an essay on spanish civil war

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Looking Back on the Spanish War

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First of all the physical memories, the sound, the smells and the surfaces of things.

It is curious that more vividly than anything that came afterwards in the Spanish war I remember the week of so-called training that we received before being sent to the front – the huge cavalry barracks in Barcelona with its draughty stables and cobbled yards, the icy cold of the pump where one washed, the filthy meals made tolerable by pannikins of wine, the trousered militia-women chopping firewood, and the roll-call in the early mornings where my prosaic English name made a sort of comic interlude among the resounding Spanish ones, Manuel Gonzalez, Pedro Aguilar, Ramon Fenellosa, Roque Ballaster, Jaime Domenech, Sebastian Viltron, Ramon Nuvo Bosch. I name those particular men because I remember the faces of all of them. Except for two who were mere riff-raff and have doubtless become good Falangists by this time, it is probable that all of them are dead. Two of them I know to be dead. The eldest would have been about twenty-five, the youngest sixteen.

One of the essential experiences of war is never being able to escape from disgusting smells of human origin. Latrines are an overworked subject in war literature, and I would not mention them if it were not that the latrine in our barracks did its necessary bit towards puncturing my own illusions about the Spanish Civil War. The Latin type of latrine, at which you have to squat, is bad enough at its best, but these were made of some kind of polished stone so slippery that it was all you could do to keep on your feet. In addition they were always blocked. Now I have plenty of other disgusting things in my memory, but I believe it was these latrines that first brought home to me the thought, so often to recur; ‘Here we are, soldiers of a revolutionary army, defending democracy against Fascism, fighting a war which is about something, and the detail of our lives is just as sordid and degrading as it could be in prison, let alone in a bourgeois army.’ Many other things reinforced this impression later; for instance, the boredom and animal hunger of trench life, the squalid intrigues over scraps of food, the mean, nagging quarrels which people exhausted by lack of sleep indulge in.

The essential horror of army life (whoever has been a soldier will know what I mean by the essential horror of army life) is barely affected by the nature of the war you happen to be fighting in. Discipline, for instance, is ultimately the same in all armies. Orders have to be obeyed and enforced by punishment if necessary, the relationship of officer and man has to be the relationship of superior and inferior. The picture of war set forth in books like All Quiet on the Western Front is substantially true. Bullets hurt, corpses stink, men under fire are often so frightened that they wet their trousers. It is true that the social background from which an army springs will colour its training, tactics and general efficiency, and also that the consciousness of being in the right can bolster up morale, though this affects the civilian population more than the troops. (People forget that a soldier anywhere near the front line is usually too hungry, or frightened, or cold, or, above all, too tired to bother about the political origins of the war.) But the laws of nature are not suspended for a ‘red’ army any more than for a ‘white’ one. A louse is a louse and a bomb is a bomb, even though the cause you are fighting for happens to be just.

Why is it worth while to point out anything so obvious? Because the bulk of the British and American intelligentsia were manifestly unaware of it then, and are now. Our memories are short nowadays, but look back a bit, dig out the files of New Masses or the Daily Worker , and just have a look at the romantic warmongering muck that our left-wingers were spilling at that time. All the stale old phrases! And the unimaginative callousness of it! The sang-froid with which London faced the bombing of Madrid! Here I am not bothering about the counter-propagandists of the Right, the Lunns , Garvins et hoc genus ; they go without saying. But here were the very people who for twenty years had hooted and jeered at the ‘glory’ of war, at atrocity stories, at patriotism, even at physical courage, coming out with stuff that with the alteration of a few names would have fitted into the Daily Mail of 1918. If there was one thing that the British intelligentsia were committed to, it was the debunking version of war, the theory that war is all corpses and latrines and never leads to any good result. Well, the same people who in 1933 sniggered pityingly if you said that in certain circumstances you would fight for your country, in 1937 were denouncing you as a Trotsky-Fascist if you suggested that the stories in New Masses about freshly wounded men clamouring to get back into the fighting might be exaggerated. And the Left intelligentsia made their swing-over from ‘War is hell’ to ‘War is glorious’ not only with no sense of incongruity but almost without any intervening stage. Later the bulk of them were to make other transitions equally violent. There must be a quite large number of people, a sort of central core of the intelligentsia, who approved the ‘King and Country’ declaration in 1935, shouted for a ‘firm line’ against Germany in 1937, supported the People’s Convention in 1940, and are demanding a Second Front now.

As far as the mass of the people go, the extraordinary swings of opinion which occur nowadays, the emotions which can be turned on and off like a tap, are the result of newspaper and radio hypnosis. In the intelligentsia I should say they result rather from money and mere physical safety. At a given moment they may be ‘pro-war’ or ‘anti-war’, but in either case they have no realistic picture of war in their minds. When they enthused over the Spanish war they knew, of course, that people were being killed and that to be killed is unpleasant, but they did feel that for a soldier in the Spanish Republican army the experience of war was somehow not degrading. Somehow the latrines stank less, discipline was less irksome. You have only to glance at the New Statesman to see that they believed that; exactly similar blah is being written about the Red Army at this moment. We have become too civilized to grasp the obvious. For the truth is very simple. To survive you often have to fight, and to fight you have to dirty yourself. War is evil, and it is often the lesser evil. Those who take the sword perish by the sword, and those who don’t take the sword perish by smelly diseases. The fact that such a platitude is worth writing down shows what the years of rentier capitalism have done to us.

In connexion with what I have just said, a footnote, on atrocities.

I have little direct evidence about the atrocities in the Spanish Civil War. I know that some were committed by the Republicans, and far more (they are still continuing) by the Fascists. But what impressed me then, and has impressed me ever since, is that atrocities are believed in or disbelieved in solely on grounds of political predilection. Everyone believes in the atrocities of the enemy and disbelieves in those of his own side, without ever bothering to examine the evidence. Recently I drew up a table of atrocities during the period between 1918 and the present; there was never a year when atrocities were not occurring somewhere or other, and there was hardly a single case when the Left and the Right believed in the same stories simultaneously. And stranger yet, at any moment the situation can suddenly reverse itself and yesterday’s proved-to-the-hilt atrocity story can become a ridiculous lie, merely because the political landscape has changed.

In the present war we are in the curious situation that our ‘atrocity campaign’ was done largely before the war started, and done mostly by the Left, the people who normally pride themselves on their incredulity. In the same period the Right, the atrocity-mongers of 1914-18, were gazing at Nazi Germany and flatly refusing to see any evil in it. Then as soon as war broke out it was the pro-Nazis of yesterday who were repeating horror stories, while the anti-Nazis suddenly found themselves doubting whether the Gestapo really existed. Nor was this solely the result of the Russo-German Pact. It was partly because before the war the Left had wrongly believed that Britain and Germany would never fight and were therefore able to be anti-German and anti-British simultaneously; partly also because official war propaganda, with its disgusting hypocrisy and self-righteousness, always tends to make thinking people sympathize with the enemy. Part of the price we paid for the systematic lying of 1914-18 was the exaggerated pro-German reaction which followed. During the years 1918-33 you were hooted at in left-wing circles if you suggested that Germany bore even a fraction of responsibility for the war. In all the denunciations of Versailles I listened to during those years I don’t think I ever once heard the question, ‘What would have happened if Germany had won?’ even mentioned, let alone discussed. So also with atrocities. The truth, it is felt, becomes untruth when your enemy utters it. Recently I noticed that the very people who swallowed any and every horror story about the Japanese in Nanking in 1937 refused to believe exactly the same stories about Hong Kong in 1942. There was even a tendency to feel that the Nanking atrocities had become, as it were retrospectively untrue because the British Government now drew attention to them.

But unfortunately the truth about atrocities is far worse than that they are lied about and made into propaganda. The truth is that they happen. The fact often adduced as a reason for scepticism – that the same horror stories come up in war after war – merely makes it rather more likely that these stories are true. Evidently they are widespread fantasies, and war provides an opportunity of putting them into practice. Also, although it has ceased to be fashionable to say so, there is little question that what one may roughly call the ‘whites’ commit far more and worse atrocities than the ‘reds’. There is not the slightest doubt, for instance, about the behaviour of the Japanese in China. Nor is there much doubt about the long tale of Fascist outrages during the last ten years in Europe. The volume of testimony is enormous, and a respectable proportion of it comes from the German press and radio. These things really happened, that is the thing to keep one’s eye on. They happened even though Lord Halifax said they happened. The raping and butchering in Chinese cities, the tortures in the cellars of the Gestapo, the elderly Jewish professors flung into cesspools, the machine-gunning of refugees along the Spanish roads – they all happened, and they did not happen any the less because the Daily Telegraph has suddenly found out about them when it is five years too late.

Two memories, the first not proving anything in particular, the second, I think, giving one a certain insight into the atmosphere of a revolutionary period:

Early one morning another man and I had gone out to snipe at the Fascists in the trenches outside Huesca. Their line and ours here lay three hundred yards apart, at which range our aged rifles would not shoot accurately, but by sneaking out to a spot about a hundred yards from the Fascist trench you might, if you were lucky, get a shot at someone through a gap in the parapet. Unfortunately the ground between was a flat beet-field with no cover except a few ditches, and it was necessary to go out while it was still dark and return soon after dawn, before the light became too good. This time no Fascists appeared, and we stayed too long and were caught by the dawn. We were in a ditch, but behind us were two hundred yards of flat ground with hardly enough cover for a rabbit. We were still trying to nerve ourselves to make a dash for it when there was an uproar and a blowing of whistles in the Fascist trench. Some of our aeroplanes were coming over. At this moment a man, presumably carrying a message to an officer, jumped out of the trench and ran along the top of the parapet in full view. He was half-dressed and was holding up his trousers with both hands as he ran. I refrained from shooting at him. It is true that I am a poor shot and unlikely to hit a running man at a hundred yards, and also that I was thinking chiefly about getting back to our trench while the Fascists had their attention fixed on the aeroplanes. Still, I did not shoot partly because of that detail about the trousers. I had come here to shoot at ‘Fascists’; but a man who is holding up his trousers isn’t a ‘Fascist’, he is visibly a fellow creature, similar to yourself, and you don’t feel like shooting at him.

What does this incident demonstrate? Nothing very much, because it is the kind of thing that happens all the time in all wars. The other is different. I don’t suppose that in telling it I can make it moving to you who read it, but I ask you to believe that it is moving to me, as an incident characteristic of the moral atmosphere of a particular moment in time.

One of the recruits who joined us while I was at the barracks was a wild-looking boy from the back streets of Barcelona. He was ragged and barefooted. He was also extremely dark (Arab blood, I dare say), and made gestures you do not usually see a European make; one in particular – the arm outstretched, the palm vertical – was a gesture characteristic of Indians. One day a bundle of cigars, which you could still buy dirt cheap at that time, was stolen out of my bunk. Rather foolishly I reported this to the officer, and one of the scallywags I have already mentioned promptly came forward and said quite untruly that twenty-five pesetas had been stolen from his bunk. For some reason the officer instantly decided that the brown-faced boy must be the thief. They were very hard on stealing in the militia, and in theory people could be shot for it. The wretched boy allowed himself to be led off to the guardroom to be searched. What most struck me was that he barely attempted to protest his innocence. In the fatalism of his attitude you could see the desperate poverty in which he had been bred. The officer ordered him to take his clothes off. With a humility which was horrible to me he stripped himself naked, and his clothes were searched. Of course neither the cigars nor the money were there; in fact he had not stolen them. What was most painful of all was that he seemed no less ashamed after his innocence had been established. That night I took him to the pictures and gave him brandy and chocolate. But that too was horrible – I mean the attempt to wipe out an injury with money. For a few minutes I had half believed him to be a thief, and that could not be wiped out.

Well, a few weeks later at the front I had trouble with one of the men in my section. By this time I was a ‘cabo’, or corporal, in command of twelve men. It was static warfare, horribly cold, and the chief job was getting sentries to stay awake at their posts. One day a man suddenly refused to go to a certain post, which he said quite truly was exposed to enemy fire. He was a feeble creature, and I seized hold of him and began to drag him towards his post. This roused the feelings of the others against me, for Spaniards, I think, resent being touched more than we do. Instantly I was surrounded by a ring of shouting men: ‘Fascist! Fascist! Let that man go! This isn’t a bourgeois army. Fascist!’ etc. etc. As best I could in my bad Spanish I shouted back that orders had got to be obeyed, and the row developed into one of those enormous arguments by means of which discipline is gradually hammered out in revolutionary armies. Some said I was right, others said I was wrong. But the point is that the one who took my side the most warmly of all was the brown-faced boy. As soon as he saw what was happening he sprang into the ring and began passionately defending me. With his strange, wild, Indian gesture he kept exclaiming, ‘He’s the best corporal we’ve got!’ ( ¡ No hay cabo como el! ) Later on he applied for leave to exchange into my section.

Why is this incident touching to me? Because in any normal circumstances it would have been impossible for good feelings ever to be re-established between this boy and myself. The implied accusation of theft would not have been made any better, probably somewhat worse, by my efforts to make amends. One of the effects of safe and civilized life is an immense oversensitiveness which makes all the primary emotions seem somewhat disgusting. Generosity is as painful as meanness, gratitude as hateful as ingratitude. But in Spain in 1936 we were not living in a normal time. It was a time when generous feelings and gestures were easier than they ordinarily are. I could relate a dozen similar incidents, not really communicable but bound up in my own mind with the special atmosphere of the time, the shabby clothes and the gay-coloured revolutionary posters, the universal use of the word ‘comrade’, the anti-Fascist ballads printed on flimsy paper and sold for a penny, the phrases like ‘international proletarian solidarity’, pathetically repeated by ignorant men who believed them to mean something. Could you feel friendly towards somebody, and stick up for him in a quarrel, after you had been ignominiously searched in his presence for property you were supposed to have stolen from him? No, you couldn’t; but you might if you had both been through some emotionally widening experience. That is one of the by-products of revolution, though in this case it was only the beginnings of a revolution, and obviously foredoomed to failure.

The struggle for power between the Spanish Republican parties is an unhappy, far-off thing which I have no wish to revive at this date. I only mention it in order to say: believe nothing, or next to nothing, of what you read about internal affairs on the Government side. It is all, from whatever source, party propaganda – that is to say, lies. The broad truth about the war is simple enough. The Spanish bourgeoisie saw their chance of crushing the labour movement, and took it, aided by the Nazis and by the forces of reaction all over the world. It is doubtful whether more than that will ever be established.

I remember saying once to Arthur Koestler, ‘History stopped in 1936’, at which he nodded in immediate understanding. We were both thinking of totalitarianism in general, but more particularly of the Spanish Civil War. Early in life I had noticed that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper, but in Spain, for the first time, I saw newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts, not even the relationship which is implied in an ordinary lie. I saw great battles reported where there had been no fighting, and complete silence where hundreds of men had been killed. I saw troops who had fought bravely denounced as cowards and traitors, and others who had never seen a shot fired hailed as the heroes of imaginary victories, and I saw newspapers in London retailing these lies and eager intellectuals building emotional superstructures over events that had never happened. I saw, in fact, history being written not in terms of what happened but of what ought to have happened according to various ‘party lines’. Yet in a way, horrible as all this was, it was unimportant. It concerned secondary issues – namely, the struggle for power between the Comintern and the Spanish left-wing parties, and the efforts of the Russian Government to prevent revolution in Spain. But the broad picture of the war which the Spanish Government presented to the world was not untruthful. The main issues were what it said they were. But as for the Fascists and their backers, how could they come even as near to the truth as that? How could they possibly mention their real aims? Their version of the war was pure fantasy, and in the circumstances it could not have been otherwise.

The only propaganda line open to the Nazis and Fascists was to represent themselves as Christian patriots saving Spain from a Russian dictatorship. This involved pretending that life in Government Spain was just one long massacre ( vide the Catholic Herald or the Daily Mail – but these were child’s play compared with the continental Fascist press), and it involved immensely exaggerating the scale of Russian intervention. Out of the huge pyramid of lies which the Catholic and reactionary press all over the world built up, let me take just one point – the presence in Spain of a Russian army. Devout Franco partisans all believed in this; estimates of its strength went as high as half a million. Now, there was no Russian army in Spain. There may have been a handful of airmen and other technicians, a few hundred at the most, but an army there was not. Some thousands of foreigners who fought in Spain, not to mention millions of Spaniards, were witnesses of this. Well, their testimony made no impression at all upon the Franco propagandists, not one of whom had set foot in Government Spain. Simultaneously these people refused utterly to admit the fact of German or Italian intervention, at the same time as the Germany and Italian press were openly boasting about the exploits of their ‘legionaries’. I have chosen to mention only one point, but in fact the whole of Fascist propaganda about the war was on this level.

This kind of thing is frightening to me, because it often gives me the feeling that the very concept of objective truth is fading out of the world. After all, the chances are that those lies, or at any rate similar lies, will pass into history. How will the history of the Spanish war be written? If Franco remains in power his nominees will write the history books, and (to stick to my chosen point) that Russian army which never existed will become historical fact, and schoolchildren will learn about it generations hence. But suppose Fascism is finally defeated and some kind of democratic government restored in Spain in the fairly near future; even then, how is the history of the war to be written? What kind of records will Franco have left behind him? Suppose even that the records kept on the Government side are recoverable – even so, how is a true history of the war to be written? For, as I have pointed out already, the Government also dealt extensively in lies. From the anti-Fascist angle one could write a broadly truthful history of the war, but it would be a partisan history, unreliable on every minor point. Yet, after all, some kind of history will be written, and after those who actually remember the war are dead, it will be universally accepted. So for all practical purposes the lie will have become truth.

I know it is the fashion to say that most of recorded history is lies anyway. I am willing to believe that history is for the most part inaccurate and biased, but what is peculiar to our own age is the abandonment of the idea that history could be truthfully written. In the past people deliberately lied, or they unconsciously coloured what they wrote, or they struggled after the truth, well knowing that they must make many mistakes; but in each case they believed that ‘the facts’ existed and were more or less discoverable. And in practice there was always a considerable body of fact which would have been agreed to by almost everyone. If you look up the history of the last war in, for instance, the Encyclopaedia Britannica , you will find that a respectable amount of the material is drawn from German sources. A British and a German historian would disagree deeply on many things, even on fundamentals, but there would still be that body of, as it were, neutral fact on which neither would seriously challenge the other. It is just this common basis of agreement, with its implication that human beings are all one species of animal, that totalitarianism destroys. Nazi theory indeed specifically denies that such a thing as ‘the truth’ exists. There is, for instance, no such thing as ‘science’. There is only ‘German science’, ‘Jewish science’ etc. The implied objective of this line of thought is a nightmare world in which the Leader, or some ruling clique, controls not only the future but the past . If the Leader says of such and such an event, ‘It never happened’ – well, it never happened. If he says that two and two are five – well, two and two are five. This prospect frightens me much more than bombs – and after our experiences of the last few years that is not a frivolous statement.

