case study of competition act 2002

Popular Courses
Export & Import
More classes
More Courses

Case Study on Competition Act, 2002

Kanzra Kysco, a company incorporated and listed in South Korea, is inter-alia engaged in the business of manufacturing and sale of steel products, automotive parts and fuel cell systems. Kanzra Kysco present in India through its subsidiaries, i.e. Kanzra Kysco India Private Limited.

Kanzra Kysco India Private Limited a company incorporated in India, is engaged in the business of supply/distribution of processed steel sheets to automobile original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), or their vendors. Kanzra Steel, a company incorporated and listed in South Korea, is an integrated iron and steel mining company inter-alia engaged in manufacture and sale of various steel products such as steel bars, steel beams, hot and cold rolled steel and plates.

Kanzra Steel's presence in India is largely limited to the supply of certain raw materials to Kanzra Kysco India Private Limited. Kanzra Kysco and Kanzra Steel contemplates a merger.

The proposed combination under Section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002 relates to the merger of Kanzra Kysco into Kanzra Steel as a result of which Kanzra Kysco would cease to exist and Kanzra Steel will be the surviving company. Both Kanzra Kysco and

Kanzra Steel belong to the Kanzra Automobiles Group of South Korea.

Based on the above fact, answer the following:

(a) As Company Secretary of Kanzra Kysco India Private Limited, advise the Chairman of your Company, who is seeking your advice, regarding threshold of combination as prescribed under Competition Act, 2002.

(b) Merger notice under Section 6(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 has been received by Competition Commission of India. Assuming yourself as the Chairman of Competition Commission of India, state the factors that need to be considered while determining the above combination whether such merger is likely or not likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India?

LET'S CONSIDER APPLICABLE PROVISIONS

Section 5 in the competition act, 2002.

Combination.- The acquisition of one or more enterprises by one or more persons or merger or amalgamation of enterprises shall be a combination of such enterprises and persons or enterprises, if- (a) any acquisition where-

(i) the parties to the acquisition, being the acquirer and the enterprise, whose control, shares, voting rights or assets have been acquired or are being acquired jointly have,-

(A) either, in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees one thousand crore or turnover more than rupees three thousand crore; or (B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than five hundred million US dollars or turnover of more than fifteen hundred million US dollars; or

(ii) the group, to which the enterprise whose control, shares, assets or voting rights have been acquired or are being acquired, would belong after the acquisition, jointly have or would jointly have,-

(A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees four thousand crore or turnover of more than rupees twelve thousand crore; or (B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than two billion US dollars or turnover of more than six billion US dollars; or

(b) acquiring of control by a person over an enterprise when such person has already direct or indirect control over another enterprise engaged in production, distribution or trading of a similar or identical or substitutable goods or provision of a similar or identical or substitutable service, if-

(i) the enterprise over which control has been acquired along with the enterprise over which the acquirer already has direct or indirect control jointly have,-

(A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees one thousand crore or turnover of more than rupees three thousand crore; or (B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than five hundred million US dollars or turnover more than fifteen hundred million US dollars; or

(ii) the group, to which enterprise whose control has been acquired, or is being acquired would belong after the acquisition, jointly have or would jointly have,-

(i) the enterprise remaining after merger or the enterprise created as a result of the amalgamation, as the case may be, have,- (A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees one thousand crore or turnover of more than rupees three thousand crore; or (B) in India or outside India, in aggregate, the assets of the value of more than five hundred million US dollars or turnover of more than fifteen hundred million US dollars; or

(ii) the group, to which the enterprise remaining after the merger or the enterprise created as a result of the amalgamation, would belong after the merger or the amalgamation, as the case may be, have or would have,- (A) either in India, the assets of the value of more than rupees four thousand crore or turnover of more than rupees twelve thousand crore; or (B) in India or outside India, the assets of the value of more than two billion US dollars or turnover of more than six billion US dollars.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,-

(a) "control" includes controlling the affairs or management by- (i) one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another enterprise or group; (ii) one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or enterprise;

(b) "group" means two or more enterprises which, directly or indirectly, are in a position to- (i) exercise twenty-six per cent. or more of the voting rights in the other enterprise; or (ii) appoint more than fifty per cent. of the members of the board of directors in the other enterprise; or (iii) control the management or affairs of the other enterprise;

(c) the value of assets shall be determined by taking the book value of the assets as shown, in the audited books of account of the enterprise, in the financial year immediately preceding the financial year in which the date of proposed merger falls, as reduced by any depreciation, and the value of assets shall include the brand value, value of goodwill, or value of copyright, patent, permitted use, collective mark, registered proprietor, registered trade mark, registered user, homonymous geographical indication, geographical indications, design or layout-design or similar other commercial rights, if any, referred to in sub-section (5) of section 3.

SECTION 6(2) IN THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

(2) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), any person or enterprise, who or which proposes to enter into a combination, may, at his or its option, give notice to the Commission, in the form as may be specified, and the fee which may be determined, by regulations, disclosing the details of the proposed combination, within seven days of-

(a) approval of the proposal relating to merger or amalgamation, referred to in clause (c) of section 5, by the board of directors of the enterprises concerned with such merger or amalgamation, as the case may be;

(b) execution of any agreement or other document for acquisition referred to in clause (a) of section 5 or acquiring of control referred to in clause (b) of that section.

SECTION 6(5) IN THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

The public financial institution, foreign institutional investor, bank or venture capital fund, referred to in sub-section (4), shall, within seven days from the date of the acquisition, file, in the form as may be specified by regulations, with the Commission the details of the acquisition including the details of control, the circumstances for exercise of such control and the consequences of default arising out of such loan agreement or investment agreement, as the case may be.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, the expression-

(a) "foreign institutional investor" has the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (a) of the Explanation to section 115AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961); (b) "venture capital fund" has the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (b) of the Explanation to clause (23FB) of section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961).

(a) The thresholds for the combined assets/turnover of the parties to a combination prescribed under the Competition Act, 2002 are as follows:

At Enterprise level: The value of combined assets of the combining enterprises exceeds INR 2,000 crores or the combined turnover of the combining enterprise exceeds INR 6,000 crores, in India.

In case either or both of the combining enterprises have assets / turnover outside India also, then the combined assets of the combining enterprises value exceeds US$ 1000 million, including at least INR 1000 crores in India, or combined turnover exceeds US$ 3000 million, including at least INR 3000 crores in India.

At Group level: The group to which the combining enterprise whose control, shares, assets or voting rights are being acquired, would belong after the acquisition, or the group to which the combining enterprise remaining after the merger or amalgamation, would belong has either assets of value of more than INR 8000 crores in India or turnover more than INR 24000 crores in India. Where the group has presence in India as well as outside India then the group has assets more than US$ 4 billion including at least INR 1000 crores in India or turnover more than US$ 12 billion including at least INR 3000 crores in India.

The term 'Group' has been explained in the Act. Two enterprises belong to a "Group" if one is in position to exercise at least 26 per cent voting rights or appoint at least 50 per cent of the directors or controls the management or affairs in the other.

(b) The Competition Act, 2002 envisages appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market in India as the criterion for regulation of combinations. In order to evaluate appreciable adverse effect on competition, the Act empowers the Commission to evaluate the effect of Combination on the basis of factors mentioned in Section 20(4) of the Competition Act, 2002.

Factors to be considered by the Competition Commission of India while evaluating appreciable adverse effect of Combinations on competition in the relevant market, are as under:

(a) Actual and potential level of competition through imports in the market; (b) Extent of barriers to entry into the market; (c) Level of concentration in the market; (d) Degree of countervailing power in the market; (e) Likelihood that the combination would result in the parties to the combination being able to significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins; (f) Extent of effective competition likely to sustain in a market; (g) Extent to which substitutes are available or are likely to be available in the market; (h) Market share, in the relevant market, of the persons or enterprise in a combination, individually and as a combination; (i) Likelihood that the combination would result in the removal of a vigorous and effective competitor or competitors in the market; (j) Nature and extent of vertical integration in the market; (k) Possibility of a failing business; (l) Nature and extent of innovation; (m) Relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic development, by any combination having or likely to have appreciable adverse effect on competition; (n) Whether the benefits of the combination outweigh the adverse impact of the combination, if any

SECTION 20(4) IN THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

For the purposes of determining whether a combination would have the effect of or is likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market, the Commission shall have due regard to all or any of the following factors, namely:-

(a) actual and potential level of competition through imports in the market; (b) extent of barriers to entry into the market; (c) level of combination in the market; (d) degree of countervailing power in the market; (e) likelihood that the combination would result in the parties to the combination being able to significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins; (f) extent of effective competition likely to sustain in a market; (g) extent to which substitutes are available or are likely to be available in the market; (h) market share, in the relevant market, of the persons or enterprise in a combination, individually and as a combination; (i) likelihood that the combination would result in the removal of a vigorous and effective competitor or competitors in the market; (j) nature and extent of vertical integration in the market; (k) possibility of a failing business; (l) nature and extent of innovation; (m) relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic development, by any combination having or likely to have appreciable adverse effect on competition; (n) whether the benefits of the combination outweigh the adverse impact of the combination, if any.

The Preamble of Competition Act, 2002 provides that "An Act to provide, keeping in view of the economic development of the country, for the establishment of a Commission to prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets, to protect the interests of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets, in India, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act, requires certain combinations to be reported to the commission. The threshold limit will be calculated on the basis of their asset value /turnover. This is necessary to protect , improve competition and economic development of our country.

DISCLAIMER: The case law presented here is only for sharing knowledge and information with readers. The views are personal. In case of necessity do consult with professionals for better understanding and clarity on subject matter.

Published by

FCS Deepak Pratap Singh (Associate Vice President - Secretarial & Compliance (SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd.)) Category Corporate Law Report

Trending Online Classes

LIVE Course on Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA)(with recording)

LIVE Form 10 B and Form 10BB: Handle Tax Audit Reports of Charitable Organizations(with recording)

Foreign Trade Programme (Export & Import)(With Recording)

CCI Articles

You can also submit your article by sending to [email protected]

Browse by Category

Corporate Law
Info Technology
Shares & Stock
Professional Resource
Union Budget
Miscellaneous

Whatsapp Groups

India's largest network for finance professionals

Alternatively, you can log in using:

Call for Papers
Competitions
World Legal
Legal Drafting
Know Your Rights

Top 20 Landmark Judgements of Competition Law

UPSE v. National Stock Exchange Limited

Here, various fee waivers and the low level of deposit requirements only with respect to the CD segment of NSE were considered completely at a variance with its conduct in other segments and were aimed at eliminating competition and discouraging potential entrants. The issue before the court was if it violates the relevant act.

Competition Commission of India relying on the number of factors provided that under the Competition Act, 2002 has attempted to determine if activities of NSE amounts to indulgence in abusing of its dominant position and violation of the provisions of the Act.

Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars Ltd. & Ors

Appellant had filed the information against Volkswagen India, Honda India and Fiat India for violation of Section 3(4) and Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 as Original Equipment Manufacturers (hereinafter referred to as „OEMs‟) entered into agreements with Original Equipment Suppliers (hereinafter referred to as „OESs‟) and authorized dealers, which imposed unfair prices on the sale of auto spare parts and restricted the free availability of genuine auto spare parts in the market. Was there any violations?

CCI in this case has rendered a landmark ruling on automobile ancillary products and services in the auto industry.

Maharashtra State Power Generation Company Ltd. v. M/s. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. & Anr.

The information in this case was filed under section 19(1)(a) of the Act by two state owned power generation companies in Maharashtra and Gujarat against CIL and its subsidiaries alleging contravention of the section 4 of the Act. They alleged that OP were dominant in the relevant market and were abusing this dominance primarily through the terms and conditions imposed in the Fuel Supply Agreements.

The court in this case provided the constitutional mandate for state monopoly was raised by Opposite Parties placing reliance on Supreme Court ruling in Ashoka Smokeless Coal (P) Ltd. v. Union of India

M/s. Madhya Pradesh Power Generating Company Limited v. M/s. South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Anr.

Here, the SECL being the monopoly supplier was neither willing to negotiate the terms of coal supply agreement nor ensuring the supply obligations and therefore the terms and conditions of SECL were not fair and according to the object for which the informant was acquiring coal.

It was held that while CCI worked to regulatory framework and formulation of policy, CCI did not exempt the applicability of the Act to SOEs. Additionally, although cases relating to FSAs and Coal India are in appeal, it does not look like CCI will be changing its approach towards other SOEs.

COMPAT in M/s. Excel Crop Care Limited v. Competition Commission of India & Ors.

In the case of Sandhya Organic Chemicals, for which the tablets are the sole product, COMPAT reduced the penalty to a tenth of the original sum ordered by the CCI, on account of its relatively small production capacity. The challenge was made to this as an issue.

In the present case it has been rightly held that it was important to articulate the reasons as to why a particular percentage of penalties were being imposed and secondly, what would be the relevant turnover for such imposition.

Google Inc. v. CCI

A Complaint was filed before the CCI that Google Inc. has abused its dominant position in the internet advertising space by promoting its vertical search services like Youtube, Google News, Google Maps, etc. In other words, these services would appear predominantly during a search result on Google, irrespective of their popularity or relevance. The main issue was whether an administrative body like CCI had inherent powers to review or recall its order passed under section 26(1) in the absence of any specific provisions in the Competition Act, 2002?

The Delhi Court held that Competition Commission of India can recall or review its order subject to certain restrictions and the same should be done sparingly and not in every case where an investigation has been ordered without proper hearing.

Automobiles Dealers Association v. Global Automobiles Limited & Anr.

Here in this conflict, interpretation of section 19(3) of the Competition Act came before the court.

The language in section 19(3) states that the CCI shall have ‘due regard to all or any’ of the aforementioned factors. However, in this case CCI held that it would be prudent to examine an action in the backdrop of all the factors mentioned in Section 19(3).

Jet – Etihad Case

An appeal under Section 53B was made to COMPAT challenging the Jet – Etihad Orde was dismissed on the point of locus standi without examining the merits of the Jet – Etihad Order. Though Section 53A provides that ‘any person, aggrieved’ may challenge an order of CCI, COMPAT interpreted ‘any person’ to mean, a person ‘aggrieved’ by the CCI order and that it could not mean ‘any’ and ‘every’ person.

TELCO v Registrar of RT Agreement

The appeal is under Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (referred to as the Act) against the judgment and order of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (referred to as the Commission) dated 25 July, 1975. The principal question for consideration in this appeal is whether the agreement between the appellant referred to as Telco and its dealers allocating territories to its dealers within which only the dealers can sell bus and truck chassis referred to as the vehicles produced by the company constitutes a “restrictive trade practice.

The Supreme Court in this case held that rule of reason had to be applied in the cases of agreements constituting violations of the RTP.

