component of Russia’s intervention in Libya.

Full airbase shot, June 6, 2020.

The arrival of a large contingent of Russian artillery and PMC Wagner Group forces, May 28, 2020.

A Russian Su-24 attack aircraft taxiing on an Al Jufra runway, demonstrating continued Russian military activity, June 8, 2020.

PMCs have been Moscow's spearhead for advancing its foreign policy, military, and economic interests in Libya. With the Libyan civil war, Russia saw a power vacuum and chance to exploit the instability to expand Russian influence, using PMCs to bolster Haftar , tip the conflict in their favor, and reap the rewards. In exchange, Moscow sought economic and military concessions , deploying PMCs to key oil and gas facilities and Mediterranean ports as those areas fell to the LNA. Russia also used Libya to strengthen ties to traditionally U.S. partners, namely UAE and Egypt. Since 2017, Russian PMCs have deployed to Egypt’s Sidi Barrani airfield to direct joint Russian-Egyptian military support to Haftar. Newly acquired CSIS imagery shows the deployment of Russian equipment at Sidi Barrani in March 2017.

Left: A recently arrived Il-76 transport aircraft in March 2017 at Sidi Barrani. Russian special operations forces and private military contractors deployed to Sidi Barrani as part of a bid to support Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar.

Right: Vehicles on the aircraft apron at Sidi Barrani in March 2017.

Russia's deployment of PMCs to Libya has strengthened its geostrategic position and diplomatic influence in the country, ensuring Moscow's role in any resolution of the conflict and an end-state amenable to Russian interests . However, there were also limits to Moscow’s use of PMCs. Despite assistance from PMCs, the LNA was unable to seize Tripoli and even triggered an expanding intervention from Turkey to bolster the GNA. Wagner Group alone has lost hundreds of fighters and key weapons systems in Tripoli's heavy ground fighting and from Turkish drone strikes. Nonetheless, through its PMC-led intervention, Moscow has gained a new strategic foothold and geostrategic position on the Mediterranean, as well as a bridgehead into the rest of the African continent.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Though Russian PMCs first appeared in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as early as 2014, Russia significantly expanded the geographic scope and missions of PMCs in Sub-Saharan Africa following its interventions in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya. Russia has primarily used PMCs to target resource-rich countries with weak governance, such as Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Madagascar. Though PMC tasks have varied from case to case to meet local needs, in each of these countries Russia exchanged military and security support for economic gains and political influence.

In Sudan, Russia used Wagner Group to provide military and political support to President Omar al-Bashir in exchange for gold mining concessions. Russia also had a strategic motive to seek basing rights in the Red Sea. In November 2017, Moscow facilitated a mining operations agreement for M Invest, a Russian company tied to Yevgeny Prigozhin. PMC troops, who arrived the following month, provided training and military assistance to local forces. In addition, PMCs orchestrated a disinformation campaign to discredit protesters through many of the same techniques the Internet Research Agency, linked to Prigozhin, used in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Central African  Republic

Russia has followed a similar model in the Central African Republic, where the Wagner Group and Patriot—another Russian PMC—have reportedly been active. Beginning in January 2018, Russia exchanged military training and security—primarily for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and mining operations—for access to gold, uranium, and diamonds . New CSIS imagery sheds light on the training camp these troops established southwest of Bangui in the ruins of the Palace of Berengo.

Wagner PMC Base in Berengo Progress

Following their arrival in 2018, PMC troops established a training camp in the ruins of former-emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa’s palace at Berengo, southwest of Bangui. Troops repaired existing facilities and constructed new housing, storage structures, and training areas—including firing ranges and revetments. The imagery below shows the year-by-year development of the main base on the palace grounds and the two adjacent training areas, beginning with the conditions in 2017 before PMCs arrived.

In early spring 2018, Wagner Group sent a small group of political analysts to Madagascar to support incumbent President Hery Rajaonarimampianina's reelection bid in exchange for economic agreements on mining (chromite and gold), oil, agriculture, and the port of Toamasina . In April, additional troops arrived to provide security and military training, allegedly with the assistance of Federal Security Service and GRU officers . Though Rajaonarimampianina lost the election, he facilitated the promised agreements prior to leaving office. Ferrum Mining , a Russian company involved in one such deal, began operations on the island in October 2018 but soon paused due to strikes.