But is it perhaps childish or morbid to terrify oneself with visions of a totalitarian future? Before writing off the totalitarian world as a nightmare that can’t come true, just remember that in 1925 the world of today would have seemed a nightmare that couldn’t come true. Against that shifting phantasmagoric world in which black may be white tomorrow and yesterday’s weather can be changed by decree, there are in reality only two safeguards. One is that however much you deny the truth, the truth goes on existing, as it were, behind your back, and you consequently can’t violate it in ways that impair military efficiency. The other is that so long as some parts of the earth remain unconquered, the liberal tradition can be kept alive. Let Fascism, or possibly even a combination of several Fascisms, conquer the whole world, and those two conditions no longer exist. We in England underrate the danger of this kind of thing, because our traditions and our past security have given us a sentimental belief that it all comes right in the end and the thing you most fear never really happens. Nourished for hundreds of years on a literature in which Right invariably triumphs in the last chapter, we believe half-instinctively that evil always defeats itself in the long run. Pacifism, for instance, is founded largely on this belief. Don’t resist evil, and it will somehow destroy itself. But why should it? What evidence is there that it does? And what instance is there of a modern industrialized state collapsing unless conquered from the outside by military force?

Consider for instance the re-institution of slavery. Who could have imagined twenty years ago that slavery would return to Europe? Well, slavery has been restored under our noses. The forced-labour camps all over Europe and North Africa where Poles, Russians, Jews and political prisoners of every race toil at road-making or swamp-draining for their bare rations, are simple chattle slavery. The most one can say is that the buying and selling of slaves by individuals is not yet permitted. In other ways – the breaking-up of families, for instance – the conditions are probably worse than they were on the American cotton plantations. There is no reason for thinking that this state of affairs will change while any totalitarian domination endures. We don’t grasp its full implications, because in our mystical way we feel that a régime founded on slavery must collapse. But it is worth comparing the duration of the slave empires of antiquity with that of any modern state. Civilizations founded on slavery have lasted for such periods as four thousand years.

When I think of antiquity, the detail that frightens me is that those hundreds of millions of slaves on whose backs civilization rested generation after generation have left behind them no record whatever. We do not even know their names. In the whole of Greek and Roman history, how many slaves’ names are known to you? I can think of two, or possibly three. One is Spartacus and the other is Epictetus . Also, in the Roman room at the British Museum there is a glass jar with the maker’s name inscribed on the bottom, ‘ Felix fecit ’. I have a vivid mental picture of poor Felix (a Gaul with red hair and a metal collar round his neck), but in fact he may not have been a slave; so there are only two slaves whose names I definitely know, and probably few people can remember more. The rest have gone down into utter silence.

The backbone of the resistance against Franco was the Spanish working class, especially the urban trade union members. In the long run – it is important to remember that it is only in the long run – the working class remains the most reliable enemy of Fascism, simply because the working class stands to gain most by a decent reconstruction of society. Unlike other classes or categories, it can’t be permanently bribed.

To say this is not to idealize the working class. In the long struggle that has followed the Russian Revolution it is the manual workers who have been defeated, and it is impossible not to feel that it was their own fault. Time after time, in country after country, the organized working-class movements have been crushed by open, illegal violence, and their comrades abroad, linked to them in theoretical solidarity, have simply looked on and done nothing; and underneath this, secret cause of many betrayals, has lain the fact that between white and coloured workers there is not even lip-service to solidarity. Who can believe in the class-conscious international proletariat after the events of the past ten years? To the British working class the massacre of their comrades in Vienna, Berlin, Madrid, or wherever it might be, seemed less interesting and less important than yesterday’s football match. Yet this does not alter the fact that the working class will go on struggling against Fascism after the others have caved in. One feature of the Nazi conquest of France was the astonishing defections among the intelligentsia, including some of the left-wing political intelligentsia. The intelligentsia are the people who squeal loudest against Fascism, and yet a respectable proportion of them collapse into defeatism when the pinch comes. They are far-sighted enough to see the odds against them, and moreoever they can be bribed – for it is evident that the Nazis think it worth while to bribe intellectuals. With the working class it is the other way about. Too ignorant to see through the trick that is being played on them, they easily swallow the promises of Fascism, yet sooner or later they always take up the struggle again. They must do so, because in their own bodies they always discover that the promises of Fascism cannot be fulfilled. To win over the working class permanently, the Fascists would have to raise the general standard of living, which they are unable and probably unwilling to do. The struggle of the working class is like the growth of a plant. The plant is blind and stupid, but it knows enough to keep pushing upwards towards the light, and it will do this in the face of endless discouragements. What are the workers struggling for? Simply for the decent life which they are more and more aware is now technically possible. Their consciousness of this aim ebbs and flows. In Spain, for a while, people were acting consciously, moving towards a goal which they wanted to reach and believed they could reach. It accounted for the curiously buoyant feeling that life in Government Spain had during the early months of the war. The common people knew in their bones that the Republic was their friend and Franco was their enemy. They knew that they were in the right, because they were fighting for something which the world owed them and was able to give them.

One has to remember this to see the Spanish war in its true perspective. When one thinks of the cruelty, squalor, and futility of war – and in this particular case of the intrigues, the persecutions, the lies and the misunderstandings – there is always the temptation to say: ‘One side is as bad as the other. I am neutral’. In practice, however, one cannot be neutral, and there is hardly such a thing as a war in which it makes no difference who wins. Nearly always one stands more or less for progress, the other side more or less for reaction. The hatred which the Spanish Republic excited in millionaires, dukes, cardinals, play-boys, Blimps, and what-not would in itself be enough to show one how the land lay. In essence it was a class war. If it had been won, the cause of the common people everywhere would have been strengthened. It was lost, and the dividend-drawers all over the world rubbed their hands. That was the real issue; all else was froth on its surface.

The outcome of the Spanish war was settled in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin – at any rate not in Spain. After the summer of 1937 those with eyes in their heads realized that the Government could not win the war unless there were some profound change in the international set-up, and in deciding to fight on Negrin and the others may have been partly influenced by the expectation that the world war which actually broke out in 1939 was coming in 1938. The much-publicized disunity on the Government side was not a main cause of defeat. The Government militias were hurriedly raised, ill-armed and unimaginative in their military outlook, but they would have been the same if complete political agreement had existed from the start. At the outbreak of war the average Spanish factory-worker did not even know how to fire a rifle (there had never been universal conscription in Spain), and the traditional pacifism of the Left was a great handicap. The thousands of foreigners who served in Spain made good infantry, but there were very few experts of any kind among them. The Trotskyist thesis that the war could have been won if the revolution had not been sabotaged was probably false. To nationalize factories, demolish churches, and issue revolutionary manifestoes would not have made the armies more efficient. The Fascists won because they were the stronger; they had modern arms and the others hadn’t. No political strategy could offset that.

The most baffling thing in the Spanish war was the behaviour of the great powers. The war was actually won for Franco by the Germans and Italians, whose motives were obvious enough. The motives of France and Britain are less easy to understand. In 1936 it was clear to everyone that if Britain would only help the Spanish Government, even to the extent of a few million pounds’ worth of arms, Franco would collapse and German strategy would be severely dislocated. By that time one did not need to be a clairvoyant to foresee that war between Britain and Germany was coming; one could even foretell within a year or two when it would come. Yet in the most mean, cowardly, hypocritical way the British ruling class did all they could to hand Spain over to Franco and the Nazis. Why? Because they were pro-Fascist, was the obvious answer. Undoubtedly they were, and yet when it came to the final showdown they chose to stand up to Germany. It is still very uncertain what plan they acted on in backing Franco, and they may have had no clear plan at all. Whether the British ruling class are wicked or merely stupid is one of the most difficult questions of our time, and at certain moments a very important question. As to the Russians, their motives in the Spanish war are completely inscrutable. Did they, as the pinks believed, intervene in Spain in order to defend democracy and thwart the Nazis? Then why did they intervene on such a niggardly scale and finally leave Spain in the lurch? Or did they, as the Catholics maintained, intervene in order to foster revolution in Spain? Then why did they do all in their power to crush the Spanish revolutionary movements, defend private property and hand power to the middle class as against the working class? Or did they, as the Trotskyists suggested, intervene simply in order to prevent a Spanish revolution? Then why not have backed Franco? Indeed, their actions are most easily explained if one assumes that they were acting on several contradictory motives. I believe that in the future we shall come to feel that Stalin’s foreign policy, instead of being so diabolically clever as it is claimed to be, has been merely opportunistic and stupid. But at any rate, the Spanish Civil War demonstrated that the Nazis knew what they were doing and their opponents did not. The war was fought at a low technical level and its major strategy was very simple. That side which had arms would win. The Nazis and the Italians gave arms to their Spanish Fascist friends, and the western democracies and the Russians didn’t give arms to those who should have been their friends. So the Spanish Republic perished, having ‘gained what no republic missed’.

Whether it was right, as all left-wingers in other countries undoubtedly did, to encourage the Spaniards to go on fighting when they could not win is a question hard to answer. I myself think it was right, because I believe that it is better even from the point of view of survival to fight and be conquered than to surrender without fighting. The effects on the grand strategy of the struggle against Fascism cannot be assessed yet. The ragged, weaponless armies of the Republic held out for two and a half years, which was undoubtedly longer than their enemies expected. But whether that dislocated the Fascist timetable, or whether, on the other hand, it merely postponed the major war and gave the Nazis extra time to get their war machine into trim, is still uncertain.

I never think of the Spanish war without two memories coming into my mind. One is of the hospital ward at Lerida and the rather sad voices of the wounded militiamen singing some song with a refrain that ended:

‘Una resolucion, Luchar hast’ al fin!’

Well, they fought to the end all right. For the last eighteen months of the war the Republican armies must have been fighting almost without cigarettes, and with precious little food. Even when I left Spain in the middle of 1937, meat and bread were scarce, tobacco a rarity, coffee and sugar almost unobtainable.

The other memory is of the Italian militiaman who shook my hand in the guardroom, the day I joined the militia. I wrote about this man at the beginning of my book on the Spanish war, and do not want to repeat what I said there. When I remember – oh, how vividly! – his shabby uniform and fierce, pathetic, innocent face, the complex side-issues of the war seem to fade away and I see clearly that there was at any rate no doubt as to who was in the right. In spite of power politics and journalistic lying, the central issue of the war was the attempt of people like this to win the decent life which they knew to be their birthright. It is difficult to think of this particular man’s probable end without several kinds of bitterness. Since I met him in the Lenin Barracks he was probably a Trotskyist or an Anarchist, and in the peculiar conditions of our time, when people of that sort are not killed by the Gestapo they are usually killed by the G.P.U. But that does not affect the long-term issues. This man’s face, which I saw only for a minute or two, remains with me as a sort of visual reminder of what the war was really about. He symbolizes for me the flower of the European working class, harried by the police of all countries, the people who fill the mass graves of the Spanish battlefields and are now, to the tune of several millions, rotting in forced-labour camps.

When one thinks of all the people who support or have supported Fascism, one stands amazed at their diversity. What a crew! Think of a programme which at any rate for a while could bring Hitler, Pétain , Montagu Norman , Pavelitch , William Randolph Hearst , Streicher , Buchman , Ezra Pound , Juan March , Cocteau , Thyssen , Father Coughlin , the Mufti of Jerusalem , Arnold Lunn , Antonescu , Spengler , Beverley Nichols , Lady Houston , and Marinetti all into the same boat! But the clue is really very simple. They are all people with something to lose, or people who long for a hierarchical society and dread the prospect of a world of free and equal human beings. Behind all the ballyhoo that is talked about ‘godless’ Russia and the ‘materialism’ of the working class lies the simple intention of those with money or privileges to cling to them. Ditto, though it contains a partial truth, with all the talk about the worthlessness of social reconstruction not accompanied by a ‘change of heart’. The pious ones, from the Pope to the yogis of California, are great on the ‘changes of heart’, much more reassuring from their point of view than a change in the economic system. Pétain attributes the fall of France to the common people’s ‘love of pleasure’. One sees this in its right perspective if one stops to wonder how much pleasure the ordinary French peasant’s or working-man’s life would contain compared with Pétain’s own. The damned impertinence of these politicians, priests, literary men, and what not who lecture the working-class Socialist for his ‘materialism’! All that the working man demands is what these others would consider the indispensable minimum without which human life cannot be lived at all. Enough to eat, freedom from the haunting terror of unemployment, the knowledge that your children will get a fair chance, a bath once a day, clean linen reasonably often, a roof that doesn’t leak, and short enough working hours to leave you with a little energy when the day is done. Not one of those who preach against ‘materialism’ would consider life livable without these things. And how easily that minimum could be attained if we chose to set our minds to it for only twenty years! To raise the standard of living of the whole world to that of Britain would not be a greater undertaking than the war we are now fighting. I don’t claim, and I don’t know who does, that that wouldn’t solve anything in itself. It is merely that privation and brute labour have to be abolished before the real problems of humanity can be tackled. The major problem of our time is the decay of the belief in personal immortality, and it cannot be dealt with while the average human being is either drudging like an ox or shivering in fear of the secret police. How right the working classes are in their ‘materialism’! How right they are to realize that the belly comes before the soul, not in the scale of values but in point of time! Understand that, and the long horror that we are enduring becomes at least intelligible. All the considerations that are likely to make one falter – the siren voices of a Pétain or of a Gandhi, the inescapable fact that in order to fight one has to degrade oneself, the equivocal moral position of Britain, with its democratic phrases and its coolie empire, the sinister development of Soviet Russia, the squalid farce of left-wing politics – all this fades away and one sees only the struggle of the gradually awakening common people against the lords of property and their hired liars and bumsuckers. The question is very simple. Shall people like that Italian soldier be allowed to live the decent, fully human life which is now technically achievable, or shan’t they? Shall the common man be pushed back into the mud, or shall he not? I myself believe, perhaps on insufficient grounds, that the common man will win his fight sooner or later, but I want it to be sooner and not later – some time within the next hundred years, say, and not some time within the next ten thousand years. That was the real issue of the Spanish war, and of the present war, and perhaps of other wars yet to come.

I never saw the Italian militiaman again, nor did I ever learn his name. It can be taken as quite certain that he is dead. Nearly two years later, when the war was visibly lost, I wrote these verses in his memory:

The Italian soldier shook my hand Beside the guard-room table; The strong hand and the subtle hand Whose palms are only able

To meet within the sound of guns, But oh! what peace I knew then In gazing on his battered face Purer than any woman’s!

For the flyblown words that make me spew Still in his ears were holy, And he was born knowing what I had learned Out of books and slowly.

The treacherous guns had told their tale And we both had bought it, But my gold brick was made of gold – Oh! who ever would have thought it?

Good luck go with you, Italian soldier! But luck is not for the brave; What would the world give back to you? Always less than you gave.

Between the shadow and the ghost, Between the white and the red, Between the bullet and the lie, Where would you hide your head?

For where is Manuel Gonzalez, And where is Pedro Aguilar, And where is Ramon Fenellosa? The earthworms know where they are.

Your name and your deeds were forgotten Before your bones were dry, And the lie that slew you is buried Under a deeper lie;

But the thing that I saw in your face No power can disinherit: No bomb that ever burst Shatters the crystal spirit.

Written August 1942, Sections I, II, III, and VII printed in New Road , June 1943

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Spanish Civil War summary

Learn about the spanish civil war fought from 1936 to 1939 against the government of spain.

Spanish Civil War , (1936–39) Military revolt against the government of Spain. After the 1936 elections produced a Popular Front government supported mainly by left-wing parties, a military uprising began in garrison towns throughout Spain, led by the rebel Nationalists and supported by conservative elements in the clergy, military, and landowners as well as the fascist Falange. The ruling Republican government, led by the socialist premiers Francisco Largo Caballero and Juan Negrín (1894–1956) and the liberal president Manuel Azaña y Díaz, was supported by workers and many in the educated middle class as well as militant anarchists and communists. Government forces put down the uprising in most regions except parts of northwestern and southwestern Spain, where the Nationalists held control and named Francisco Franco head of state. Both sides repressed opposition; together, they executed or assassinated more than 50,000 suspected enemies to their respective causes. Seeking aid from abroad, the Nationalists received troops, tanks, and planes from Nazi Germany and Italy, which used Spain as a testing ground for new methods of tank and air warfare. The Republicans (also called loyalists) were sent matériel mainly by the Soviet Union, and the volunteer International Brigades also joined the Republicans. The two sides fought fierce and bloody skirmishes in a war of attrition. The Nationalist side gradually gained territory and by April 1938 succeeded in splitting Spain from east to west, causing 250,000 Republican forces to flee into France. In March 1939 the remaining Republican forces surrendered, and Madrid, beset by civil strife between communists and anticommunists, fell to the Nationalists on March 28. About 500,000 people died in the war, and all Spaniards were deeply scarred by the trauma. The war’s end brought a period of dictatorship that lasted until the mid-1970s.

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Robert D. Farber University Archives and Special Collections

Spanish civil war periodical collection, 1923-2009.

Description by Sean Beebe, doctoral student in History and Archives & Special Collections assistant.

A large number of periodicals created during the Spanish Civil War were created by the fighting forces, many by particular units within those forces. These publications were intended to promote the image of those fighters and to help maintain unit morale and cohesion. The January 23, 1938 edition of Nuevo Ejercito (New Army), the newspaper of the 47th Division of the Republican army, contained a summary of the division’s recent combat activity; a Catalan-language page; and unit news, all interspersed with photographs of the division’s soldiers in winter action.

A similar approach is found in La Voz de la Sanidad, the newspaper of the international medical brigade attached to the 15th Division. Befitting the brigade’s multinational status, the paper was written in four languages: Spanish, French, English and German. La Voz de la Sanidad’s content consisted of a mixture of the same items reproduced—side-by-side or on succeeding pages—in each of the four languages, alongside items, both informative and comic, unique to each language.

A second type of periodical served to call for material support for the Republican side. In New York City, African-Americans combined this support with efforts to combat racism at home. The Negro Committee to Aid Spain, sponsored by such notables as Mary McLeod Bethune, Langston Hughes, A. Philip Randolph, Paul Robeson, and Richard Wright, published a pamphlet entitled “A Negro Nurse in Republican Spain,” which recounted the story of Salaria Kee, an African-American nurse from Harlem who joined the volunteer American Medical Unit in 1937.