Voltas Ltd v/s Union of India

An order of adjudication under the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was passed against the petitioner resulting into raising a demand of Rs. 81,68,304.00 on account of duty, and Rs. 35 lacs on account of fine with a penalty of Rs. 35,04,000.00 . The petitioner sought for waiver of pre-deposit and stays of the recovery. On 14th February, 1997, the Tribunal passed an order under Section 35-F of the Act, directing the amount of Rs. 50 lacs be deposited within a period of three months and subject to such deposit the recovery of balance to remain stayed during the appeal. The same was challenged in the court.

The apex Court has held that in view of the general definition of RTPs under Section 2 (o), practices other than the one listed under Section 33 (1) could be examined under Rule of Reason analysis.

Brahm Datt v. Union of India

A writ petition filed in the Supreme Court challenged the constitutional validity of the appointment of a retired bureaucrat as the head of the Commission. The Supreme Court passed its order on the said matter declining to grant relief sought by the Petitioner in view of the Government offering to amend the Competition Act.

Sodhi Transport Co. v. State Of U.P.

In this case of conflict between the parties the interpretation of Section 3(4) of the Competition Act came before the court.

The apex court has interpreted ‘shall be presumed’ as a presumption and not evidence itself, but merely indicative on whom burden of proof lies. Further, vertical agreements relating to activities referred to under Section 3(4) of the Competition Act on the other hand have to be analyzed in accordance with the rule of reason analysis under the Competition Act.

Shri Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Agni Devices Pvt. Ltd

Respondents claims itself to be the leading manufacturer, developer, importer and exporter of fire alarm systems, etc and has used threatening language to the appellant in regard to the use of trademarks. It this voilative of the act.

It was held that a mere restriction on the use of trademark would not be in violation of Sections 3 or 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

M/s. Magnus Graphics v. M/s. Nilpeter India Pvt. Ltd.

Where in a case the maintenance services and the spare parts of the said machine were provided to the Informant with a delay of 2 to 3 days, to which the Informant had not strongly objected, An analysis was carried out by the Commission in this case where based on a preliminary review of the provisions of the agreement and a preliminary examination of the effect of such clauses in terms of Section 3 of the Act, the Commission concluded a prima facie case and directed further investigation.

M/s. Financial Software and System Private Limited v. M/s. ACI Worldwide Solutions Private Limited &Ors

Here also based on a preliminary review of the clauses of the relevant agreement and its impact in terms of Section 3 of the Act, the Commission directed the DG to investigate further.

Mohit Manglani v. M/s Flipkart India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors

It was alleged by the Informant that these e-commerce websites have been indulging in anti-competitive practices in the nature of “exclusive agreements” with seller of goods/services. The Informant stated that owing to such practices, the consumer was left with no option in regards to terms of purchase and price of the goods and services and was bound to either purchase the product as per the terms of the website or opt not to purchase the product in totality. Whether the practice of entering into exclusive agreement for sale and purchase of goods by way of e-commerce is violating the provisions?

It was held that an exclusive arrangement between manufacturers and e-portals is not against Section 3. It is rather to help the consumer make an informed choice.

M/s Fast Track Call Cab Private Limited v. M/s ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd.

The CCI was of the prima facie view that predatory pricing, providing more incentives and discounts to customers and drivers compared to the revenue earned resulted in ousting the existing players out of the market and created entry barriers for the potential players against provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Moreover, the quantity of resources and the dependence of the consumer in the relevant market with no substitute are relevant factors to be taken into consideration when looking for acts in violation of Section 4.9.

M/s Jasper lnfotech Private Limited (Snapdeal) v.M/s Kaff Appliances (India) Pvt. Ltd.

Here in this conflict, interpretation of Section 3(4)(e) of the Competition Act came before the court.

The Competition Commission of India held that display of products at prices less than that determined by the dealers/distributors and also hinders their ability to compete and is thus a violation of Section 3(4)(e) read with 3(1) of the Act.

Steel Manufacturers Case

It was alleged by EEPC that the rise in the steel price in India is much higher in comparison to the world prices. Such sharp steel price increase was detrimental to the Indian engineering industry and the exporters of engineering goods especially those belonging to the small and medium scale sectors like critical engineering industry segments.

It may be considered an exception as its genesis lies in the MRTP Act. In such cases CCI examines whether the substantive law in these cases should be MRTP Act or the Act as a preliminary point before proceeding further.

Faridabad Industries Association vs. M/s Adani Gas Limited

Here in this case, it was alleged in the information that the opposite party by grossly abusing its dominant position in the relevant market of supply and distribution of natural gas in Faridabad has put unconscionable terms and conditions in Gas Sales Agreement (GSA), which are unilateral and lopsided, besides being heavily tilted in favour of AGL. The opposite party (AGL), in the garb of executing GSA, has imposed its diktat upon the buyers of natural gas, who are members of FIA. The issue if natural gas was a separate and distinct market was raised.

CCI observed that the opposite party was the only licenced gas supplier in Faridabad and natural gas had distinct features and characteristics and although end-users interchangeably used fuel oils and natural gas, CCI concluded that natural gas was a separate and distinct market.

1. CCI has jurisdiction over anti-competitive aspects of lottery business though lottery may be res extra commercium: SC

Case Details: Competition Commission of India v. State of Mizoram Citation: [2022] 134 taxmann.com 199 (SC)

Judiciary and Counsel Details

Sanjay Kishan Kaul & M.M. Sundresh , JJ.
Rajshekhar Rao , Sr. Adv., Arjun Krishnan , AOR, Ms Khushboo Mittal , Sumit Srivastava , Advs., Brijender Chahar , Sr. Adv., Rajesh Kumar , AOR, Varun Mudgil , R.K. Srivastava , Dr Pratyush Nandan , Arjun Garg , Aakash Nandolia , Adv., Sagun Srivastava , Advs., Kedar Nath Tripathy , AOR, Siddhesh Kotwal , Ms Ana Upadhyay , Ms Manya Hasija , Ms Pragya Barsaiyan , Akash Singh , Advs., Nirnimesh Dube , AOR, Nikhilesh Krishnan , Pranav Malhotra , Advs. & Shantanu Kumar , AOR for the Appearing parties.

Though lotteries, being akin to gambling activities, comes under purview of doctrine of res extra commercium, that will not takeaway aspect of something which is anti-competition in context of business related to lotteries and thus, CCI has jurisdiction over anti-competitive aspects of lottery business

Facts of the Case

The State of Mizoram had issued an Expression of Interest (EoI) inviting bids for the appointment of lottery distributors and selling agents for State lotteries regulated by the Mizoram Lotteries (Regulation) Rules, 2011 framed under the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998.

The EoI was for appointment of lottery distributors/selling agents to organise, promote, conduct, and market the Mizoram State Lottery through both conventional paper type and online system. The EoI specified that the minimum rate fixed by the Government of India is Rs.5 lakh per draw for Bumper and Rs. 10,000 per draw for others – bids less than these rates would be summarily rejected. In pursuance of the EoI, five bids were received of which four which quoted identical amount of Rs. 10,000, were selected. The State had also asked the successful bidders to furnish a security and deposit amount

The Respondent No. 4 made a complaint to the CCI under Sections 3 & 4 read with Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act alleging that the State of Mizoram abused its dominant position as administrator of State lotteries, by requiring distributors to furnish exorbitant sums of money towards security, advance payment, and prize pool even before the lotteries were held.

Respondent No. 4 alleged that the bidders had cartelised and entered into an agreement that had an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the lottery business in Mizoram. There was bid-rigging and a collusive bidding process which violated Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, and also caused grave financial loss to the State of Mizoram.

The CCI’s Director General (DG) found prima facie evidence on cartelisation and big rigging against the bidder companies, but the case against State was dropped by the DG.

The State of Mizoram moved to the High Court by filing a writ petition challenging the adverse remarks made against it by the CCI. The High Court by an interim order halted the CCI final orders. The High Court opined, was applicable to legitimate trade and goods, and was promulgated to ensure competition in markets that are res commercium.

Thus, lottery activity being in the nature of res extra commercium could not be covered by the Competition Act and consequently the CCI did not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of respondent no. 4, the High Court ruled. The CCI moved to the Supreme Court in appeal against the order

Supreme Court Held

The Supreme Court observed that though lotteries are state-regulated, the CCI has jurisdiction over the anti-competitive aspects of lottery business like bid-rigging in tendering process for appointment of selling agents and distributors. The CCI can order a probe into any perceived bid rigging in appointment of selling agents & distributors of lotteries.

Lotteries may be a regulated commodity and may even be res extra commercium. That would not take away the aspect of something which is anti-competition in the context of the business related to lotteries.

“We must take note of the expansive definition of ‘Service’ under Section 2(u) of the Competition Act. It means “service of any description”, which is to be made available to potential users.”

The purchaser of a lottery ticket is a potential user and a service is being made available by the selling agents in the context of the Competition Act. Suffice for us to say the inclusive mentioning does not inhibit the larger expansive definition.

The lottery business can continue to be regulated by the Regulation Act. However, if in the tendering process there is an element of anti-competition which would require investigation by the CCI, that cannot be prevented under the pretext of the lottery business being res extra commercium (thing beyond trade/commerce), more so when the State Government decides to deal in lotteries.

2. CCI slaps penalty of Rs. 936.44 Cr. on Google for abuse of dominance in market for licensable OS for smartphones

Case Details: XYZ (Confidential) v . Alphabet Inc. Citation: [2022] 145 taxmann.com 43 (CCI)

Ashok Kumar Gupta , Chairperson, Ms Sangeeta Verma & Bhagwant Singh Bishnoi , Member
Sajan Poovayya , Jayant Mehta , Sr. Advs. Karan Chandhiok , Ms Deeksha Manchanda , Ms Raksha Aggarwal , Ms Avaantika Kakkar , Kaustav Kundu , Ms Ruchi Verma , Tarun Donadi , Ms Auraellia Wang , Thomas Bohnett , Ms Smita Ann Andrews , Ms Sonam Mathur , Ms Dinoo Muthappa , Abir Roy , Dhruv Dikshit , Mark Buse , Vivek Pandey , Advs. & Tom Thomas for the Appellant.

CCI imposes penalty of Rs. 936.44 Cr. on Google for abuse of dominance in market for licensable OS for smartphones & in market for app store for Android

The CCI found that Google had abused its dominant position in contravention of several provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 as under –

Google was found to be in violation of the provisions of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act by making access to the Play Store, for app developers, dependent on mandatory usage of the Google Play Billing System (GPBS) for paid apps and in-app purchases which constitute an imposition of an unfair condition on app developers.
Google was found to be in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Act by following discriminatory practices by not using GPBS for its own applications such as YouTube. This also amounts to an imposition of discriminatory conditions and pricing on other apps that are required to use the system.
Google was found to be in violation of Section 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Act due to the mandatory imposition of the Google Play Billing System, which disrupts innovation incentives and limits the ability of payment processors and app developers to innovate and undertake technical development in the market for in-app payment processing services.
The mandatory imposition of GPBS by Google, has resulted in the denial of market access for payment aggregators and app developers, in violation of Section 4(2)(c) of the Act.
The practices followed by Google resulted in leveraging its dominance in the market for licensable mobile operating systems and app stores for Android to protect its position in the downstream markets, in violation of Section 4(2)(e) of the Act.
Google’s use of different methodologies to integrate its own UPI app with the Play Store compared to rival UPI apps resulted in the violation of Sections 4(2)(a)(ii), 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(e) of the Act.

The CCI observed that the prohibitions laid down in section 4 of the Competition Act are straightforward and any abuse of dominant position in terms of the imposition of unfair conditions, denial of market access, leveraging, imposition of supplementary obligations etc. is prohibited.

The CCI held that Google, after imposing unfair conditions as well as engaging in other conducts violating Section 4 of the Act, cannot take a plea that it lacked anti-competitive intent. The dominant undertakings are expected to comply with the provisions of the Act. Thus, the plea raised by Google was devoid of any merit and the same was rejected.

Further, the CCI imposed a penalty of Rs. 936.44 crores upon Google for violating Section 4 of the Act and directed Google to deposit the penalty amount within 60 days of the receipt of this order.

Also, the CCI directed Google to cease and desist from indulging in anti-competitive practices that have been found to be in contravention of Section 4 of the Act.

3. CCI orders probe against Apple for forcing ‘app developers’ to use its in-app payment solution

Case Details: Together We Fight Society v . Apple Inc. Citation: [2022] 135 taxmann.com 194 (CCI)

Ashok Kumar Gupta , Chairperson, Ms Sangeeta Verma & Bhagwant Singh Bishnoi , Member

Apple requires app developers, who wish to sell digital in-app content to their consumers, to use Apple’s in-app payment solution and thus, restricts choice available to app developers to select a payment processing system of their choice especially considering when Apple charges a commission of 30 per cent, though other payment processing solutions charge significantly lower fee for processing payments, these restrictions imposed by Apple forecloses market for app stores for iOS for potential app distributors in violation of section 4(2)(c)

In the instant case, the informant (an NGO called ‘Together We Fight Society’) alleged that Apple uses a barrage of anti-competitive restraints and abuse of dominant practices in markets for distribution of applications (‘apps’) to users of smartphones, tablets and processing of consumers’ payments for digital content used within iOS mobile apps (‘in-app content’).

The Informant averred that Apple imposes unreasonable and unlawful restraints on app developers from reaching users of its mobile devices (e.g., iPhone and iPad) unless they go through the ‘App Store’ which was stated to be controlled by Apple.

Further, Apple requires app developers who wish to sell digital in-app content to their consumers to use Apple’s in-app payment solution i.e. In-App Purchase (IAP) which carries a 30 per cent commission which is 10 times higher than as compared to open market rates.

The informant alleged that such restrictive practice and charge of exorbitant price amounts to abuse of dominant position under section 4 of the Act.

The Informant further asserted that Apple enjoys a dominant position in the market for non-licensable mobile OS for smart mobile devices as well as in the relevant market for app store for Apple smart mobile OS in India.

Apple’s App Store was the only approved App store for iOS devices. App developers have no other alternative except Apple’s App Store through which they could reach users of iOS. Thus, Apple was stated to have a monopoly in the iOS app distribution market.

The informant had alleged that Apple prevents iOS users from downloading app stores or apps directly from websites; pre-installs its own App Store on every iOS device it sells; disables iOS users’ ability to remove the App Store from their devices; and conditions all app developers’ access to iOS on the developers’ agreement to distribute their apps solely through the App Store and not to distribute third-party app stores.

The Competition Commission of India observed that in a relevant market i.e., market for app stores for iOS in India, Apple’s App Store is only means for developers to distribute their apps to consumers using Apple’s smart mobile devices running on Apple’s smart mobile operating system iOS, Apple holds a monopoly position in relevant market.

Then Apple requires app developers, who wish to sell digital in-app content to their consumers to use Apple’s in-app payment solution i.e., In-App Purchase (‘IAP’), and thus, restrict choice available to app developers to select a payment processing system of their choice especially considering when Apple charges a commission of 30 per cent however, other payment processing solutions charge significantly lower fee for processing payments; Apple also prohibits app developers to include a button/link in their apps which take user to third party payment processing solution other than Apple’s IAP, these restrictions imposed by Apple forecloses market for app stores for iOS for potential app distributors in violation of section 4(2)(c).