In Mozambique, Russia traded Wagner's military support against Islamist insurgents in Cabo Delgado province for access to natural gas. Wagner troops arrived in early September 2019 but were unprepared for the mission. They had little experience conducting operations in the brush and difficulty coordinating with local forces. After significant losses, Wagner troops retreated south to Nacala in November 2019 to regroup. Despite sending additional equipment and troops in February and March 2020, Wagner was replaced in April by the Dyck Advisory Group , a South African PMC. It is unclear whether any Wagner troops remain in the country.

Latin America

Date of Arrival: 2017

Russia’s global use of PMCs has also extended to Latin America, though they are not as widespread as in Africa. PMCs have most notably played a role in Venezuela, though their presence has also been rumored in countries such as Nicaragua.

PMCs have been present in Venezuela since at least 2017 to guard Russian business interests and companies, such as Rosneft . Despite investments in the Venezuelan economy, Moscow's relationship with Caracas is primarily driven by a geostrategic desire to reassert its influence in the region at the expense of the United States. In response to the Trump administration's calling for the ouster for Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim president in January 2019, Russia deployed approximately 100 security contractors, likely from Wagner, the same month to provide security to president Maduro amid political upheaval. These contractors conducted surveillance and cybersecurity protection in addition to physical security.

Outlook & Implications

August 4, 2018: Victor Tokmakov, first secretary of the Russian Embassy, presents diplomas to graduating recruits in Berengo. Russian military consultants have set up training for the Central African Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces after delivering weapons to the country. Photo by FLORENT VERGNES/AFP via Getty Images

These examples demonstrate Russia’s expanding global use of the PMC model to advance its geopolitical and economic goals and undermine U.S. interests. PMCs provide the Kremlin a deniable means to project power and influence into its "near-abroad," as recent PMC activity in Belarus has demonstrated. They offer a glimpse of how Russia plans to compete with the United States in the future, particularly in weak, strategically located, and resource-rich states.

PMCs are an important instrument in a broad Russian toolkit that includes covert action, cyber operations, and other irregular activity across the globe. Yet PMC activities have not always been successful. In Libya, for example, Russia and its PMCs suffered a serious setback following the battlefield losses of Khalifa Haftar. Despite such problems, U.S. efforts to counter Russian PMCs have been weak and ad hoc. A more effective response should include several steps.

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Killing Chloroplasts

Herbicides Targeting Photosynthesis

By Angela K. Hartsock

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This case study takes place at a fictional biotechnology company developing herbicides against invasive plant species. The case study focuses on five herbicides with different effects on photosynthesis. Students play the role of lab interns and explore photosynthesis and the herbicide effects by engaging in concept mapping, experimental design, data manipulation, and data analysis. The goal is to use the experimental data to predict the steps in photosynthesis that are inhibited by each herbicide. Students should come away from the case study with a process-based understanding of photosynthesis. This case study is designed for the "flipped" classroom with suggested preparatory videos and associated assessment questions included. Videos can be supplemented with textbook readings or mini-lectures. This activity was developed for a non-majors introductory biology course but it could also be used in any general biology course, including majors' courses. It might also be used to establish foundational knowledge for more advanced discussions of photosynthesis in plant biology (botany) courses.

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Date Posted

• Develop a hypothesis based on observations.
• Diagram the process of photosynthesis.
• Analyze the interactions between the different processes happening during photosynthesis.
• Apply understanding of photosynthesis to experimental data analysis.

photosynthesis; chloroplasts; plants; herbicides; atrazine; chloroplast; corn resistance;

Subject Headings

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

High school, Undergraduate lower division, Undergraduate upper division

TOPICAL AREAS

TYPE/METHODS

Teaching Notes & Answer Key

Teaching notes.

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Materials & Media

Supplemental materials.

• The Simple Story of Photosynthesis and Food This video explores the relationship between photosynthesis and carbohydrates, starch, and fiber; and how the air we breathe is related to the food we ingest. The video provides a general overview and context for a more detailed discussion of the process in the next video. Running time: 4:00 min. Lesson by Amanda Ooten, animation by Bouncepad Collective, 2013.
• Photosynthesis In this video Paul Andersen reviews photosynthesis including the structure of choloroplasts, the major pigments involved, the light reaction, the Calvin cycle, and strategies for avoiding the problem of photorespiration that evolved in CAM and C4 plants. Running time: 12:26 min. Bozeman Science, 2012.
• How Atrazine Kills Plants This video links the action of the herbicide atrazine to the inhibition of photosynthesis. This video also prepares students to consider how the actions of herbicides influence each of the major components in photosynthesis. Running time: 4:49 min. Created by Angela Hartsock for the National Center for Case Study Teaching in Science, 2016.

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