Kee’s story was juxtaposed with a more general account of those of African-American men who had volunteered for the International Brigades, as racism at home “appeared to them as part of the picture of fascism,” which could be most directly confronted in Spain. The pamphlet chronicled Kee’s early life, decision to go to Spain and her service there, both in hospitals and directly behind the lines — until a shell wound made her unfit for further service. Kee returned to America, and joined the fundraising campaign for which the pamphlet was produced. The text concluded with a quotation from Kee: “Negro men have given up their lives there…as courageously as any heroes of any age. Surely Negro people will just as willingly give of their means to relieve the suffering of a people attacked by the enemy of all racial minorities — fascism — and its most aggressive exponents — Italy and Germany.”

One further form of publication, that of outright propaganda designed to influence hearts and minds, forms an extensive part of the collection. A 1937 edition of the British magazine Spain Illustrated featured photographs (including those of corpses) and articles portraying “a year’s fight for democracy,” and condemning the Nationalists and their fascist backers for the tremendous suffering inflicted upon the Spanish people. The non-interventionist policy of the Western democracies was vilified as an utter failure, with Parliament coming in for particular criticism for its “pro-fascist” stance. Most dramatically, the magazine contended that the defeat of the Republicans would be but the prelude “for attacking England and France…all hope of peace in Europe would be at an end.”

Finally, the example of quasi-neutral international media opens an interesting window on to how the conflict was perceived outside of Spain, outside of an obvious ideological lens. In August 1936, the famed French illustrated magazine, L’Illustration , published a special edition dedicated to the civil war. L’Illustration ’s version of the war was one of utter tragedy, in which “fratricidal” conflict split the nation apart; its editors “could only see in the two Spains in conflict a single country which we love and which suffers.” Consequently, the magazine presented images of the conflict’s devastation, whether the rather graphic images of corpses left in public places, those of defiled churches, or of cities after bombardments and shelling. These particularly dramatic choices appear to serve an almost fatalistic reading of the conflict, in which no action can be taken but to observe this tremendous amount of suffering.

May 2, 2015

Brandeis University's Archives & Special Collections holds a significant amount of material relating to the Spanish Civil War, including over 4,700 books, close to 400 periodicals and roughly 250 posters. In addition, the Charles Korvin photograph collection comprises 244 black and white images taken during the War. Follow the links below for further information about these holdings:

Spanish Civil War periodical collection, 1923-2009 (finding aid)

Charles Korvin photographs, circa 1937-1938 (finding aid)

Spanish Civil War posters, 1936-1938 on Brandeis University’s Institutional Repository

Spotlight on the Spanish Civil War posters

Spotlight on the SCW poster ¡Jovenes! (circa 1937)

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From Guernica to Human Rights: Essays on the Spanish Civil War by Peter N. Carroll

Forthcoming review for H-Humanities (H-War)

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Politics, Religion & Ideology

George Esenwein

Raanan Rein

This is the frst scholarly volume to ofer an insight into the less-known stories of women, children, and international volunteers in the Spanish Civil War. Special attention is given to volunteers of diferent historical experiences, especially Jews, and voices from less-researched countries in the context of the Spanish war, such as Palestine and Turkey. Of an interdisciplinary nature, this volume brings together historians and literary scholars from diferent countries. Their research is based on newly found primary sources in both national and private archives, as well as on post-essentialist methodological insights for women's history, Jewish history, and studies on belonging. By bringing together a group of emerging and senior scholars from diferent countries, we highlight the polyphony of voices of diverse individuals drawn into the Spanish Civil War. Contributors to this volume have explored new or little-researched primary sources found in archives and documentary centers, including papers held by relatives of the people we study. This volume is aimed at both scholarly and non-scholarly public, including any readers interested in the Spanish Civil War, twentieth-century European history, Jewish studies, women's history, or anti-fascism. This volume can be used both in undergraduate college courses and in postgraduate university seminars.

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The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism

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This chapter provides a broad introduction to the subject of anarchism in Spain and the Spanish Civil War, noting the key developments, historiography and debates in this area.

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Morris Brodie

In our latest AnarchistStudies.Blog article, Morris Brodie tracks 80 years of historiography on the Spanish Civil War, from caricatures of anarchists as idealistic and/or bloodthirsty (by fascist, liberal and orthodox communist historians) to an ‘anarchist renaissance’ in civil war historiography in the last twenty years. He includes a list of further reading on anarchists in the Spanish Civil War. Available at (https://anarchiststudies.noblogs.org/article-salvaging-the-revolution-anarchist-historiography-on-the-spanish-civil-war/)

Archaeology and Capitalism. From Ethics to Politics, pp. 84-102

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Why the Spanish Civil War Mattered to Writers on Distant Shores

Sarah watling looks at the role literature played in the fight against fascism.

The Spanish war began in July 1936 when a group of disaffected generals—including Francisco Franco, who would emerge as their leader— attempted to launch a coup against their country’s elected government. The reaction of foreign powers was significant from the start.

Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany offered decisive material support to Franco’s side (the nationalists) while the Republican government received from its fellow democracies in France, the United States and Great Britain only a queasy refusal to intervene.

As the Republic battled to survive this well-resourced attack, relying on a tenacious popular resistance to the military takeover and on arms from Soviet Russia and Mexico, many observers understood the war as an opportunity to halt the global advance of fascism: one that their own governments seemed loath to take up.

Some months in, Nancy Cunard challenged her fellow writers to make public statements on the war in an urgent call that framed things like this:

It is clear to many of us throughout the whole world that now, as certainly never before, we are determined or compelled, to take sides. The equivocal attitude, the Ivory Tower, the paradoxical, the ironic detachment, will no longer do.

This was where the Spanish Civil War began to matter to me. It happened that, when I first found this eye-catching statement, I was living through an era of national and international upheaval that made Nancy’s 80-year-old challenge snatch up my attention.

It was possible, in her day, to see democracy as a teetering edifice, a system that had outlived, even failed, its potential. Alternatives vied for dominance. The Great Depression in America, that “citadel of capitalism,” had not only destabilized economies around the world but shaken faith in the capitalist system itself—proving, to some minds, the validity of the Marxist theory that had predicted its collapse.

The twenties and early thirties had seen military dictators or  non-democratic forms of government gain the upper hand in a raft of countries: Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Japan, Portugal, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece and, of course, even earlier, Russia. By 1936, Germany and Italy had been governed by fascists for years. Their regimes found plenty of sympathizers in countries shaken by the First World War and ensuing Depression.

The British Union of Fascists, for instance, was already almost four years old. Nor was fascist aggression on the international stage something new. Italy had invaded Ethiopia in 1935; Germany was openly remilitarizing—something forbidden by the terms of the peace imposed at the end of the First World War. For some, the great dichotomy of the 1930s was provided by fascism and communism. For many others (including those who weren’t convinced of a meaningful difference between the two), Spain was perhaps simpler still: fascism or opposition to fascism.

By my day it had become fairly common to hear people drawing dark parallels with the 1930s: that decade in which Mussolini and Hitler crushed opposition and raised their armies, and Franco took over Spain, and “Blackshirts” marched in the streets of London. We thought we knew these facts, but it seemed they were losing their power to terrify or forewarn; that acknowledging them belonged to an old tyranny of decency and truth that others were ready to throw off.

It’s an absurd kind of grandiosity, in a way, to relate the darkest past to your own moment and its preoccupations. Yet I felt many of the things I had taken for granted dropping away around the time I first started reading about Nancy Cunard. Democratic processes, mechanisms of justice, truth itself: all were under renewed threat.

My country seemed a less moderate, less peaceful place than I was used to, and newly emboldened extremists were taking eagerly to the public stage. Inequalities of wealth and opportunity were widening. The urgency of the climate crisis felt increasingly clamorous. It was difficult not to simply feel hopeless; pinioned into a narrow space of outraged despair.

And yet, it was quite convenient to have so much out in the open. It was something to respond to. It gave Nancy’s uncompromising position a certain appeal—even offered, perhaps, a kind of permission. I kept remembering a feminist demonstration I had taken part in years before, when I was 21. Meeting friends in a park afterwards, one of them had punctured our exultant mood: the turn-out I’d bragged of was more or less meaningless, he opined, an act of preaching to the choir. What was the point when everyone on the march was already persuaded?

By 2019—a year in which, though abortion rights had just been extended in Ireland, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights could describe US policy on abortion as “gender-based violence against women, no question” and the anti-feminist, far-right Vox party made unprecedented gains in Spain, raising the uncomfortable specter of  Franco—the response I should have made was becoming clearer to me. My 21-year-old self had marched to give notice of her resistance. There was nothing to be gained by trying to understand the point of view we were protesting (that the way women dressed could provoke rape), but much to be risked from letting that idea exist in the world unchallenged.

Nancy’s “taking sides” has an air of immaturity about it, perhaps precisely because of the playground training most of us receive in it. So much prudence and fairness is signified by resisting these easy allegiances, by seeing “two sides to every story”—a terminology that tends to imply that truth or moral superiority can only ever exist in not choosing either one. And it was becoming clear that polarization serves the extremes best of all.

But something about Nancy’s construction spoke to me. It suggested that there is power in the act of taking a side; that there are moments on which history rests, when nuance or hesitation (perhaps or tomorrow) will prove fatal, when it is vital to  know—and to acknowledge—which side you are on.

The worst times can take on an appearance of simplicity and war is exactly the kind of aberration that removes options, leaving the single choice of one side or another in its place. Yet when Nancy and thousands of other foreigners to Spain acted voluntarily in support of the Spanish Republic, they made their beliefs public. Their actions proposed the worst times as periods of opportunity, too: invitations to reclaim principles from the privacy of our thoughts and conversations and ballot boxes, and make them decisive factors in the way we live and act.

This is why my book is not about the Spanish experience of the war, but rather about the people who had the option not to involve themselves and decided otherwise.

Writers are good for thinking through. I was interested in the question of critical  distance—whether it is always possible or even, as I’d instinctively assumed, always   desirable—and I could think of no better individual to shed light on this than a writer (or intellectual) in war-time.

But people from all walks of life understood the Spanish war as a question, a provocation that demanded an answer. Thousands from across the world volunteered on behalf of the Republic, going so far as to travel to the country as combatants and auxiliaries. Others declared themselves through campaigning and fundraising. Martha Gellhorn defined herself as “an onlooker”: I wanted to explore, too, the experience of people whose commitment drew them closer to the action.

Alongside her in this book are the British Communist Nan Green and her husband, George, who wrenched themselves from their children to volunteer with medical and military units in Republican Spain. There is a young African American nurse named Salaria Kea who saw her service there as a calling. There is one of the boldest photographers to contribute to the memory of the war: Gerda Taro, a refugee from Germany for whom the fight against fascism was personal.

They left their own accounts of the conflict, whether through images or text, and following their stories taught me much about how historical narratives are formed in the first place; why leaving a record can be one of the most instinctive, and contested, human impulses.

They went because, as Martha Gellhorn put it, “We knew, we just knew that Spain was the place to stop Fascism.”

When I went looking for Salaria Kea, the negotiations and challenges her story had undergone became as interesting to me as the missing pieces. A woman of color deemed a political radical, a nurse and not a writer: hers was a voice that rarely received a welcome hearing. My book voices many of my questions, but with Salaria so much was unclear that I realized I could only tell her story by narrating the pursuit and leaving the questions open.

“Rebels,” like Franco, turn military might against the government they’re meant to serve. But I found that all the people I chose to follow fulfilled the word’s other definition, of those who “resist authority, control, or convention.” I wanted to know why they believed that the moment had come, with Spain, for taking sides.

Or, rather, I wanted to know how they recognized the Spanish war as the moment for doing something about the way their present was heading, and what “taking sides” had meant in practice. I wanted to know whether Nancy really thought the mere act of declaring a side could make a difference, as she suggested when she put out that urgent call. I wanted to know why she had addressed it specifically to “Writers and Poets.”

The Spanish war is often remembered for, and through, its  writers—and notably writers from outside the country. Of all the defeats in history, perhaps only Troy has been as well served by literature as Republican Spain was during and after the ascension of Franco, who would eventually rule in Spain for almost forty years. Countless novels and memoirs, a handful of them the greatest books by the greatest writers of their generation; reams of poetry, both brilliant and pedestrian, have preserved the memory of its cause.

As I read, I began to think that their authors’ position had something to say about the nature of writing itself. It seemed significant that each of the writers in this book saw themselves, whether at home or abroad, as an outsider. If not belonging was a fundamental part of that identity, taking sides on Spain only crystallized a series of pressing questions about the purpose and privileges of writers.

The 1930s was a decade of art colliding with politics, of artists determining to marry the two. Presented with the trauma of the Great Depression, the unavoidable phenomenon of Soviet Russia and the spread of fascism, there were journalists and poets alike who sought new modes and new material. Writers questioned their obligations to society, asked what art could achieve; they interrogated the intellectual life to expose its value and its limitations.

The list of foreigners who spent time in Spain during the war reads like a roll call of the most celebrated voices of the era: think of the Spanish war and I imagine you think of Ernest Hemingway and George Orwell, perhaps Stephen Spender, John Dos Passos, W. H. Auden. Delve a little further and you will find a far greater array of authors, including writers who were female, writers of color, writers who did not write in English (though the wealth of Spanish-language literature falls beyond the scope of a book interested in the outsiderness of writers).

They went because, as Martha Gellhorn put it, “We knew, we just knew that Spain was the place to stop Fascism,” or because they believed in the liberal project of the Republic and wanted to raise awareness of its plight, or because they wanted to observe, or even participate in, the cause célèbre of the moment. They saw history coming and went out to meet it.

__________________________________

From Tomorrow Perhaps the Future by Sarah Watling. Copyright © 2023 by Sarah Watling. Excerpted by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher. 

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The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction

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The Spanish Civil War: Very Short Introduction offers an explanation of the war's origins and course, explores its impact on a personal and international scale, and provides an ethical reflection on the war. How has the war inspired some of the greatest writers of our time? In what ways does it continue to resonate today in Britain, continental Europe, and beyond? The war can be seen as an arena of social change where ideas about culture were forged or resisted, and in which both Spaniards and non-Spaniards participated alike. During the Second World War, these conflicts would stretch from Franco's regime, which envisaged itself as part of the Nazi new order, to Europe and beyond.

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Free essays on the Spanish Civil War