The Commission prima facie viewed that Apple has violated the provisions of section 4(2)(a), 4(2)(b), 4(2)(c), 4(2)(d) and 4(2)(e) of the Act, and therefore, it warrants detailed investigation. Accordingly, CCI directed the Director-General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter under the provisions of section 26(1).

4. CCI dismisses complaints of abuse of dominance and tie-in sales arrangement against Zomato

Case Details: Rohit Arora v . Zomato (P.) Ltd. Citation: [2022] 137 taxmann.com 68 (CCI)

OP i.e. Zomato , and another online intermediary for food ordering and delivery i.e. Swiggy, were competing with each other in same segment on various parameters, prima facie Zomato did not appear to hold a dominant position and complaints of abuse of dominance and bundling/tying of food ordering services with food delivery services were to be dismissed

In the instant case in the matter of Mr Rohit Arora v. Zomato Private Limited (now Zomato Limited) [2022] 137 taxmann.com 68 (CCI) , an information was filed by an Informant under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Act) against Zomato Private Limited (OP) alleging contravention of provisions of Sections 3(4) and 4 of the Act. The Informant is stated to be a consumer of Zomato for a long and has been ordering regularly from its platform since 2018.

The Informant alleged that Zomato abused its dominant position by raising food delivery charges and by charging unfair, discriminatory, and exorbitant delivery charges from its consumers. It was further alleged that Zomato vertically restrained restaurants from delivering food themselves and is restricting food delivery from unfavoured restaurants by not assigning delivery executives.

In order to support the complaint, the Informant mentioned three incidents:

First Incident: Zomato had canceled the order stating it could not deliver the order, as the customer was unavailable to collect the food at the mentioned address and your phone was unreachable. Since the restaurant had prepared your order and denied to refund the amount for this order

The Informant later checked the terms of service on the OP’s app and found that as per Term XIII, any cancellation will be treated as an authorization breach for which Zomato is entitled to levy liquidated damages which it may determine at its discretion. The imposition of such an arbitrary cancellation policy was alleged to be abusive conduct on the part of the OP.

Second Incident: The second incident was related to spillage of food, Zomato and replied that Zomato Valet has delivered perfect orders in the last week and he is rated 4.9 out of 5 stars. We’ll treat this mistake as an exception from his end and share feedback with him. According to the Informant, this amounted to an abuse of dominant position by Zomato.

Third Incident: This incident was related to the non-refund of money on the cancellation of order. Zomato refunded only 50% of the order amount citing that the restaurant had begun preparing the food ordered. The Informant compared the cancellation policy of Zomato with other platforms such as Swiggy, Talabat.com, Deliveroo, Food Panda, etc. to demonstrate that the cancellation policy of the former is abusive.

Zomato’s reply

In its reply, Zomato, at the outset, as regards the first incident, stated that, the Informant placed an order through Zomato, then directly contacted the delivery partner asking him to contact him on his landline number and not on his registered mobile number when delivering the order. When such instructions are communicated through Zomato, its customer service executives ensure that such instructions reach the delivery partner. But in the present circumstances, when the instructions were directly passed on to the delivery partner, it would have been unfair for Zomato to provide the Informant a full refund since the delivery partner had spent time, energy, and fuel to pick up and transport the order.

With regard to the second incident, Zomato had stated that its customer support executive asked the Informant to select the item that was spilled. However, the Informant did not proceed with the complaint and did not provide a photo of the spill which prima facie shows that the Informant was just interested in getting a quick refund, and when he realised that this will not happen, he did not proceed with the complaint and is now twisting the facts by stating that Zomato did not ask him to provide photographic evidence of the spill. As per Zomato, had it been a genuine case, the Informant should have raised the issue with the customer support team or contacted them through email, attaching photographic evidence of the spillage.

As regards the third incident, Zomato had refuted the Informant’s claim that he cancelled the order dated 30.10.2020 ‘within 30—40 seconds’. As per Zomato, the Informant had placed the order at 11.09 A.M. and had reached out for cancellation at 11.11 A.M., which was two minutes after placing the order. Even then, contrary to the Informant’s allegation, he was provided a full refund for the order, a fact which the Informant has wilfully and fraudulently failed to disclose.

CCI ruled that with respect to the three personal incidents of abuse alleged by the Informant, the Zomato sought to negate the same with evidence on record, which was not refuted by the Informant substantively, and thus, the Commission found no instance of abuse has been made out against the Zomato

The Commission observed that the Informant had delineated two separate relevant markets as online food ordering services provided by food aggregator apps in India and food delivery services in India, which Zomato had disputed. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commission believed that there exists no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of the Act against the OP, and the Information filed is directed to be closed forthwith under Section 26(2) of the Act.

5. No violation of Competition Act if Govt. dept. insists their suppliers to get accreditation from NABL only

Case Details: Dushyant v. National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL) Citation: [2022] 135 taxmann.com 349 (CCI)

In a tender floated by OPs for supply of products/services, OPs mandated suppliers to obtain testing or accreditation services from NABL or labs accredited by NABL based on their policies/guidelines/rules of procurement/some enactments governing their functioning, there was no violation of provisions of sections 3 and 4 by OPs

In the instant case, in the matter of Dushyant v. National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL) [2022] 135 taxmann.com 349 (CCI), Mr Dushyant (“Informant”) filed an application under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (Act) alleging contravention of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act by the National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (“NABL”) and other Department of Government/Government-affiliated bodies or Public Sector Undertakings-Opposite Parties (OPs).

The Informant alleged that NABL entered into Exclusive Supply Agreements (ESA) with the other OPs where no other accreditation service other than that of NABL was allowed. The suggested bidders/suppliers had to obtain accreditation services from NABL and its accredited laboratories only. The Informant contended that when there were other accreditation agencies existing as on date in India, it violated the provisions of section 3 (4) of the Act.

The Informant further submitted that it led to the monopolisation of power in the hands of NABL and caused an appreciable adverse effect on competition, leading to the denial of market access. The Informant contended that this violates Sections 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(c) of the Act.

The CCI held that the Informant failed to provide any evidence about NABL having an agreement/arrangement with OPs in relation to some exclusive arrangement in favour of NABL. Thus, the CCI, prima facie, does not find a contravention of Section 3(4) of the Act by any OPs.

As far as the question of violation of section 4 of the Act was concerned, CCI held that the Informant failed to provide any data/information to support his claim regarding the market share or dominance of each of the OPs.

The OPs seeking NABL’s accreditation (based on their policies/ guidelines/ rules of procurement/some enactments governing their functioning), there was nothing to suggest that NABL had any role in framing the same.

Further, OPs are free to stipulate standards for procurement, and the same cannot be held to be out-rightly anti-competitive. There was no hint to suggest that procurers other than OPs are also imposing similar conditions as the present OPs. Therefore the question of foreclosure of the market for other accreditation agencies does not arise.

The CCI ordered that there was no prima facie case of contravention of any of the provisions of Section 3 and/or 4 of the Act was made out against the OPs for causing an investigation into the matter. Therefore, the matter was ordered to be closed forthwith.

6. CCI imposes a monetary penalty of Rs. 1,337.76 crores on Google for anti-competitive practices

The Competition Commission of India (Commission) has imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,337.76 crores on Google for abusing its dominant position in multiple markets in the Android Mobile device ecosystem, apart from issuing cease and desist orders. The Commission also directed Google to modify its conduct within a defined timeline.

Based on its assessment, the Commission found Google to be dominant in all the below-mentioned relevant markets:

(a) Licensable OS for smart mobile devices in India;

(b) App store for Android smart mobile OS in India;

(d) Non-OS specific mobile web browsers in India;

(e) Online video hosting platform in India.

Further, Google also secured a significant competitive edge over its competitors in relation to its other revenue-earning app, i.e. YouTube on Android devices. The competitors of these services could never avail of the same level of market access that Google secured and embedded for itself through a Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA). Network effects, coupled with status quo bias, create significant entry barriers for competitors of Google to enter or operate in the concerned markets.

Further, the Revenue Sharing Agreements (RSAs) helped Google to secure exclusivity for its search services to the total exclusion of competitors. The combined results of these agreements guaranteed continuous access to search queries of mobile users, which helped not only in protecting the advertisement revenue but also to reap the network effects through continuous improvement of services, to the exclusion of competitors. With these agreements in place, the competitors never stood a chance to compete effectively with Google. Ultimately, these agreements resulted in foreclosing the market for them and eliminating choice for users.

CCI Observations

The Commission opined that the markets should be allowed to compete on merits, and the onus is on the dominant players, i.e. Google, that its conduct does not influence this competition on merits. By virtue of the agreements discussed above, Google ensured that users continued to use its search services on mobile devices, which facilitated uninterrupted growth of advertisement revenue for Google. Further, it also helped Google to further invest and improve its services to the exclusion of others. Thus, the underlying objective of Google in imposing various restrictions via MADA and RSAs was to protect and strengthen its dominant position in general search services.

CCI’s Decision

Accordingly, in terms of the provisions of Section 27 of the Act, the Commission imposed a monetary penalty of Rs. 1,337.76 crores and issued cease and desist orders against Google from indulging in anti-competitive practices that have been found to be in contravention of provisions of Section 4 of the Act.

One important part of the CCI order is that Licensing of Play Store (including Google

Play Services) to OEMs shall not be linked with the requirement of pre-installing Google search services, Chrome browser, YouTube, Google Maps, Gmail or any other application of Google. The CCI wants Google to stop the mandatory pre-installation of the entire Google Mobile Suite on smartphones under its Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA) that it signs with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). The CCI noted in the press release that this placement is unfair to “device manufacturers” and anti-competitive in nature. Further, it cannot restrict users from uninstalling its apps and choosing other search engine options.

Read the Full Press Release

7. Bar council of India couldn’t be said to be an enterprise, a review petition filed before Supreme Court dismissed

Case Details: Thupili Raveendra Babu v. Competition Commission of India Citation: [2022] 142 taxmann.com 549 (SC)

Supreme Court dismissed review petition filed against it ruling that Bar Council of India is a statutory body established under section 4 of Advocates Act, 1961, which is exclusive rule making authority to set standards of legal education and, thus, it could not be said to be an ‘enterprise’ within meaning of section 2(h)

Facts of the Case

In the instant case, the petitioner was an executive engineer in the Central Public Works Department (CPWD), Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India. He planned to take voluntary retirement to pursue a legal education.

According to the petitioner, the Bar Council of India (BCI) regulates legal practice and education in India. It enjoys the dominant position in controlling legal education and practice in India.

The petitioner stated that pursuant to Clause 28 of Schedule III, Rule 11 to Part IV – Rules of Legal Education, 2008, a part of BCI Rules enacted under the Advocates Act, 1961 according to which the candidates belonging to the general category who have attained the age of more than 30 years, was barred from pursuing a legal education.

The BCI had allegedly imposed maximum age restrictions, which act as an indirect barrier for the new entrants. The impugned clause 28 had been incorporated by the BCI in contravention of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 by ‘misusing its dominant position’. Further, the BCI had also indulged in a colourable exercise of power.

Therefore, the petitioner had prayed before the Commission to declare the impugned Clause 28 as illegal and void ab initio and impose the maximum penalty on the BCI for violation of Section 4 and indulging in a colourable exercise of power. Further, the petitioner also prayed for interim directions under Section 33 for suspending the impugned clause 28.

The CCI opined that there was no prima facie case under Section 4 and directed the information filed to be closed immediately under Section 26(2) of the Act. Therefore, the aggrieved petitioner preferred an appeal before the NCLAT.

The NCLAT held that the Bar Council of India is a Statutory Body and has its primordial role in performing its duties. Hence, the Bar Council of India is not an ‘enterprise’ having any economic and commercial activity.

Further, the NCLAT held that the BCI is concerned with the standards of the legal profession and equipping those who seek entry into such profession with the relevant knowledge and skills.

The Supreme Court, by the impugned order, upheld the order passed by the NCLAT. Then, the petitioner, by the instant petition, sought a review of the impugned order.

The Supreme Court held that the Bar Council of India is a statutory body established under Section 4 of the Advocates Act. It is the exclusive rule-making authority to set standards of legal education. Thus, it couldn’t be said to be an ‘enterprise’ within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Competition Act, 2002.

The Supreme Court further held that the impugned order didn’t suffer from any apparent error warranting its reconsideration. Accordingly, the instant review petition was to be dismissed.

8. CCI orders investigation into allegations of abuse of dominance by Google in news aggregation services

Case Details: Digital News Publishers Association v . Alphabet Inc. Citation: [2022] 134 taxmann.com 103 (CCI)

Ashok Kumar Gupta , Chairperson, Ms Sangeeta Verma & Bhagwant Singh Bishnoi , JJ

Google was an indispensable trading partner for news website publishers and Google had unilaterally decided not to pay digitalnewspublishers for snippets used by them in search engine, it also forced publishers to build mirror-image websites using Accelerated Mobile Pages (AMP) format with Google caching all articles and serving content directly to mobile users, such conduct of Google required a detailed assessment, and thus, DG was directed to cause an investigation into matter under provisions of section 26(1)

In the instant case in the matter of Digital News Publishers Association v. Alphabet Inc – [2022] 134 taxmann.com 103 (CCI) , the informant (Digital News Publishers Association), a Section 8 Company formulated to promote, aid, help, encourage, develop, protect and secure the interest of digital news publishers filed a complaint under section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 against Alphabet Inc., Google LLC, Google India Private Limited, and Google Ireland Limited (collectively referred to as ‘Google’) alleging violation of Section 4 of the Act.

The Informant claimed that the majority of the traffic on news websites comes from online search engines (i.e. more than 50%), wherein Google is claimed to be the most dominant search engine. The informant argued that Google imposed direct/indirect unfair conditions on the members of the Informant while allowing website links of the members of the Informant on their search engine results.

The informant alleged that Google abused its dominant position to impose unfair and arbitrary conditions on the members of the Informant u/s Section 4(2)(a)(i), as the members of the Informant were not informed of or given any data pertaining to the amount of revenue earned by the Google by providing advertisements on the websites/links of the members of the Informant. Google only give a small chunk of revenue generated to the members of the Informant in an arbitrary manner. The publishers of the news only got a smaller chunk of the revenue generated.

The informant also alleged that unfair acts of Google are detrimental and prejudicial to the interests of the consumers as well as the journalism industry as it de-motivates the entire journalism industry, as they put all hard work into publishing news and get only a smaller chunk of revenue.

The Informant further alleged that Google does not produce any news of their own; however, they have steadily grown their influence in the news space by effectively using their dominance in the relevant markets.

It had been contended that Google not only had a monopolistic position in search in India, it also had a very strong position in advertising intermediation and controls the major share at each level. The informant alleged that Google abused its dominance in every way. The members of the Informant have no other option but to accept the terms, as they are, with no bargaining power whatsoever.

The informant prayed the Commission to pass an order under section 26(1) of the Act to inquire into the conduct of Google for the violation of Section-4 of the Act.

The Commission noted that Google’s market share ranged from 98% to 99% in the mobile search engine market during the period April 2019 to July 2021. Apart from market share data, the Commission had also taken note of the detailed submissions of the Informant on other factors given under Section 19(4) of the Act to assert the dominance of Google in the relevant markets.

Based on the above, the Commission, prima facie viewed that no doubt Google has the dominance in the relevant market and Google had violated the provisions of Section 4(2)(a) of the Act, which merits investigation. The Commission observed that an investigation by the DG would be able to examine the issues comprehensively by allowing all concerned to present their case. Accordingly, directed the DG to cause an investigation into the matter under the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act.

9. HCs can’t interfere with CCI’s probe unless there is an abuse of process and it appears a mala fide investigation

Case Details: GMR Hyderabad lnternational Airport Ltd. v . Competition Commission of lndia Citation: [2022] 144 taxmann.com 186 (Telangana)

K. Lakshman , J.
S. Niranjan Reddy & Ms Rubaina S. Khatoon for the Petitioner.
K. Vivek Reddy , Ms Neha Pandey , D. Prakash Reddy & P. Sriram for the Respondent.

CCI order directing probe against GMR for alleged abuse of market power, on a complaint filed by informant an aircraft Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) service provider Air Works was well reasoned, hence could not have been interfered with

In the instant case in the matter of GMR Hyderabad lnternational Airport Ltd. v. Competition Commission of lndia – [2022] 144 taxmann.com 186 (HC-Telangana), a question was raised before the High Court as to whether the Court can interfere in CCI proceedings and investigations when there appears to be an abuse of law?

High Court Held

The High Court observed that an order passed u/s 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, directing investigation by the Director General is an administrative order passed only to determine whether allegations made by informant u/s 19(1), about possible violations of competition law are true.

It was further observed that once information is received u/s 19(1), CCI, based on material produced by the informant has to form a prima facie opinion regarding possible competition law violations. The High Court held that while forming a prima facie opinion, CCI has to only determine if allegations along with material produced are taken to be true, will that result in breach of competition law.

The High Court held that scope of interference of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in an order passed directing investigation under section 26(1) is extremely limited. The CCI and authorities under Act, 2002 were well equipped to conduct the investigation and possess expertise in said field.

In view of the above, it was held that the High Courts could not interfere with such investigation unless there is an abuse of process and prima-facie it appears that the investigation was marred by mala fides.

It is only after the investigation/inquiry is completed and parties are given an opportunity of hearing that the CCI can decide whether the dispute is strictly commercial and raises no competition law concerns.

10. No abuse of dominance by Asian Paints; allegations of enforcing exclusive supply agreement couldn’t be substantiated: CCI

Case Details: JSW Paints (P.) Ltd. v . Asian Paints Ltd. Citation: [2022] 142 taxmann.com 210 (CCI)

Informant filed information against manufacturer of decorative and industrial paints , i.e. OP that it had acted in contravention of provisions of sections 3 and 4 by enforcing an exclusive supply agreement and restraining paint dealers to not to deal with informant’s paint , however, said allegations could not be substantiated with concrete evidence, no case of contravention of provisions of sections 3 and 4 was made out

In the instant case in the matter of JSW Paints (P.) Ltd. v. Asian Paints Ltd. – [2022] 142 taxmann.com 210 (CCI) , the information was filed by JSW Paints (P.) Ltd (the “Informant) u/s 19(1)(a) against Asian Paints Limited alleging the contravention of sections 3(4) and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

JSW Paints alleged that, immediately after the launch of its decorative paints, Asian Paints targeted dealers/distributors/retailers partnering with JSW Paints. It directed them to stop dealing with JSW Paints and threatened them to stop supplies to these dealers.

Further, it also asked dealers to remove display of JSW Paints products from their retail shelves and threatened of not to allow them discretionary discounts, among others.

Further, Asian Paints was alleged to hinder the entry of JSW Paints by virtue of its dominance in the market for the manufacture and sale of decorative paints by the organised sector in India, in contravention of provisions of Section 4(2)(c) of the Act. Thus, the conduct of Asian Paints was aimed at preventing JSW Paints from establishing its presence in the said market

The CCI noted that the conduct of Asian Paints was a case of enforcing an exclusive supply agreement and refusal to deal as provided in Section 3(4) of the Act. Thus, the said conduct caused an appreciable adverse effect on competition by creating barriers to entry, driving existing competitors out of the market and foreclosure of competition by hindering the entry of JSW Paints into the market.

The CCI observed that the Asian Paints prima facie appeared to enjoy a dominant position in the relevant market for “manufacture and sale of decorative paints by the organised sector in India”.

Further, with respect to the alleged contravention of Section 3(4) of the Act, the CCI observed that the restraints imposed by Asian Paints appeared to be in the nature of an exclusive supply agreement and refusal to deal. Accordingly, the CCI directed the DG to cause an investigation to be made into the matter under the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act.

The CCI, on the basis of DG findings, held that there has to be evidence that, on the balance of probabilities, would point towards a strong entrenched player using tactics to oust a smaller player or even a new entrant to the market (regardless of its size or inherent advantages) by either incentivizing or coercing downstream players to boycott or not deal with the new players.

“In the present case, the balance was not tilted towards JSW Paints. Asian Paints was able to demonstrate that some of its conduct or practices adopted qua the dealers were in furtherance of its terms of doing business with such dealers and not to keep JSW Paints away from the market. “

In view of the above, the allegations of enforcing an exclusive supply agreement and refusal to deal against the Asian Paints were to be dismissed.

Disclaimer: The content/information published on the website is only for general information of the user and shall not be construed as legal advice. While the Taxmann has exercised reasonable efforts to ensure the veracity of information/content published, Taxmann shall be under no liability in any manner whatsoever for incorrect information, if any.

Taxmann Publications has a dedicated in-house Research & Editorial Team. This team consists of a team of Chartered Accountants, Company Secretaries, and Lawyers. This team works under the guidance and supervision of editor-in-chief Mr Rakesh Bhargava.

The Research and Editorial Team is responsible for developing reliable and accurate content for the readers. The team follows the six-sigma approach to achieve the benchmark of zero error in its publications and research platforms. The team ensures that the following publication guidelines are thoroughly followed while developing the content:

The statutory material is obtained only from the authorized and reliable sources
All the latest developments in the judicial and legislative fields are covered
Prepare the analytical write-ups on current, controversial, and important issues to help the readers to understand the concept and its implications
Every content published by Taxmann is complete, accurate and lucid
All evidence-based statements are supported with proper reference to Section, Circular No., Notification No. or citations
The golden rules of grammar, style and consistency are thoroughly followed
Font and size that’s easy to read and remain consistent across all imprint and digital publications are applied

To subscribe to our weekly newsletter please log in/register on Taxmann.com

Latest books.

R.K. Jain's Customs Tariff of India | Set of 2 Volumes

R.K. Jain's Customs Law Manual | 2023-24 | Set of 2 Volumes

R.K. Jain's GST Law Manual | 2023-24

R.K. Jain's GST Tariff of India | 2023-24

Everything on Tax and Corporate Laws of India

Author: Taxmann

Font and size that's easy to read and remain consistent across all imprint and digital publications are applied

Everything you need on Tax & Corporate Laws. Authentic Databases, Books, Journals, Practice Modules, Exam Platforms, and More.

Express Delivery | Secured Payment
Free Shipping in India on order(s) above ₹500
+91 8688939939
About Company
Media Coverage
Union Budget 2024-25

Business & Support
Sell with Taxmann
Locate Dealers
Locate Representatives
CD Key Activation
Privacy Policy
Return Policy
Payment Terms

IMPACT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM ON NON-ASSOCIATED

How blockchain technology can revolutionize the legal field, popular data science tools to know in 2024, role of ai in transforming legal profession.

How Personal Injury Lawyers Maximize Your Compensation After a Car Accident

SOCIAL LAWS TODAY is the Largest Legal Blog integrating tremendous knowledge and information amongst the entire legal fraternity and revolutionising Legal Services.

Community Guidelines
Country Ambassadors
Editorial Advisory Board
Privacy Policy
Publish Article/Guest Post
Terms and Conditions
Advertise with us

Competition Act 2002 – Maintaining a Fair and Healthy Competition

by Social Laws Today
May 15, 2023
10 minutes read

Table of Contents

Introduction

In a rapidly growing economy like India, maintaining fair and healthy competition is crucial for sustainable economic development. To achieve this objective, India enacted the Competition Act 2002, which aims to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote market efficiency, and protect consumer interests. This article explores how the Competition Act 2002 of India is helping to maintain fair and healthy competition and prevent the abuse of dominant position by firms.

Understanding the Competition Act 2002

The Competition Act 2002 is a comprehensive legislation that governs competition-related matters in India. It replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, and established the Competition Commission of India (CCI) as the regulatory authority. The Act is designed to create a competitive market environment, prevent monopolies, and ensure consumer welfare.

Ensuring Market Efficiency

The Competition Act 2002 promotes market efficiency by encouraging free and fair competition. It prohibits anti-competitive agreements, and abuse of dominant position, and regulates mergers and acquisitions that may have an adverse impact on competition. By ensuring a level playing field, the Act fosters innovation, efficiency, and productivity, benefiting both businesses and consumers.

Encouraging Innovation and Consumer Benefits

Healthy competition stimulates innovation and drives businesses to offer better-quality products and services at competitive prices. The Competition Act safeguards consumers’ interests by preventing unfair practices such as price manipulation, collusion, and misleading advertising. This encourages businesses to focus on providing value to consumers, leading to improved choices, affordability, and overall consumer welfare.

Preventing Anti-Competitive Practices

The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements, including cartels and bid-rigging, which harm competition and result in higher prices and reduced consumer welfare. The Competition Commission of India has the authority to investigate such practices and impose penalties on the offenders. This ensures that businesses compete based on merit, rather than engaging in unfair practices that stifle competition.

Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Position

The Competition Act 2002 also addresses the issue of abuse of dominant position by firms in the market. The abuse of dominance refers to practices undertaken by a dominant firm to exploit its market power and restrict competition. The Act identifies and prohibits such practices to protect the interests of consumers and maintain a level playing field.

Establishing Dominance

To determine the dominance of a firm, the Competition Act considers various factors such as market share, size, resources, and competitive strength. The Competition Commission of India evaluates the relevant market and assesses the firm’s ability to operate independently of competitive forces.

Abuse of Dominant Position

The Act explicitly prohibits the abuse of dominant position by firms. It includes practices such as unfair pricing, predatory pricing, denial of market access, discriminatory practices, and imposing unfair terms on trading partners. These practices are detrimental to fair competition and can harm both consumers and competitors.

Examples of Abuse

Several instances of abuse of dominant position have been addressed under the Competition Act. For example, in the telecom sector, dominant firms were found to engage in predatory pricing, leading to the exclusion of smaller competitors. The Act empowered the Competition Commission to take action against such practices, ensuring a level playing field for all players.

Role of the Competition Commission of India (CCI)

The Competition Commission of India plays a vital role in enforcing the Competition Act 2002 and ensuring fair competition in the market.

Investigation and Enforcement

The CCI has the authority to investigate and penalize anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominant position. It can conduct inquiries, summon witnesses, gather evidence, and impose penalties on violators. This robust enforcement mechanism acts as a deterrent and promotes compliance with the Act.

Penalties and Remedies

The Act empowers the CCI to impose penalties on firms found guilty of anti-competitive practices. These penalties can be significant, including fines and divestment orders. Additionally, the CCI can issue cease and desist orders, directing firms to discontinue their anti-competitive behavior and restore fair competition.

Advocacy and Awareness

Apart from enforcement, the CCI plays a proactive role in advocacy and creating awareness about competition-related issues. It conducts workshops, seminars, and public consultations to educate stakeholders and promote a culture of fair competition. Through its advocacy efforts, the CCI encourages voluntary compliance with the Act and fosters a competitive market environment.

Case Studies of Successful Enforcement

The Competition Act 2002 has been instrumental in addressing anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominant positions in various sectors of the Indian economy. Here are a few notable case studies:

Bharti Airtel Limited v. Competition Commission of India

In the case of Bharti Airtel Limited v. Competition Commission of India, the Competition Act 2002 was instrumental in addressing anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector. Bharti Airtel Limited, a dominant firm in the industry, was accused of engaging in predatory pricing and unfair practices that restricted competition.

Bharti Airtel Limited, one of the leading telecom companies in India, was alleged to have engaged in predatory pricing, where it offered services at excessively low prices to drive competitors out of the market. This predatory behavior was seen as an abuse of its dominant position, as Bharti Airtel held a significant market share and had the ability to influence prices and restrict competition.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) conducted a thorough investigation into the matter. The CCI found evidence of predatory pricing and determined that Bharti Airtel Limited had violated the provisions of the Competition Act 2002. As a result, the CCI imposed a significant penalty on Bharti Airtel, along with a cease and desist order, directing the company to discontinue its anti-competitive behavior.

Significance

This case highlighted the role of the Competition Act 2002 in addressing anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector. The CCI’s intervention ensured fair competition, improved pricing, and enhanced services for consumers. It also sent a strong message to dominant firms that engaging in predatory pricing and restricting competition would not be tolerated under the provisions of the Act.

Flipkart v. Competition Commission of India

In the case of Flipkart v. Competition Commission of India, the Competition Act 2002 played a crucial role in regulating the e-commerce industry. Flipkart, a dominant player in the market, was accused of engaging in unfair practices, including exclusive tie-ups, deep discounts, and preferential treatment.

Flipkart, one of the largest e-commerce platforms in India, faced allegations of anti-competitive behavior. It was accused of entering into exclusive tie-ups with certain sellers, offering deep discounts on its platform, and providing preferential treatment to select sellers, thereby creating an uneven playing field for competitors.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) initiated an investigation into the matter. The investigation revealed evidence of anti-competitive practices by Flipkart, which were found to be in violation of the Competition Act 2002. As a result, the CCI imposed penalties on Flipkart and issued a cease and desist order, directing the company to end its unfair practices and promote fair competition.

This case showcased the importance of the Competition Act 2002 in regulating the e-commerce industry and ensuring fair competition. The intervention of the CCI prevented dominant players from leveraging their market power to gain unfair advantages, thereby creating a level playing field for all market participants. It fostered fair competition, encouraged innovation, and protected the interests of consumers.

Cipla Limited v. Competition Commission of India

In the case of Cipla Limited v. Competition Commission of India, the Competition Act 2002 played a significant role in addressing anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical sector. Cipla Limited, a major pharmaceutical company, was accused of collusion and price-fixing.