Although it’s difficult to deem what the exact crime and evidence used against the “Anarchotrotskyists” would have been if the trial had been allowed to take place.  When assessing “The Claim” it’s difficult to analyse the extent to which the supposed Trotskyist crimes against the Republican government can be deemed to be true as the Communist aspects within the Republican government were predominantly Stalinist sympathising thus their judgement may have been perhaps limited because of such things as the Moscow Show Trials which displayed Trotsky as a supposed opponent to Communism  When looking at the May Days we must bare in mind that at this time that Stalin was not considered to be such a monster as he is now as much of the left simply didn’t accept events such as the purges and Ukrainian famine to have happened to the extent that we know them to have had now. Thus mine and I can imagine a great number of peoples judgement of someone referring to themselves as a Stalinist are clouded by more recent historical truths.   Historic Antagonism   When looking at the history of the Spanish left it begins to appear that the May Days were an inevitable clash between Anarchism and Communism as within Spain these two different ideologies had been vying for popularity for many years. If we briefly look at the history of both groups within Spain this becomes quite apparent.   Although obviously not either an Anarchist or a Communist the most radical movement in the mid-19th were the followers of Pierre-Joseph Proudhorn, the most famous of these “federalists”, in Spain, was Fransesc Pi i Margall whom was regarded as being “the wisest of the federalists, almost an anarchist” by Ricardo Mella and also interestingly the only prime minister of the short lived First Spanish Republic of 1873. What we can gather from this is that Spanish “radicals” historically veered to the libertarian side of the left rather than the more federalist communism.[13]   The first major introduction of Anarchism to Spain was through a visit in 1868 by Giuseppe Fanelli the famous Italian Anarchist revolutionary, which was organised by perhaps the most influential figure of Anarchism, Mikhail Bakunin, to recruit members for the newly formed First International[14] (which aimed to unite different left-wing socialist, communist and anarchist political groups as well as trade-union organisations as well as creating a forum for discussion).[15] In 1872 the anarchists split from the International. Anthony Beevor describes this as being because “Bakunin utterly distrusted Marx’s character and predicted that the philosophy of such a man could only lead to dictatorship and deceit.”[16] If Beevor is to believed it seems inevitable that the two would be destined to split and secondly that the ideologies presented by these two intellectuals would not be able to coexist because of their contradictory nature of them as well as the emphasis both put on the problems with the others views and the negative affects such ideologies, if followed, would have.   In 1871 Marx sent his son-in-law Paul Lafargue to Spain after the fall of the Paris Commune.[17] During his time in Spain he is said to have laid the basis of Spanish Marxist socialism in Madrid.[18] Beevor writes that “The Marxists’ lack of success, in comparison to the anarchists, was partly due to the emphasise they placed on the central state. The idea of a ‘parliamentary road to socialism’ was unthinkable in such a blatantly crooked electoral system as Spain’s.”[19] Marx is said to have written to Engels that they would have to leave Spain to Bakunin for the time being.  Due to the popularity of Anarchism in Spain it’s perhaps not surprising that the 1936 revolution was predominantly an Anarchist movement [20] with much of Spain’s economy being put under worker control; in anarchist strongholds like Catalonia, the figure was as high as 75%, but lower in areas with heavy PCE influence.[21]  Any chance of cooperation between the two groups within Spain was further harmed in 1923 when Primo brought the secretary of the UGT, Fransisco Largo Caballero, into his government to set up industrial arbitration boards.[22] This was much against Anarchist principles as it was seen to be entirely “counterrevolutionary” to have any link to the bourgeois government as they were essentially the “enemy”.   It could perhaps be these historic relationships between Anarchism and Communism that caused such antagonism throughout the war as both ideologies had never previously been able to coexist and when present in the same environment tended to clash. Ultimately when the communists sided with the Republican government and attempted to disband the militias in favour of a “Popular Army”,[23] disarm private citizens and create a non-unionised army went against many of the “victories” that the Anarchists had made at the beginning of the revolution. Thus the Anarchists had to make the decision to either put up with these changes in order to form a “Popular Front” against the Fascists or continue their more Libertarian revolution.  When looking at these events from a historically determinist viewpoint it could be argued that the historical antagonism between Communists and Anarchists, both generally and specifically is Spain, caused the Barcelona May Days as at the inception of the “revolution” it was inevitable that it’s final resting place could not be ideologically inclusive of both views. The question therefore lies: if there was no Spanish Civil would these opposition groups have clashed in such a violent manner? At least hypothetically it seems that this would have been unlikely as events like the establishment of a regular army and moves towards more capitalist forms of production transpired to have brought these two groups into a hostility. Without such events it seems that antagonism of the nature seen in the May Days would have been unlikely to occur. We could perhaps therefore look at the Spanish Civil War as a catalyst for the May Days which brought historical opposition to a violent head.  This exacerbation of the situation could perhaps be partially attributed to the split on the Communist side with anti-Stalinists now forming a large group within Spain and  because of their anti-Soviet views be more likely allies of the Anarchists, which naturally would have unnerved the Stalinist aspects within Republican government who were at this time striving for a more Stalinist style governmental system. The Anarcho-Syndicalist Standpoint   Before embarking upon the views of Anarchists we must firstly remember that rather than a small and inconsequential left wing faction, as anarchists are regarded in many European countries, in 1934 and, I dare say, even now anarchists, hold great public support within Spain. In 1934 the CNT’s, “according to a government source”, membership numbered 1.58 million people whereas the UGT’s membership was 1.44 million.[24]   The Anarcho-Syndicalist standpoint is along the line of the May Days being part of a much wider move to make an originally predominantly anarchist revolution more inline with a Stalinist agenda. For this reason the IWA (International Workers Association), essentially the English cousin of the CNT, have written an article about why the May Days were significant as they saw the “Communists made their decisive move”[25] against the CNT and it’s associates as they stormed the CNT controlled telephone exchange which was seen to be symbolic of a much larger aim of “reintroducing capitalist modes of production.”[26] Which is against Anarcho-Syndicalist philosophy that sets out how industry should not be controlled on  a central level but instead by individual trade unions.[27]  The article from the IWA goes on to refer to a “courageous” plea made by the leadership of the CNT which read “Workers of the CNT! Workers of the UGT! Don’t be deceived by these manoeuvres. Above all else, Unity! Put down your arms. Only one slogan: We must work to beat fascism! Down with fascism!”[28] This call was mostly headed, leading to a stop in the fighting and can perhaps explains why Anarchist trade unions were not targeted after the May Days to the same extent that the POUM was. The article however fails to mention that this call to create a “popular-front” and essentially put on hold the “revolution” was not shared by all Anarcho-Syndicalist factions, the more radical Friends of Durruti whom were calling for a all out “revolution” against the “counter-revolutionary” republican government.[29]   To summarise the Anarcho-Syndicalist perspective, groups like the CNT and FAI took the view that the PCE and Republican government were attempting to attack the principles upon which the revolution had been built. However in the most part they took up the opinion that this conflict was one to be had later and at this time it was far more important to stop the Fascists winning the war. However we must also not forgot that there were those within these main Unions as well as in the Friends of Durutti militia who felt that any hope of the prolongation of the revolution depended upon the Republican government being combated at this time. The Trotskyist Standpoint   In the eyes of many Trotskyists a conflict with the republican government was in some ways inevitable and perhaps desirable. This was because the republican government was moving towards a more Soviet Union style system of government[30] which obviously went against the anti-Stalinist views of the “Trotskyists”.  The liquidation of a “revolutionary” atmosphere in Barcelona is no better shown than in George Orwell’s accounts of the Spanish Civil War. When he first arrived in Barcelona on the 26th of December 1936 [31] he described a situation were “there were no private motor cars”, “revolutionary posters were everywhere, flaming from the walls in clean reds and blues” and “except for a small number of women and foreigners there were no ‘well-dressed’ people at all.”[32] This seemingly couldn’t be more in contrast to his description of Barcelona just prior to the May Days with him writing that “The smart restaurants and hotels were full of rich people wolfing expensive meals, while for the working-class population food-prices had jumped enormously.”[33] Understanding this situation, it seems conceivable that the so called “Trotskyists” would want to show there opposition to the Stalinists and the republican government. This would therefore support an argument for the Trotskyists starting the May Days although obviously not in the sense that they were acting under Fascist orders whilst trying to undermine Stalinist elements within the Republican government.   It could therefore be said that although many “Trotskyists” desired a confrontation in order to challenge Stalinist influence within the Republican government, the actual violence of the May Days was in the most part triggered by the Stalinists with the taking of the telephone exchange and the clamping down on Trotskyist militias and leaders both after and before the May Days. Conclusion   It’s obvious that the historical opposition between the Anarchists and Communists and later the Stalinists and Trotskyists played a major part in the creation of a climate in which a conflict could occur. This can be seen by the numerous disagreements in the past that in the case of Anarchism and Communism lead to the Anarchists leaving the First International and secondly the opposition of Trotsky to Stalin in Russia which lead to the Moscow show trials, due to these events it does not seem inconceivable that such groups could clash in such a way in Spain.  What also seems to be clear is that Stalinist influence played a major part in causing antagonism between the Republican government and the POUM as well as Anarcho-Syndicalist groups, through the creation of a “Popular Army” as well as moving towards more capitalist modes of production. It could perhaps be said that it was through the taking of the CNT controlled telephone exchange that the situation was ignited.  In reference to the Trotskyist involvement in causing the May Days, it seems inconceivable that they could have had caused it in the way that many Stalinist insinuate/have insinuated. Although I’m sure that the Trotskyists didn’t cause the May Days in the sense that they were Fascist spies and in league with Hitler. They perhaps contributed to the situation that caused it’s occurrence with many members of the POUM, as I’ve previously mentioned, believing that a confrontation with the Republican government was desirable.   To summarise the “Trotskyist” factions were as far as I can see partially to blame for the conflict as they did nothing to prevent such a clash occurring. Although through my research it seems that the Stalinist government played a far larger part in creating the conflict as they both brought about the events that made cooperation no longer an option for both the Anarchists and Trotskyists as many of their aims had now been marginalised. The aftermath also shows us that the Stalinists capitalised on the conflict in such a way that it seems unlikely that it was simply a consequence of the clashes. Alongside the roles of factions in the immediate build up to the conflict it seems that the role of the long run antagonism within the left in Spain must not be overlooked as it appears to have done more than anything to create a climate in which a confrontation could occur. Footnotes:   [1] Hitchens, Christopher. Hitch 22: A Memoir. London: Atlantic, 2011. 72. Print  [2] Hitchens, Christopher. Hitch 22: A Memoir. London: Atlantic, 2011. 72. Print  [3] Leys, Simon. Orwell & the Anarchists. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/orwell-and-anarchists/. 2011. Web  [4] Durgan, Andy, The Spanish Trotskyists and the Foundation of the POUM in The Spanish Civil War: The View From The Left - Al Richardson. Pontypool: The Merlin Press Ltd, 1992. 47. Print  [5] Held, Walter. Stalinism and the POUM in the Spanish Revolution. Quatrième Internationale, 1937. Print  [6] Rees, Tim. International Communism and the Communist International, 1919-43, Manchester University Press, 1998. 154. Print  [7] Souchy, Augustin. A Tragic Week In May. London: Freedom Press, 1987. 17. Print.  [8] Courtouis, Stéphane. The Black Book of Communism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. 340. Print  [9] Brockway, Fenner. Arrest of P.O.U.M. leaders. International Bureau for Revolutionary Socialist Unity, 1937. Print  [10] Solano, Wilebaldo. The Spanish Revolution The Life of Andreu Nin. ILP: 1974. Print  [11] Ibárruri, Dolores. Memorias de Dolores Ibárruri. Barcelona: Planeta, 1985. 383. Print  [12] Solano, Wilebaldo. The Spanish Revolution The Life of Andreu Nin. ILP: 1974. Print  [13] Bookchin, Murray. To Remember Spain: The Anarchist and Syndicalist Revolution of 1936. San Francisco: AK Press. 1994. Print  [14] Guillaume, James. Michael Bakunin A Biographical Sketch. New York : Knopf. 1971. 23. Print  [15] Raymond, Walter. Dictionary of politics: selected American and foreign political and legal terms. Brunswick Publishing Corp. 1992. 85. Print  [16] Beevor, Anthony. The Spanish Civil War. Penguin Books. 2006. 24. Print  [17] Heywood, Paul. Marxism and the Failure of Organised Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936. Cambridge University Press. 2003. 6. Print  [18] Beevor, Anthony. The Spanish Civil War. Penguin Books. 2006. 26. Print  [19] Beevor, Anthony. The Spanish Civil War. Penguin Books. 2006. 26. Print  [20] Bookchin, Murray. To Remember Spain: The Anarchist and Syndicalist Revolution of 1936. San Francisco: AK Press. 1994. Print  [21] Dolgoff, Sam. The Anarchist Collectives: Workers' Self-Management in the Spanish Revolution.  New York Free Life Editions. 1974. 41. Print  [22] Beevor, Anthony. The Spanish Civil War. Penguin Books. 2006. 31. Print  [23] Colberg, Barbara. The Effect of Communist Party Policies on the Outcome of the Spanish Civil War.The Ohio State University. 2007. 33. Print  [24] Beevor, Anthony. The Spanish Civil War. Penguin Books. 2006. 27. Print  [25] http://www.solfed.org.uk/the-‘may-days’-in-barcelona-1937. The ‘May Days’ in Barcelona 1937. Web  [26] http://www.solfed.org.uk/the-‘may-days’-in-barcelona-1937. The ‘May Days’ in Barcelona 1937. Web  [27] Rocker, Rudolf. Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism. Freedom Press. 21.1988. Print  [28] http://www.solfed.org.uk/the-‘may-days’-in-barcelona-1937. The ‘May Days’ in Barcelona 1937. Web  [29] The friends of Durruti group. Towards a Fresh Revolution. 1938. Print  [30] Colberg, Barbara. The Effect of Communist Party Policies on the Outcome of the Spanish Civil War. The Ohio State University. 2007. 33. Print  [31] Orwell, George. Orwell In Spain. Penguin Classics. 2011. 6. Print  [32] Orwell, Geroge. Homage to Catalonia. Mariner Books. 1980. 3. Print  [33] Orwell, Geroge. Homage to Catalonia. Mariner Books. 1980. 98. Print

In July 1936, in parallel to German troops marching in the Rhineland and the Rome-Berlin Axis being signed, the Spanish Civil war broke out. A consequence of complete opposite ideologies, unhappiness towards democracy and an appeal to extreme solutions, Spain soon fell under the same situation happening in neighboring countries, Germany and Italy, where Fascism was taking over. From 1923 to 1930 General Primo de Rivera ruled the country after years of an incompetent government in power. Following the 1929 Wall Street Crash and Great Depression, Spain and many more countries suffered a severe economic crisis, which led Alfonso XIII to abdicate and the end of a monarchy. As unhappiness and lost hope increased among the population in Spain, the popularity of two main opposing groups grew, the right-wing Nationalists and the left-wing Republicans. Professor Alaric Searle describes the civil war as a war that “had a clear division between the major totalitarian participants and the democratic observers.” This essay will in fact analyze and evaluate the difference in ideologies of the two main forces fighting in the Spanish Civil war and how their role and additional complications affected the victory of the Nationalist right-wing party.

José Calvo Sotelo, a leading member of the monarchist and conservative right-wing party in the parliament, was murdered on July 13th, 1936 by a close connection to the leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), Indalecio Prieto. This event was the spark that started the previously planned military coup by the Nationalists, which later failed and officially marked the start of the Spanish Civil War. The so-called Nationalist group led by General Franco was amused by the totalitarian fascist ideology whose popularity was growing in both Italy and Germany around the same time. Supported by the Army, the Church and many landowners, this political group had the tendency to only focus on the military aspects of a conflict. As they all claimed they were fighting for law and order, they also felt the need to protect the Church from godless political parties like the Communists. The Nationalists was how the numerous right-wing groups decided to call themselves prior of the war. However, even though the name may suggest that they all share the same ideology, they didn’t. In fact, it was a group made up of the Carlists, who demanded a restoration of monarchy; the Falange, a fascist group favoring a dictatorship; the Nationalists, who fought for a strong government and a national attitude; and finally the Military and the CEDA, group of right-wing parties leaders. Clearly, all groups had different aims and ideologies in mind, however they shared one similarity which was the enemy, specifically the Communist party. The role of ideology within the Nationalists was crucial, with only one aim connecting all groups it had to be strong, passionate and clear enough for them to fight together. Foreign interest was as equally divided, in fact countries like Britain decided to follow non-intervention. Nevertheless, countries such as Italy, Germany and Russia joined either side due to their immense interest in who would win the war and therefore affect any political, economic or social connections with Spain. I believe the support to the Nationalists from such charismatic fascist countries such as Italy and Germany, definitely played a role in uniting the differences in ideologies from all right-wing countries. The belief of fighting alongside such passionate totalitarian states that shared some of the same ideals and definitely the same enemy, had an impact on how much the groups believed in one another as they fought against the same enemy. Therefore, observing all ideology differences part of the Nationalists the chances of internal fighting was high, however the fact that they shared the same enemy and threat tightened the bond between them.

Foreign investment also played a major role in maintaining fanatic loyalty within Nationalist members and all ideology differences may have become secondary to them while fighting. As Eric Hobsbawm claims, these times, such as the Spanish Civil War years can be defined as “Ages of extremes”, this can suggest how the Republic ideology was the complete opposite of any right- wing beliefs from the Nationalists. After the abdication of the King Alfonso XIII and the fall of the monarchy, the atmosphere of republicanism was growing. The republican left-wing government was elected at the start of 1936, whose ideology wanted radical change after years of instability and skepticism in the government. Supported by army officers, workers and peasants, their ideology to solve problems was based on the organization of strikes, riots and assassinations. Some of their first radical changes, included Catalonia being allowed to be a self-government, attacks on the Church and its power and the nationalization of large states, which were against all different right-wing party’s ideologies. Also known as the Popular Front, the Republican opposition was made up of 3 main left-wing ideology-based groups  whose differences severely weakened their position later in the war. This group was made up of the Anarchists, who believed in no borders, and complete freedom; the Syndicalists, who was a powerful group of trade unions and wanted to overthrow the capitalist system; and finally, the Socialists, who in fact were despised by the two previously stated left-wing groups, because of their ideology appeal to the middle-class groups instead of the workers. Led by Largo Caballero, the Socialists party in charge, decided to not support the government anymore, which gained the support of the communists as well, hoping the government would fail and they could seize power. The clear and tragic differences in ideologies between these 4 left-wing groups, had little to no equal ideologies, similarly to the Nationalist groups. However, unlike the Nationalists, the Republican’s foreign interest and intervention played a weak role in keeping the different ideologies together to fight against the same enemy. Even if the USSR, a communist state, offered intervention to the Republicans, their support was weak, underequipped and old-fashioned. The USSR decided to provide the left-wing army in Spain with old ammunition, aircraft and military resources reserves, which were no longer needed or wanted in the USSR. Stalin also firmly believed that all Anarchists and Socialists should be weakened since they did not support communist ideology completely. As a result, he considered them as enemies as well and murdered many of them. This weak, violent and unstable connection between groups part of the Popular Front, started to affect the final outcome fighting against the Nationalists, leading to Republican defeat in March 1939.

Looking beyond the ideology conflicts which caused the civil war, factors like the Great Depression added pressure and unhappiness among the Spanish population. Just like in numerous other countries, like Britain, Italy and Japan, the Great Depression after 1929 severely caused problems within these nations. Prior to the war, as Spain was still a monarchy, the country was considered quite backwards, with very few industries based on the production of steel and iron, and it mostly relied on the agriculture market. As a result of the Wall Street Crash in 1929 and the Great Depression, in Spain, agricultural prices were drastically falling due to the drop in important trades with outside countries in economic instability. Both wine and olive exports declined, as a result peasants and workers unemployment increased. This can explain the support and appeal to the left-wing ideology at the beginning of the 1930s, who prioritized workers, their positions and wages. Although, all solutions  presented by the left-wing parties, soon resulted in little to no change to the worker’s conditions and problems, therefore causing the support loss of many workers contributing to the start of the civil war. Consequently, the small industrialized market in Spain of iron fell by a third, while steel production fell by a half. Looking a few years forward, foreign intervention was very much needed in order to fight a war, since such metal production had drastically fallen, unable to provide ammunition and resources to both Nationalists and Republicans. Just as we can observe a similar situation happening in Weimar Germany, the population was clearly unhappy, exhausted and had lost belief in the government, here the extreme and drastic solutions that both the right-wing and left-wing parties proposed, turned out to be very appealing to the population. In Spain, the lost trust in the government resulted in political and social infighting from different groups in the population, leading a tragic division of ideologies. In conclusion, after carefully analyzing and evaluating how the ideology differences from the right-wing Nationalist party and the left-wing Republican party contributed to the start of the civil war, it is clear to see that there was a great threat posed by opposing ideologies. Such extreme ideologies as these, clearly caused conflicts and severe disagreements within the population and the groups themselves, which could only be heard by the organization of violent attacks or assassinations. While ideology differences inside the numerous groups forming the Nationalists could be kept together with the help of foreign fascist intervention and the aim of defeating the same enemy, the Republican army fell apart due to the same reasons. Both opposing parties appealed to very different approaches of totalitarian states, where the military aspect had a tendency to only be focused on. In addition to these great differences in ideologies, the Great Depression certainly played a major role in the building up to such extreme divisions in the country. Results of the depression such as unhappiness, economic and political problems led the population to follow and believe in extreme ideals, dividing the population further.

 In 1936 a civil conflict broke out in Spain between the country's republican government and a nationalist movement led by Francisco Franco, after over 100 years of social, economic and political disputes. Both Republicans and Nationalists could be considered amalgamations of different political groups, each with differing ideologies. Furthermore, there was great ideological polarization in Europe at the time, which marked the reactions of the other countries when it came to the conflict. Due to this “Evaluating the role of ideological differences in the Spanish Civil War” can be considered quite a broad and vague prompt as said ideological differences found their way into all aspects of the conflict. In order to analyze their role more effectively this essay will describe their influence in starting, fuelling and deciding the victor of the conflict. This essay will argue that while ideological differences played a major role in starting and, on a more minor scale, fueling the war, it was the overwhelming power difference granted to the two combatting sides by the military support of foreign countries, or lack thereof, that ultimately sustained the war and decided its outcome. While Ideological differences were clearly a crucial factor in starting the war, it is not a stretch to argue that they might have had little importance in commencing the conflict. The motivation that most likely sparked the war on July 17th 1936 was the pent up frustration and displeasure on the part of all the exponents of conservatism in Spain, built up by a series of radically liberal reforms made by the government. One of these major exponents being the CEDA party (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas), the most influential catholic force in Spanish politics, who were naturally perturbed by the government’s “separation of the church and the state” which denied, under article 26 of the constitution, funding for the catholic church; repurposing some of their properties, and banning clerics from teaching in schools. Likewise, integral conservative and nationalist parties such as Acción Española, as well as the aristocracy, strongly  disapproved the nationalization of large estates, such as land, banks and railways, in addition to the agrarian reforms and the strides that were being made to give more freedom to Catalonia and the Basque Country. Additionally, the Spanish Military Union (Unión Militar Española), of which Franco was a part of, felt betrayed by the government’s amnesty of left wing political prisoners and the discharging or transfer of various military leaders. Furthermore the fascist Falange group was intent on establishing a fascist government in Spain under the example of Italy and Germany. Lastly, groups like the Alfonsists and Carlists, who advocated for the reinstitution of the Spanish monarchy, were ideologically opposed to the idea of a democratic government in the first place. The rise to power of the Popular Front in the elections of 1936 and their immediate radical liberal reforms, thus forced a strong communion of interests among all the differing right wing ideologies. And together with the structural weakness, due to the clash of ideologies, of the Popular Front, which included a heterogeneous mixture of parties such as the socialists, syndicalists and communists (with the addition of the anarchists), that made a possible war more appealing to the right, a conflict was made inevitable. However the straw that broke the camel's back was the murder of right wing polititian Calvo Sotelo by the Republican guard which led the right wing to believe that force was the only option. On the other hand, it can also be argued that, as AJP Taylor said referring to Hitler rather than the war, the Great Depression put wind in the Spanish civil war’s sails, as the 1929 stock market crash was what caused the great ideological divide present in Spain in the first place. Due to the depression unemployment skyrocketed and the Republic lost support of the working class. Due to this the government was forced to give into the people’s demands more to regain their support, this led to a much more “socialist” way of governing, as well as all the aforementioned reforms. Furthermore, it can also be argued that what truly moved the right wing to action  were the economic interest of different social classes. The military officers were simply moved by their forced premature retirements that caused them trouble economically and in terms of social status. The conservative representatives, who were largely landowners, and the members of the church were hit economically by the nationalization of their estates as well as a general loss of power, which, for the landowners, also came largely due to the agrarian reforms. While the Industrialists were hit hard by the nationalization of railways and the government enforced increase in worker rights and salaries. And while this economic argument does explain the actions that led to the start of the war in a similar way to the previous one, it still represents the polarization of opposite ideologies involving the conceptions of social order, the roles of Church and State, the battle between obscurantism and modernization. As the war progressed, the ideological conflict attracted the interest of major international powers with similar ideologies (Italy and Germany on the side of the Nationalists and the USSR on the side of the republicans). To some extent Hitler and Mussolini chose to get involved in the conflict in order to stop the spread of communism and spread their own Fascist ideology. Much like his fascist counterparts, Stalin was concerned with the recent rise of fascism in europe and offered his help to the republicans in order to marginalize its advance and increase the influence of communism. Stalin however was not alone as the anti fascist sentiment had spread throughout the world, which led to the formation of the International Brigades counting over 40000 men from 53 different nations. These soldiers truly believed in their ideology and risked their lives for it; they believed they were fighting a crucial battle against evil as shown in the Irish song “​Viva la Quinta Brigada​'' in which lyrics like “truth and love against the forces of evil” truly carry the sense of determination and passion these men felt during the conflict. This shows how ideological differences played a key role in turning a civil  war into a global conflict that would affect the lives of people the world over as well as in extending the conflict and fueling the bloodshed. However Hitler and Mussolini’s motivations ran much deeper and were much more strategically based than simply supporting a war of ideologies. The two dictators hoped that a nationalist Spain would be a valuable ally against France and Britain, an alliance that would give them control over much of mainland Europe and an especially strong advantage against France. In addition, well agreed upon sentiments regarding Hitler and Mussolini’s motivations are that of historian and author Eileen Heyes who argues that for Hitler the Spanish civil war was merely “a chance to test the weapons and planes Germany was building” and that of the Naval War College (U.S.) which states that Mussolini “coveted access to bases from which he could easily ravage vital French strategic routes in the western Mediterranean”, access that he would later obtain. This, together with the fact that Franco wasn’t actually a pure Fascist, thus reducing the importance of ideological influence, shows how these countries' motivations for fueling the war were much more tactical than ideological. To further reinforce the idea that pure ideological motivation wasn’t enough of a reason to further fuel the conflict, on the other side Stalin only offered minimal support and mainly focussed his efforts on encouraging the Comintern to act, while France, Britain and the US refused to act out of domestic issues, military incapability and lack of strategic interest respectively. Ideological Differences also played a minor role in deciding the victor of the Spanish civil war. While the nationalists were unified in their aim, had a common enemy and a charismatic leader in Francisco Franco, the republicans were divided by Ideological differences, often clashing with each other. The anarchists and communists fought each other in Barcelona, the communists themselves being divided into Stalinists and Trotskyites. There was even a change in leadership as Caballero was replaced by Juan Negrín. Showing how ideological differences  ended up playing a limited, secondary role in deciding the victor of the civil war. Ultimately, it is evident that the prime reason for the Republican loss in the spanish civil war was the overwhelming discrepancy in military resources between the two armies. As discussed before the Republican army was offered only a fraction of the military support the Nationalists received. Italy offered around 80000 men, 157 tanks and 458 aircrafts and much more while Germany supported the Nationalist army by air dropping them to the continent from Morocco with the use of the Condor Legion, a special aircraft unit, as well as also offering equipment and men. Crucially, the international community signed a non-intervention agreement. The US had their own non intervention policy and therefore refused involvement in foreign countries’ affairs. The United Kingdom was struggling with the consequences of the Great Depression, public opinion was extremely anti war and the army was in no shape to fight a large scale conflict. France on the other hand was already worried by a possible conflict with Germany and thus opted not to participate in the war. Even the aid the Republicans received was limited and subpar. It only included the 40000 international brigade volunteers as well as obsolete weapons and aircrafts from the Soviet Union all heavily priced and whose payment was to be immediate and in gold. Further adding insult to injury, Nationalist war leaders were highly skilled, experienced soldiers as a large part of the experienced army officers aligned themselves with the right wing cause. This exemplifies the relative non importance of ideological differences in deciding the victor of the Spanish civil war as even without internal turmoil, the Republicans were left at an insurmountable military disadvantage. In conclusion, while ideological differences played a crucial role in starting the civil war; as a whole, they did not contribute in a significant manner to the events that followed, and thus played an overall supporting role to that of foreign intervention that was key in fuelling and deciding the outcome of the conflict.

Foreign intervention played a key role in the outcome of the Spanish civil war, leading to a Nationalist victory and Republican loss. Germany and Italy, the fascist powers of Europe, supported the nationalists under Franco, supplying them with weapons, strategy, supplies and to a smaller extent soldiers. The Republicans on the other hand received support from the soviet union, receiving limited and outdated weaponry such as the Heinkel airplanes as well as little manpower other than the International brigades, which contained 36,000 untrained men. Additionally, the republicans did not receive aid from the only other Democratic powers in Europe, Britain and France, as they had a non-intervention policy. This essay will argue that Foreign intervention on one side and limited intervention on the other were the main cause for the victory of Franco’s nationalists. Firstly, a look into the support received by the Republicans is required. The republicans received resources from the Soviet Union in exchange for their gold reserves. This meant that the Republicans no longer had money to buy resources from anyone and were solely reliant on the Soviet Union for support. This can be seen by them not buying weaponry and resources from any foreign power. The Soviets, supplied with the Spanish gold reserves, provided the Republicans with a few hundred tanks and airplanes yet no actual soldiers to support them other than the International Brigades which were organized by the Comintern. This meant that the Soviets were unwilling to provide real assistance to the Spaniards as they did not consider this war important enough for Russian lives to be lost. This is further detailed by George Orwell, as he determines that there were very few Russians within the international brigade and that there were no trained Russian units fighting in the war. The planes and pilots the soviets provided the Republicans ultimately proved ineffective and unimportant in the outcome of the war. The Heinkel airplanes proved no match for the German Messerschmitt’s provided by the Condor legion which ultimately led to a loss of air superiority in 1937. Additionally, the Russian tanks proved ineffective as they broke down and as there were no mechanics nor resources to fix them, the Nationalists gained superiority in the flatlands. The lack of strategy within the Republican army allowed the Nationalists to take the entirety of western Spain within a year. This could have been avoided had the Soviets sent over trained brigades as well as commanders, as they would have been able to put up a strategic defense of the western part of Spain as well the major cities. Ultimately tanks and airplanes were instrumental in the taking of the two major Republican cities of Madrid and Barcelona as detailed by George Orwell when describing the loss of morale within the International Brigades and subsequently the Spanish Republican volunteers. In conclusion, due to the lack of foreign intervention in support of the Republicans they could not keep up with the Nationalists and the support they received from the Italians and Germans However, the Republicans would have been unable to win the war were it not for German and Italian intervention. Firstly, the Army of Africa would have been unable to cross over to mainland Spain as they would not have had any means of transportation. The Germans supplied the army with an airlift while the Italians supplied the ships moving the supplies with air cover. Without this air cover and airlift, the Nationalists would have been unable to cross the Mediterranean. The Army of Africa would have had to go by sea as they had no airplanes in Morocco and the airplanes under Nationalist control in the Mainland would have been unable to carry the soldiers. This can be seen as there were only 10 planes under Nationalist control. The sea was controlled by the Republicans, as they still remained in control of the navy. Therefore, any attempts to cross the Mediterranean by boat would have been stopped and would most likely have made the war far easier for the Republicans. The Army of Africa was instrumental to Nationalist victory. In 1936, the Army of Africa took control of almost the entirety of western Spain, stretching all the way from Cadiz, to Corunna. The reason for this was that the soldiers were trained and under the command of a well-respected General. The soldiers also had far superior supplies to those of the regular Spanish army, as they had machine guns and weapons which were needed in their conquest of Morocco. These soldiers had also experience battles before, as they were stationed in rebellious Morocco, therefore their morale was far higher and rarely decreased. The assistance of Foreign powers was also instrumental in decreasing the morale of the soldiers of the Republican army. The Italians decreased the morale through the destruction of the ships carrying resources for the Republicans using submarines. This can be seen by the lower conscription numbers in 1936-37, the increase in 1938 occurring due to heightened morale after the Italians agreed to stop bombing the ports. Additionally, the gruesome bombing of Guernica by the Condor legion, as portrayed by Pablo Picasso, led to the Germans instilling fear in the Republican cities, as they were now aware as to what will happen if they resist the Nationalists. This can be seen by the swift fall of Bilbao. This meant that the Nationalists were able to move through Spain at a far greater speed as they could take major cities very quickly. Additionally, air superiority as well as tanks played a major role in the taking of the major cities of Barcelona and Madrid. The German Messerschmitt’s outmatched the Soviet Heinkel’s in the war due to their superior technology as they were built far later. The superiority of German planes can also be seen in operation Barbosa were the Germans achieved air superiority over Stalingrad before moving their planes to the west. Addiotionally, tanks played a key role in taking the major cities, as the conscripted soldiers had no tools to fight them, as detailed by George Orwell’s description of the fall of Barcelona. Finally, German and Italian assistance was vital in the Nationalists winning the Spanish civil war. In conclusion, although both sides received foreign aid, the German and Italian proved much more effective than the Russian aid and was the only reason the Nationalists won the war. Had the airlift of the Army of Africa not occurred, the Republicans would have remained in control of the government just as they remained in control after the riots in 1936, they did not require soviet assistance for that and would not have required it to stop the soldiers of the mainland Army that decided to join the Nationalists. 

  From the May 2018 IBDP History Paper 2 Exam

 Examine the long- and short-term causes of one 20th-century war. 

As stated by Antoine de Saint-Exupery, “A civil war is not a war but a sickness...The enemy is within. One fights against oneself”. The Spanish Civil War, which took place from 1936-39, began following the failure of a military coup in its aim to take control of the entire country, and was the outcome of political polarisation in Spain that had already been brewing for several decades before the outbreak of the war. It was seen as the equivalent of Fascist takeovers by Mussolini and Hitler. The war led to the intervention of other countries on both sides, with the Nationalists, or rebels, receiving aid from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, whilst the Republicans were helped by the Soviet Union and the International Brigades, which was made up of European and American volunteers. Regarding the origins of the Spanish Civil War, there were long- and short-term causes that were to blame for this ruthless conflict. This essay will discuss that whilst political issues were the main causes, long- and short-term, there were also other factors, especially when taking the long-term causes into consideration. Officially, the Spanish Civil War began on July 17th, 1936, only four days after the murder of Jose Calvo Sotelo, a Spanish politician and jurist. The assassination followed the victory of the Popular Front government in the general election on Febrary 16th 1936, in which Azaña was restored to power with a liberal but not radical manifesto. This event was seen as both a pursuit to keep democracy and peace and also an operation of extremist communism, highlighting the extent to which Spain was polarised at the time. Furthermore, this threw the Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas), or CEDA into a pit of disruption, which was unusual, as usually the CEDA itself was the one at the root of chaos subsequent to its formation in February 1933, shortly after Azaña lost much of the support he once had. For example, it was what sparked the Asturias rising in October 1934, when Catalonia attempted to declare independence, however the act of freedom was suspended after the uprising of the Asturian miners against the right-wing government. Going back a decade, Spain was already suffering, as the country had no resistance to the coup of General Primo de Rivera, who established an authoritarian right-wing regime to solve Spain’s problems. Due to this, he was able to rule ruthlessly for seven years (1923-30) and undermine the legitimacy of the monarchy before his resignation in 1930. Additionally, Spain had twelve unsuccessful governments between the years 1918-1923, further presenting the political instability and struggles between periods of conservatism and liberalism. Moreover, extremists in Spain believed that the country’s problems stemmed from long-term issues that could only be fixed by war, in particular after the establishment of the Second Republic in April 1931. This was also the Republican movement that overthrew Alfonso XIII. These long-term issues were not also political, but also industrial, economic, and army-related. Many of the short-term causes of the Spanish Civil derive from there being ‘Two Spains’ at the time, however this polarisation began long before the war ever broke out. There was the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and VGT controlling urban areas, but the Communist Party, Socialists, and Liberals were also present in Spain, all of which were divided over reforms, which could’ve been the lead up to Spain failing to keep a stable government closer to the start of the war. There were an abundance of different political issues, including corrupt or rigged elections, the church using its wealth to gain political and social influence, and power being held mostly by the wealthy oligarchs of society. In addition, there were struggles between the centralist state and Catalona and the Basque Provinces after Primo de Rivera took  back Catalonia’s self-governing rights. The effects of WWI, the Russian Revolution, and the final loss of the Spanish empire in 1898 also had a further effect on Spain that could have been somewhat at fault for the Spanish Civil War, destroying much of Spain’s political strength. Aside from political injustices and problems, Spain was also faced with industrial issues long before the war. There was a huge need for modernisation and reform, as industrial workers struggled with low wages, long working hours, poor working conditions and housing, and more. Agriculture was Spain’s main source of economy and employment, but it did not provide enough food, as work was seasonal. Furthermore, the agricultural system was feudalistic, with anarchists advocating for the redistribution of land. The expansion of any agricultural land was also limited by poverty. For all of the reasons mentioned above, it is understandable why the country was so divided, not only over politics but also industry (in this case, mainly agriculture), and also the economy. Moreover, there were several different origins of economic issues that contributed to the long-term causes of the Spanish Civil War. The post WWI depression was one of them, as well as the end of the Moroccan war in 1924, which put Spain in severe debt. The Church was also an issue, as it controlled education and certain important elements of the economy, however only really supported the upper classes, therefore was resented by the poor peasants. They saw the Church as a part of the wealthy classes that oppressed them, forbidding them to ever attempt to move up in the economic and social hierarchy. Spain was completely segregated, with land being owned by the ‘Grandees’ (Spanish nobility) in the south, and peasants owning insufficient land in the north who were supported by the anarchists. In the north, there were also riots which were repressed by the Civil Guard, but still even decades before the war there was violence and division within the country. The Spanish army was seen as a protector of the nation that intervened in politics if a crisis ever were to occur. However, it was unpopular due to its brutal reputation and heavy taxes, and also ineffective, as shown by the loss of the Spanish empire and struggle to keep control of Morocco between 1906-26. Knowing this, it can be understood why the civil war escalated in Spain, as it is unlikely that it would be able to keep control of its own population if it could not control Morocco’s, which has always been much smaller. In addition, the army was too big, with too many officers, and there was a desperate need for reform as with too many officers, it is difficult to keep order within the army. Similarly to the Church’s preference to the upper class, upper and middle class dominated officer corps and were generally conservative, so the lower class and those who were not conservative were completely excluded. To conclude, although it was technically the assassination of Jose Calvo Sotelo and other significant events shortly before that that caused the Spanish Civil War, one cannot forget the political, industrial, and economic issues that Spain had been struggling with long before such events, which may have not even happened if such problems had been resolved earlier. If such had been successful, Spain would most likely no longer have been polarised, meaning that no civil war would’ve ever broken out. For these reasons, whilst the short-term causes of the Spanish Civil War are obviously significant to the reasons as to why the war started, these would not have arisen without the long-term problems Spain had already been faced with.  Works Cited Untitled, https://nisis.weebly.com/uploads/1/0/2/9/10295486/causes_of_scw.pdf. Accessed 11 December 2022. Byrne, Justin. “Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Socialist_Workers%27_Party. Accessed 11 December 2022. “History- Spain Flashcards.” Quizlet, https://quizlet.com/54704251/history-spain-flash-cards/. Accessed 11 December 2022. “The Long Term and Short Term Causes of the Spanish Civil War.” Prezi, https://prezi.com/8cqpyl_llaf4/the-long-term-and-short-term-causes-of-the-spanish-civil-war/. Accessed 11 December 2022. “Spanish Civil War | Holocaust Encyclopedia.” Holocaust Encyclopedia, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/spanish-civil-war. Accessed 11 December 2022. Woodcock, George. “Spanish Civil War | Definition, Causes, Summary, & Facts.” Encyclopedia Britannica, published 8 November 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Spanish-Civil-War. Accessed 11 December 2022.      