Cipla Limited, along with other pharmaceutical companies, was alleged to have engaged in collusion and price-fixing, which restricted competition and resulted in inflated prices of medicines. This behavior was seen as an abuse of dominant position, as these companies collectively held a substantial market share and had the ability to control prices.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) extensively investigated the case. The CCI gathered evidence of collusion and price-fixing among pharmaceutical companies, including Cipla Limited. Based on the evidence, the CCI concluded that the companies had violated the provisions of the Competition Act 2002.

As a result, the CCI imposed significant penalties on Cipla Limited and the other pharmaceutical companies involved in the collision. Additionally, the CCI issued a cease and desist order, directing them to discontinue their anti-competitive practices and restore fair competition in the pharmaceutical market.

This case highlighted the critical role of the Competition Act 2002 in addressing anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical sector. The intervention of the CCI ensured increased affordability of medicines and improved access for consumers. By taking action against collusion and price-fixing, the Act contributed to a more competitive market, fostering innovation and benefiting consumers in need of essential medications.

The Competition Act 2002 acts as a safeguard, protecting consumer interests, encouraging innovation, and promoting economic growth. By preventing anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominant position, the Act contributes to the overall development and sustainability of the Indian economy.

Challenges and Criticisms

While the Competition Act 2002 has significantly contributed to maintaining fair competition, it faces certain challenges and criticisms.

Lack of Speedy Resolution

One criticism is the time-consuming nature of legal proceedings under the Act. The lengthy investigative process and appeals can lead to delayed resolution of cases, impacting the effectiveness of enforcement.

Insufficient Resources

The Competition Commission of India faces resource constraints, including staffing and budgetary limitations. This can affect its ability to handle a large number of cases and conduct in-depth investigations.

Coordination with Other Regulatory Bodies

Coordinating with other regulatory bodies, such as sector-specific regulators, can be challenging. Ensuring the harmonization of competition policies with sectoral regulations is essential for effective enforcement.

In conclusion, the Competition Act 2002 of India plays a vital role in maintaining fair and healthy competition in the Indian market. It promotes market efficiency, encourages innovation, and prevents anti-competitive practices. By prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position, the Act ensures that no firm can exploit its market power to the detriment of consumers and competitors.

The Competition Commission of India, as the regulatory authority, plays a crucial role in enforcing the Act. Through investigation, enforcement, and advocacy, the Commission ensures compliance with competition laws, imposes penalties on violators, and raises awareness about the benefits of fair competition.

While the Act has been successful in addressing anti-competitive practices in various sectors, challenges such as delays in resolution and resource limitations exist. Efforts to streamline legal proceedings and provide adequate resources to the Competition Commission will enhance the effectiveness of enforcement.

Overall, the Competition Act 2002 of India serves as a powerful tool to maintain fair and healthy competition, foster innovation, and protect consumer interests. By promoting a competitive market environment, the Act contributes to the sustainable growth of the Indian economy.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q1. What is the objective of the Competition Act 2002?

A1. The objective of the Competition Act 2002 is to promote fair and healthy competition, prevent anti-competitive practices, and protect consumer interests in India.

Q2. How does the Competition Act promote fair competition?

A2. The Competition Act promotes fair competition by prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant positions, and regulating mergers and acquisitions. It ensures a level playing field and encourages innovation, efficiency, and consumer benefits.

Q3. What is the role of the Competition Commission of India?

A3. The Competition Commission of India is the regulatory authority responsible for enforcing the Competition Act. It investigates anti-competitive practices, imposes penalties, advocates for fair competition, and raises awareness about competition-related issues.

Q4. How does the Act prevent the abuse of the dominant position?

A4. The Competition Act prevents the abuse of a dominant position by defining and prohibiting practices such as unfair pricing, predatory pricing, discriminatory practices, and denial of market access. The Act empowers the Competition Commission to take action against firms engaging in such practices.

Q5. What are the major challenges faced in implementing the Act?

A5. The major challenges in implementing the Competition Act include delays in the resolution of cases, resource limitations faced by the Competition Commission, and coordination with other regulatory bodies. Efforts to address these challenges can further strengthen the effectiveness of the Act.

To know about Cyberbullying and Laws about it in India: Click Here

Share This Post:

Labor laws in india – development and importance, the resolution professional: the strong-weak pillar in the ibc, leave feedback about this cancel reply.

Quality 5 4 3 2 1
Price 5 4 3 2 1
Service 5 4 3 2 1

How Personal Injury Lawyers Maximize Your Compensation After a

How to file an uber driver sexual assault lawsuit.

Apprentice Lawyer

10 Important Judgments on Competition Law by Indian Courts in 2023

2023 has been an important year in the development of competition law jurisprudence in India.

While the Competition Commission of India ( CCI ) remained inquorate for a substantial part of the year, the Supreme Court of India ( Supreme Court ), the High Courts, and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal ( NCLAT ) (the appellate authority of the CCI) pronounced a number of judgments that impact the jurisdiction and functioning of the CCI, and address contentious issues within the Indian competition law framework.

These key decisions are summarised below.

1. Coal India Ltd & Anr. v. Competition Commission of India & Another (Supreme Court – June 2023) - Competition Act is applicable to State-owned monopolies.

After a ten-year legal battle between Coal India Ltd ( CIL ) and the CCI on its jurisdiction to examine the conduct of State-owned monopolies, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 ( Competition Act ) apply to CIL and similar public sector undertakings. The Supreme Court decision clarified that the Competition Act is applicable to all government companies and statutory monopolies that operate to further “common good” under the Constitution of India.

Given the Supreme Court’s decision, the CCI’s jurisdiction to investigate and take measures against statutory monopolies similar to CIL in abuse of dominance cases has been confirmed.

2. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v. Competition Commission of India & Another (Delhi High Court – July 2023) – Patents Act, 1970 is a code in itself and prevails over the provisions of the Competition Act

A division bench of the Delhi High Court held that disputes relating to allegations of anticompetitive conduct in the licensing of patents cannot be examined under the Competition Act and should be examined under the Patents Act, 1970.

This decision has effectively barred the jurisdiction of the CCI in examining disputes relating to the licensing of patents. Previously, a licensee could approach the CCI impugning terms and conditions in licensing agreements which potentially violated the provisions of the Competition Act. Now, a licensee will have to approach the Controller of Patents on all issues relating to alleged unreasonable conditions in patent license agreements, including allegations of anticompetitive conduct.

The CCI has appealed the Delhi High Court’s decision before the Supreme Court. However, the appeal is yet to be admitted.

3. Institute of Chartered Accounts of India v. Competition Commission of India & Others (Delhi High Court – June 2023) – The CCI does not have the jurisdiction to examine decisions of other statutory regulators

The Delhi High Court held that the CCI does not have jurisdiction to examine the decisions of other statutory regulators taken by them in exercise of their regulatory functions, with no interface with trade or commerce. The Delhi High Court also held that the Competition Act does not contemplate the CCI acting as an appellate court or a grievance redressal forum against decisions of statutory bodies, which are taken in exercise of their statutory powers.

The Delhi High Court decision creates an important exception for statutory regulators / bodies from the CCI’s scrutiny, even if their decisions may create anticompetitive effects.

No appeal has been filed against this decision as on the date of writing this article.

4. Google India Pvt. Ltd v. Matrimony.com Ltd (Madras High Court – August 2023) – Civil Courts’ jurisdiction is ousted by the Competition Act in abuse of dominance cases

Several parties approached the Madras High Court under its civil jurisdiction seeking a declaration that the terms and conditions imposed by a dominant entity in a commercial agreement were illegal and unenforceable. Rejecting the plaint, the Madras High Court held that Section 61 of the Competition Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of civil courts from entertaining suits based on the cause of action relating to the abuse of a dominant position by an enterprise. The Madras High Court further held that even though civil courts are empowered to go into the question of unconscionable nature of agreements entered between parties of unequal bargaining power under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 ( ICA ) the Competition Act, being a special law, will prevail over the ICA.

This decision is significant as it upholds the jurisdiction of the CCI to examine the conduct of dominant enterprises under Section 4 of the Competition Act.

The decision is currently pending in appeal before the division bench of the Madras High Court.

5. Alliance of Digital India Foundation v. Competition Commission of India & Others (Delhi High Court – April 2023) – Mere defect or vacancy in the constitution of the CCI does not impede its jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints or any other proceedings pending before it

The Delhi High Court held that the CCI could continue its adjudicatory process even in the absence of a coram of three members. The decision notes that a mere defect or vacancy in the constitution of the CCI would not invalidate the proceedings before it.

Prior to the pronouncement of the judgment, the CCI was unable to issue orders for a period of approximately six months due to being inquorate. In February 2023, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India allowed the CCI to invoke the “ doctrine of necessity ” to examine combinations under its merger control mandate to clear the backlog of transactions awaiting approval. However, no such direction was seemingly provided for adjudication of pending enforcement cases.

When a party approached the Delhi High Court seeking directions to the CCI to act on its complaints and provide interim relief, the Court examined various provisions of the Competition Act and noted a distinction between administrative functions (where the Court held that quorum requirements may apply) and adjudicatory functions (where the Court held that there were no strict quorum requirements prescribed under the Competition Act). The High Court also appreciated that preventing the CCI from passing adjudicatory orders would effectively bring its functioning to a standstill which would go against the spirit of the Competition Act.

This decision will ensure that the CCI continues to adjudicate enforcement cases (including urgent applications for interim relief) even if it is inquorate in the future, making sure that adjudication of cases is not halted due to a mere vacancy in the CCI’s coram .

This decision was appealed before the division bench of the Delhi High Court. However, the appeal was subsequently withdrawn.

6. Ultratech Cement Ltd v. Competition Commission of India & Another (Delhi High Court – December 2023) – The CCI may allow impleadment of any party with “substantial interest” and “in public interest”

The Delhi High Court ruled that the CCI has the power to implead any party to a competition proceeding at any stage provided it satisfies the two-fold test of ‘substantial interest’ and ‘public interest’ under Regulation 25 of the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009. It further clarified that such an impleadment does not change the nature of proceedings as proceedings in personam but merely assists the CCI to conduct proceedings in a better and effective manner enabling it to reach an informed decision.

This is one of the first decisions where the CCI allowed the impleadment of a party after the DG had concluded its investigation in the matter. The decision also provides much needed clarity regarding the test for impleadment to matters pending before the CCI for third parties who are interested in the outcome of the proceeding.

The decision is currently pending in appeal before a division bench of the Delhi High Court.

7. Google LLC & Anr v Competition Commission of India & Others (NCLAT – March 2023) – The CCI must conduct an “effects analysis” for proving abuse of dominance under the Competition Act

The NCLAT held that the CCI must conduct an “ effects analysis ” to prove that an entity has abused its dominant position in violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act. The test to be employed while conducting an “ effects analysis ” is to show whether the abusive conduct in question is anticompetitive. Notably, the NCLAT also held that the CCI cannot impose a behavioural remedy on a dominant enterprise unless there is a specific finding of abuse of dominance in relation to such conduct.

The NCLAT’s decision is significant because the wording of Section 4 of the Competition Act does not expressly require the CCI to consider the anticompetitive effects of an impugned conduct to arrive at a finding of infringement. However, in contrast, the legislature has provided for such a stipulation when the CCI examines anticompetitive agreements under Section 3 of the Competition Act.

The NCLAT’s decision marks an important shift in Indian competition law jurisprudence where previously, the CCI has found dominant entities to violate Section 4 of the Competition Act, irrespective of whether their conduct led to an anticompetitive effect in the market. There have also been instances of the CCI imposing positive behavioural remedies on dominant entities, without finding a specific finding of abuse in relation to such conduct.

Given the NCLAT’s decision, the CCI will have to conduct a thorough examination of the anticompetitive effects of a dominant entity’s conduct, if any, to support a finding of infringement and prior to imposing any behavioural remedies on such entity in ongoing and future cases.

The NCLAT’s decision is currently pending in appeal before the Supreme Court. However, no stay has been granted on the operation of the decision.

8. Consumer Unity & Trust Society v. Competition Commission of India & Others (NCLAT – August 2023) –Transactions exempt from merger review cannot be examined under the provisions concerning anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominance

The NCLAT clarified that the provisions relating to anticompetitive agreements or abuse of dominance cannot be invoked to investigate a transaction that is exempt from notification under the merger control provisions of the Competition Act.

The decision provides clarity between the difference in the legal frameworks for horizontal agreements and mergers under the Competition Act (and how they operate in completely different fields). It further clarifies that while a merger between entities (which is exempt from notification to the CCI) cannot be examined by the CCI ex-ante under Section 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, the parties’ conduct can be scrutinised under these provisions ex-post (after the fact) if there is some evidence of violation of the Competition Act.

This decision will ensure that mergers which are otherwise exempt from notification to the CCI are not halted by frivolous complaints and interim relief applications filed before the CCI alleging violations of Section 3 or 4 of the Competition Act.

No appeal has been filed against this decision as on the date of writing this article.

9. The U.P. Glass Manufacturers Syndicate v. Competition Commission of India & Others (NCLAT - July 2023) – Third-parties do not always have a right to submit comments against combinations pending approval before the CCI

The NCLAT held that third-parties are not entitled to submit comments / submissions against or in favour of combinations pending approval before the CCI, unless the CCI invites such comments or information. The NCLAT clarified that the public’s right of participation arises only when the CCI directs the parties to the combination to publish the details of the combination to bring the combination to the knowledge of the public and persons affected or likely to be affected.

The NCLAT’s decision clarified that combination orders cannot be challenged by third-parties on the grounds of violation of principles of natural justice for failing to consider suggestions / objections by the public, unless the CCI has specifically directed the parties to publish the details of the combination and sought comments from the public.

10. Balrampur Chini Mills Limited v. Competition Commission of India & Others (NCLAT – October 2023) – One who hears should decide

The NCLAT held that the composition of CCI members who hear final arguments in a matter must be part of the decision making and pronouncement of the final judgment. The appellant submitted that the CCI’s order was patently illegal since it was pronounced by a composition of three CCI members, whereas the final arguments were heard by a composition of six CCI members. The NCLAT broadly accepted the argument, and set aside the CCI’s order on the grounds that: (a) it was pronounced after an inordinate delay of thirteen months after the matter was heard; and (b) due to this inordinate delay, some of the members that heard final arguments in the matter had left office before the final order could be pronounced.

This decision is significant considering that several cases during the inception years of the CCI were heard by a composition of different members, some of which are still pending in appeal.

About the authors: Rohan Arora is a Partner and Shivek Sahai Endlaw is an Associate in the Competition Law Practice at Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co, New Delhi.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are personal. They do not purport or reflect the opinions or views of SAM & Co or its members.

10 Important Judgments on Competition Law by Indian Courts in 2023 #Columns #CompetitionLaw #Courts https://t.co/YNVdhUq1ZU — Bar & Bench (@barandbench) January 10, 2024

Kluwer Competition Law Blog

The curious case of composite combinations under the indian competition law regime.