 Paper 2: Examine the long- and short-term causes of one 20th-century war. As a Spaniard, the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 is deeply ingrained into my history, as it played an instrumental role in forming the Spain that I know today. Due to the extent of foreign involvement and the supposed direct confrontation between communism and fascism, the Spanish Civil War, which saw a conservative, monarchist, Catholic Nationalist faction overthrow a Republic ruled by communists, socialists, and anarcho-syndicalists, is often touted as the "dress rehearsal for World War II", and, while this may or may not be true, its profound effect on Spain and the world is undeniable. However, in order to properly understand this complex and influential conflict, it is crucial to examine the causes of the Spanish Civil War, both in the long-term and the short-term. In this essay, I will argue that the long-term processes of the Spanish Empire's decline and the class struggle within Spain, combined with short-term causes including the Great Depression, the left-wing government's reforms, and the assassination of José Calvo Sotelo, led to the outbreak of civil war in Spain, and that fascism was not a key factor. In the long-term, the Spanish Civil War was caused by the gradual decline of the Spanish Empire and the subsequent surplus of military officers concentrated in the Army of Africa. Having been the first empire known as "the empire on which the sun never sets" and having brought Catholicism to the New World, the Spanish Empire's decline, initiated by the Spanish American wars of independence in the early 19th century, was particularly humiliating for Spain, a once proud and powerful nation that saw itself reduced to a rump state. The final blow was delivered by the Spanish–American War of 1898, which resulted in Spain's loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. This was a key turning point, as, after the Spanish–American War, the considerable number of military officers that had been necessary to control a colonial empire but were now superfluous returned to Spain, eventually becoming primarily concentrated in Spanish Morocco as part of the Army of Africa. Given that these military officers were, for the most part, conservative, monarchist, and devoutly Catholic, this concentration of military personnel in Spanish Morocco later served as a powerful basis for a Nationalist uprising against the Popular Front government, which many in the military saw as betraying everything Spain stood for, especially in terms of religion. On the other hand, with regards to the Republicans, it can be argued that the Second Spanish Republic's creation and controversial reforms, which were a short-term catalyst of the Spanish Civil War, were caused by the long-term process of the class struggle within Spain. For centuries, Spain had, much like most of its European contemporaries, been a deeply hierarchical society, with the lavish life of the aristocracy starkly contrasting the horrendous standards of living that the peasants were subjected to. In fact, Antony Beevor introduces his well-known book The Spanish Civil War by using an image of Alfonso XIII, King of Spain until 1931, being pushed forwards in his broken automobile by peasants, to illustrate the extent of the divide between social classes in Spain and the effect this had on the sentiment of the populace. This is a valid representation of Spanish society at the time, seeing as the income share of the top 0.01 percent of the population was around 1.5 percent in the early 1930s, compared to around 0.8 percent in 2005. By the 1930s, Spain's working class population had endured centuries of hardship while watching the monarchs indulge in luxuries – it is not surprising that they embraced the opportunity for change and  helped bring about the Second Spanish Republic. By doing so, they plunged Spain into the period of instability that would culminate in the Spanish Civil War. While the Spanish Empire's decline and the class struggle within Spain made civil war possible, it is vital to consider the short-term causes that triggered the Spanish Civil War. One of these was the Great Depression, which led the Spanish economy to drop 20 percent below its usual trend in gross domestic product (GDP) throughout the 1930s. When economic downturn first occurred in 1929 and the value of the Spanish peseta fell, the Spanish military's grievances with dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera grew, causing King Alfonso XIII to withdraw his support for Primo de Rivera, who resigned on January 28, 1930. This proved to be detrimental, as Primo de Rivera's successor, Dámaso Berenguer, was unable to consolidate power and, on April 14, 1931, the Second Spanish Republic was proclaimed and Alfonso XIII left Spain as a result of the 1931 Spanish local elections, which were perceived as a plebiscite on the monarchy of Alfonso XIII. The Great Depression had ended a period of relative stability under Primo de Rivera and ushered in the Second Spanish Republic, which further divided Spain politically and whose radical reforms where another short-term cause of the Spanish Civil War. The reforms enacted by the left-wing government of Manuel Azaña, who became prime minister of Spain on October 14, 1931, included granting more autonomy to Catalonia and the Basque Country, separating the Church from the state, ending religious education in schools, compulsorily retiring many military officers, nationalizing large estates which were mostly owned by the Church, and attempting to increase the proletariat's wages. While these changes were welcomed by most city-dwelling young people and women, the Spanish land and business owners, as well as the military and the Church, were furious. The military was especially fearful, as it saw the government's crackdown on military officers as an existential threat. Although a right-wing government was able to take power in the 1933 elections, the Popular Front, a coalition of communists, socialists, and anarcho-syndicalists, among others, took power in 1936, at which point political division in Spain became even more evident. As stated by José María Gil Robles, leader of CEDA, a right-wing party, in a parliamentary session on June 17, 1936, the Republicans had, since February 1, 1936, destroyed 160 churches, murdered 296 people, and assaulted 83 newspapers. Acts like these are a perfect example as to why several high-ranking military officers led by General Emilio Mola had been plotting to overthrow the Republican government since April 1936. Those in the military who were still hesitant or thought a coup lacked justification were finally convinced on July 13, 1936, when José Calvo Sotelo, a prominent conservative, monarchist member of the Congress of Deputies (the lower house of Spanish parliament), was murdered by socialist militiamen. This assassination represented the final catalyst for a civil conflict in Spain that had been brewing for months, if not years, and it also confirmed the Nationalists' view that they were fighting a godless, terroristic regime. As is expressed in the Spanish saying; "nos acostamos en una monarquía y despertamos en una república" ("we went to bed in a monarchy and woke up in a republic"), Spain was not prepared for nor fully open to the far-reaching changes implemented by the left-wing government in such a short period of time – they were too sudden and too radical to ever be successful, instead becoming a trigger for internal conflict. It is important to note that it is still widely believed that the primary cause of the Spanish Civil War was fascism, following in the path of Germany and Italy. For example, Paul Preston, author  of some of the most critically acclaimed books on the Spanish Civil War, points to the rise of Spanish fascist movements such as the Falange as a key factor in the country's descent into conflict. However, this is easily disproven by the fact that the Falange only received 0.07 percent of the vote in the 1936 Spanish general election, demonstrating that the vast majority of the Nationalist faction did not align itself with fascism. It is also difficult to broadly categorize the Nationalists in Spain as fascists, seeing as they did not really have a "us and them" doctrine, were mainly a reactionary movement wishing to preserve the status quo, and were made up of many different groups with varying ideologies. While Preston may be right in saying that the Falange contributed to the Spanish Civil War, labeling the Falange a "key factor" is an exaggeration, which must be taken into account when examining the causes of the Spanish Civil War. In summation, it is clear that the long-term processes of the Spanish Empire's decline and the class struggle within Spain laid the foundations for the Spanish Civil War, which was triggered in the short-term by the Great Depression, the left-wing government's reforms, and the assassination of José Calvo Sotelo. The individual events contained in each of these causes may have, when viewed on their own, seemed unlikely to unleash a conflict that ended up killing around half a million people, which indicates the importance of fully considering all implications of historical events. Thus, after examining the long- and short-term causes, one can conclude that the Spanish Civil War, much like many other conflicts, began long before the first bullet was fired.

Example III: Despite the complexities of the Spanish Civil War, its causes can be understood by simply examining Pablo Picasso’s famous painting: “Guernica”. In the painting, the deformed bull symbolizes Spain and its internal destruction as a result of growing ideological differences, whereas the physical devastation of the town highlights the impact of external factors in the war. Therefore, this essay will examine the role of ideological factors within Spain and socio-economic factors originating from foreign events and how they led to civil war. When looking at “Guernica”, it is clear that the distorted bull represents the way Spain was being torn apart by its internal ideological differences. In the short-term, this was caused by increasingly extremist ideas in both left- and right-wing parties, which led to growing civil unrest with the election of every government between the years of 1931 and 1936. This can be seen with the election of the Second Republic of 1931, which banned all support of the monarchy and began the nationalization of large estates, leading to an increasing number of strikes, protests and violence in the streets. Two years later, the right-wing coalition CEDA canceled most of these reforms, but labor strikes did not cease.1 This continuing civil unrest is evidence of Spaniards’ seemingly uncompromising stance regarding their ideological differences, and the unrelenting violence that resulted. This is clearly reflected in the words of French poet Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, “A Civil War is not a war but a sickness. The enemy is within. One fights almost against oneself”.2 This internal conflict can largely be attributed to the spread of extreme left-wing ideologies, which resulted in growing political polarization that would eventually make war inevitable by 1936. One long-term cause of this was the Spanish-American War of 1898, which rid Spain of imperial ideals and shifted political focus towards the country itself.3 This resulted in an increasing need for modernization in politics, eventually leading to the rejection of the monarchy.4 This downfall of monarchist ideals can largely be credited for the political conflicts leading up to the war, as it resulted in the election of the Left Republic in 1931 and the introduction of its extremist reforms. However, the violence that emerged as a result of political conflict cannot entirely be blamed on internal ideological differences in Spain. Here, the Russian Revolution played a crucial role as a long-term cause of the war as it provided an example of a successful revolution for Spain, thus inspiring a long period of violence as a method for political change. The revolution also sparked the ‘trieno bolchevista’ or ‘three Bolshevik years’ in Spain, which saw extreme militancy in the Spanish labor movement.5 Therefore, the increasing demands of trade unions and growing frequency of labor strikes in the period of political polarization of 1931-1936 were not entirely due to ideological differences. Although the destruction of Guernica in Picasso’s painting was the result of foreign involvement during the Civil War, the effects of foreign events could be seen long before the start of the war with the build-up of socio-economic issues in Spain. Increasing poverty in the 1920s can be interpreted as the root of the social division that drove political conflicts throughout the 1930s as it caused a surge in migrations from rural areas to cities, thus accelerating social polarization between ‘la España profunda’ or ‘deep Spain’ and urban areas.6 The cause of this was the First World War and its aftermath, as Spain went from being a source of imports for the fighting countries to a nation facing severe inflation as a result of the recovery of European industry after the war.7 During WWI, the Spanish economy witnessed remarkable economic growth, however, this simply added to the growing division between northern and southern Spain due to their differing industries. This is because northern regions enjoyed substantial industrial expansion, whereas southern and central regions, as well as most of the Levante, underwent an agricultural crisis.8 Directly linked to this is the facilitated appeal of left-wing ideologies in struggling agricultural areas, thus driving the division between North, eventually Nationalist, and Central and Southern, eventually Republican, Spain.9 In the short term, this social polarization was exacerbated by the Great Depression,10 which caused an agricultural crisis due to soaring unemployment rates,11 thus driving landless laborers towards urban areas and increasing the prominence of social division. In conclusion, the Spanish Civil War was the result of growing ideological differences within Spanish politics and the population, as well as the socio-economic effects of external events - as depicted in Pablo Picasso’s “Guernica”. In Picasso’s interpretation of the bombing of the rural town, as in the four decades prior to the Spanish Civil War, the source of destruction was not simply internal conflict but also international circumstances. Works Cited Beevor, Antony. The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. Phoenix, 2007. Casanova, Julián. A Short History of the Spanish Civil War. Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. “Cause of the Spanish Civil War and its consequences.” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/summary/Spanish-Civil-War. Accessed 10 December 2022. de Ojeda, Jaime. “The Spanish-American War of 1898: a Spanish View - The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War (Hispanic Division.” Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/ojeda.html. Accessed 10 December 2022.  Evans, Richard J. “The Spanish Civil War 1936-39.” Richard J Evans, https://www.richardjevans.com/lectures/spanish-civil-war-1936-39/. Accessed 10 December 2022. Ponce, Javier. “Spain | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1).” 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, 20 March 2015, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/spain. Accessed 10 December 2022. Preston, Paul. “Spain’s October Revolution and the Rightist Grasp for Power.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 10, no. 4, 1975, pp. 555-578. JSTOR. Sánchez, Andrés, et al. “Wartime and Post-war Economies (Spain) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1).” Encyclopedia 1914-1918, 30 May 2017, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/wartime_and_post-war_economies_sp ain. Accessed 9 December 2022. “Spanish Civil War maps.” NZHistory, https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/spanish-civil-war-map. Accessed 10 December 2022. Zoffmann Rodriguez, Arturo. “Lenin in Barcelona: the Russian Revolution and the Spanish trienio bolchevista, 1917–1920.” Slavic Review, vol. 76, no. 3, 2017, pp. 629-636. Cambridge University Press.  

 Examine the long- and short-term causes of one 20th-century war. The Spanish Civil War, spanning from 1936-1939, culminated the polarization of the life and politics in Spain, which arose thanks to a failing government and an economic crisis following the Great Depression. Such brought about much unrest among the Spanish people, leading to impulsive reelections and revolts, eventually bringing about the election of the left wing ‘Frente Popular’ (Popular Front) in February 1936. This was met with discontent by the Nationalist right, where the murder of their political leader, Calvo Sotelo, in July 1936 was the last straw regarding revolution, and soon after war. The following essay will argue that financial (long term) and political (short term) unrest were the predominant causes of the Spanish Civil War, and will further discuss the separation within Spain which amounted to such a War. The long term effects of the depression coupled with the ineffective economic policies in place throughout the early 1930s paved the path to Civil War. The first sign of financial struggle came at the end of Rivera’s reign (1923-1930). Rivera, who came to power as a military dictator in 1923, reformed Spain and rectified its financial struggles, by industrializing a backwards country. Rivera was able to implement many reforms, such as increasing foreign trade by 300%1, but his economical victories came to an end as the depression hit Spain hard in the early months of 1930. The peseta fell drastically against other currencies, and their bad harvest the previous year did not aid the cause whatsoever 2. Exports of iron and oil, which once were higher than ever, now exponentially declined, and working class unemployment was at an all-time high. Rivera found himself stuck in an economic slump, in which he found no escape. Once he lost the backing from the military, public unrest and pressure caused him to resign and hand the regime back to the Monarchy 3. This proved to be pointless, as King Alfonso was unable to do any better than, and was forced to abdicate only one year later. Spain had since become a republic, but governance came and went, as none was able to bounce back from the economic hardship in which the depression had placed them. The working class stared to condemn the republic, and found it no better than the monarchy or dictatorship, as their wages were incredibly low. The left wing government at the time acted quickly to squander any reason for a revolution by implementing a polices such as the  8-hour-day and the Law of Municipal Boundaries, which forbade hired workers who weren’t local to the owner's holdings1. This law caused unemployment to rise further, and brought about more social turmoil. In a desperate attempt to decrease unemployment, they started to regulate the use of machinery, which alienated the landowners, who now had neither people nor machinery to work their fields and factories. The Spanish governance changed constantly, where every new leader reversed changes made by the last, sending Spain into an economic dilemma. This cause great polarity among Spain, as each new government made reforms which aided different classes of people. Strikes and arson were an everyday occurrence, the largest being the Asturian miners revolt of 19341, the first major sign of an impending revolution. The polarity among the Spanish populace thanks to the long term effects of the depression and the failure of the republic to enact useful policies brought about the formation of two extremist parties; the Frente Popular, a group of socialists, anarchists, syndicalist and communists, and the Nationalists, which were made right wing groups such as the Falange. The mass unrest and financial crisis among the working class most definitely led to the regions filled with different social classes to side with different extremists sides. When the Frente Popular took control of the government in the 1936 rigged election, the working class whom which sided with the Nationalists started to revolt, while the middle class sided with the Frente Popular. This bringing about the Civil war in which the country was split between the density of the classes. With the ever-changing governments unable to make financial reforms to reverse the effects of the great depression, Spain spiraled into chaos and division, a breeding ground for Civil War. The short term effect of the constant political change and poor political decisions effectively led to the beginning of the Civil War. The constant changing of the government in the years following up to the war left Spain divided, as with every new regime came new policies, and abolishment of old ones. In 1932 the left wing government under the lead of Azana was in power, they placed law in place which they expected would aid the development of Spain. One of their laws was an attack on the Church, which separated the Church and state by cutting funding and expelling the Jesuits4. Since they were mainly the educators in Spain, they now had a huge crisis in terms of teachers and education, which made the middle class and lower classes very  uneasy. They also started nationalizing large estates, meaning that landowners were losing land which they rightfully owned to the state. Bringing about more unrest, and fueling protests and strikes. In 1933, the government set fire to houses in a village known as the Casas Viejas Incident, which lost them the support of the working class, causing the Right winged CEDA party to win the November 1933 general elections1. But, they were denied the house by the Left republicans, who tried to cancel the votes and instead brought the RRP to power.3 Such brought major unrest to the streets of Spain, as voters felt that their right was being taken away from them, and they such corruption should be punished. After almost a year of protests and violence in the streets, CEDA was given the seats in the Senate which they deserved in hopes that the revolutionary ideas would wash away. But then a revolt by the Asturian miners led to a fierce battle in which the Spanish military squandered the revolution, leading to hatred from the working class. The CEDA once in power, then reversed lots of Azana’s policies, canceling the reforms of the new Catalan government, and refusing the Basques their own government. The Basques, who had previously supported the right, now condemned them and switched to the left. By reversing the polices, CEDA effectively stabbed themselves in the back and lost the support of two major regions in Spain5. As the government returned the land to landowners, they became fiercely in favor of the right, and started to abuse the workers. They started firing leftist workers and taunting the workers by telling if they were hungry to “go eat the republic.”[4] In 1935 the RRP came back into power since the CEDA had lost much support with the lower class and the Basque and Catalan regions.1 The RRP experienced not much better, as they failed to appeal to the middle class and once again, an election was called and a new party rose, a culmination of left-wingers, the Frente Popular2. They were not welcomed since they had taken the streets on election day and rigged the ballots. After this, the country rapidly descended into anarchy, as the widely divided people and parties started to form coalitions to take control of Spain. The outright division between the people and the governments into the Nationalist (right wing) and Republicans (left wing) descending into civil war. The short term effect of the poor political decisions by the rapidly changing governments led to a clear segregation between classes, paving a path for coalitions to fight the Civil War.  Although some may argue that the sole reason for the Civil War was due to the short term effect of the murder of Right-wing political leader Jose Calvo Sotelo. After the Frente Popular came to power, their police sent squads to arrest certain political oppositions. When going to arrest Calvo Sotelo, they instead shoot him in the back of the neck1. Such a rash action on the side of the Republicans led to massive reprisals and reactions among other right winged groups. Such an event was a perfect catalyst for a publicly justified coup, and almost undoubtedly, according to Preston Paul, was the sole reason for the uprisings in Spanish held Morocco, marking the beginning of the Civil war6. Although Preston Paul did determine the event which justified the start of the Civil War, he didn’t consider the causes of the event, or any of the prior events which led to the separation of the people of Spain, allowing there to be a Civil War. Helen Graham argues that polarity within Spain was the sole cause of Civil war; and agrees with this essay that without financial and social turmoil, there would not be any reason for there to be “two Spains” as Helen states, which confront each other in 19363. The idea that the murder of Calvo Sotelo was what accelerated Spains Civil War is no stranger; but to say that the Spanish Civil War was improbable without the murder of Sotelo completely ignores the rising tension within the country thanks to the depression and constant change in the Spanish Governance and their policies. It is an undeniable fact that the reasons for which the Civil War had occurred were primarily due to the Political and Finical unrest. To return to the question, both the Long term effect of financial hardship on account of the depression, and the short term effects of the constant political unrest both contributed to the social polarity within Spain, hence bringing about “two Spains” and the contrasting idea in how their country should be ruled. Such forced the hand of political leaders to convene and revolt against the opposing parties, as the end of July 1936 marked the beginning of a 3-year long violent and bloody war preluding the second World War. RRP- Radical Repulican Party CEDA- Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas   CEDA English-Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights  References: 1.Wikipedia. “Spanish Civil War,” December 5, 2022. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Civil_War#cite_. 2.The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. “Spanish Civil War | Definition, Causes, Summary, & Facts.” In Encyclopædia Britannica, January 31, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/event/Spanish-Civil-War. 3. Graham, Helen. The Spanish Civil War : A Very Short Introduction. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 4.Mann, Michael. Fascists. Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 316 5.Wikipedia Contributors. “CEDA.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, December 17, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CEDA. 6.Preston, Paul, and Paul 1946- Preston. The Spanish Civil War : Reaction, Revolution and Revenge. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2007.     

 Long Term and Short Term Causes of The Spanish Civil War The Spanish Civil War between the years 1936 and 1939 was one of the most brutal civil wars in history, between the Nationalists, the army and the upper-classes, and Republicans, the lower and middle-classes, with a number of approximately 500,000 lives lost. People wondered what could have led to such a brutal civil war, whether it was the occurrence of specific events such as “The Popular Front” or if there were other long term causes as well that made the war inevitable by the time it happened. In his book “The Battle for Spain'', Antony Beevor raised the question “Was there ever a people whose leaders were as truly their enemies as this one?” coming up with the conclusion that it was the leaders of Spain that allowed such destruction to be brought upon their own country. In this essay, I will support Antony Beevor’s argument by investigating the long and short term causes of The Spanish Civil War. The Spanish Civil War was the result of many long term causes leading the country into division and chaos. Throughout the 19th century until the civil war, Spain dealt with poverty due to an agriculturally based economy supported by Goerge Orwell’s description, “The ordinary class-division of society had disappeared to an extent that is almost unthinkable in the money — tainted air of England; there was no one there except the peasants and ourselves, and no one owned anyone else as his master.”. More than half of the population being peasants and uneducated created an enormous gap between the upper and lower classes. This extreme lack of economical balance within Spain sparked hatred between the two classes as the division it caused left no possibility for mutual empathy or respect that the two sides should have treated each other with. This supports the idea that the Nationalists were too satisfied with their positions of power and wealth that they were selfish enough to disregard the poverty the rest of the country was drowning in. They found it unacceptable to replace conservative elements of the government because it wasn’t going to benefit them like it would the Republicans. Thus with clearly being more powerful than the Republicans, the 1930’s Depression the economic imbalance made way to, became a huge threat to The Republic as they faced losing the support of the working class, motivating the Nationalists to rebel against The Republic as it showed signs of instability. Referring back to Antony Beevor’s argument, the leaders of Spain had differing views on what action to take even though they were responsible for the economic collapse of the country after the failed attempt for the Industrial Revolution. Beevor further argues that “The Spanish Civil War has so often been portrayed as a clash between left and right, but this is a misleading simplification. Two other axes of conflict emerged: state centralism against regional independence and authoritarianism against the freedom of the individual.” This argument was valid and supported as the role that regions played in the causes of The Spanish Civil War was too large to disregard. There was great tension between the centralist state and Catalonia and the Basque regions with both provinces searching for independence and decentralization, having their own languages, economies, cultures and churches. When Primo de Rivera took back the self-governing rights of Catalonia, separatist forces began supporting the Republican movement that replaced Alfonso XIII, the King of Spain, in 1931. Their support  upset the Nationalists because Alfonso was closely associated with the military, occasionally introducing himself as the ‘soldier-king’. This became a motive for the Nationalists to rebel against the Republic and punish the Catalans which they did achieve after Franco gained control over Spain. However, these reasons are too simplistic to unleash the country into such bloody chaos. There were two other long term causes that led to the war; The army and The Catholic Church. The Catholic Church, due to its wealth, was able to gain influence over the population and therefore became a major power that allied with the Nationalists. Due to their control over the education and other public life elements, Republicans had already begun disliking The Catholic Church and had made attempts at removing their influence that injected opposing views towards modernization and libreal forces. Additionally, the upper-classes funded The Church so that they could continue to spread religious beliefs that restricted the people’s freedom of choice over their own lives in a means of securing their positions of power and thus having easy access to reaching their goal of overthrowing the Republic with the use of manipulation. The Catholic Church, therefore, allied itself with the Nationalists due to the endless support they received from aristocrats and the Nationalists began taking advantage of the widespread influence their new allies had in order to gain more allies. When it became clear that The Church was supporting the upper-classes, lower-classes’ resentment increased. It led to protests that caused more hostility between the two groups. The Spanish Army, on the other hand, was politically powerful due to their association with Alfonso XIII, although proved themselves ineffective on the battlefield with the Loss of the Spanish Empire in the 19th century. This was an ironic situation as it was proved in many instances, for example the Ottoman Army’s involvement with the Empire’s politics leading to the 31 March Incident in April 1909, a political crisis that became one of the reasons for the Empire’s downfall, that an army’s involvement with politics always resulted in negative outcomes. The Republic, due to this very reason, were bothered by their involvement and wanted to remove The Spanish Army from politics. This aggravated the army who already had a reputation for being cruel and savage, and because they were traditional and possessed conservative beliefs due to their faith towards the Catholic Church, they found it beneficial to take a stand with the Nationalists. The size of the army was a huge advantage that the Nationalists had gained through this alliance, a large number of people joining Franco. The Catholic Church and the Spanish Army both led to the formation of the two groups, once again supporting Beevor’s argument with the Church being Spain’s religious leaders and the army’s association with the King of Spain, Alfonso. Although, the real trigger that set the civil war into motion was one of the short term causes, political polarization. Between the years 1931 and 1936, the population was divided due to the long term issues. Extremists admitted that they believed that war was the only solution to solve Spain’s problems. Thus this foreshadowed the brutal civil war as there was now a portion of the Spanish people with an undeniable thirst for bloodshed. After Alfonso’s resignation, The Left Republic came to power in April 1931 until November 1933. They shared the views of the Republicans and made an attempt at modernizing Spain. Manuel Azana became president and took action to fix the long term issues that had been causing issues within the country such as restricting the Church’s power and taking an anti-army approach by closing down military  academies. Every choice that the Left Republic made was viewed as an attack towards the Right Wing even though it can be deduced that they did not intentionally attack the Nationalists but were making a genuine effort to support the lower-class people of Spain to rescue the country from its initial state at the time. From 1933 to 1936, however, the Right Republic took over and led the country in an exactly opposite direction than the way that the Left Republic had begun taking it. The hostility of Right Republicans and the violence behind the decisions they took was revealed quickly when the largest party CEDA turned into ‘a group of war ministers’. These two years were branded as the ‘black years’ due to the systematic reversal that occurred, the Church once again gaining authority over the country, and Catalonia being stripped away from its independence despite how much they tried to resist. This was a backwards step for the modernization of Spain, however it ensured the satisfaction of the upper-class Nationalists. But, in 1936, one of the main triggers for the Spanish Civil War, the Popular Front emerged, a party including a large number of Republicans. The Popular Front was also viewed as the ‘last stand to achieve peace’ within the country or ‘extreme communism’ by following the footsteps of Stalin’s policy in 1935. This angered the Nationalists and the army immediately began planning a coup. This clearly led the country to disaster as the only way the Republicans and the Nationalists interacted with each other was through violent attacks. With all the leaders of each party failing to create a stable government, their actions caused the people to believe that war was the only option they were left with in order to achieve what they wanted. In conclusion, Beevor makes a valid argument by blaming the leaders of Spain for the causes of the Spanish Civil War. The economic crisis in Spain during the 19th century and the role of regions creating a base for the civil war and later on the increase in tension with the army and the Catholic Church’s made the war inevitable and even motivated the Nationalists to the extent that they did not just think it necessary to rebel against the Republic but also desired the violence it brought forth. The use of manipulation by powerful allies such as the Church and the tension between the two parties indeed carved a path that led to a civil war that was unavoidable.

 Examine the long- and short-term causes of one 20th-century war - Spanish Civil War “Spaniards! To all of you who feel holy love for Spain, to all of you who in the ranks of the army and the navy have sworn to serve the fatherland, to those of you who swore to defend it from its enemies with your lives, the nation calls you to defend it.” These powerful words spoken by Francisco Franco, leader of the nationalist forces, demonstrate the passion and intensity only a civil war can inspire in its people. In essence, the Spanish Civil war was a culmination of a multitude of social and political factors that led to the culmination of conflict between factions of the nationalist and republican forces. Various short and long term factors escalated to the point of a bloody and gruesome struggle for power. In this essay, I will discuss three key factors that led to the outbreak of civil war: economically divided classes, the changing position of the Catholic Church and colossal political instability.

Antony Beever himself chose to begin his book (one that encompassed the causes, events and aftermath of the entire war) by accentuating the class differences present in Spain before the conflict began. A harrowing picture is painted as Beever describes how the car of King Alfonso XIII is being pushed by tanned and poorly dressed men, while in the background men in suits merely observe. “Few images better represented the extremes of the social and economic contrasts of Spain in the early part of the 20th century”. This class divide is significant as uprisings and revolutions are often led by the working class - and this one was no different. As Spain was a mainly agrarian society, a large amount of the lower classes were made up of farmers as well as other industry workers, who felt as though they deserved better treatment. In the aftermath of WW1, inflation hit these workers particularly hard as salaries increased by a mere 25% while prices doubled between 1913 and 1918. This was a factor that led to the mass joining of leftist union groups such as the UGT and CNT, whose members were to partake in acts of violence leading up to, and during, the civil war. Furthermore, the events in Spain may have been partly attributed to what happened in the Russian revolution little over a decade earlier. Russia abolished its monarchy, just as Spain will, and the working class was at the forefront of this revolution as well. The period of 1913 became known as the ‘three years of bolshevism’ and included uprisings in Andalucia and unrest in Barcelona. The formation of the Spanish Communist party followed in 1921, with continued demonstrations in Andalusia and beyond. Communism was also seen in various other parties in Spain, including in the Marxist POUM founded in 1935, as well as various socialist youth groups brought together under communist rule towards the beginning of the civil war. The creation of these various groups, both communist and union centered, created a stronger desire for social change as well as a large group of men that would form part of the fighting base during the three years of war. Economic class divide created strain throughout Spain, whose effects were significant in both the long and short term, and increased the time it took for the nation to progress into civil war.  

Another notable cause, both long and short term, of the civil war was the changing role and power of the Roman Catholic Church. The church had been a formidable influence throughout Spanish history, and formed much of the population’s thought and purpose in unity with the state as early as 1479. With the concordat of 1851, Catholicism became Spain’s ‘only’ religion and had large power in education and the press, as well as extended influence due to high illiteracy rates. However, its great power led to a more prominent abuse of power, and the lower classes specifically had complications due to the ties the church had with the aristocracy because they defended the rights of the higher classes as they provided a significant amount of funding. Resentment towards the church was seen as early as 1909 in the “Semana  Trágica”, which was one of the nation’s first uprisings. Though it was caused by an anti-militaristic mood stirred up by the need for an army in Morocco, the church was a chief target, with 80 of the 112 buildings set fire to being church owned or affiliated. In Beever’s words: “Such symbolic violence was the reaction of a people traumatized by intense superstition”. However, despite the important role of the church being a long-term cause of general resentment and change for the people, its effects have been exaggerated in the short term. Collectively, the right wing nationalists (who emerged victorious in 1939) used public support for the church and the past system to gain followers, which did work for the aristocracy. In fact, the creation of the Catholic party CEDA in 1933 reinforced the fact that there was some lingering belief in this old system. However, the church’s power was declining towards the 1930’s as religious attendance was the lowest of any Christian country - in 1934, less than 20% of Spain’s population was going to mass. Other groups and causes (such as various labor unions and political organizations) attracted the masses on a more significant scale than the church did. While the role of the Catholic church was a significant long term cause of bitterness for the working class, its magnitude in escalating violence in the short term is generally overemphasized.

Lastly, political instability caused in particular by the lasting effects of the monarchy contributed greatly to confusion and polarization that eventually led to the civil war. The monarchy had been in place from the times of King Ferdinand and Isabella, and was dissolved suddenly in 1931 with the creation of the Spanish republic. Despite issues associated with it, namely its close ties with the church, the nationalist party supported and used it as a beacon of familiarity for its members. The Carlist group was centered around the idea of reestablishing the Bourbon dynasty, and the “Renovación Española” or the Spanish renovation movement, was also centered around bringing back monarchic principles - both of which establish a clear presence of support for monarchy. Furthermore, the army, which was conservative in nature, also had close ties with the monarchy and this was one of the reasons for the compulsory retirement of many of its members, causing anger and resentment. Moreover, following a line of unsuccessful coup’s the politically charged assassination of monarchist Calvo Sotelo was a monumental short term cause of the civil war. The lack of response from the leading party of the time, the left’s Popular Front, caused public outrage, also caused by the fact that he was a highly influential leader of the right. The event also played a large role as a catalyst to the unsuccessful coup d’etat of July 1936, which was the beginning of the civil war itself. The monarchy played a significant role in the long and short term causes of the civil war. In all, the significance of the changing role and power of the Catholic church and the monarchy are instrumental to understanding the deep rooted causes of the civil war. Articulately summed up by Antony Beever: ”the trinity of army, monarchy and church, which had originally made the empire, was also to preside over its final collapse”. Both of these factors in combination with the vast class divide in Spanish society created a multitude of short and long term causes of the war - ranging from the social alignment to various political groups to the escalation of violence and assassination of people in power. An understanding of these three instrumental factors allows for a glimpse into the complexity of the causes of the Spanish civil war.