Introduction

Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act, 2002 [‘ the Act ’] provide the basic statutory framework for merger control in India. The Report of the Raghavan Committee, which played an instrumental role in the formulation of the Act, contemplated the Indian Competition Law regime to be one of pre-notification in order to elude the high social costs of post-merger unscrambling. The Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011 [‘ Combination Regulations ’] were introduced in the Competition Law regime in order to streamline the mandatory procedure for filing of Combinations and their approval by the Competition Commission of India [‘ CCI ’].

One of the many provisions implemented to facilitate the goal conceived by the Raghavan Committee is Regulation 9(4) of the Combination Regulations. Regulation 9(4) deemed inter-connected or inter-dependent transactions to be composite combinations . This provision was enacted to extend the notification requirements to each transaction in a set of transactions even if only one of them was a Combination, thereby, requiring the parties involved to provide details of every single transaction which may otherwise be exempt from notification to the CCI. The Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Amendment Regulations, 2016 [‘ 2016 Amendment ’], however, omitted the words “or inter-dependent on one another” from Regulation 9(4). This article attempts to trace the jurisprudence surrounding composite combinations especially in light of the 2016 Amendment.

The Interpretation of Composite Combinations

In one of the earliest orders defining ‘composite combination’, which was reported as SIIL/MALCO , [1] the CCI delved into the definition of a composite combination without referring to Regulation 9(4). The tribunal found that a series of inter-related and inter-dependent transactions shall be considered to be composite if the ultimate objective could only be achieved by the successful completion of all transactions comprising the series and all such transactions which formulate the composite must be notified to the CCI even if they were not notifiable on a standalone basis. While this test prima facie closely resembled the language of Regulation 9(4), the use of the term “inter-related” instead of “inter-connected” and the use of the conjunctive ‘and’ instead of the disjunctive ‘or’ were major departures from the conditions contemplated under the Combination Regulations.

Shortly after, the Tech Mahindra/C&S [2] order documented a similar finding to the former. However, a glaring difference from the tribunal’s approach in SIIL/MALCO was the use of ‘or’ between the terms “inter-related” and “inter-dependent” and the same was in line with the Combination Regulations. In CCI v. Zero Coupon Optionally Convertible Debentures , [3] the CCI, while referring to Regulation 9(4), took a very different approach when it resorted to using “and/or” between “inter-connected” and “inter-dependent” while defining a composite combination .

Subsequently, in the gun-jumping proceedings against Jet/Etihad , [4] the CCI found that the relatedness between a series of transactions rendered them composite and, thus, the parties could not allude Regulation 9(4). While in GlaxoSmithKline/Novartis , [5] the CCI, while considering the notice u/s 6(2), considered the inter-conditional and inter-dependent nature of the transactions.

In the gun-jumping proceedings against Piramal/Shriram , [6] when the parties to the transaction referred to European Commission’s Consolidated Juridical Notice to argue that the acquisitions were not inter-related, the CCI found that the acquisitions were inter-related under the European law and were, thus, inter-connected in terms of Regulation 9(4).

The CCI’s order in Thomas Cook/SHRIL [7] discussed, in detail, the purpose behind Regulation 9(4), the tribunal was of the opinion that scrutinizing some parts of a Combination may not result in an accurate analysis of the effects it might have on the competition in a market. Parties could not be allowed to structure their transactions in a manner to avoid compliance with the requisites of the Act. In this matter, the tribunal found that, as the parties would not enter a certain transaction (say X) in the absence of another transaction (say Y), the former could not be perceived as isolated from the latter. In other words, the tribunal held that, if entering X was contingent upon the completion of Y, X and Y would form a composite Combination. Insofar as the parties’ reliance on the Jet/Etihad order was concerned, the tribunal stated that mutual interdependence was not the only test to determine a composite combination. The tribunal went on to find that – “…considering two different transactions as one combination depends on the facts and circumstances of each case with due regard to the subject matter of the transactions; the business and entities involved; simultaneity in negotiation, execution and consummation of the transactions; and also, whether it is practical and reasonable to isolate and view the transactions separately.”

The matter was appealed before the erstwhile Hon’ble CompAT and the tribunal observed that the objective of Regulation 9(4) was to facilitate filing of one notice for interconnected, interrelated , or interdependent transactions. [8] The tribunal upheld the CCI’s rejection of the inapplicability of the SIIL/MALCO , Tech Mahindra/C&S and Jet/Etihad orders.

However, as the CompAT set aside the penalty imposed on Thomas Cook, the CCI preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court [‘ SC ’]. The SC, while setting aside the impugned order, found that all the transactions of Thomas Cook were a part of the same transaction, and thus, they were held to be “intrinsically connected and interdependent.” [9] The SC also dictated that technical interpretation of transactions cannot be made the basis to isolate different steps of the composite transaction and the same would, in actuality, be contrary to the spirit of the Act.

The Issues Pertaining to the Interpretation Regulation 9(4)

Prior to the 2016 Amendment, as the test to determine the existence of a composite combination varied between the use of “and”, “or” or “and/or” to bridge “inter-connected” and “inter-dependent”, the CCI concluded findings that substantially deviated from the actual wordings of Regulation 9(4). Also, the usage of terms like “inter-related” and “inter-conditional” muddied the waters insofar as a standard test for determining a composite transaction is concerned.

Further, the foregoing doctrinal research interestingly reveals that no adjudicatory authority actually addressed the difference between ‘inter-connectedness’ and ‘inter-dependence’. This difference becomes especially important in light of the 2016 Amendment which omitted ‘inter-dependent’ from Regulation 9(4). Prior to the 2016 Amendment, the CCI’s enquiry would be to find inter-connectedness and inter-dependence. [10] On the flipside, after the 2016 Amendment, the CCI shifted to finding transactions to be inter-connected [11] without ever shedding light on the difference made by the omission of ‘inter-dependent’.

The gravity of the situation can only be fully appreciated upon visiting the definitions of the various terms used in the test to ascertain the existence of a composite combination. While Marriam-Webster defines ‘inter-connected’ as “mutually joined or related” and “having internal connections between the parts and elements” , Lexico (by Dictionary.com and Oxford University Press) defines it as “having all constituent parts linked or connected” . Further, Marriam-Webster defines ‘inter-dependent’ as “dependent upon one another” and Lexico defines the same as “dependent on each other” . Thus, as per the definitions of these terms, it can be said that they refer to different kinds of relationships two entities can have with one another even if the definitions do not constitute water-tight compartments per se.

The argument for there being a distinction between ‘inter-connected’ and ‘inter-dependent’ especially in the context of Regulation 9(4) is provided by a rule of Interpretation of Statutes – the Legislature does not waste its words. [12] Constitutional courts have time and again held that “every word used by the Legislature must be given its due importance and significance” . [13] Hence, it is evident that the two separate words used by the Legislature to determine the existence of composite combinations were to be given their due importance and significance. That being said, in practice, as can be seen in the aforementioned discusses, there doesn’t seem to be a palpable difference on account of the omission made by the 2016 Amendment.

Regulation 9(4) was introduced in the Combination Regulations to dictate the procedure of filing every composite combination for approval from the CCI, however, the understanding of Regulation 9(4) is obscured by various CCI orders wherein –

It has fluctuated between using disjunctive and conjunctive to bridge ‘inter-connected’ and ‘inter-related’, or
It has used terms alien to the Act and the Combination Regulations such as inter-related and inter-conditional.

When guidance was sought from the CompAT, it too added to the ambiguity by holding that the objective of Regulation 9(4) was to facilitate the filing of one notice for inter-related, inter-connected or inter-dependent transactions. Furthermore, while keeping in mind the legislative intent behind Regulation 9(4), the insignificance given to defining ‘inter-connected’ and ‘inter-dependent’ is another obstruction for its operationalisation. When the Thomas Cook/SHRIL case went up to the SC for adjudication, the Hon’ble court also did not delve into the definition of the two terms. Consequently, as the definitions have not been elucidated upon by any adjudicatory authority, the exact effect of the 2016 Amendment has been rendered unfathomable.

[1] SIIL/MALCO, Combination Registration No. C-2012/03/45, order dated 12 th April 2012, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/C-2012-03-45_0.pdf

[2] Tech Mahindra/C&S, Combination Registration No. C-2012/03/48, order dated 26 th April 2012, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/C-2012-03-48_0.pdf

[3] CCI v. Zero Coupon Optionally Convertible Debentures, Combination Registration No. C-2012/03/47, order dated 28 th May 2012, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/faq/C-2012-03-47.pdf

[4] Jet/Etihad, Combination Registration No. C-2013/05/122, order dated 12 th December 2013, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/faq/Order%20191213.pdf

[5] GlaxoSmithKline/Novartis, Combination Registration No. C-2014/07/188, order dated 12 th December 2014, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/C-2014-07-188_0.pdf

[6] Priamal/Shriram, Combination Registration No. C-2015/02/249, order dated 2 nd May 2016, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Order%20under%20Section%2043A-%20.pdf

[7] Thomas Cook/SHRIL, Combination Registration No. C-2014/02/153, order dated 21th May 2014, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/C-2014-02-153R.pdf

[8] Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, Appeal No. 48 of 2014, https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/587f39554a9326336e216f57

[9] Competition Commission of India v. Thomas Cook (India) Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 13578 of 2015, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/84791944/

[10] Cairnhill/Mankind, Combination Registration No. C-2015/05/276, order dated 25 th June 2015, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Notice_order_document/C-2015-05-276.pdf

[11] FMC/Dow Chemical, Combination Registration No. C-2017/06/519, order dated 18 th September 2017, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Notice_order_document/Order%20-31_519-Public%20Version-Final.pdf; Chalet/Genext, Combination Registration No. C-2017/02/478, order dated 16 th March 2017, https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Notice_order_document/Order%20C-2017-02-478.pdf

[12] Ku. Sonia Bhatia v. State of UP, 1981 SCR (3) 239, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1631108/

[13] Mohd. Jainul Ansari v. Mohd. Khalil, 1991 (1) BLJR 12, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1901852/; Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd v. Vaibhav Jhawar, W.P.(c) 4237/2018, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/131479500/; Ramulu Ammal v. Ramachandra Reddy, 2009 (3) LW 622, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/637701/

________________________

To make sure you do not miss out on regular updates from the Kluwer Competition Law Blog, please subscribe here .

Kluwer Competition Law

The 2022 Future Ready Lawyer survey showed that 79% of lawyers are coping with increased volume & complexity of information. Kluwer Competition Law enables you to make more informed decisions, more quickly from every preferred location. Are you, as a competition lawyer, ready for the future? Learn how Kluwer Competition Law can support you.

Competition Law - Notes, Case Laws and Study Material

Master competition law: notes, case laws, and study material. essential resources for understanding market regulations..

Competition Law is a law that promotes or seeks to maintain market competition by regulating companies' anti-competitive conduct. It helps us get a better view and perspective on the country's economy. Any business, regardless of its legal status, size, and sector, needs to be aware of competition law.

Legal Bites has compiled the best online study material on Competition Law. The 4 modules of this course familiarize readers with the Competition Act, 2002 and a variety of other topics such as predatory pricing and Anti-Competitive Agreements . With our well-researched and in-depth articles, you can get a better understanding of the law as well as the rules and regulations that drive our country's economic development.

Important articles and study material on Competition Law – Click on the links to Read:

Competition Law in India: An Overview
Important Definitions under Competition Act, 2002 | Explained
Competition Act 2002 – Bare Act
Abuse of Dominant Position; Meaning, Determination and Case Laws
Appreciable Adverse Effect of the Competition in the Market
Horizontal and Vertical Restraint on Competition
Cartels and Bid Rigging: Concept, Inquiry and Penalty
Predatory Pricing: Concept, Issue, Effect and Evolution
Prevention of Abuse of Dominant Position in Market
Anti-Competitive Agreements under Competition Act, 2002
Determination of Relevant Market: Concept and Rules
Anti-Competitive Agreements: A Comparative Analysis of EU, US and UK
Combinations: Concept, Regulation and Adverse Impact
Combinations: Mergers and Acquisition | Explained
Competition Commission of India: Overview
Competition Appellate Tribunal: Overview
Competition Advocacy in India | Overview

Important Articles

[1] Challenges to Competition in Digital Markets

[ 2] 10 Important Competition Law Cases

Your valuable feedback in the form of comments or any desired inputs are encouraged and always welcome. Every contribution toward a goal is valuable, regardless of how small it may be .

Admin Legal Bites

Legal Bites Study Materials correspond to what is taught in law schools and what is tested in competitive exams. It pledges to offer a competitive advantage, prepare for tests, and save a lot of money.

Analysis of Section 26, 27 and 29 of the Competition Act, 2002

This article is written by Sparsh Agrawal , from Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad. In this article, a detailed analysis of Section 26, 27 and 29 of the Competition Act, 2002 is given. Furthermore, the aforementioned sections are discussed in length in the light of relevant case laws.

Table of Contents

Section 26 of the Competition Act, 2002 allows the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to ask for the Director General’s investigation in case of “ prima facie ” violations of the Act. Pertinently, the result of such an investigation under no circumstance is bound to influence the final decision given by the CCI. DG’s investigation is imperative to analyze and understand the facts and issues of the matter.

Although, such an investigation looks procedural in nature but it bears importance to understand what standard of proof qualifies to be the ‘prima-facie’ violation for the CCI for catena of reasons:

Firstly, while carrying out such an investigation, the CCI has to carry out a cost-benefit analysis since the CCI has limited finances and operates within limited resources.
Secondly, such an investigation carried out by CCI plays a direct role in order to determine the business practices adopted by the parties, so that they follow this set-pattern to avoid judicial scrutiny.
Lastly, the scheme of the Competition Act, 2002 does not allow the CCI to find an ultimate contravention until and unless the Director General’s investigation is ordered. The aforesaid scheme of the Act allows the opposite parties involved in the matter to defend themselves at two stages i.e. the investigation stage and after the submission of report to the Director General.

From the date of enforcement of the Competition Act, 2002 there are about 750 cases registered before the commission with respect to the anti-competitive agreements (Section 3) and abuse of dominant position (Section 4) . Therefore, because of such overwhelming numbers it becomes imperative to allocate resources to achieve the aim and objectives of the Act.

Furthermore, the CCI General Regulations, 2009 suggests that the investigation must be completed within the 60 days, but a research conducted at Centre for Competition Law and Economics states that the median time taken to investigate the matters was 240 days. In the light of such findings it can be stated that any prima facie violation of the Act found by the CCI results in considerable expenditure through the Director General’s Office.

Relevant cases

Here are some analyses of some relevant case laws to reflect upon the evidence taken into consideration by CCI for initiating an investigation under Section 26(1), or to close the matter in accordance with Section 26(2) of the Act. In these rulings, it was duly stated that the informant party has to demonstrate substance in its allegations in order to convince the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to order the Director General’s investigation.

Android case

The instant case was initiated by Umar Javeed against Google. It was alleged that Google was abusing its dominant position by imposing unfair terms on the app developers and end-users which was causing foreclosure in the market and harming the competitive environment in the market. The informants placed the reliance on the international precedents decided by other antitrust regulators which had already found Google to be dominant in the relevant market. In the present case, the CCI relied on the findings provided by the informants. This shifted the burden of proof to the opposite party to discharge the doubt placed by the informants. [Google v. Android]

Maruti Suzuki Case

This particular case was a suo moto case initiated by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) after it received an anonymous mail which alleged that Maruti Suzuki is abusing its dominant position in the relevant market. It stated that Maruti did not allow the dealers to give discounts to the end consumers based on their own discretion and it placed a cap on the same. If any dealer is giving a discount and he would be subjected to penalty. Moreover, it was stated that such information resulted in consumer harm since they were not able to acquire the best price which was prevailing in the relevant market.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) invoked Section 3(4) of the Competition Act, 2002 and also ordered for the investigation in order to form a “prima facie” of the violation. It is pertinent to note that, Maruti filed several affidavits for testifying and countering the allegations of the mail, however, the CCI shifted the burden of proof to Maruti to justify itself for not causing contravention to any provisions of the Act. In this particular case, the CCI adopted the “omission of act” approach for formulating its opinion. [ In re: Maruti Suzuki Case ]

OYO Rooms Case

In Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India v. Ashok Kumar Gupta , RKG Travels Pvt. Ltd (Informants) alleged that OYO is abusing its dominant position in the relevant market by imposing unfair conditions on owners of the hotel for maximizing its revenue and consumer base. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) did not form any ‘prima facie’ view of the violation of Competition Act, 2002 and closed the case in accordance with 26(2) of the Act. Moreover, the CCI defined the relevant market as “market for franchising services for budget hotels in India”. However, it tracked back the same later. And also, ultimately took view on the opposite party based on the relevant market which was defined in the first place. [OYO rooms case]

In this particular case, the informants i.e. Unilazer Ventures Private Limited alleged multiple cinema owners such as PVR, Inox, Cinepolis that they were levying “virtual printing fee” from the informants and also they are acting in collusion which is anti-competitive conduct as per the Competition Act, 2002. The CCI did not find “prima facie” violations as per the Act. And it also held that the informants have to discharge the burden of proof on it as per the scheme of the Competition Act, 2002 in order to have an order for investigation. Therefore, it failed to define the “initial burden of proof” which is placed upon the parties. [Inox case]

Therefore it can be stated that there is an evident gap between CCI ‘s rulings on Inox case and OYO rooms case.

By virtue of Section 27 of the Competition Act, 2002, the Competition Commission of India has been provided with wide-ranging powers. This section empowers the CCI to impose a penalty on entities which are involved in the anti-competitive conduct such as abusing its dominant position and entering into an anti-competitive agreement.

This provision also states that if at all the CCI deems it to be fit it can impose a penalty on the entity which must not be more than 10 percent of the average of the turnover for the last 3 preceding financial years of the entity.

It has been unfortunate that CCI has been following an inconsistent pattern when it comes to imposing penalties for the cases wherein the firm has entered into an anti-competitive agreement or abused its dominant position. Moreover, there has been catena of orders, wherein CCI has failed to justify itself the quantum of penalty imposed. It can be stated that the CCI must record more robust reasons for the imposition of such penalties.

Pertinently, Section 27 of the said Act uses the term “average of the turnover” and does not specify whether the turnover is to be considered based on acts or agreements in question. Section 2(y) of the Competition Act, 2002 states that the term “turnover” only includes the value of goods and services. Therefore, it is imperative for the Act to have a precise meaning of the term “turnover”.

The corundum of Section 27 of the Competition Act, 2002 was clarified in the Excel Corporation v. Competition Commission of India . In this case, the CCI imposed a penalty based on the “total turnover” of the affected companies in relation to the anti-competitive agreements entered by these affected companies, which resulted in the formation of a cartel.

The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case held that the imposition of penalty by CCI must only be based on “relevant turnover” i.e. the turnover relevant to the case in dispute and not the overall turnover. The Supreme Court also stated that such punishments must be based on the universal principle of proportionality.

Even the other foreign antitrust regulators have a tendency to impose a penalty on the entity as per the “relevant turnover” and not the overall turnover of the company. Moreover, the European Union guidelines on Competition Law also support the same principle.

The CCI many times take into consideration the decisions given by other foreign law jurisdictions, especially common law jurisdictions since the jurisprudence of competition law is comparatively new. In the Exel Corporation case itself, the Supreme Court relied upon the judgment given by the South African Anti-trust regulator i.e. the case of Southern Pipeline Contractors Conrite Walls (Pty) Ltd. V. The Competition Commission wherein it was stated that the quantum of penalty has to be determined based on consideration i.e. the damage caused and the profits which accrue the cartel activity.

Section 29 of the Competition Act 2002 binds the parties to the combination and sends the mandatory notification to the CCI for a combination and the aforesaid Act provides for high thresholds with regard to assets and turnover.

According to Section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002 a combination is an “ acquisition of one or more enterprises by one or more persons or merger or amalgamation of enterprises shall be a combination of such enterprises and persons or enterprises ”.

In simple words, a combination can be defined as a merger, acquisition, amalgamation between two or more enterprises or businesses. The aforesaid Act puts up a responsibility on the government to control such merger, acquisition and amalgamations by the Multinational Companies, as MNCs with their huge power and resources tend to dominate the Indian small scale industries. Therefore, the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 ensures that there is fair competition in the market.

Prima Facie Opinion

As per Section 29(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 the Competition Commission of India needs to have a prima facie opinion within 30 days of the receipt of the notice for approving any combination. Moreover, in accordance with the 2016 Amendment Regulations , the commission may order the parties to the combinations to file additional information.

Furthermore, the parties to a combination or a merger are asked to publish the requisite details of the combinations in accordance with Section 29(2) which creates an open invitation to the public to come forth with a statement of objections within the 15 days from the publishing under Section 29(3). Moreover, the Competition Commission of India reserves a right to demand additional information regarding the combination or merger under Section 29(4) read with Section 29(5).

Pertinently, in order to simplify the filing requirements for the mergers and acquisitions (M&A), in the year 2018 the Competition Commission of India revised its combination regulations. The impugned amendment allows the parties to the combination to submit the remedies in response to the show-cause notice on the apprehension of adverse effect on the competition.

Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 allows the Competition Commission of India(CCI) to form a ‘ prima facie ’ view as per the violations of the Act.

From the cogent reading of Android case, Maruti Suzuki case, OYO rooms case and Inox case, it can be stated that CCI placed reliance on NCLT’s decision only in one case out of the four aforementioned cases. This makes CCI adopt a more coherent approach for deciding ‘ prima facie’ violations as per the Act. With the presence of NCLT’s decision, it is imperative for the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to pay more attention to NCLT’s ruling so that there is much better allocation of resources.

Section 27 of the Competition Act, 2002 which talks about the imposition of penalty, has been an issue for entities which were subjected to scrutiny under the Act. The Supreme Court judgment pertaining to the Excel Corporation case can be a precedent for clarifying the imposition of penalties under section 27 of the Act. However, there can be several instances wherein the entities use this Supreme Court judgment as a means to appeal against the decision of CCI order to sell alteration or revision on the fines imposed on them.

The impugned amendment in Section 29 of the Competition Act, 2002 allows the parties to the combination to submit the remedies in response to the show-cause notice on the apprehension of adverse effect on the competition. This will result in transparency to expedite faster disposal of the combination cases. In such a way, the parties to the combination could address the deficiencies without facing any invalidation by the Competition Commission of India.

LawSikho has created a telegram group for exchanging legal knowledge, referrals and various opportunities. You can click on this link and join:

https://t.me/joinchat/J_0YrBa4IBSHdpuTfQO_sA

TURBOCHARGE YOUR LAW PRACTICE with AI as copilot

Register now

Thank you for registering with us, you made the right choice.

Congratulations! You have successfully registered for the webinar. See you there.

Competition Act 2002: An Overview at Indian Perspective

Madhuri Singh Research Scholar, Barkatullah University, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India

Competition is the pioneer to accomplishment. At the point when markets buckle down there is maintainability, profits, effectiveness, advancement and enduring benefits to the economy. The Competition Act is one such enactment which target to get rid of anticompetitive practices through prevention of anti-competitive agreements and maltreatment of predominance circumstances in marketplace. This paper means to consider the fundamental aspects of the Competition Act by discussing primary concepts in an exact way. Making consumer aware in the field of Competition Law is an absolute necessity since most of the time consumers don't know about the impacts of such practices and neglect to understand the monopoly of market. Inside this time of evolution, competition law and policy in India has seen an active interpretational exercise.

Requires Subscription or Fee pdf (USD 30)

Make a Submission

Jcgibl menu.

JCGIBL Scope
Call For paper
JCGIBL Indexing
Double-Blind Peer Review

Plagiarism Policy

Open Access Statement
Authorship Criteria
Article Withdrawal Policy
Journal's Instructions
Digital Archiving Policy
JCGIBL Journal Key Words
Copyright Form
Mode of Payment
Manuscript Submission Checklist
Camera Ready Format
Publication Services
Reference Stylesheet
Every published material will be provided with an on-demand DOI and will remain the permanent link of that article.

Information

For Readers
For Authors
For Librarians

Developed By

Current issue, subscription.

Focus and Scope

Section Policies

Open Access Policy

Submissions

Online Submissions

Author Guidelines

Privacy Statement

Author Fees

Journal Metric

Special Issue

About this Publishing System

ISSN: Applied

Law Journals

Lex-O-Pedia

Know what is hot in the legal fraternity and governance. We curate everything going around in Legal aspects of the country.

Study Notes: Anti-Competitive Agreements under Competition Act, 2002

WHAT ARE ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS?

One of the main objectives of Competition Act, 2002 is to promote a fair and healthy competition in the market and prevent anti-competitive practices/agreements that cause or are likely to cause appreciable adverse effect on competition.
Section 3(1) of Competition Act, 2002 prohibits such Anti-Competitive Agreements relating to production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, which cause or are likely to cause an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (hereinafter referred to as “AAEC”) within India.
According to Section 32 of the Act even if an agreement has been entered into outside India, the CCI has power to enquire into such an arrangement if such an agreement has an AAEC in India.
These anti-competitive agreements are declared void by Section 3(2) of the Act.

TYPES OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS

Anti-competitive agreements can further be categorized into:

Horizontal Agreements [Section 3(3)]
Vertical Agreements[Section 3(4)]

HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS [Section 3(3)]

Horizontal agreements are agreements/arrangements between enterprises/persons at the same stage of production and hence generally take place between rivals.

For example, agreement between two or more manufacturers of same product or; between two or more service providers of same service.

Section 3(3) of the Act provides that horizontal agreements are agreements between enterprises/persons engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services .

Horizontal agreements are subject to the adverse presumption of being anti-competitive. This is known as ‘per se rule’ which implies that the agreements (here, horizontal agreement), acts or practices specified by the Competition Act as deemed or presumed to have appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) are by themselves void.

Types of Anti-Competitive Horizontal Agreements:

As per Section 3(3) of the Act any horizontal agreement of either of the following kinds shall be presumed to have AAEC and hence is anti-competitive and void:

Cartel – A serious type of anti-competitive agreement is cartel. Cartel is defined in Section 2(c) of the Act as an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale, price or trade of goods/services.

There are four main types of cartel agreements: Price Fixing; Limiting Production or Supply; Market Sharing and; Bid Rigging/Collusive Bidding.

In Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers Association and Ors. [1] (Cement Cartel Case) it was held that existence of written material is not necessary to prove a common understanding or agreement and it is sufficient if the activities of the companies imply the existence of such an agreement. The Commission also gave the concept of parallelism-plus that parallel behaviour in prices, dispatch, supply, accompanied with some other factors indicating coordinated behaviour among firms may become a basis apart to determine the existence of cartels in the market.

Price Fixing- Agreements that directly or indirectly determine purchase or sale prices are void. Price fixing can either be direct (by maintaining actual prices) or indirect (by offering same discounts, credit terms etc.).
Limiting Production or Supply – Agreements that either limit or control production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services are void.
Sharing of Market- Under Market Sharing Agreements the competitors divide/allot the market amongst themselves in various ways [geographically, goods/services wise, customer wise or in any other way] and agree to deal only in their allotted segment of the market. Hence, the competitors agree not to compete with each other by not dealing in each other other’s allotted area. Such agreements result in creation of monopoly of enterprises in their allotted area; less number of choices of goods/services for consumers; decrease in supply of products/services to customers; increase in prices etc. Therefore, these agreements are presumed to be void.
Bid Rigging/Collusive Bidding – Agreements that directly/indirectly eliminate or reduce competition for bids or manipulate the process for bidding are known as Big Rigging Agreements. Under these agreements competitors agree and take turns to be the winner of the tenders by not competing with each other in the tender.

In the landmark judgment Rajasthan Cylinders and Containers Ltd. v. Union of India [2] the Supreme Courtestablished a law on price parallelism for oligopolies that price parallelism by itself is not conclusive of arrangement of bid rigging.

VERTICAL AGREEMENTS [Section 3(4)]

Agreement between enterprises operating at different levels of production is known as Vertical Agreement. These agreements operate at different levels of trade.

For example, agreement between supplier and manufacturer or; between supplier and dealer.

As per Section 3(4) of the Act Vertical Agreement is an agreement between enterprises/persons at different stages of the production chain in different markets .

‘Per se Rule’ does not apply in case of Vertical Agreements, that is, they are not per se presumed to be anti-competitive. Legality of Vertical Agreement is assessed on the basis of ‘Rule of Reason’ . The Rule of Reason is a legal approach where in order to decide whether or not a practice/agreement should be prohibited an attempt is made to evaluate the pro-competitive features of the practice/agreement against its anti-competitive effects. In short, a vertical agreement is declared void only if it causes or is likely to cause AAEC .

US Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States [3] explained Rule of Reason in examining the legality of restraint of trade as “Any restraint is of essence, until it merely regulates and promotes competition. To determine this question, the Court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which restraint is applied, its condition before and after the restrain was imposed, the nature of restrain and its actual or probable effect.”

Types of Vertical Agreements:

Tie-in Arrangement – Under this arrangement, the seller ties the desirable good that he is selling with another good and makes a precondition that in order to purchase the desired good the purchaser has to also purchase the second good (the tied good) irrespective of the fact whether the purchaser wants to buy the second good or not.

In Shri Sonam Sharma v. Apple Inc. [4] , the CCI held that the following ingredients must be present in a Tie-in Arrangement:

Presence of two separate products or services capable of being tied .
The seller must have sufficient market power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product.
The tying arrangement must affect a “not insubstantial” amount of commerce.
Exclusive Supply Agreement – These agreements restrict the purchaser in the course of his trade from acquiring or dealing in any goods other than those of the seller. For example, a supplier of goods of one seller is prohibited from dealing with other sellers of the same goods.
Exclusive Distribution Agreement – These agreements limit, restrict or withhold the output or supply of any goods or allocate any area or market for the sale of goods.
Refusal to Deal – According to the Act these agreements restrict the persons or classes of persons to whom the goods are sold or from whom goods are bought.

In Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. [5] (Spare Parts case) the genuine spare parts of automobiles were not made freely available in the market and agreements were made between the OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) and the authorized dealers requiring the latter to source spare parts only from the OEMs or their authorized vendors only.

CCI held that these agreements allowed the OEMs to become monopolistic players in the market for their model of cars, create entry barriers, foreclose competition from the independent service providers, and seek exploitative prices from consumers besides having potential long term anti-competitive structural effects on the automobile market in India. These agreements were held to be of the nature of vertical agreements including exclusive supply agreements, exclusive distribution agreements and refusal to deal under Section 3(4) and held them to have AAEC in India.

Resale Price Maintenance – This includes any agreement to sell goods on condition that the prices to be charged on the resale by the purchaser shall be the prices stipulated by the seller unless it is clearly stated that prices lower than those prices may be charged.

In Fx Enterprise Solutions India v. Hyundai Motor India Limited [6] CCI imposed penalty on Hyundai for violation of Section 3(4)(e) [ Resale Price Maintenance ] for monitoring maximum permissible discount level through a Discount Control Mechanism whereby dealers (who were mandated to procure all automobile parts and accessories from Hyundai) were only permitted to provide a maximum permissible discount and were also not authorized to give discount beyond a recommended range.

EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS [Section 3(5)]

According to Section 3(5)(i) , a person exercising his right to prevent infringement or imposing reasonable conditions to protect his Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter referred to as “IPRs”), that is, Copyright, Patent, Trademark, Geographical Indications and Designs shall exempted from forming anti-competitive agreement under Section 3.

In Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. [7] CCI rejected the exemption claimed under Section 3(5)(i) of the Act and held that:

“….. though registration of an IPR is necessary, the same does not automatically entitle a company to seek exemption under section 3(5)(i) of the Act. The important criteria for determining whether the exemption under section 3(5)(i) is available or not is to assess whether the condition imposed by the IPR holder can be termed as “imposition of a reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for the protection of any of his rights”.” [Para 9.1.13]

As per Section 3(5)(ii) , anti-competitive agreement under section 3 shall not restrict the right of any person to export goods from India to the extent to which the agreement relates exclusively to the production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provision of services for such export.

INQUIRY OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS [Section 19]

Who may ask for inquiry?

Section 19(1) of the Competition Act provides that the CCI may inquire into anti-competitive agreements:

On its own or;
On receipt of any information from any person or consumer or their association or trade association or;
On a reference by the government.
Factors Determining Appreciable Adverse Effect On Competition

While determining whether an agreement is anti-competitive and has AAEC under Section 3, the CCI takes into account the following factors as provided under Section 19(3) :

Creation of barriers to new entrants in the market;
Driving existing competitors out of the market;
Foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the market;
Accrual of benefits to consumers;
Improvements in production or distribution of goods or provision of services;
Promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by means of production or distribution of goods or provision of services.
Relief in case of Anti-Competitive Agreement [Section 27 & 33]

If after inquiry CC finds that the agreement is anti-competitive and has AAEC, it may pass all or any of the following orders:

Direct the parties to discontinue and not to re-enter such anti-competitive agreement [Section 27(a)].
Impose penalty (not to be more than 10% of the average of the turnover for the last three preceding financial years) upon each party involved in such agreement [Section 27(b)].
In case of a cartel, impose a penalty up to three times of its profit for each year of the continuance of such agreement or 10% of its turnover for each such year, whichever is higher [Section 27(b)].
Modify the agreement [Section 27(d)].
Direct the enterprise to comply with the orders, directions and make payment of cost as directed by CCI [Section 27(e)].
Pass any other order or direction as it may deem fit [Section 27(g)].
Issue interim orders [Section 33].

[1] Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers Association, Case No. 29/2010. [2] Rajasthan Cylinders and Containers Ltd. v. Union of India, 2018 SCC Online SC 1718. [3] Chicago Board of Trade v. United States , 246 U.S. 231 (1918). [4] Shri Sonam Sharma v. Apple Inc., Case No: 24/2011. [5] Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd., Case No. 03/2011. [6] Fx Enterprise Solutions India v. Hyundai Motor India Limited , Case no. 36 & 82 of 2014. [7] Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd., Case No. 03/2011.

Shivani Chauhan

Shivani is a Contributing Editor @LegalWires. She has done B.A.LL.B.(Hons.) from Dr. RMLNLU and has completed her LL.M. in Business law. Her areas of interest are Competition Law, IPR and Sports Law.

Study Notes: Winding Up of Companies

Case Study: Bar of Indian Lawyers through its President Jasbir Singh Malik v. D. K. Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable diseases and Anr.

Study Notes: Doctrine of Constructive Notice

Case Study: Salomon v. A. Salomon and Co. Ltd.

Case Study: Badshah v. Urmila Badhshah Godse and another

Case Study: Ruben and Anr v. Great Fingall Consolidated and Ors

Case Study: Mahony v. East Holyford Mining Co.

Case Study: Dev Kishan and Ors v. Ram Kishan and Ors.

Case study: Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur and others

Dalit Horrors Remembrance Day: Commemorating the weeks into 75th Independence Day

Decoding Fashion Industry: Need for Fashion Law

Legal Wires is an Online Electronic Media Portal, dedicated to Public Education and Critical Legal Analysis of the trending discourses of National and International importance.

Human Rights
Constitutional Law
Competition Law

Privacy Policy
Terms & Conditions

All Intellectual Property rights including Copyright etc. are reserved and vested exclusively with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). No part of the material contained in this website may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, technical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, or stored in any retrieval system of any nature without the written permission of the ICAI.

Quick Links

Official Directory

The Competition Act, 2002 (Act No. 12 of 2003, as amended up to Act No. 7 of 2017), India

Available materials.

The Competition Act, 2002 (Act No. 12 of 2003) (IN089)
The Finance Act, 2017 (Act No. 7 of 2017) (IN092)
The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No. 39 of 2009) (IN113)
The Competition (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009 (Ordinance No. 6 of 2009) (IN112)
The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007 (Act No. 39 of 2007) (IN111)

COMMENTS

Case Study on Competition Act, 2002
The Preamble of Competition Act, 2002 provides that "An Act to provide, keeping in view of the economic development of the country, for the establishment of a Commission to prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets, to protect the interests of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade ...
PDF Competition Act
Key Concepts - Objective of the Competition Act, 2002 Prevent practices having adverse Ensure freedom of trade effect on competition
Top 20 Landmark Judgements of Competition Law
The issue before the court was if it violates the relevant act. Competition Commission of India relying on the number of factors provided that under the Competition Act, 2002 has attempted to determine if activities of NSE amounts to indulgence in abusing of its dominant position and violation of the provisions of the Act.
"Assessing Competition Act 2002: Reliance Jio VS. C Shanmugam & Manish
Further, this study examines the effectiveness of the Competition Act 2002 in India in regulating the abuse of dominant position in the telecom industry, using the case study of C Shanmugam and Manish Gandhi vs. Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd, DoT, TRAI and BSNL.
10 Landmark Competition Law Case Laws
This article highlights the top 10 Competition Laws case laws of 2022, chosen by the Taxmann editorial team. These case laws have garnered attention.
The Competition Act, 2002
Objective and scope of The Competition Act, 2002. The Competition Act of 2002 is a piece of legislation that aims to defend consumer interests from anti-competitive behaviour, foster and sustain market competition, safeguard consumer interests, and guarantee other market participants' freedom of trade.
Competition Act 2002
This case showcased the importance of the Competition Act 2002 in regulating the e-commerce industry and ensuring fair competition. The intervention of the CCI prevented dominant players from leveraging their market power to gain unfair advantages, thereby creating a level playing field for all market participants.
10 Important Judgments on Competition Law by Indian Courts in 2023
After a ten-year legal battle between Coal India Ltd ( CIL) and the CCI on its jurisdiction to examine the conduct of State-owned monopolies, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 ( Competition Act) apply to CIL and similar public sector undertakings. The Supreme Court decision clarified that the Competition Act is applicable to all government companies and ...
PDF Study of Anti-Competitive Behaviour with reference to Decided Case Laws
In this background, the article is examining the five dimensions of the Competition Act, 2002 with reference to few decided case laws on this matter.
PDF CCI Basic Introduction
Preface The Competition Commission of India (Commission) has been established under the Competition Act, 2002 1 (the Act) to prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in Indian markets, to protect the interests of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets, in India, and for matters connected therewith ...
The Curious Case of Composite Combinations under the Indian Competition
Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act, 2002 [' the Act '] provide the basic statutory framework for merger control in India. The Report of the Raghavan Committee, which played an instrumental role in the formulation of the Act, contemplated the Indian Competition Law regime to be one of pre-notification in order to elude the high social costs of post-merger unscrambling. The Competition ...
Competition Law
Any business, regardless of its legal status, size, and sector, needs to be aware of competition law. Legal Bites has compiled the best online study material on Competition Law. The 4 modules of this course familiarize readers with the Competition Act, 2002 and a variety of other topics such as predatory pricing and Anti-Competitive Agreements.
Analysis of Section 26, 27 and 29 of the Competition Act, 2002
Know about: detailed analysis of Section 27, 27 and 29 of the Competition Act, 2002 along with relevant case laws.
Competition Act 2002: An Overview at Indian Perspective
The Competition Act is one such enactment which target to get rid of anticompetitive practices through prevention of anti-competitive agreements and maltreatment of predominance circumstances in marketplace. This paper means to consider the fundamental aspects of the Competition Act by discussing primary concepts in an exact way.
Anti-Competitive Agreements Under the Competition Act, 2002
Relating to Anti-Competitive Agreements. Section 3(1) of the Competition Act prohibits agreements among or persons or associations in respect of production, supply, distribution, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, which causes or cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India.
The Competition Act, 2002
Short title, extent and commencement. (1) This Act may be called The Competition Act, 2002. (2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint: Provided that different dates1 may be appointed for ...
STUDY NOTES: Abuse of Dominant Position under the COMPETITION ACT, 2002
Section 4 (2) of Competition Act, 2002 provides a list of conducts that would amount to abuse of dominant position. The provision prohibits per se and prevents the following acts resulting in abuse of dominant position: Impose unfair or discriminatory conditions or prices in the purchase or sale of goods or services.
Study Notes: Anti-Competitive Agreements under Competition Act, 2002
One of the main objectives of Competition Act, 2002 is to promote a fair and healthy competition in the market and prevent anti-competitive practices/agreements that cause or are likely to cause appreciable adverse effect on competition. Section 3 (1) of Competition Act, 2002 prohibits such Anti-Competitive Agreements relating to production ...
ICAI
Initial Pages Chapter 1: The Competition Act, 2002 Chapter 2: The Real Estate (Regulation & Development) ACT, 2016 Chapter 3: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 Chapter 4: The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 Chapter 5: The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 Chapter 6: Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988
PDF The Competition Act, 2002 (12 of 2003) Contents
lled the "Competition Commission of India".(2) The Commission shall be a body corporate by the name aforesaid having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable, and to contract.
The Competition Act, 2002 (Act No. 12 of 2003, as amended up to Act No
The said amending Act No. 7 of 2017 provides amendments (in force on May 26, 2017) to the following provisions of this consolidated version of the Competition Act, 2002: - Section 2, clause (ba) under Chapter I "Preliminary".
PDF Home
An Act to provide, keeping in view of the economic development of the country, for the establishment of a Commission to prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets, to protect the interests of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets, in India, and for matters connected therewith or incidental ...

Case Study on Competition Act, 2002

LET'S CONSIDER APPLICABLE PROVISIONS

SECTION 6(2) IN THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

SECTION 6(5) IN THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

SECTION 20(4) IN THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

Related Articles

Trending Online Classes

Browse by Category

Whatsapp Groups

RELATED ARTICLES MORE FROM AUTHOR

1. CCI has jurisdiction over anti-competitive aspects of lottery business though lottery may be res extra commercium: SC

Judiciary and Counsel Details

Facts of the Case

Supreme Court Held

2. CCI slaps penalty of Rs. 936.44 Cr. on Google for abuse of dominance in market for licensable OS for smartphones

3. CCI orders probe against Apple for forcing ‘app developers’ to use its in-app payment solution

4. CCI dismisses complaints of abuse of dominance and tie-in sales arrangement against Zomato

Zomato’s reply

5. No violation of Competition Act if Govt. dept. insists their suppliers to get accreditation from NABL only

6. CCI imposes a monetary penalty of Rs. 1,337.76 crores on Google for anti-competitive practices

CCI Observations

CCI’s Decision

7. Bar council of India couldn’t be said to be an enterprise, a review petition filed before Supreme Court dismissed

Facts of the Case

8. CCI orders investigation into allegations of abuse of dominance by Google in news aggregation services

9. HCs can’t interfere with CCI’s probe unless there is an abuse of process and it appears a mala fide investigation

High Court Held

10. No abuse of dominance by Asian Paints; allegations of enforcing exclusive supply agreement couldn’t be substantiated: CCI

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

To subscribe to our weekly newsletter please log in/register on Taxmann.com

Everything on Tax and Corporate Laws of India

Author: Taxmann

IMPACT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM ON NON-ASSOCIATED

Competition Act 2002 – Maintaining a Fair and Healthy Competition

Introduction

Understanding the Competition Act 2002

Ensuring Market Efficiency

Encouraging Innovation and Consumer Benefits

Preventing Anti-Competitive Practices

Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Position

Establishing Dominance

Abuse of Dominant Position

Examples of Abuse

Role of the Competition Commission of India (CCI)

Investigation and Enforcement

Penalties and Remedies

Advocacy and Awareness

Case Studies of Successful Enforcement

Bharti Airtel Limited v. Competition Commission of India

Flipkart v. Competition Commission of India

Cipla Limited v. Competition Commission of India

Challenges and Criticisms

Lack of Speedy Resolution

Insufficient Resources

Coordination with Other Regulatory Bodies

Frequently Asked Questions

Share This Post:

Related Post

How Personal Injury Lawyers Maximize Your Compensation After a

10 Important Judgments on Competition Law by Indian Courts in 2023

Kluwer Competition Law Blog

Kluwer Competition Law

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Competition Law - Notes, Case Laws and Study Material

Important articles and study material on Competition Law – Click on the links to Read:

Admin Legal Bites

Related News

Analysis of Section 26, 27 and 29 of the Competition Act, 2002

Relevant cases

Android case

Maruti Suzuki Case

OYO Rooms Case

Prima Facie Opinion

RELATED ARTICLES MORE FROM AUTHOR

TURBOCHARGE YOUR LAW PRACTICE with AI as copilot

Register now

Competition Act 2002: An Overview at Indian Perspective

Make a Submission

Information

Developed By