 Examine the long- and short-term causes of one 20th-century war. In 1936, after a series of aggression by the majority communist, socialist and anarchist Republicans under Azana against the conservative, monarchist and fascist Nationalists, CEDA member Sotelo was assassinated on July 12th by the PSOE-controlled Assault Guards which triggered the Nationalists to stage a military coup a couple of days later, triggering the Spanish Civil War. During this Spain, an impoverished terra incognita became an ideological battleground of ‘Fascism against Communism’ for which thousands of foreign young men gave their lives in a combat a mort. This essay will argue that the causes of the Spanish Civil War included the short-term events of the assassination of Sotelo, a prominent socialist member of the Spanish parliament, as well as Azana’s violent crackdown on the Nationalist faction, along with the long-term causes of the internal class-struggle and ideological tensions, and to a lesser extent the early foreign intervention of Germany, Italy, and the USSR. In order to truly make sense of the multi-faceted conflict, one cannot only consider the events of 1936, because these short-term causes were deeply rooted in long-term socio-political issues which had been simmering since the beginning of the hierarchical system way back in the Roman Empire, creating and slowly exacerbating political tensions between the Republicans and Nationalists, causing a growth in popularity and passionate intensity for both, thereby leading to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. By the beginning of the 20th century, the once deeply religious Spanish populace turned their back on the Catholic Church, as the farmers viewed the church as a perpetrator of the monarchy, which oppressed them. The landless poor were effectively treated as slaves at the whim of their landowners, who also effectively owned the militarised Guardia Civil, and would go as far as to shoot unemployed workers scavenging for acorns and wood. In Castiblanco desperate men were arrested for gathering acorns, and near Ciudad Real famished peasants fed on grass. It was also common for labourers to earn 2 pesetas a day and forcibly spend a third of their year in enforced idleness, living less well than their master’s donkeys, as approximately 10,000 families of the 21 million population owned half the country’s cultivable land in the 1910s. This widespread inequality and poverty were key in causing a rapid rise in the popularity of left-wing ideologies, such as the PSOE, whose trade union grew from 8,000 members in 1908 to 200,000 in 1920. This was a clear sign of frustration, as revolutionary thoughts were brewing within the increasingly political impoverished population, some of them became anarchists, this meant that frequent strikes, robbed banks, bombs and political assassinations ensued. As we can clearly see, the proletariat was forced into severe apathy for the system, violent revolutionary thoughts were boiling, and the once clueless population shifted into a period of political disillusionment, where they would ache for an opportunity such as the de Riviera’s death to forcibly reform the nation out of mass poverty. Thus, the antagonism of the proletariat towards the conservative minority and those associated with them soon created a radical polarization in Spain, which finally erupted into open conflict in 1936. Furthermore, it is also crucial to keep in mind the long-term decline of Spanish influence and economy which triggered the rise of conservatism, and led to a climate of fear and repression in Spain when they were in power. Spain was once a great power whose king, Charles V used to say “I speak French to women, Italian to my soldiers, German to my horse and Spanish to God", he also left Spain to his firstborn and  Germany to his half-brother. This was the reason why it was especially humiliating for the conservative population of Spain to witness the once powerful Spain’s loss of all its colonies in the Americas, Carribean, and the Pacific, only being left with its African possessions. This caused immense frustration within the monarchist Spanish military, who is now impotent, without any other colony to conquer or control, making them stuck in, and extremely concentrated in Morrocco. This frustration was almost brought to its limit when the devastating blow of the depression of 1929 caused Spain’s GPP to decline by 30%, almost an imitation of Hitler’s rise to power in Weimar the Weimar Republic, public dissidence of de Rivera significantly increased, so that when he died, his intended successor, Derenque was not able to gain power, and the popular front overthrew the dictatorship, whose policies were anti-clerical, anti-military, anti-oligarchy and anti-education, everything that the Nationalists stood against. They also forced the king, Alfonso XII, to abdicate the throne, never to return. The contribution of these factors to the preexisting political instability was extremely crucial, as it made the military officers resentful towards the Republicans, exacerbating tensions between the two. While the decline of the Spanish Empire and its, it is also crucial to consider the short-term causes of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s which were the clashes between the Nationalists and Republicans, as well as the assassination of Sotelo. As the Nationalists implemented their vision when they got in power in 1933, they cracked down on opposition groups and individuals using violence and intimidation, as well as the imprisonment and execution of political dissidents, the Republicans did the same in 1931, and 1936. The rise in tensions and left-wing support allowed the republicans to overthrow the monarchy and the military dictatorship of de Riviera in January 1931, this catalysed violent rivalries between the Nationalist factions and Republicans, during the October revolution of 34’ caused by protests against electoral fraud by the socialists, both sides killed 1,500 men, women and children, and burned down 112 religious buildings. This example clearly shows how ideological tensions between the Nationalist factions and Republicans and the polarization of Spain up to 1935 instigated detrimental effects on the population, which over time built up an unbearable amount of hostility, hatred, and contempt between those who took sides, one side wishing to completely crush and eradicate the other. This divide turned Spain from a monarchial, organised nation, to a deeply divided one with both extremes. Knowing what we know now, it is clear that the detrimental conflicts, strikes, and innocent deaths exacerbated the passion of the two sides, increased popularity within their supporters, and aggravated the opposition, increasing hostility and desire to fight and kill marched the deeply divided country into a civil war. Additionally, up to 1936, the Republican military significantly overpowered the Nationalists in manpower, Franco needed to also win the support of as many Civil Guards as possible, as he couldn’t count on the Regulares consisting of inexperienced Moroccans and a mere 8,000 troops of the Legion Espanola to beat the 750,000 manned Ejército Popular de la República. Thankfully, the Popular Front’s abuse of power towards the Nationalists and their assassination of Sotelo 2 days before the coup was his go-head. After the Popular Front coalition’s win in the 1936 general elections, Azana resumed his Premiership amidst socio-economical convulsions between FAI and CEDA. After failing to reconcile and moderate the situation, Azana, in hopes of consolidating his power, attacked the Republicans’ most powerful rival, de Riviera, and forcibly dissolved the Falange, among many other provocative actions. This backfired, as the Falange's membership rose rapidly from 1,000 to 100,000 in July, this pattern repeated itself for the Monarchists and others.  Azana’s open antagonism and the Falange’s desperate actions clearly frustrated the Nationalist factions, causing more and more to become open to the idea of a revolution, and those who have already accepted it, to become more vocal. One of these men was Robles. In July, he gave the Cortes a list of violence that was caused by the popular front, including 269 political murders, 1.200 wounded, 160 churches gutted, and 10 newspaper offices destroyed; Sotelo, an important member of the Renovacion Espanola then followed with a bitter diatribe, passionately and openly threatening a military revolt. A couple of days later, he was shot dead by Assault Guards controlled by the PSOE on July 12th. During Sotelo’s funeral, Renovacion Espanola leader Goicochea promised to “imitate your example, to avenge your death and to save Spain”. This wish manifested 5 days later, when the military rebellion began in Morrocco, marking the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, and a staggering 47% of the Guardia Civil turned to the Nationalist side, giving Franco his last push. As we can see, even though a plan for a coup was already in place ever since the Republicans’ win in January of 1936, the assassination of Calvo Sotelo, the last of its kind before the war, as well as Azana’s open antagony and hostility towards the Nationalists clearly provoked the last indecisive military soldiers to support the Nationalists’ rebellion and was Franco’s last impetus to reclaiming Spain from the hands of Azana. Additionally, the widely believed misconception that foreign intervention in the global war of ‘Fascism against Communism’ caused the Spanish Civil War was largely untrue. Nevertheless, the Spanish Republican army had 750,000 soldiers, 1500 pieces of artillery, 800 tanks and armoured vehicles. El Caudillo wouldn’t have dared to bring his 30,000-manned Army of Africa into Spain simply because of his strong beliefs unless he could muster up a significant backing from foreign powers, more significant than that received by Azana. Luckily for Franco, as early as one month before the coup, Franco went to Hitler for his help, after which 20 cargo planes were immediately flown to Morrocco to the Army of Africa to the mainland. Therefore it was clear to Franco that he would receive the support of the Germans. Additionally, it was also known even before the war started that the Soviet’s Heinkels were no match for the German Messerschmitts as German military technology was far more advanced and cutting-edge. These facts suggest that it was the upcoming severe military edge and initial support that instilled a sense of confidence within Franco and his generals. However, although the nationalists would receive 10,000 troops, 800 aircraft, and 200 tanks from Germany and 70,000–75,000 troops, 750 planes, and 150 tanks from Italy and Germany, as a history student evaluating the causes of an event, one must limit oneself to the perspective of a person experiencing such an event before it happens, put away the power of hindsight. Although knowing what we know now, one would think that if the Nationalists knew the support they would have received, foreign intervention would be the biggest factor influencing their decision to stage a coup. However, the Nationalists knew no such things. Therefore to say that foreign intervention was one of the causes of the Spanish Civil war is an inherently weak argument. One, these impressive provisions were made after the coup on July 15th, meaning Franco couldn’t have been certain that he would have received them. Secondly, although it is also undeniable that Mussolini definitely helped Franco, these provisions wouldn’t arrive until his first bombing of Madrid in September 3rd, and even though Mussolini started planning the coup along with Sanjurjo, who was supposed to be the new Caudillo of Spain since January, his sudden death in July and the lack of communication of Mussolini and Franco up until then meant that il Duce didn’t trust  Franco. He didn’t even fully decide to support Franco until the French and British mistakenly signed the non-intervention agreement, which he and Hitler were more than willing to break, guaranteeing the victory of the Nationalists, as the Republicans would then receive minimal support. While Germany’s initial support and their technological advancement helped provide some confidence to the Nationalists, it is clear that foreign support, in fact, didn’t make the great impact that it is widely acknowledged to have in terms of causing the Spanish Civil War, as it was still unclear whether or not Franco would receive the full support of Hitler, or even Mussolini at all. The long-term ideological tensions in Spain since 1876, as well as the short-term factors of an imbalance of foreign support, and the Republican’s public antagonism and abuse of power towards the Nationalists all contributed to the Spanish Civil War. The Spanish population’s long-term ideological tensions caused a polarisation of Spain. They exacerbated tensions between the Republicans and Nationalists, setting the stage for a civil war. At the same time, the short-term antagonism of the Republicans towards the Nationalists and their assassination of Azana was the most important factor in triggering the coup d’etat. To a lesser extent, Germany’s minimal support at the beginning of the coup and its technological superiority to the USSR also influenced the coup, however far less than it was imagined to be. Although this makes us wonder, which of these factors was responsible for turning the coup into a devastating 3-year-long civil war.

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Spanish Civil War (1936-1939): Archives at Yale

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• Spanish Civil War Collection This collection documents society and events during the Spanish Civil War. Formats include magazines, comic books, handbills, pamphlets, broadsides, manuscripts, diaries, and toys.
• André Landín Correspondence 136 letters between Spanish Nationalist André Landín and his family members, 1936-1946. Letters document Landín's service in the Spanish Civil War, his time in the Spanish army, his service in Russia with the Azul Division, and his assignment to the Army Ministry after the war. The bulk of the correspondence is between Landín and his wife, Marichrista Landín.
• Argimiro Bosch Letters Thirty-one letters written by Argimiro Bosch, a Republican soldier in the Spanish Civil War, to his wife, Angelita Talens Bo, and his family. The letters document Bosch's time as a prisoner in Valencia.
• Chiaromonte (Nicola) Papers The Nicola Chiaromonte Papers consist of correspondence, manuscripts, clippings and notebooks documenting the professional life of Chiaromonte. Prominent correspondents include Lionel Abel, Andrea Caffi, Albert Camus, Mary McCarthy, Dwight MacDonald, Gaetano Salvemini, and Ignzaio Silone. Series II contains typescripts, notes and clippings of many articles by Chiaromonte, including several concerning the Spanish Civil War.
• Claude McKay Collection Contains a file folder labels "Spain and the Spanish Civil War", 1935-1938.
• Edwin Borchard Papers Yale Law School professor and specialist in international law. Contain correspondence with American Friends of Spanish Democracy, 1937-1940, article and speech both entitled "The Spanish Civil War and Its Implications. There may be related materials in his general correspondence.
• Ernst Toller papers A small amount of correspondence (1933-1939) is largely concerned with his Spanish Relief Project, devoted to raising funds to alleviate the consequences of the Civil War in Spain.
• Felipe Lorenzo Famoso Diary Diary covering the career of Felipe Lorenzo Famoso, a Spanish soldier in Morocco and Spain, from 1923-1949.
• Fenton (Charles Andres Papers) The papers consist almost entirely of bibliographical material, newspaper magazine articles, excerpts from books and news dispatches collected for his proposed work on American literary approaches to the Spanish Civil War. There is also a small amount of correspondence (1954-1960).
• Harry Weinberger Papers Includes correspondence from Emma Goldman to Weinberger, her lawyer, regarding her post-deportation travels and activities in the Spanish Civil War before her death in 1940.
• Historical picture collection Contains one folder with photos of the Spanish Civil War.
• Jaime Arando Correspondence Seventy-two letters from Jaime Arando to his father, Francisco Arando, dating from 1937-1940. Jaime Arando was active on the Ebro Front, spent time in a concentration camp, and later joined the National Army.
• Joan Alzina Papers Papers of Joan Alzina, Catalan soldier in the Spanish Civil War’s Republican Army, 24th Army Group, Group Logistics, 3rd Section. Includes seven notebooks documenting Alzina’s service in the army, his time as a prisoner at Navalpino, and his tenure as a prison guard for a mental hospital at Alcalá de Henares, Madrid for other Republican prisoners. Alzina’s notebooks written during the war include uncensored drafts of letters to family members. Also included is a drawing by Alzina of Mickey Mouse as a soldier and notes by Alzina on how to dig and fortify trenches.
• Joaquim Sancho Papers Papers of Joaquim Sancho, a Spanish Civil War soldier fighting for the Republican cause. The bulk of the collection comprises Sancho's correspondence, spanning from the period of his military service in the Regular Spanish Army, No. 55, VIII Grupo and the 4th Company, 103rd Mixed Brigade, through his time as a prisoner in a Nationalist concentration camp. Before Sancho’s capture, he typically wrote in Catalan, and during his capture he wrote in Spanish. In addition to correspondence, the collection includes a 1938 manuscript map with notes of the trench works of the 103rd Mixed Brigade; lists of phone calls and correspondences Sancho sent and received; a likeness of Gandhi drawn on the back of Sancho’s registration for the Republican Independent Party of Catalunya; a likeness of Franco drawn on an envelope; and manuscript and printed fragments of material pertaining to the war.
• Langston Hughes Papers Contains well-documented photos of Hughes' trip to Spain during the Civil War (Series XII) and a group of correspondence cards from the Spanish Civil War (Series XXII.) In his professional correspondence there is a folder of "Spanish Letters" with dates in the late 1930s (Series II); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee correspondence dating from 1944-1953 in Box 245; Abraham Lincoln Brigade correspondence dated 1938-1966 and Veterans of the American Lincoln Brigade correspondence dated 1944-1949.
• Lluís Baró Segimón Correspondence Forty-eight letters between Lluís Baró Segimón and his wife, Pilar Val de Baró. Lluís Baró Segimón fought with the Republican 27th Division during the Spanish Civil War, and postmarks indicate that Lluís wrote from the front lines of the war to Pilar in Morell, Tarragona.
• Louise Crane and Victoria Kent papers Victoria Kent's correspondence and subject files are a window into the activities of the expatriate Spanish community in the United States following the Spanish Civil War. The papers also relate to Crane and Kent's work to publish the Spanish-language magazine Ibérica as well as their personal relationship.
• Louise Morgan and Otto Theis papers Contains the Nancy Cunard papers. Cunard was an "ardent anti-Fascist and put her press and energy to work supporting the Communists." Includes materials on "Spanish Civil War/Fascism." There may be potentially relative material in her correspondence.
• Lucy Kramer Cohen Papers The papers of Felix S. Cohen include research material, clippings, and correspondence relating to Puerto Rico and the Spanish Civil War.
• María Pilar Fort Trigo diary Diary of María Pilar Fort Trigo, a woman from Valencia, Spain, covering 1936 October through 1938 January, and lacking 1937 December. The diary describes the everyday life of a Spanish woman during the Spanish Civil War and discusses gender relations in Spain and Fort Trigo's engagement to a lawyer, Enrique Jorro Vives. Also includes Fort Trigo's obituary.
• Mas Yebra Family Correspondence Correspondence of the Mas Yerba family, a prominent political family in Barcelona. The correspondence includes one hundred thirty-three letters exchanged among the family members and their associates during the Spanish Civil War. Also includes a small amount of the family's legal and financial papers.
• Photographs of James Weldon Johnson Box 16 contains photographs taken by Johnson relating to the Spanish Civil War.
• Puertes family Correspondence on the Spanish Civil War The collection consists of correspondence from Republican soldiers during the Spanish Civil War. Most were written by Isidoro Puertes, a soldier who served with the 4th Company, of the 4th Battalion of the 225 "Brigada Mixta." Antonio Puertes, probably Isidoro's cousin, served with him. Letters, sometimes written by both men jointly, were sent to their family members.
• Ralph Bates Papers Contains a few photographs and documents concerning his International Brigade service during the Spanish Civil War.
• Ramon Llado correspondence Eleven letters between Ramon Llado, a Republican soldier in the Spanish Civil War, and his family. Seven letters are from Ramon to his wife, Concepcion. Three letters are from Concepcion to Ramon, and one letter is to Ramon from his sister, Dionisia, and his brother-in-law.
• Russian state military archives collection, 1919-1941 The collection consists of photocopies of documents in the Russian State Military Archive (Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv) in Moscow. The documents relate to German-Soviet military and economic relations between 1918 and 1941, and the use of Soviet tanks in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939.
• Spanish and Portuguese Architecture Photograph Collection Some material documents bomb damage during the Spanish Civil War.
• War Poster Collection Large collection of posters and handbills from the Spanish Civil War.

The Spanish Civil War: Battleground for Idealists - Documentary

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• The Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War

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• Cited by 16

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• Stanley G. Payne , University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Book description

This book presents a new history of the most important conflict in European affairs during the 1930s, the Spanish Civil War. It describes the complex origins of the conflict, the collapse of the Spanish Republic and the outbreak of the only mass worker revolution in the history of Western Europe. Stanley Payne explains the character of the Spanish revolution and the complex web of republican politics, while also examining the development of Franco's counter-revolutionary dictatorship. Payne gives attention to the multiple meanings and interpretations of war and examines why the conflict provoked such strong reactions at the time, and long after. The book also explains the military history of the war and its place in the history of military development, the non-intervention policy of the democracies and the role of German, Italian and Soviet intervention, concluding with an analysis of the place of the war in European affairs, in the context of twentieth-century revolutionary civil wars.

‘Payne, drawing on his knowledge and research on Spanish history, has written a legible (rather than just academic) history of the origins, political and military development, and consequences of the Spanish Civil War. His familiarity with twentieth-century European history enables him to place it in a comparative perspective. An important and objective work that … will generate interesting debates.’

Juan J. Linz - Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political and Social Science, Yale University

‘Stanley Payne has written a fine introductory history of the Spanish Civil War. Based on an unrivalled mastery of the huge historiography of the topic, Payne’s volume convincingly dispels many of the myths that still surround the fratricidal conflict. It will be indispensable not just to students but to anyone interested in understanding one of the bitterest wars of the twentieth century.’

Julius Ruiz - University of Edinburgh

‘This is an extremely insightful book that has remarkably condensed analytical power. Payne's vast knowledge has generated an up-to-date and inclusive history of the Spanish conflict. He situates the Spanish Civil War in the context of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary confrontations in Europe, from the French Revolution to World War II. Furthermore, he succinctly and skillfully places the conflict within the long history of Spain. There is no better synthesis.’

Michael Seidman - University of North Carolina Wilmington

‘It seems providential that one S. Payne should produce the most accomplished non-native writing on Spain's recent past. In his sixth decade of research, Stanley Payne has acquired wisdom beyond maturity. No living historian thinks so broadly or writes so cogently. Few authorities survey the scarred landscape of the tortured twentieth century with such a cool, forensic gaze. His standards of consideration and interpretation are elevated – and for readers, elevating. Perhaps surprisingly, this latest book is Payne's first comprehensive study of the Spanish Civil War. It prioritizes recent work without neglecting the packed storehouse of earlier scholarship. It should become an indispensable guide to its endlessly complex and supremely significant subject.’

Rob Stradling - Professor Emeritus of History, Cardiff University

‘Essential for interwar and/or modern Spain graduate collections. Highly recommended.’

Source: Choice

‘Stanley Payne's study of the Spanish Civil War and the events leading up to that cataclysm is the latest work by one of America's premier historians of Europe.’

Paul Gottfried Source: The American Conservative

‘The Spanish Civil War still excites strong passions … is a must-read for anyone wishing to understand that controversial event … Payne’s book restores scholarly standards to a field that remains more than ever beset by ideological controversy.'

Paul Gottfried Source: Chronicles Magazine

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Frontmatter pp i-vi

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Contents pp vii-viii

Chronology of major events pp ix-xii, glossary pp xiii-xiv, preface pp xv-xvi, introduction - civil war in twentieth-century europe pp 1-4, 1 - modernization and conflict in spain pp 5-23, 2 - from revolutionary insurrection to popular front pp 24-36, 3 - the breakdown of democracy pp 37-63, 4 - the military insurrection of the eighteenth of july pp 64-81, 5 - the battle of madrid – the first turning point pp 82-92, 6 - revolution pp 93-102, 7 - terror pp 103-110, 8 - a war of religion pp 111-118, 9 - franco's counterrevolution pp 119-130, 10 - foreign intervention and nonintervention pp 131-148, 11 - soviet policy in spain, 1936–1939 pp 149-159, 12 - the propaganda and culture war pp 160-168, 13 - a second counterrevolution the power struggle in the republican zone pp 169-182, 14 - the decisive northern campaigns of 1937–1938 pp 183-202, 15 - the war at sea and in the air pp 203-215, 16 - civil wars within a civil war pp 216-230, 17 - the war in perspective pp 231-243, conclusion - costs and consequences pp 244-252.

• The Long Dictatorship

Select Bibliography pp 253-256

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